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Introduction
Insofar as law has a certain impact on the organization of social life, it can be understood as a 
tool to mediate between the plurality of individual needs on the one hand, and the general 
requirements of a common social life on the other. Legal development can be seen thus as a 
process  in  which  these  often  contradictory  requests  are  put  in  relation  to  each  other  in 
different ways. This does not mean, however, that legal development would always achieve or 
even  strive  for  a  dynamic  balance  between  individual  and  social  needs,  by  which  the 
satisfaction of these needs would complement rather than inhibit  each other.  Actually,  the 
development of law is pursued with disparate motivations and perspectives, making the quest 
for legal development even more challenging.
Consequently, including varied and broad topics like the recognition and respect of 
Human Rights, the institution of ‘real’ democracies, the establishment and strengthening of 
the rule of law, the protection of ecosystems and the liberalization of markets and regional 
integration, legal development is an all-encompassing and omnipresent concern of our time. 
The call for legal development is, thus, neither circumscribed to a specific legal field nor to a 
concrete state or type of law or a particular legal culture. From a more theoretical perspective, 
understanding  law  as  a  functional  system,  including  actors,  practices  and  discourses,  to 
develop law must be one of the main goals of law itself. As a system, it pretends to keep being 
functional (regardless of the function we as researchers may attach to it) or at least to maintain 
a discourse of its functionality and necessity for the functionality of society. Interestingly, 
movement (i.e. development) is thus a tool for stability. As a consequence, the lack of legal 
development is linked to the maintenance and increase of social conflict and/or the oppression 
of  social  growth,  understood  economically,  politically  or  even  as  an  expression  of  the 
individual growth of the citizens. 
Law can promise stability for a society only so far as it evolves at the same pace as 
society does (or, at least as it appears to do so). Today, the fact that social change is speeding 
up in unexpected and uncontrollable ways is not new anymore, and the consequences for legal 
systems and for law as a field of study are quite obvious. The answers that were more or less  
useful  until  now  start  to  be  part  of  the  problem.  We  do  not  have  recipes  prepared  for 
multicultural and intercultural societies, supranational entities, embryonic or GMO research, 
and many other questions of our time. Legal development is imperative.
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However, in the race for development, little reflection is put on the assumptions in 
which  this  quest  for  legal  development  is  embedded.  Especially  unclear  is  how  the 
development of which we dream is connected to other dreams of our time, particularly the 
coexistence of diversity. To know what kind of development we want is easy when we think 
all the same (or at least when only our answer counts). But when we see plurality as a value, 
cultural identity as an object of innate rights, and difference as a requirement for a rich social 
life, when in the name of Human Rights we subscribe to pluralistic societies, then the quest 
for  development  turns  to  be  more  complex.  To  what  extent  is  the  concept  of  legal 
development at the height of our needs, when we strive at the same time for diversity, and 
thus implicitly maybe also for diverse, perhaps even contradictory, concepts of development?
Thus, it is a worthy enterprise to reflect on legal development as a crucial concept for 
the  use  and  self-understanding  of  socio-legal  studies,  particularly  in  its  relationship  to 
plurality as  a  social  concern.  In  this  work,  I  elaborate  on  the  relationships  amongst  law, 
development and plurality primarily through three main questions. Firstly, I inquire in chapter 
A how  legal  development  is  linked  to  anthropological  and  social  perspectives  that  are 
specifically related to modernity as a socio-linguistic situation marked by a tension between 
universalism and pluralism. Furthermore, this investigation presents in chapter B how these 
modern perspectives on legal development are challenged by postmodern research, calling the 
attention  to  the  elements  of  power  and  culture  that  are  present  (but  insufficiently 
acknowledged)  in  modern  approaches  to  law.  On  the  base  of  these  critiques,  the  third 
important question addressed to in chapters C and D is how do pluralistic and postmodern 
perspectives on law and on development allow to envisage new forms of legal development.
Importantly, while legal development can take a variety of forms, I will pay particular 
attention to one approach that emphasizes legal transfer as its central tool. There are several 
reasons for this choice. Firstly, processes of legal transfer have been and still are major tools 
applied in the international practice of legal development. Secondly, also from a scientific 
perspective, legal transfer has been a major way to conceive of past, present and future legal 
developments. Consequently, the field of research on legal transfer offers sufficient practical 
and theoretical research to build a reference point in the following quest. Last but not least, 
the processes of legal transfer are particularly important for the question of the relationships 
between legal development and pluralism, because they imply from the outset the encounter 
amongst different approaches to law. The question on how legal development occurs through 
the engagement with difference is at the core of research on legal transfer. Nevertheless, while 
legal  transfer  builds  an  important  aspect  of  this  endeavor,  because  of  the  interest  of  this 
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investigation  in  different  approaches  to  legal  development,  I  will  not  restrict  all  my 
investigation to legal transfer.
Legal development is a topic that can be as specific or as broad as the researcher wants 
it  to  be.  My intention  here  will  be  to  find  a  balance  between  two  extremes  where  one 
approach would be too general and the other too specific. Thus, while the emphasis of this 
discussion  relies  on a  conceptual  approach to  legal  development,  I  combine  philosophic-
anthropological questions with specific practical examples.  Although, as with any inquiry, 
endless examples could be chosen, the ones I gathered here seem to me especially important 
because of their relationship with the question of pluralism, diversity and otherness. I tried to 
balance the fact of these authoritative and limited choices by presenting them and reflecting 
on them as clear as possible in the text. Importantly, my investigation is based mainly on a 
critical reflection of sources found through bibliographical research, and aims to make already 
existant research in the areas of law, anthropology, cultural studies, philosophy and history, 
fruitful for an interpretation on the place(s) of pluralism in legal development. 
However, in the course of this investigation, I engaged directly with the places, actors 
and techniques of the processes to which I refer. For example, I had the opportunity to do 
research abroad,  gathering on-site  information  and interviewing personnel  working in  the 
German Association for Technical Cooperation (now German Association for International 
Cooperation  –  GIZ,  Deutsche  Gesellschaft  für  Internationale  Zusammenarbeit)  in  China, 
within indigenous and non-indigenous courts in Mexico, as well as in the Centro do Teatro do 
Oprimido Rio in Brazil. Moreover, I took courses in Theater of the Oppressed, experiencing 
directly these techniques at the base of Legislative Theater. These experiential approaches had 
an  important  impact  on  the  choices  I  made  for  the  final  version  of  this  investigation. 
Importantly, it was in the course of this engagement within a variety of fields, that I realized 
the range of existing ethnographic, anthropological and sociological research of high quality, 
as well as, quite often, the lack of communication amongst the different (but related) areas. It 
is  in  this  context,  that  I  experienced the  need to  address  the  topic  of  legal  development 
through a more abstract approach, combining the resources of experts in each geographic and 
disciplinary  field.  I  am indebted  to  these  authors,  and  it  is  my  hope  that  this  reflective 
engagement is as enriching for them as their research was for me.
In this sense I feel deeply thankful to the individual researchers and research institutions that 
have made this endeavor possible. I have to thank the persons that trusted in me since the 
beginning, including, first of all, my family. There are, however, also new families, brothers 
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and sisters, fathers and mothers, uncles and aunts, grandfathers and grandmothers, that life 
endows to us now and then: the teachers who accompanied and teased me, the friends who 
cared and supported me, and the love who opened my horizon of life constantly, enriching it 
at every step. In this long journey, none of the words of encouragement, none of the gestures  
of love you gave me was dispensable. For that, I thank you from the bottom of my heart.
I thank particularly Prof. Dr. René Kuppe, my adviser at the University of Vienna, and 
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Dietrich, my professor at the University of Innsbruck, who accompanied 
me through the academic and intellectual labyrinths that a doctoral research implies. To my 
colleagues and friends Catalina Vallejo Piedrahíta and Orlando Aragón Andrade I owe fruitful 
discussions and important support regarding bibliography and investigation results, besides 
their constant encouragement. On a special note, I want to thank Shawn Bryant for remaining 
my caring compañero in the ups and downs of an important part of this labyrinth called thesis, 
and, most importantly in the bigger roller-coaster of life. Importantly, a central part of writing 
a  thesis  was to learn to write in a manner that  at  least  some people can understand. For 
helping me with the English language and for the correction of the final text, I am indebted to 
Shawn Bryant (again) and to my dear friend Alicia Dueck. Naturally, neither my professors 
not my helpers could purge my thinking or my writing from all its asperities, for which I take  
full responsibility.
Furthermore,  this project could not have been possible without the institutional (and 
financial) support of the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes, the Theodor Körner Preis, 
Deutsche  Forschungsgesellschaft  (DFG),  the  Internationales  Forschungszentrum  für 
Kulturwissenschaften (IFK, Wien) and the Graduiertenkolleg ‘Das Reale in der Kultur der 
Moderne’ (University of Konstanz), especially Prof. Dr. Helmut Lethen and Prof. Dr. Albrecht 
Koschorke.  All  of  them confided  in  me  and  gave  me  unquestioned  freedom along  with 
institutional backing. In these times when the value of academic institutions is doubted, their 
resources cut, their freedom abridged, I hope that my endeavor serves as a small example and 
an  emphatic  call  for  the  need  to  maintain,  support  and  recreate  spaces  of  critique  and 
reflection.  It  is  my wish  that  this  thesis  succeeds  in  pursuing  the  goals  of  the  academic 
freedom  that  these  institutions  abide:  allow  us  to  find  new  ways  to  engage  with  life 
challenges, permit us to go beyond our limits, impulse us to transform and develop.
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A. Modern Law and Legal Development
I.  Modernity, Rationality and Universalism  
1.  Modernity as a Socio-Linguistic Situation  
As with any inquiry, in this quest for the modern assumptions on ‘legal development’ and 
their consequences, the first difficulty consists in clarifying the concepts used. Not only the 
multiple answers to the question about what is law or what we describe with it can fill several  
doctoral  thesis,  but  also the question about  modernity and its  meaning is  confusing.  It  is 
possible  to  understand  modernity  in  several  different  ways.  In  fact,  modernity  has  been 
conceptualized  at  least  as  an  historical  epoch,  as  a  process  of  ‘modernization’,  as  an 
intellectual and cultural movement and as a discourse (Spencer 2006, 376 f.). These different 
concepts overlap in meaning, and have been deployed differently at different points in science 
history. Yet, when using one of these concepts to define modernity, necessarily the remaining 
aspects and, most importantly, the connection between them is neglected, thus reducing the 
concept of ‘modernity’ unnecessarily and in a detrimental way to a thorough understanding of 
the complexity of the issue at stake.  Therefore,  for this inquiry,  I will  work with a broad 
concept of modernity as a specific sociolect, i.e. a socio-linguistic situation that determines 
the  posing  of  certain  questions  and answers  (Zima  2001,  37).  As Peter  V.  Zima  (*1946) 
shows,  this  broad  conceptualization  allows  the  researcher  to  observe  modernity  in  its 
complexity,  so  that  some  discursive  difficulties  can  be  avoided,  like  monologuism  or 
Manichaeism, which would hinder the reflexive intention of an academic inquiry as the one 
proposed here (Zima 2001, 22).
The identification of a socio-linguistic situation that researchers refer to (and construct) 
as modern can only be done in relation to contrasting socio-linguistic situations. In contrast to 
late-modernity and postmodernity, Zima characterizes the questions that structure a modern 
system of thought and action by their ambiguity. Ambiguity, as he argues, is related to but 
different from the ambivalence of late-modernity, that starts to be stronger around the middle 
of  the  19th century,  and  the  indifference  predominant  in  a  postmodern  sociolect,  more 
noticeable in the second half of the 20th century (Zima 2001, 41). The main difference relies 
therein that the modern discursive ambiguity can be, and is expected to be, solved through 
modern discourse itself,  particularly through the application of universal reason. Thus, the 
discomfort caused by the synchronic presence of two or more (conflicting) meanings as part 
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of one unity, ambiguity, is (seemingly) overcome, restating the order of binary oppositions 
like  true/false,  good/bad,  reality/illusion,  etc.  For  this  view,  the  (re-)connection  with  one 
reality seems possible, there is a right way to understand it, and insufficiencies in this respect 
depend on the lack of thorough, good, beautiful, true reasoning. Illusion can be set apart, truth 
can be discovered, the core of reality is accessible. Ambiguity is acknowledged, but it exists 
only as an undesirable confusion that needs to be overcome.
The  late-modern  and  postmodern  perspectives,  as  part  of  changing  social  systems, 
distanced themselves increasingly from these assumptions turning reflective on the implied 
contradictions  of  modernity  that  cannot be  solved,  finally  reacting  in  front  of  these 
assumptions as unfulfillable hopes. It is not possible any more to dissolve the contradictions 
through  the  binary  opposites  of  good/bad,  beautiful/awful,  etc.,  and  thus,  the  status  of 
legitimative resources of argumentative chains like reason, objectivity or universality change 
dramatically and seem to be at the arbitrary disposition of the narrator. Hence, the restatement 
of order and clear differentiation moved from being a guiding (and achievable) goal to be an 
unreachable hope and ended up later just offering one possibility amongst a free palette of 
exchangeable choices.  
It is my intention here to present the ambiguity of modern thought, the ambivalence it 
reaches in late-modernity and how these groups of ideas find expression in the legal field. 
Modern  law,  as  has  been  stated  repeatedly  by  legal  philosophers  and  historians,  is  a 
consequence  of  the  cross-fecundation  between  diverse  currents  of  thoughts  and  their 
continuously  renovated  interpretation.  Despite  the  diversity  of  scholarly  and  politically 
acknowledged legal systems, however, some main features are taken into account in order to 
assume their ‘modern’ character, and, as we will see later, their character as ‘legal’ in the first 
place. These elements that make law ‘modern’ are connected to philosophical understandings 
with an emphasis on rationality, but modern reason is loaded with contradictions, especially 
between its universal validity and the particular interests that it includes. 
2.  Modernity and the One Development  
The early-modern sociolect that called for reason as a tool to solve ambiguity was especially 
influential in Europe in the 18th century, but it had been developing since much earlier. In fact, 
the outburst of the Enlightenment, emphasizing the freedom of the subject due to his reason 
was  the  zenith  of  a  process  that  had  started,  at  least  in  the  European  continent,  in  the 
beginning of the 16th century. The division amongst the different confessional groups in the 
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church and the many wars in and between states had put in question all standing orders. With 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that proclaimed the freedom of religion, the dogmatism of 
one  specific  religion  was  no longer  recognized as  generally  binding.  In  its  place,  reason 
should reign, bringing freedom and peace. Absolute dogmas did not match the call for reason, 
and this was the case also with absolute forms of government. Reason, Humanity, Justice, 
Technical  Development  and  Free  Commerce:  these  were  main  concerns  of  the  new free 
subject that had awoken from the sleep of the Middle Ages. These were the oracles that would 
provide all answers since the disruption of absolute systems of power in the most diverse 
fields of society had left so many questions open. If disenchantment of the world was the 
consequence of the disappearance of God, He was quickly replaced in His enchanting and 
omnipotent role by Science, the State and Humanity (Supiot 2007, 46).
In scientific research, the arena of enlightening reason par excellence, the search for the 
dissolution  of  the  ambiguity  had  important  consequences.  In  the  now  so-called  natural 
sciences, it took the shape of the requirement of scientists to be free of religious dogmatism 
and remain true to nature when observing and presenting their study objects (Daston/Galison 
2002, 35 ff.). Guided by the light of reason, ideal1 images of nature were created by scientists 
in their atlas, in order to overcome the imperfectness of the individual objects they found in 
nature. The universal could be represented with one image (Idem, 71) that would necessarily 
be different from any concrete individual (Idem, 42). Draftsmen would be observed by the 
professional  scientist,  who  would  correct  the  presentation  of  nature  in  order  to  show its 
“natural  harmony,  individual  truth  and  security”  (Idem,  472).  The  ambiguity  of  concrete 
experience could be overcome by the power of abstract reason.3 
Idealism and its power of dissolving contradictions achieved a later heyday with Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich  Hegel's  (1770-1831)  argumentative  perspective,  in  which,  although  an 
emphasis  on  the  dialectic  between  opposites  is  central,  this  interaction  ends  up  in  the 
‘Aufhebung’ (sublation) of the duality. Thus, ambiguity can be overcome through synthesis. 
This is what Zygmunt Bauman (*1925) characterizes as the “ideology of the superiority of 
reason” and Alain Touraine (*1925) as the enforcement of the  idéologie moderniste  (Zima 
1 Lorraine Daston (*1951) and Peter Louis Galison (*1955) refer to four different understandings of being 
true  to  nature,  differentiating amongst  approaches  with  an  emphasis  on  the  concepts  of  typical,  ideal,  
characteristic, and average. However, for our purpose, it will suffice to keep in mind the importance of the 
encompassing idea of ‘true to nature’. The differentiations of Daston and Galison are insofar relevant, as  
they show the  variety of  aspects  of  this  notion  and  the  transition  towards  the  concept  of  mechanical  
objectivity (Idem, 40 ff.).
2 All translations are by the author except where otherwise indicated in the list of references.
3 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) refers, for example, to the necessity of definitions in this sense 
(Daston/Galison 2002, 42).
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2001, 41, 58). However, this type of reason in the form of subjective idealism would soon find 
its own limitations in overcoming ambiguity. Ambivalence appears, thus, when early-modern 
reason cannot offer a clear solution for the ambiguities of modern man anymore, because he 
becomes aware that “the law of the market, technical-scientific progress and rationalization on 
the one hand enable the development of democracy, welfare and individual freedom, and, on 
the other hand, put them into risk” (Idem, 52). Hence, the values that served as an orientation 
for  the  application  of  reason  until  then  seemed  to  fall  apart.  Instead  of  belief-oriented 
rationality,  thus,  purposive,  goal-oriented rationality will  be leading (Idem, 48).  Since the 
promised cultural progress of modern man, oriented to the domination of nature, conceals the 
risk of a backlash into barbarism (Idem, 50), it is man’s own nature, the one, that has to be 
dominated.
Consequently, the subjective character of science that once required from the researcher 
to find the ideal behind the imperfectness of matter was rejected in the 19 th century and it was 
replaced by the call for objectivity. During late-modernity, machines turned thus to represent 
the ideal type of scientist, photographic cameras turned to be the ‘better eye’. However, more 
than the rejection of universalism, this change expressed the ambivalence in which the new 
scientist was caught.  It just  underlined the tension between a plurality of realist  machine-
produced images and the universality of general categories as well as the universal validity of 
mechanic processes themselves. 
The primacy of the machine is characteristic for this epoch of industrial progress. That 
the success of rational values of freedom and humanity would lead the emancipated rational 
subject to be subordinated to the domination of machines and serial production did not match 
the dreams of modern man. The recognition of the absolute value of the individual ended up 
in his subordination to social classes and made individual subjects totally replaceable. Man 
was obviously not such a free creature, constrained in all kinds of socio-economic structures. 
But at the same time that those structures seem to constrain him, they also seem to liberate 
him. A solution of this paradox did not appear possible anymore.
In working with the concepts of ambiguity, ambivalence and indifference, Zima highlights the 
connection between modernity, late-modernity and postmodernity on the one side, and the 
question of universalism/pluralism as answers in front of difference on the other side. While 
the ‘feudal era’ was structured by dualistic exclusivity, and thus in an anti-paradoxical way, 
modern thinking recognizes and solves contradictions through rational thinking (Zima 2001, 
44). Difference in conflict can be solved through universal values. In doing this, early-modern 
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approaches remain, nevertheless, implicitly ambiguous and unconscious of the paradox they 
are based on.  The paradox resides  lastly therein that  (absolute)  individual  freedom is not 
compatible with (absolute) universal reason. The ambivalent perspective of late-modernity, 
aware of this paradox, is not able anymore to solve the conflict amongst differences through a 
higher  synthetic  universal  (Idem,  42).  This  pro-paradoxical  attitude  is  reinforced  in  a 
postmodern approach, characterized by pluralistic indifference and leaving no space for any 
answer whatsoever that could dissolve the paradox. 
 Thus, a change and a progressive radicalization of the attitude in front of contradiction 
can be observed. The ambivalence of late-modernity is an expression of the impossibility to 
overcome the ambiguity of the coexistence of difference coherently, that is to say, without 
throwing out the window the same values that serve to overcome ambiguity. The freedom of 
the individual subject that served as the north for the rational solution of the conflict between 
diverse attitudes in front of the organization of economy was the same value that was being 
oppressed by free individuals. Nevertheless, it is not that ambivalence does not answer at all  
in  front  of  plurality,  thus  producing  indifference  in  front  of  difference,  as  a  postmodern 
sociolect  will  do later,  according to  Zima.  The awareness  of  the paradox means for late-
modern ambivalence just that it has to refrain from answers through specific contents (values) 
that would put it back in the paradox. To move out of the paradox of values, late-modern 
approaches  move to  another  level:  from content  to  form.  This  move allows  it  to  remain 
ambi-valent,  without  getting  to  be  in-different.  Now  it  is  the  form  and  not  the  values 
themselves  that  will  be  guided  by  reason.  Thus,  reason  is  not  anymore  associated  with 
specific values, but moreover, it is beyond the paradox. Difference, and thus pluralism, has a 
space,  but the form of that space will  be delimited by reason. Thus, the reaction of late-
modernity in front of difference is ambivalent in a double sense: firstly, differences cannot be 
solved  consistently  through  values;  therefore  two  contradictory  positions  can  be  valid. 
Secondly, while this is true, only one, a reasonable position, is allowed by formal reason. This 
second  ambivalence  ends  up,  thus,  in  a  solution,  a  precarious  and  constrained  one,  but 
nevertheless, within its formal limits, a rational answer with universal value. Form itself, thus, 
turns to be the leading value.
When contradiction is seen as a problem to solve, when unity is the goal, what is at 
stake is the existence of difference. The characterization of difference itself is in question, 
because  when we manage to  make the  difference  as  less  radical  as  possible,  in  order  to 
overcome the undesired tension between identical/different, we are just looking for the Other 
to  be  less  other;  we  are  waiting  for  the  difference  to  disappear.  Overcoming  ambiguity 
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through specific values or escaping ambivalence through general formalities, as ways to get 
rid of contradiction through modern thinking mean both to deny the full legitimacy of the 
existence of  contradiction,  and deny thus the legitimacy of  the existence of the Other  as 
equally valid. 
This is true for all types of others, be it persons, arguments, laws, etc. In all cases, the  
principal consequence of such a perspective is that a hierarchy of validity must be set. The 
tool to be applied in order to legitimate arguments regarding validity is going to be, once 
more, universal reason, this is a rationality that only accepts one winner, either because the 
better rational argument or the rational structure established with due form and process say so. 
It is clear thus, what is the link between universalism and rationalism in this perspective. The 
acceptance of the existence and equal validity of diverse rationalities would be unthinkable 
for this model. The goal of rational logic in modernity is exactly to provide freedom from, or  
at least an escape from, contradictions. 
Having said that, the form that the movement of life through time takes (or should take) 
from a rationalistic perspective, is clear: a straight line. From lack of reason to reason, from 
contradiction  to  resolution,  from many to  one.  If  early-modern  thinkers  spoke  about  the 
emancipation of the subject as the core value, late-modern thinkers refer equally, despite the 
diversity  amongst  their  approaches,  to  optimist  or  pessimist  arrows  of  development.  The 
Marxist  historical  materialism  as  well  as  the  Darwinist  evolutionism  and  the  Comtian 
positivism, all of them exemplify a vectoral vision on development. In a Cartesian axis, when 
the time is fixed and divided in units in the horizontal line, and values are quantified from 
zero to infinity in the vertical one, development can only be imagined as the achievement of 
an ever-higher position in this bidimensional field. The idea of development  of something 
turned thus into the development towards something (else), namely towards the realization of 
an ideal value (as content or form). Reason is what makes the laws of development natural 
and necessary. Optimist or pessimist,  from the modern perspective, we move from fear to 
hope,  from chaos  to  order,  or  the  other  way around,  but  nothing  changes  regarding  the 
vectoral structure of time and thus of development.
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II.  Modern Rationality and Law  
Referring to the field of legal philosophy,  Johann Braun, exemplarily for the approach of 
many contemporaneous researchers,  stated that  “the modern age  is  a  phase of  history,  in 
which  we still  are  today,  according to  general  perception,  notwithstanding the  occasional 
invocation of a ‘postmodernity’” (Braun  2006, 72). However, law is linked to this tradition 
not only in legal philosophy.  Even more than in this reflexive attitude, in the daily praxis of 
law and in its disciplinary conception, law continues arguing with the same elements that 
modernity brought about. Humanity, reason, freedom, equality, the sovereign State, secularity 
and autonomy of the law, subjective rights and duties and a clear connection to the material 
world that is accessible to experience here and now, are central to our understanding of law 
today. We have not left, at least in our official and conscious ways to organize society and 
deal with conflicts, the realm of modernity. Hence, if this is true, our concept of ‘modern law’ 
must be charged with the same load of tensions as modernity itself. 
Although the link with early modernity justifies to recall experiences and arguments of 
the 16th century to understand contemporary law, this does not explain ‘modern law’ in its 
complexity. Leading aspects of Western contemporary legal thinking derive from or reflex 
approaches of both early and late-modernity. What is generally understood today by ‘modern 
law’ is thus a combination of propositions that emanate from the belief in the emancipatory 
power of the subject, who can solve contradictions through the light of reason on the one 
hand, and the withdrawal from subjectivity towards the universally valid objectification of 
reason on the  other.  Both elements  can  be  seen in  the never-ending dispute between the 
philosophies  of  natural  law  and  positive  law,  and  the  practical  consequences  of  these 
approaches. From this perspective, as the result of an early-modern/late-modern combination, 
the contemporary category of ‘law’ developed first  as ambiguous and then as ambivalent, 
especially in regard to its relationship to universalism/particularisms. The labels of natural and 
positive law are thus expressions of this ambiguity and ambivalence. Superficially, they are 
different sets of answers, but both are offspring of the same tension. The dispute between the 
two philosophical  extremes just  replicates  the friction of the inner  contradictions  that  are 
inherent to each of them. It is in this combination of early-modern ambiguity of natural law 
and  late-modern  ambivalence  of  positive  law  that  ‘modern  law’ serves  as  an  object  of 
reference  when it  comes to talk about legal development.  The maintenance of this contradic- 
11
tory structure is essential, as we will see, for the concept of law and the identity of Western 
law as a model of reference for development. 
Through breaking with absolutism and dogmatism, modern reason opened the door to all 
potentials of humanity. But the plurality of possibilities did not fit always with the need for 
post-revolutionary security of modern man. Concerned, as modernity was, with overcoming 
the contradictions to which free reason had opened the door, the question for the norm was a 
crucial element. In fact, the key role of law for this process of ‘dis-ambiguation’ is obvious 
when  we  remember  the  main  explicit  objective  of  law,  namely  to  prevent  and,  more 
importantly,  to  solve  conflicts;  conflict  being  just  another  word  for  contradiction: 
contradiction of interests, of wills, of statements, of claims, etc. It is no wonder, thus, that 
‘modern law’ has been one of the most strongly developed fields in the last centuries, being a 
main concern of modernity and contemporaneity that society be rationally organized.
The change from a socio-cultural situation dominated by the omnipresence of God in 
the Middle Ages to a perspective marked by the primacy of humanity opened up the field for 
reflection  and  criticism  towards  social  reality.  Natural  law  responded  to  this  need  of 
justification, developing principles that were seen as binding for all social actors. Innate rights 
that were independent from the concrete legal system put into force by human institutions 
served as a protection against the arbitrariness of absolute power. These rights did not need to 
be  created  and could  not  be abolished,  because  they were  seen  as  pre-existent  to  human 
thought and reason, and served thus as a hierarchical guide for the mundane creations of man. 
They were perceived as part of a truer truth that humans are called to recognize, the same way 
that other scientists dis-cover the inherent laws of nature. In fact, this law was called ‘natural’ 
because it was imagined as an expression of nature that was as given as the laws of physics  
were supposed to be. The work of the jurist consisted thus merely in the recognition of these 
truths, without letting his judgment be disturbed by any moral dogmas. Concomitantly, the 
realms of religious morality and secular law were successively divided. Thus, questions that 
were previously in the realm of religious morality were turned into matters of law and legal 
philosophy.  This  turn  materialized  into  concrete  social  institutions  like  the  Inquisition 
amongst many others (Dietrich 2008, 199). Paradigmatic for this exchange of morals for laws 
is  the process of reformation by which the one truth of the universal Church was deeply 
perturbed. Who should offer the base for stability once the Catholic Church was internally 
divided and, even more, when it was just one alternative amongst several others? The answer 
came with a legal pact,  the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Not only was a moral question 
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answered with a legal statement, but furthermore, law, as an expression of secular power, was 
clearly separated from the realm of the Church and its moral regards. 
The Peace of Westphalia serves as a marker for the strong position that the modern 
state had already achieved. The concept of the modern state means, on the one hand, that the 
authority is conceived through the establishment of territorial power, independently from a 
personal obligation like the fief, and, on the other hand, that it is a centralized entity of power 
exercised through the autonomous creation of law. As an aspect of internal sovereignty in the 
sense of Jean Bodin (1530-1596), the state had the prerogative to be the only source of law 
and to organize structures that would execute the order established and judge on the basis of 
that law (Braun 2006, 80).  This is a clear break with the tradition of God as being Himself the 
law that led the legal conception  in the  Middle  Ages,  as  the  Sachsenspiegel4  states  (Idem, 
77). Hence, the secular State would be the new guardian of social stability through law.
Before this shift, as the Sachsenspiegel exemplifies, even fixed written law was only a 
‘mirror’ of  pre-existing law,  or  at  least  it  had to  present  itself  as  such in  order  to  claim 
legitimacy. However, at the beginning of the 16th century, this perception started to change and 
the reference to a rather static concept of law that claimed legitimacy from the identity with 
the past and from scholastic explications of predetermined authoritative texts was exchanged 
for the reference to a higher Truth that emanated from the very nature of things first, and of 
the state later. 
However, natural law was invoked equally for the rights of the secular state as it did 
for the rights of the individuals. The trust in the own reason of the individual and the call to 
participate  in  the  socio-political  order  himself  that  had  found  expression  in  the  German 
Peasant's War at the beginning of the 16th century, culminated in the outcry of the French 
Revolution. It is this subject, aware of his own nature the one that, putting himself in the 
center of his world, erects himself to claim his own right. Immanent rights of the individual,  
which  remain  socially  effective  with  their  background  of  natural  law  until  today  in  the 
conception of Human Rights, were the natural consequence of the acknowledgment of the 
innate value of the subject, and ended up later in the claim for the Rights of the Citizen. Thus, 
through the figure of citizenship,  the individual and the state  were entangled in  a double 
tension that last until present times. State and citizen, both need each other, but at the same 
time each of them claims for himself to be the final source of legitimacy, and, consequently,  
of social power. 
4 The Sachsenspiegel was a private record of norms of the 13 th century as well as the Schwabenspiegel and 
Deutschenspiegel. The name Sachsenspiegel means literally ‘mirror of the Saxons’. 
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Nevertheless, the individual that natural law equipped with own rights was ultimately 
the result of a concept of human being as a creature of God, gifted with specific virtues and 
goals. Hence, it remained linked to a theocentric perspective that was somehow contradictory 
to  the  increasingly distant  relationship  of  modern  man to  God (Braun 2006,  17  f.).  This 
tension found explicit expression in the 18th and 19th centuries, that brought a severe crisis in 
the understanding of man and his way of thinking (Idem, 6). Similar to the transition that 
natural  sciences  experienced,  changing  from  the  precept of  being  true  to  nature  to  the 
paradigm of objectivity, the initial subjective idealism that characterized the modern approach 
in social sciences transformed increasingly into objective idealism. 
The idea of ‘reality’ was increasingly reduced to the sensible material world and law 
performed that step equally in the positivization of natural law. Through the concretization of 
natural law thinking into positive law, natural law had both achieved its  goal and lost  its 
reason to be. This is the case with the codifications of natural law, including the Bavarian 
Civil Code of 1756, called Codex Maximileaneus Bavaricus Civilis, the Prussian Allgemeines  
Landrecht of 1794, the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1811 and most of all 
the Code Civil of 1804. While the Prussian and Austrian codes were written by outstanding 
natural law experts (e.g. Karl Anton Freiherr von Martini (1726-1800) and Franz von Zeiller 
(1751-1828) in the Austrian case), the French code was embedded in the modern ideas of 
freedom and  equality  that  had  led  the  revolution  against  the  old  system.  Thus,  in  these 
codifications as well as in uncountable simple laws, natural law became positive law (Braun 
2006, 15). Concomitantly, the accent of the legitimizing power of law moved from absolute 
values to absolute forms. The 19th century witnessed thus the appearance of an ever-increasing 
amount of laws that had to be collected in ‘law journals’.5 
In  the  end,  this  change  came  to  weaken  natural  law  in  its  traditional 
self-understanding.  While  natural  law had been a  rational  alternative  to  the  law in force, 
confronting absolutist states with the ‘right law’, the moment it united itself with the power of 
the state, the rhetoric power of the better – because rationally less contradictory – argument 
was replaced by the material power of the state and its compulsory apparatus (Braun 2006, 
16). Thus, the work of convincing changed from an ideal question, to a material one.6 As a 
consequence, later, the perspective on the eternal absolute values of the Good, the True and 
5 For example, in the German speaking territories, the  Kur-Badische Regierungsblatt in 1803, the  Gesetz-
Sammlung für die Königlich Preußischen Staaten in 1810, and the Regierungsblatt in 1806.
6 See e.g. Friedrich W. J. Schelling's (1775-1854) statement in his ‘New Deduction of Natural Law’ (1795): 
“natural law destroys itself necessarily in its consequence (so far it turns into mandatory law), i.e. it sublates 
all law. Because the latter, which is trusted with the preservation of law, is physical superior strength” cit. in  
Braun 2006, 16.
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the Beautiful  were criticized as  products  of  power structures  (Idem,  18),  and equally the 
existence of the ‘right law’ was seen as a façade for the use of power.
Natural  law was  equally  challenged  by a  change  in  the  concept  of  nature  at  the 
beginning of the 19th century. While nature during the 17th and 18th centuries referred to an 
inner true being that expressed itself in plural concrete ways, the nature of the 19th century 
scientist was mute in that regard. From the perspective of modern empiricism, nature was 
‘just’ the factual existence of things, directly accessible through senses, measurable and void 
of moral or meta-physics. Nature was not normative, and thus ‘Sein’, how things are, and 
‘Sollen’,  how  things  should  be,  were  to  be  strictly  divided.  Suddenly,  law  was  not  a 
consequence of the nature of man, but a cultural tool needed to control the problematic nature 
of man. The purpose of law turned to be a central question, as Rudolf von Ihering (1818-
1892) stated in his ‘Purpose in the Law’ of 1877:  “The purpose is the creator of the whole 
law; there is not one single legal rule which was not framed with a view to a purpose, i.e. a  
practical motive” (cit. in Strömholm 1985, 277). Similarly, for Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), 
a  key figure  in  the  development  of  legal  positivism,  law followed  the  objective  of  “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number” (Idem, 250).
The positivist approach had equally an important connection with the commencing 
idea of nation to which the historicism of Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861)was central, 
because,  although  the  Historical  School  explicitly  opposed  the  positivistic  turn,  which 
pretended to create law ‘from nothing’, the history it referred to was a history of documents, 
more specifically of written documents, and their interpretation built their focus of attention. 
The importance that (this particular form of) history acquired, especially in the beginning of 
the  19th century,  was  a  reflection  of  the  general  movement  towards  worldliness and 
empiricism. Equally, the connection to Roman law, especially through the pandectistic turn in 
law, served as a unifying historical source and, more importantly, as an explicit or implicit  
reference for interpretation of contemporaneous legal understandings.
Interestingly, the nation was the one that was now carrying a spirit, replacing nature. 
The perception on the work of the jurist changed thus from understanding and recognizing an 
ideal norm to realize its content through law, into recognizing already existent secular law 
properly. While natural law was linked to an idea of development, so that the law-maker had 
to  be  reminded  of  the  ultimate  principles  that  should  guide  his  doing,  with  the  turn  to 
historicism, law was an expression of national history. In the sense of Savigny, the work of the 
jurist  was  to  understand,  rejuvenate  and  maintain  fresh  this  matter  that  was  given  as  a 
necessary result of national spirit (Braun 2006, 22). 
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Thus, while this modern law referred to an origin that legitimized its status, it had to 
actualize this national truth continuously through an uninterrupted flood of laws, running after 
the ever-changing social reality. The tension inside natural law, due to a conflict of values, 
was transposed to the tension between positive laws, a tension with which lawyers could deal 
more easily once a hierarchy of norms was fixed, as Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) did later in his 
‘Pure Theory of Law’ (1934). The problem of the ‘proper law’ turned, thus, to be a matter of 
its position into a system of hierarchies, and of the form and process that brought about that 
positive  law  into  existence.  In  the  end,  these  hierarchies  tried  to  combine  the  positivist 
structure with the naturalist quest for innate rights, as the German Grundgesetz (lit. basic law, 
constitution) with the inclusion of Grundrechte (basic rights) in its first articles exemplifies. 
Modern  law  unifies,  thus,  the  naturalist  and  positivist  approaches  to  normativity  as  an 
expression of modern reason that pursues to solve conflicts through the subsumation of reality 
under generally valid normative statements.
III.  Legal Development and Pluralism from a Modern Perspective  
1.  The Development of Modern Law and Identity  
Needless to say, the struggles for organizing normativity around rationality had consequences 
for the position that law could take in front of difference, since these differences were the 
ones that law was called to solve in order to prevent a conflict or react to it. This is the result  
of a modern rationality that compels equally to the rejection of dogmas as it compels to the 
fixation of one position that is argued as ‘the’ (most) rational one. Nevertheless, the same 
rationality aims to be a liberation from dogmatism and absolutism and thus it proclaims an 
invitation to the discussion. Hence, it assumes and accepts plurality and contradiction, even if 
the final goal is to solve the conflict between opposites. The parliamentary democratic ideal 
is, as a modern proposal, a reflex of this premise: all participants have a position that is put 
into discussion and the result of a rational procedure, be it an argumentative discussion on 
values  and/or  a  formally  fixed  process,  will  offer  an  adequate  solution.  Who  or  what 
determines what is to be seen as ‘proper’ arguments or procedures is another question. 
The modern perspective is, thus, in the middle of a tension between a call to plurality 
and  interaction  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  setting  of  the  limits  up  to  which  plurality  and 
interaction are allowed on the other hand. All arguments are invited to be discussed – as long 
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as they follow a specific reason. This perspective can be seen as a conscription of the validity 
of arguments, and thus as a reduction of possibilities under one model, as well as it can be 
seen as an aperture to plural possibilities, because all arguments are, in principle, invited to 
participate: not one idea can be rejected arbitrarily, but only reason shall be the measuring 
stick. Stating reasonable  rules to differentiate between valid and non-valid arguments first, 
and then between valuable and non-valuable arguments, the apparent contradiction between 
content and form of the call for freedom, is solved – at least in a modern perspective. Modern 
law, with its strained combination of natural and positivist approaches, is basically the valve 
that will regulate the interaction of universalism and pluralism in modern societies.
One of the aspects that derive from modern law’s main concern to negotiate in the 
tension between universal reason and multiple wills or needs, is that reform turns to be a 
crucial constitutive element of law. The question of reform goes, in fact,  beyond law and 
society. It is actually linked to the all-encompassing project of Enlightenment that involves 
the  control  of  irrationality  in  the  psychological  as  well  as  the  social  realms.  From this  
perspective, “both our law and ourselves appear as projects of self-construction that require an 
endless process of reform” (Kahn 1999, 8). The task of reform in a legal environment is to 
subordinate not only the diversity of present wills and needs under universal reason but also to 
reconfigure the relationship between the present diversity and the past products of a similar 
subordination (Idem, 17). As a result of reason, generally, those products of the past cannot be 
totally  dismissed.  Thus,  reform feeds  a  never-ending  cycle  of  reason reformed  by better 
reason.
It is important to remark that the role of reform subordinating plural wills to universal 
reason is central for different forms of governments and political organizations, because the 
tension  with  a  general  reason  remains  the  same  if  we  are  talking  about  the  will  of  the 
monarch, the will of the people or the will of the party. Similarly, it is irrelevant for this matter 
if we refer to different economical-political models, such as capitalism or socialism, as long 
as  they  are  based  on  the  assumption  of  one  true  rationale  beyond  particularisms.  Not 
surprisingly, the assumption of a straight line of development towards more freedom, however 
this freedom is interpreted, is suitable for both conceptions. 
In any case, the question remaining is always who is empowered to talk in the name of 
reason. As Paul W. Kahn7 observes for democratic societies, “in the modern state [...] there is 
a much greater diversity of claims about the content and institutional locus of reason’s norms 
7 In this academic work I have taken much care in introducing the main authors I refer to in at least their  
temporal context. However, some of the birth dates of contemporary authors are not accessible. In all cases, 
these are authors that are still alive.
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and of the people’s will. Reform is the common ambition of legislatures, executive agencies, 
and courts – as well as of popular political movements [...]” (Kahn 1999, 8). In this sense, the 
re-form of inherited law does not only take place via legislative procedures, but it is inherent 
to every application of law, as some currents of legal realism and critical legal studies have 
argued. Thus, the judicial interpretation of formal law continuously renews the meaning of 
stated law, reading in it the answers for contemporary questions. Equally, a present decision is 
always linked to a remote past and invested with its legitimizing power. The more a system 
makes a strong emphasis on the interpretation of law, the more that “reform and interpretation 
are one and the same process” (Idem, 55). Hence, paradoxically, it can be said that “judicial 
review creates the permanent Constitution” (Idem, 77).
Through  reform  and  interpretation,  modern  law  follows  the  constantly  renewed 
yearning for catching up with present and, even more, to foresee the future. The prospect of 
stabilizing social relations would be empty if law would not look forward to develop elements 
that would allow it to stay valid beyond the immediate present. Of course, this expectation 
will never be fully matched. Hence, reform is needed on the road of progress. Although these 
concepts of reform and progress are related, they do not mean the same. While the idea of 
progress,  inherited  from the  Enlightenment,  envisages  a  telos,  a  final  desirable  state,  the 
reform is not necessarily thought as stable and final aim, but as an achievable, concrete mid-
term goal. It is nurtured by a positivist idea of law and a late-modern ambivalence. Progress, 
however,  does  not  disappear,  rather  it  is  multiplied  in  each  of  the  reform  proposals. 
Consequently, “the rule of law supports multiple narrations of progress, as well as decline” 
(Idem, 107).
This ambivalence created by a plurality of narrations of progress activated anew with 
each new reform is not only inside the legal concept of progress, but at the same time is  
relevant  for  the  position  of  law  in  front  of  progress.  Otherwise  stated,  the  ambivalent 
character of a modern concept of progress materializes also in the field of law through the 
necessary connection between the goal to achieve through new law in a future time and the 
implicit legitimacy of progressing towards that goal, given by a timeless (or at least original) 
law. Modern law (also new or reformed law) requires, for its own legitimation, an anchor in 
the past, an original reason to be. This reason can take the shape of the Grundgesetz in the 
Kelsenian sense of the word, or the original contrat social, God's revelation or a revolution, 
amongst many other elements that work as  primum movens.  In any case,  “legal decision-
making differs from other kinds of policy formation in just this way: it always begins from a 
set  of  sources  that  already  have  authority  within  the  community’s  past”  (Idem,  43). 
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Consequently, the first question to answer by any representative of the law in front of a case is 
whether he has been given, through a specific norm, the competence to take a decision. All 
present rules are traceable to an original statement that gives meaning and legitimacy to it. 
This conception of law has not broken its bonds with the moral and the divine totally; 
actually, it takes over a religious theme, by which God expresses Himself through the gift of 
sacred norms. Moses descended with the law as a divine gift to save his kind from chaos and 
thus, “law is simultaneously a product and a continuing representation of the divine origins of 
the  community”  (Idem,  47).  Not  surprisingly,  similarly  as  Auguste  Comte’s  (1798-1857) 
positivism developed into a ‘Religion of  Humanity’,  law is  often experienced as  a  ‘civic 
religion’, that requires holy respect. 
This theme of revelation, as we know it from pre-Enlightenment conceptions of order 
and law, is replaced, in a post-Enlightenment world by revolution (Idem, 48). It is a revolution 
that we recognize because it  marks a rupture with the past that is  conceived as  radically 
different. This rupture is embodied in a corpus of founding laws, a constitution, that functions 
as a “revelatory act of the sovereign” (Idem). It is the memory of that revealed truth the one 
that gives unity, consistency and a legitimizing weight to all the comparatively little decisions 
that come next and recall its authority.
This unity with an authoritative past is the one that allows legal coercion to appear as 
just(ified). When that link cannot be perceived, the legal decision is questioned. In that case, 
the argument is, of course, that that decision does not follow reason, a reason that is generally 
embodied by the interpretation of a higher set of rules, pre-existent and authoritative. To argue 
outside of  this  set  of arguments  is  only possible  when the speaker  stands  outside of that 
community. (Idem, 44). Law is thus an element in the process of identification in the sense of 
Stuart Hall (*1932): a never-ending process of articulation of the relationship between the 
subject in formation and discursive practices that always entail certain politics of exclusion 
(Hall 1996, 2 f.).
Since modern law in its self-conceptualization requires an authoritative and unifying 
referent  in  the  past,  it  “creates  a  single  identity  in  what  would  otherwise  be  a  changing 
community, or communities, through time” (Kahn 1999, 47). This way, differences occupy a 
subordinate  space  in  front  of  a  unifying  law.  “We,  the  people”,  “our  past”  –  this  is  the 
language of law (not very different, in fact, from the divine gift Moses brought to his kind), 
through which a unity between the original community and the present is constantly recreated; 
this is the continuously renovated call to new life of an actor, namely ‘we’, ‘the people’, ‘the 
nation’, of which each citizen is part (Idem, 45). The radical difference between those past 
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allegedly pre-legal times and now is thus transposed to the radical difference in the present 
between our  legal  community and those outside  of  that  community,  the non-legal  others. 
These others can be in the same national territory as our community, implying thus a danger 
not only for social  order but most of all  for social  (national)  identity,  or, easier to argue, 
outside of the national territory. Thus, it is possible for researchers feeling their social identity 
endangered to argue like T. B. Smith, who wrote: “Since her Union with England in 1707 
Scotland has in a sense survived as a nation by and through her Laws and Legal System” 
(Watson 1974, 21).
Beyond mere states, though, at an international level, “law is a crucial element in the 
constitution  of  the  modern  Western  subject”  (Ruskola  2005,  270),  and  this  identification 
requires an ‘other’ to differentiate itself from which is necessarily defined in negations. Take, 
for example, the case of China. Analyzing the example of Hegel’s account of history, Teemu 
Ruskola observes thus at least three elements of dichotomizing division between conceptions 
of  the  Western  and  the  Oriental  that  find  expression  in  arguments  about  law: 
staticism/progression, community/subjectivity, and moral/law. While China is characterized as 
timeless and static, the West is dynamic, changing and progressive – a perspective that we can 
find equally in Weber’s and Karl Marx’ (1818-1883) approach (Idem, 286). Remarkably, the 
part  of  Chinese  history  referred  conventionally  as  ‘modern’ in  opposition  to  ‘traditional’ 
China,  usually refers  “to the period of significant  contact with the modern West” (Cohen 
2003, 48). This difference regarding the relationship to time is interlinked with the other two 
of subjectivity and ‘real’ law, because only a progressive ‘modern’ subject can make use of 
reason to abandon mere morals and create autonomously true law.
Hence,  as  an  example  of  the  exclusion  of  the  Other  from the  realm of  ‘real’ law, 
Ruskola,  following Edward W.  Said’s  (1935-2003)  critique,  claims  the  existence  of  legal 
orientalism,  arguing that  the “putative  absence of  law in China  [has]  become part  of  the 
observers’ cultural  identity  and,  in  turn,  contribute[s]  to  the  contents  of  the  observations 
themselves” (Ruskola 2005, 272), creating a “fabulous Western jurisprudence of Chinese law” 
(Idem, 273). Despite countless investigations on the ‘truly legal’ aspects of China's present 
and past, China, according to a long-standing tradition, is perceived as lacking ‘law’. The 
argument to  deny the ‘legality’ of Chinese law varies,  referring sometimes to the lack of 
formal legal rationality in the Weberian sense, and at other times to a liberal legal order (Idem, 
271). In any case, for contemporaneous research and praxis, “Chinese law [...]  provides a 
paradigmatic example of [...] ‘law without law’: a normative order that falls radically short of 
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‘real’ law [...]” (Idem 2003, 655). The rule of law means ‘not the rule of men’  because we are 
‘not the Others’. Or, at least, we do not want to be them. 
In the end, this is an argument that must follow from the place of reason in law, because 
if modern law and thus the rule of law are the outcome of universal reason, then the other of 
these categories must be the other of reason, and being unreasonable must be an undesirable 
state. Thus,  “the underlying structure of the debate remains remarkably constant: my reason 
against your desire. […] Such a world that never advances beyond desire to reason is exactly 
what we have in mind when we contrast law to the merely political or when we contrast the 
rule of law to the rule of men” (Kahn 1999, 18). Noticeably,  this advancement is the only 
thing that  can protect  us from turning unreasonable.  The fears around all  that  the (legal) 
subject might turn to be (namely irrational, mad, and unintelligible due to his lawlessness) and 
from what law (hopefully) protects it are projected in an image of an Other that is radically 
different. It has to be radically different, because, if not, our own social identity is endangered, 
we are not really safe from madness. Our fears might turn to be true.8 
Not  surprisingly,  Ruskola  argues  that  “the  shortcomings  of  Chinese  law  are  often 
blamed on a putative confusion of categories – the tendency of the Chinese to conflate law 
and morality, or law and custom, for example. Such claims have great intuitive appeal [since] 
they  accord  with  expectations  of  Chinese  taxonomical  madness  and  irreducible  cultural 
difference” (Ruskola 2005, 272 f.). If modern law as a rational creation separates itself from 
morality  and  unpositivized  custom,  the  Other's  shortcomings  must  be  related  to  these 
elements  that  a  modern law has  given away.  Otherwise,  we,  the  rational  ones,  would  be 
doomed to failure too. The question of otherness is, thus, implicitly a question of truth and 
value. These perceptions are not just imaginative matters. On the contrary, they are the reason 
for concrete consequences, as, for example, the legal exclusion of Chinese immigrants from 
US-American territory because of an assumed cultural disqualification for citizenship in the 
late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. “That is, the Chinese were so radically 
‘un-legal’ that they were simply not capable of the kind of self-governance that was required 
by America's ‘republican form of Government'” (Idem, 287). 
Thus, modern law contributes to the formation of subjectivity in determinant ways, linking it 
equally with an ultimate reference, rooted in a stable, remote, even sacred past, as well as with 
a constant dynamic of reforms that differentiate it from the past. While law needs an ultimate 
8 In this respect, see also Balkin 1993, 11, who refers to the need to believe in the coherence of our own social  
world.
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reason to refer to, it requires also continuous reform to be reasonable, and thus, to affirm its  
own validity. As it constructs the identity of ‘modern man’ and ‘modern nations’, it equally 
constructs the ‘others’ of these categories. These are others that are necessarily away from the 
reason that gives life to this law; away from its dynamic and away from its stability. When 
this ambiguous movement to an ‘always-the-same’ becomes part of processes of identification 
connected to an idea of universal reason, the call for bringing the Other into this movement 
towards being ‘the same’ gains appealing power.
2.  Developing the Other Through Modern Law  
As part of the process of transmutation of religious matters and themes into legal matters and 
themes, it is a legal question on the development of the Other that will dominate one of the  
first and most important debates at the outset of the modern age, namely the discussion on the 
treatment of natives by the Spanish Monarchy.9 Since 1513, the ‘Requerimiento de Palacios  
Rubio'10 was  read  (generally  without  translation)  to  the  native  peoples  in  the  American 
Continent,  a  text  explaining  to  them the content  of  the papal  bull  of  1493 regarding the 
concession of the American territories to the Spanish Kings and their prerogative and duty 
both to govern and convert the inhabitants of those lands. If the natives did not accept that 
decision, they were violently subjugated and killed. This invasion, understood in the frame of 
a thinking permeated by the concept of ‘just war’, was opposed by several theologians and 
jurists, and thus a discussion started around the question of what means were legitimate for 
the Spanish Kings to convert the natives to Christianity (González 1983, 26 f.). The positions 
on this discussion were epitomized by the debate between Bartolomé de Las Casas (148411-
1566) and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1489-1573) in Valladolid in  1550. While  Sepúlveda 
argued, following Aristotelian tradition, that there exists an inherent hierarchy amongst men, 
Las Casas followed an egalitarian principle marked by the platonic and Christian ideas of 
betterment that allowed for the improvement of all human beings. For Sepúlveda, a difference 
from  the  ideal  image  of  man,  which  he  equated  with  the  Spanish  moral  man,  meant 
automatically an insurmountable inferiority, and justified thus the subjugation and destruction 
of the ‘other’.  On the contrary,  for Las Casas, arguing with natural law, the value of any 
9 For a classical account on the legal and moral questions raised in the context of the conquest of America,  
see Hanke 2002. Importantly, the author emphasizes in his work that the Spanish conquerors sought a just 
and appropriate treatment of the native peoples.
10 After 1542 this ‘Requerimiento’ was changed into a “letter asking for [the] friendship and collaboration” of  
the natives (González 1983, 27). The physical abuses, nevertheless, did not stop or decrease.
11 Regarding the discussion about Las Casas’ birth date, see Parish/Weidman 1976.
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human being was innate because of the potential he had to access the Good, as any other 
creature (Dietrich 2008, 204).  
In this example, it is possible to see the logic of natural law in action, according to  
which the ‘other’ has the same innate rights so far it is possible to conceive him as similar 
(and so as equal), and consequently non-different. Even if right now, the otherness might be 
obvious, he can develop to achieve the same ideal from which the speaker is judging. The 
equality or at  least the possibility of the development towards a specific ideal, which has 
universal  validity,  is  precondition  for  the  acceptance  of  plurality  under  an  umbrella  of 
universal protection. Furthermore, this example shows that the formalization of law, that will 
get special strength in  the 19th century, is not in contradiction with natural law arguments. The 
written  authoritative  document  just  transposed  and  hardened the  legitimizing  point  of 
reference.
The same combination of ostensible opposites can be found in the further development 
of law. The principle of equality proposed by natural law was one of the main instruments to 
disseminate Western perspectives, while the idea of the inferiority of the Other remained as a 
central part in real politics (Idem, 206). The creation of international law itself depends, in 
fact, on the idea of the universal validity of European concepts. Thus, arguing with the idea of 
the need for the enforcement of lex humana, Francisco de Vitoria (ca. 1492-1546) , assumed 
the idea of a ‘just war’. And although Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) realized later, that a war 
could be a ‘just war’ for both sides of a conflict at the same time, he did not oppose the idea of 
a ‘just war’ itself, but he transposed the problem to the formal question of the proper authority 
to make war, and he directed his concern to the arrangement of the form of the war (Grotius 
2001). Thus, the legitimacy of colonial wars was given and the development of international 
law had the effect of a “necessary catalog of norms for the expansion of the capitalist world-
system” (Idem, 207).
The legitimacy of colonial wars depended equally on an explicit link made between 
modern law and development stages through the assumed determinacy of the laws of a society 
by  the  main  ways  of  subsistence  used,  which  were  in  turn  put  on  a  scale  of  linear 
development.  This  perspective has  been broadly accepted since the 18 th century,  and was 
adopted amongst several others by Montesquieu (1689-1755), a fundamental reference for 
socio-legal  thinking  even  today  (Fitzpatrick  1998,  92).  According  to  these  unidirectional 
perspectives  of  evolution,  the trajectory goes  from disorder,  irrationality,  and savagery to 
order, rationality, and civilization. 
This perspective can be found in several other relevant authors, like Adam Smith (ca. 
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1723-1790), who, in his ‘Lectures on Jurisprudence’ of 1978, asserted that law increased in 
quantity and complexity according to the progression of societies, relating this progression 
with the consolidation of property (Idem, 93). From a sociological perspective, Max Weber 
(1864-1920)  operated  with  the  idea  of  a  progression  of  law  according  to  an  increasing 
rationality (Idem, 112 f.). Even if his approach towards progress remained ambivalent in tune 
with the late-modern atmosphere (Henrich et al. 1988, 170), in Weber’s argument, abstract 
formalism of legal certainty constitutes itself in the negation of the ‘informal law’, for which 
he found modern examples in any form of ‘popular justice’ and any type of intense influence 
of  public  opinion,  which  were  both  incompatible  with  the  rational  course  of  justice 
(Fitzpatrick 1998, 112).
Similarly as it is the case with the constitutive role of law in the formation of the subject, the 
evolutionist  approach in law was not a consequence of a mere social  evolutionism, but a 
constitutive element of it.  Interestingly, the study of primitive society was not considered, in 
general, as an aspect of natural history; moreover, it  was treated as a part of legal studies 
(Kuper 1988, 3). Especially,  the questions investigated to inquire into the development of 
society included marriage, family, private property and the state, concepts that were thought 
from a legal point of view. Therefore, a specific legal thinking gave form to the idea of socio-
anthropological evolution.
Furthermore, some of the most influential researchers of this progressive perspective 
were  lawyers,  including  the  renowned  Sir  Henry  Maine  (1822-1888),  who  advocated  a 
vectoral movement from the dependency of the family or clan to the individual obligation, 
and  assumed  consequently  a  movement  from  the  ‘status  to  the  contract’ and  from  the 
primitive family to the modern territorial state. His work was accepted generally and is still 
very influential despite massive critiques (Watson 1974, 12). The development along the lines 
of what Maine considered the progress of Roman law was the ground to establish which were 
the ‘progressive’ societies,  a term that Maine used to refer to the civilizations of western 
Europe,  and which were the stationary ones (Maine 1931, 18, 64). From this perspective, 
Roman law served as the link between a remote past and a progressive present, promising a 
future as brilliant as the imagined past of the Roman Empire.
Although the factors of progress varied according to diverse theories, the concept of 
vectoral evolution of law and society was a common paradigm. Progress in law was seen as 
the realization of an order that was innate to social life itself. According to this premise, law 
develops as an elaboration of a primordial and predetermined order (Fitzpatrick 1998, 92 f.). 
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This allows that modern law has a strong referent in the past with which it identifies and, at  
the  same time,  a  historical  ‘other’ from which  it  distinguishes  itself.  This  silent  unity of 
contradictions in the conception of law is what post-modern critics like Peter Fitzpatrick have 
identified as the mythological basis of modern law. 
In terms of the role of law at an international level, the most important aspect of this 
analysis,  is that the present ‘other’,  who had a different socio-normative perspective,  was 
automatically  linked  with  that  ‘historical  other’,  from which  an  ever-developing  modern 
society needed to be differentiated in order to continue maintaining its modern character. The 
evolutionist model of law served to categorize the past of ‘Western’ societies, exercising a 
retroactive  taxonomic  power,  as  well  as  to  rank  contemporary  ‘non-Western’  societies 
according to the same classificatory model.  The ‘other’ remained thus separated from the 
absolute universal norm, only connected to it through a link of negation (Fitzpatrick 1998, 
68). The one thinkable evolution interpreted into the past, transformed therefore into a plan 
for the future, for the ‘development’ of the Other.
This  development  meant,  in  the  sphere  of  law,  the  export  of  modern  law  to  the 
ostensibly undeveloped other. As usual for modern law, this movement was marked, as we 
have seen, by a naturalistic approach to law, and, at the same time by a positivistic attitude. It 
is a positivistic understanding of law that makes the transplant of law first necessary and then 
possible. It made it necessary because, if the existence of universal natural law beyond all 
positivized law was sufficient, the idea of a transplant of law would make no sense; natural 
law would  simply  outlaw any human  law.  Equally,  a  positivistic  perspective  made  legal 
transplant possible, because transfer is only thinkable if a specific object can be found in one 
place  but  is  non-existent  somewhere  else;  it  is  ‘here’ but  not  ‘there’.  It  is  impossible  to 
transfer something omnipresent and pre-existent like natural law. However, if a positivistic 
understanding is needed to see legal transplant as necessary and possible, it is a naturalistic 
approach that gives sense to it. Whatever legal transplant is made, it is made in the name of a 
higher value like equality, freedom, etc. 
The consequences of the link between the idea of a vectoral development of law and the 
transfer of law, becomes obvious when we look at legal history. In Ruskola’s account of legal 
orientalism in China, he argues that “in the view of nineteenth-century international lawyers 
Chinese law was so ‘uncivilized’ as to exclude China from the ‘Family of Nations,’ which in 
turn served as a justification for reducing the country to a semi-colonial status under a regime 
of  Western  extraterritorial  privileges”  (Ruskola  2005,  271)  Later,  these  extraterritorial 
privileges served as an instrument to pursue the incorporation of ‘Western’ law in the territory 
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of the Qing Dynasty first, and later in the Chinese Republic in an attempt to develop them. In 
fact, the categories of ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ nations is still in use in some formal texts 
of international law12, meaning by civilized those who practice a specific type of modern law. 
Hence,  “the  story of  international  law was,  accordingly,  one  of  progressive  civilizing  of 
states” (Kahn 1999, 109).
In the same line, it is interesting to observe that Maine’s book, ‘Ancient Law’ (1931), in 
which he developed the ideas of legal evolution, implicitly participated in the debate around 
the most adequate way to govern India as a British colony (Stokes ref. in Fitzpatrick 1998, 
110). From Maine’s point of view, India was placed in a pre-set linear scale of progression 
and could only evolve in the singular way that progress was thinkable: the way that Romans 
and British had gone in the past (Fitzpatrick 1998, 110). If India were to have a chance for its  
evolution, then it had to follow the normative example of the model states, which had already 
blazed the trail of universally rational law. The practical consequence of this linear vision was 
devastating, since it built the primordial justification and the tool for imperialism. 
The consequences of a modern understanding of law regarding development, however, 
go beyond colonialism and imperialism. Moreover, nationalism was equally, from a modern 
point of view, a representation and a result  of a universal need for freedom and progress 
(Chatterjee 1986, 2). Seeing the creation of the nation as an essential part of the evolution, the 
perspective continued to be the same as during colonialism. In turn, this ‘national’ model was 
also  a  main  element  to  be  ‘transplanted’  as  part  of  the  imperialistic  modern  project 
(Fitzpatrick 1998, 119). All  internal diversity was subordinated to an abstract and general 
concept of law with a national character,  opposing and at  the same time reproducing the 
approach to law applied by colonialism and imperialism. 
This process was taken over in the early years of the law and development movement 
that I  will  present  later  in more detail,  when “legal  assistance was often perceived as an 
administrative mechanism for  ‘nation building’ and as  a  forum for  stable  and predictable 
commercial  transactions  within an implicit  liberal  capitalist  economy” (Gardner  1980,  6). 
Thus a clear purposeful idea on the nature of law gave life to the legal assistance after the 
Second World War, after the ‘imperialist paradigm’ in international relations was replaced by 
the  ‘development  paradigm’ (Esteva  2006a,  183 f.).  In  the  course  of  time,  the  more  the 
fascination for development as it was understood in terms of economic progress faded away, 
the more legal assistance gain on rhetoric importance (Gardner 1980, 7). As Gardner remarks, 
12 See, for example, art. 38, 1 (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, referring to “general  
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (United Nations 1945).
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this international activism, that was very powerful in the United States of America but also in 
post-colonialist Europe, was marked by “overriding technical and humanitarian ‘missionary’ 
notions” (Idem). Government institutions cooperated with the most renowned universities in 
order to help the ‘Third World'13 to “reach the stage of development” accomplished in the First 
World (Bronheim cit. in Gardner 1980, 7). 
In this context is clear the role of law as a tool, and thus, the perspective of legal realism 
in which it is embedded. As “technicians of democracy” (Malone cit. in Gardner 1980, 7), 
lawyers are assumed to be able to solve the dysfunctions of society, of any society. In other 
words, law is a tool for social engineering, a vehicle for modernity. If law is a tool, once 
imperialism had exported the tool itself, what is needed, is to teach the recipients to use that 
gift,  thus  legal  education  and  training  became  a  central  topic  in  the  rhetoric  of  legal 
development. 
Of course, the colonial rhetoric faded away following the detours of political changes, 
but, nevertheless, the perspective on legal development remained. It was partly seen as the 
continuation  of  a  civilizing  project  started  with  colonialism  (Gardner  1980,  44).  Most 
importantly,  the  development  of  the  Other  continued  to  be  necessary  and  difficult,  and 
followed what was seen as a successful model of modern law guided by reason.
Interestingly, the perspective on legal transplants as an advancement towards reason is 
not exclusive of the ‘donors’ of law. In fact, non-imposed legal transfers, might be seen as an 
expression of the solution of the tension amongst a plurality of possible developments within 
the  discussion  of  legal  reform.  Recurring  to  a  ‘higher’ legitimizing  legal  system,  more 
developed and thus more reasonable (or the other way around), puts the weight of reason 
clearly on  one  side.  Take as  an  example  the  process  of  reforms of  the  law of  the  Qing 
Dynasty, which had started long before foreign laws were officially incorporated at the edge 
of the 20th century, but when the discussion on ‘Western  legal transfer’ started, they were put 
in the light of a more developed European law (Huang 2001). 
This attitude of relying on others’ reason resonates with the traditional arguments of 
natural law and with the mythology of several legal traditions that claim to have received the 
law from a divinity (Watson 1974, 88). Reason is thus a high authority in the pursuit of the 
modernization (Seidman and Seidman 1994, 58). But what is understood by reason is still  
ambiguous and tautological at the same time. For example, contemporary authors like Ann W. 
Seidman and Robert B. Seidman, with several others, argue that “in our time [...] increasingly 
13 The term ‘Third World’ was coined apparently by Alfred Sauvy (1898-1990) in his article ‘Trois mondes,  
une planète’ ('Three Worlds, One Planet') in 1952 (Sauvy 1952).
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a valid decision must appear rational, that is, one that ‘can be explained and defended by 
arguments acceptable to a reasonable audience’” (Idem). 
3.  Theorizing Legal Development and Legal Transplants  
Similarly to the approach taken in legal aid, the conception of legal transfer in academics 
follows generally also a mechanistic concept of law. One of the most prominent researchers in 
this  field  is  Alan  Watson (*1933),  who,  highlighting  the  role  of  legal  transplant  in  legal 
development,14 argues that law is “like technology” in the sense that it “is very much the fruit 
of human experience. Just as very few people have thought of the wheel yet once invented its  
advantages can be seen and the wheel used by many, so important legal rules are invented by 
a few people or nations, and once invented their value can readily be appreciated, and the 
rules themselves adopted for the needs of many nations” (Watson 1974, 100). Consequently, it 
is  possible  to  propose  a  specific  approach  towards  sources  of  law  in  order  “to  achieve 
modernity” (Watson 1984, 106), which is seen as a value for itself. This development resides, 
unsurprisingly, in the overcoming of ambiguity, as he assumes when he states: “It would not 
be difficult to devise a system in which the law would be much less ambiguous, kept up to 
date,  and yet  subjected to judicial,  juristic and comparative criticism which could lead to 
further development” (Watson 1984, 102). In this line, he develops his proposal of a ‘two-tier 
law’. Despite the fact that “it would be disingenuous to pretend that the code and commentary 
[foreseen in the ‘two-tier law’] will ever be so well drafted as to provide automatic answers 
on the law in every case which arises or that all eventualities will be foreseen” (Idem, 121), it 
remains clear, that that automatism is central for the ideal of law that he imagines.
The mechanical view on law in the context of academic work around legal transfer is 
not exclusive of Watson. Moreover, it can be equally found in one of his most ardent critics, 
namely Otto Kahn-Freund (1900-1979), who relates the transplantability of law to “organic” 
and “mechanical” aspects of law as well as to geographical and sociological factors (Kahn-
Freund 1974, 17). Similarly, Watson does not only use mechanic metaphors, but, like Kahn-
Freund, he refers also to organic metaphors, when he states, for example, that “a successful 
legal transplant – like that of a human organ – will grow in its new body, and become part of  
14 Even if his approach and the concept of ‘legal transplant’ has been criticized by several other researchers 
(e.g. Twining 2004), which we will analyze in the next chapters, his perspective continues to be highly 
influential in theory and praxis. See, for example, Alan Watson Foundation 2008.
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that body just as the rule or institution would have continued to develop in its parent system” 
(Watson 1974, 27).15 
The incidence of these metaphors in theory and praxis is not casual, moreover, these 
rhetoric tools are connected with specific understandings of law and social reality in general. 
While mechanic metaphors are embedded in Newtonian mechanics and the Cartesian axes, 
the organic metaphors recall  the time when Social  Darwinism and positivism paired with 
romantic nationalism referred to an organic development  of society.  Obviously,  these two 
approaches differ clearly one from the other. Particularly, the machine metaphor suggests that 
“all  events are  expected to  be under the control  of someone or something”,  while  “in an 
organic metaphor, systems are considered to be autonomous or self-regulating” (Tesson 2006, 
93).  However,  these  rhetoric  tools  were  alternatively  used  by  functionalist  approaches 
(Overton and Horowitz 1991, 27). From a functionalist perspective, the researcher identifies a 
problem, which is seen as common or universal, and all results from the investigation are 
organized  around  their  function  and  functionality  to  confront  that  question.  Although 
functionalism might be useful when its epistemological limits are acknowledged, amongst 
other problems, it  depicts apparent neutrality,  while specific values are hidden behind the 
selection of a ‘universal’ problem. Most importantly, it is insufficient to address those aspects 
of social experience that are linked to communication, complexity and the symbolic aspects of 
human behavior. Questions regarding different systems of meaning, especially the one of the 
researcher, remain outside of the inquiry, the same as the specific interests of different social 
actors (and the researcher himself).
Similarly, as the critiques that have been stated against the use of organic metaphors, 
and thus of functionalism, because of their proclivity to justify and legitimate “the unjust 
power apportionment of the status quo” (Santa Ana 2002, 259),  the law-and-development 
movement,  based on diverse types  of legal  transplants,  was equally criticized because its 
technocratic  approach  served  to  maintain  authoritarian  systems:  “The  handmaidens  of 
democracy sometimes turned out to be the handmaidens of a dictatorship or authoritarian 
state”  (Gardner  1980,  281).  This  is  not  surprising  if  we recall  that  the  approach to  legal 
development, as envisaged by Watson, in the development of sources of law is exemplified 
“to a startling degree” by “powerful national, often dictatorial, leaders […] What is significant 
is  not  so much that  the dictator  has the power to  force through the reform as that  he is  
untrammeled enough by group culture to see the defects and force reform through” (Watson 
1984, 109).
15 See also the analogy with the transplant of tomatoes in Watson 2000, 9.
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Thus, the technical usefulness of modern law for oppressive regimes was not just the 
consequence of a ‘wrong’ transfer,  but  rather the model  of law upon which the law-and-
development movement drew allowed itself for this abuse. The flaws that US-American law 
might have, and might have taken to other states (Gardner 1980, 280 f.) in its  race for a 
capitalist version of development, are just an expression of broader and deeper difficulties 
regarding  questions  of  law  and  development  as  understood  from  a  modern  perspective. 
Understanding law as a mere tool that fulfills a function, disregarding the symbolic world 
connected to normativity, law is doomed to be manipulated.
Even  if  social  sciences,  embedded  to  a  great  extent  in  functionalism,  suffered  a 
paradigm crisis in the 1980's, when functionalist theory was increasingly criticized, this break 
did not hit legal inquiry with all its force. On the contrary, “it animates much of law-and-
society scholarship and legal history as well, where it implies an evolutionary paradigm, for 
the understanding of legal change” (Ruskola 2005, 274). This is, in the end, also Watson’s 
approach, which would seem, in the beginning, anti-functionalist, since he assumes the lack of 
connection between social needs and law.16 However, he can only see therein a ‘dysfunction’ 
because he constructs a function of law, and, consequently, it is towards that function that 
development has to go.17
It seems contradictory, that while Watson assumes that “what rule actually is adopted 
is of restricted significance for general human happiness”, and “usually legal rules are not 
peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they now operate and also that this is not 
a  matter  for  great  concern”  (Watson  1974,  96),  he  is  so  dedicated  to  international  legal 
development and law’s technical usefulness. Watson argues, for example, “the illogicality of 
legal development,” referring to the contradiction between the fact that “there would be little 
disagreement among modern lawyers that direct representation is of considerable advantage to 
a society. […] But Roman law never accepted agency or direct representation”, even if they 
knew about  the  concept  (Watson 1974,  34;  emphasis  added).  The generality of  Watson’s 
statement is possible, because he, as a ‘modern lawyer’, knows what is best, what is a ‘logical 
development’.
16 This is, for example, the view of Ruskola, who characterizes Watson as “an ardent foe of functionalism for 
decades” (Ruskola 2005, 280).
17 See also Watson 1984, xi: 
“Humans are social animals, and various mechanisms, […] have developed to enable them to live 
(relatively) peacefully in society.  Law is one such mechanism […]. Within the context of the  
process law has two necessary roles: a claim of legal right or power is needed to call the process  
into being, and law is used to validate the decision. To fulfill  these functions, law […] has to 
achieve some express linguistic formulation.”
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Watson's relationship with the pair ‘law’ and ‘development’ is clear when he states, on 
the one hand, that “the doctrine of a general pattern of development has come […] to obscure 
the actual development of the legal system” (Watson 1974, 15), and, on the other hand, he  
believes in a proper development to be achieved. He argues thus that legal systems have not 
developed all following a general pattern, but they could, and most importantly they should, 
develop towards qualitatively better law; that is law that is increasingly beyond ambiguity, 
following specific  reasonable requirements such as responsiveness,  comprehensibility,  and 
comprehensiveness as his model of two-tier law allegedly does. 
This contradictory approach, however, is not only a problem of Watson’s arguments. 
Moreover,  the  modern  concept  of  development  brings  this  tension  in  itself.  The  word 
‘development’ refers etymologically to the  idea of un-wrapping, and thus to unfold innate 
potentials and latent possibilities. Since it refers to a change in time, this concept can refer to 
what already has been the path of chronological change, or it can refer to the path something 
takes in the future, which from a mechanistic or organic point of view, is foreseeable or at 
least  imaginable and maybe even manipulable by human beings. It  encompasses thus, the 
nature  of  things  and  the  manipulability  of  reality.  The  uncertainty  of  the  future  and  the 
ambiguous meaning of ‘development’ is solved, from a modern perspective, by equating both 
meanings  of  development:  the  one  referred  to  the  past  which  is  one  in  its  factuality, 
unchangeable and universally true, and the other referred to the future which is plural in its 
potentialities, unknown, unreachable, subject to change and thus different from the known – 
like  the  ‘other’ of  any identity.  This  equation  synthesizes  both  aspects  through  one  key: 
rational development. One specific development, namely the rational, which is necessarily the 
one undergone by reasonable people, namely the speaker, can unfold properly.  This is the 
belief at the core of movements like  Law and Development as well as academic proposals 
like Watson's approach to legal development and legal transplants.
Despite the failure of the law-and-development movement, in the present, the relevance 
of legal transfer as a tool for international development has not decreased. In fact, the role of 
legal development and legal aid projects continues to be determinant. One clear example can 
be  seen  in  the  requirements  that  were  formulated  for  China’s  entry  in  the  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO; Kong 2002). As Ruskola states, the rule of law projects offered to China 
“draw implicitly on the idea that China’s indigenous legal resources are inadequate to the task 
of governing China and that China is dependent on Western assistance in putting together a 
‘real’ legal  order”  (Ruskola  2005,  292).  According  to  an  impact-response  paradigm,  that 
recovers the dichotomies between West and East, “China is essentially static and would be 
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consigned to the dustbin of History, but for the interventions of the West” (Idem). However, as 
Donald C. Clarke suggests, the claim that China lacks a system of  ‘rule of law’ typically 
“leaves [...] unjustified its most crucial component: the ideal against which the Chinese legal 
system is identified and measured” (Clarke 2003, 99). 
However, beyond the traditional legal aid amongst states, the legal development aid18 
has gone further, achieving the dimension of regional integration. As an answer to national 
‘underdevelopment’, the development of regional integration, for example through institutions 
like Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, is set as a new goal19. Arguably, it “contributes 
to diminish the historical dependency of Latin America in relation to developed countries” 
(Vieira/Reschke  de  Borba  2010,  216),  but  the  path  of  development  is  equally  preset  by 
‘developed  countries’.  Again,  the  arguments  for  a  ‘true’  regional  integration  sound 
ambivalent: the states should give their sovereignty, in order to defend, as a supranational 
entity,  social  interests  in  front  of  the  developed nations.  At  the same time,  integration is 
alleged to be the only way for the state to remain autonomous, since for now, they are seen as  
provinces of hegemonic states (Idem, 218). 
The  wished  direction  for  this  development,  however,  is  clear:  “with  an  optimist 
perspective, even if Mercosur is yet a very incipient project, the tendency is that it continues 
advancing  towards  a  more  complete  integration,  following  the  example of  the  European 
Union,  conserving the needed proportions  and respecting the differences,  even if  slowly” 
(Idem,  217;  emphasis  added).  Thus,  also  here  it  is  true  what  Ruskola  concluded  for  the 
Chinese case: “there is an implicit assumption […] about the self-evident Western-ness of all 
possible forms of legal modernity,  and the expectation that the expansion of markets will 
naturally  ‘civilize’ [Chinese]  subjects  of  despotism into  (liberal)  legal  subjects”  (Ruskola 
2005, 293). How is it possible then, that we expect the development of modern law to be able  
to encompass socio-cultural diversity, if, because of the mere concept of the development of 
modern  law  framing  our  question,  only  one  legal  development  assumed  as  rational  and 
functional, is imaginable?
18 It  is  important  to underline that  nowadays,  the concept of ‘development aid’ has been replaced by the 
allegedly more politically correct ‘development cooperation’. While the use of the term ‘cooperation’ seems 
to respond adequately to some of the critiques presented by postdevelopmental authors, putting the ‘Third  
World’ in a cooperation effort amongst equals, it is not possible to say that this change in the name given to  
the project is reflected in the carrying out of the project itself.
19 See  for  example,  the  professional  development  seminar  ‘Diálogo  Jurisdiccional  entre  las  Cortes  de  
Integración  Europeas  y  Latinoamericanas’ ('Jurisdictional  Dialogue  between  the  Integration  Courts  in 
Europe and Latin America') in Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil (27-29 October 2010), which was co-founded by the 
German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,  the  Austrian University of  Innsbruck and the  Institute  for  Judicial  
Training of Paraná (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2010).
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IV.  Closing Remarks  
The aim of this first chapter was to inquire the place of pluralism in a modern perspective on 
law and legal development.  Starting from a perspective on modernity as a specific socio-
lingusitic situation characterized by ambiguity and later by ambivalence, law showed to play a 
major role for the understanding of modernity and for the self-understanding of modern man. 
Most  importantly,  in  this  process  of  identification  of  modern  man  and  modern  society, 
understood as a new man and a new society, radically different from the past ones, law not 
only forms ‘modern man’ and ‘modern society’, but in order to do this, it also necessarily has 
to form the non-modern as radically different, as opposite.
In this context, I have presented modern law as a perspective on normativity that is 
marked  by the  intention  to  overcome  ambiguities  through  a  higher  reason.  Equally,  this 
normative system is marked by a certain ambivalence regarding its content to which law itself 
has to respond with procedural and formal strategies in order to maintain its claim for solving 
conflicts. Thus, it is this strained position the one that seems to give law its validity. 
Between overcoming ambiguity and maintaining a certain ambivalence, what remains 
present is the purpose of overcoming opposition – an opposition that is determined as such as 
the result of the radical difference stated by the same reason that later pretends to overcome it. 
But if that reason is seen as universally valid, any difference equals opposition, an opposition 
to  be overcome.  Difference and thus  diversity itself  are,  thus,  aspects  of reality that  turn 
problematic from the perspective of a law that requires a position to be taken on one side, the 
side of the truth. Many truths, or many rationalities, are not thinkable for this model. This 
finds expression equally in the perspective of law towards development.
According  to  this  analysis,  the  concept  of  modern  law  is  linked  directly  to  a 
unidirectional  conception  of  development.  The  more  ambiguity  is  overcome,  the  more 
developed is law, conceived as a formal/moral structure. The consequence of this thinking 
was the export of legal paradigms in the name of development, that was practised through 
colonial imposition as well as in processes that were apparently separated from questions of 
international  hegemony,  like  the  creation  of  the  Nation-State.  The  abstract  and  universal 
perspective on law itself turned to be the goal of modern development, creating a hierarchy of 
legal systems according to an Eurocentric modern approach.
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Modernity, law, and progress form thus an inseparable triad. Without a law understood 
as modern law, the idea of social and economic progress, and therefore social development 
itself, are not conceivable. In this context the legal development through ‘legalization’ and 
‘legal transfer’ turned to be an essential part of the idea of social and political development.
Problematic  is,  however,  that  if  we envisage  the  development  of  modern  law as  a 
progression towards ever less ambiguity and less chance for conflict, towards more clarity 
through positive law as well as towards truer values, development is incompatible with the 
existence  of  the  radical  difference  that  it  assumes  to  exist  incarnated  in  the  Other. 
Encountering this other will always imply conflict; it will always mean to put these values and 
our self-image into question. It is this tension that is overcome by the apparent neutrality of 
conceiving of law as a mere tool with universal validity and with trade-value. Developing the 
Other or helping it to develop, or the other way around, to develop according to pre-stated 
standards of good law, assumes this neutrality and disregards the symbolic world connected 
with normativity in general. Most importantly, in this way, reflection regarding which are the 
cultural  implications  of  specific  legal  understandings  that  are  ‘exported’ or  ‘imported’ is 
avoided and diversity is subordinated to ‘good law’ in the name of development. These are the 
critiques that postmodern thinkers will pose and which I will discuss in detail in the next 
chapter.
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B. Postmodern Critiques on Law and Development
I.  Postmodern Approaches and Pluralisms  
In the first chapter, I presented some elements that are relevant for the question of law and 
development. Mainly, these were questions addressed to the most prevalent understandings of 
law in academy and social life, that names itself as ‘modern’. Referring to several researchers 
who  investigate  diverse  legal  fields,  I  inquired  into  some  of  the  premisses  that  these 
understandings of ‘modern law’ assume explicitly or implicitly. However, this presentation, as 
any other inquiry, responds itself to a specific understanding of law, language, development, 
transfer, social organization, etc. Necessarily, all these ideas addressing ‘modern law’ as a 
topic of discussion, do not develop in a void space. One of the basic assumptions made is, for  
example, that something like ‘modernity’ exists and that the writer can talk  about it,  what 
requires some distance from the object observed. In fact, the reflections that I presented are 
closely related  with  several  approaches  that  are  usually  put  together  under  the  umbrella-
concept of postmodernity. 
But what makes them actually postmodern? Continuing with Zima's approach, it makes 
sense to interpret these perspectives as postmodern because of the socio-linguistic situation in 
which they are embedded and that they reflect. Reviewing the discussion of last chapter, some 
of  the  most  salient  concepts  and topics  that  I,  referring  to  several  authors,  have  used to 
address  the  question  of  law  and  development  critically,  are:  identity,  modernity,  reason, 
myths, legitimacy, subordination, a rhetoric of augmentation (“towards more”), the possibility 
of an argument, exclusion, vectorality (or linearity), the normative or ideological aspects of 
seemingly neutral definitions and categories, the Other, the superposition of historical and 
present ‘others’, authority, law as a tool, and paradigm, amongst others. Equally, one of the 
most  clear  strategies  to  develop  my  argument  has  been  to  blur  the  difference  between 
seemingly opposites, showing, for example, that positivistic and naturalistic approaches to 
law are expressions of the same underlying endeavor.  I have pointed out equally to blurs 
between  written  and  non-written,  as  well  as  between  moral  and  reason,  and  even  blurs 
regarding time like in the expression that  constant  (legal)  review in pursue of a different 
future recreates the past.
All of these are elements that remit to a critical and distantiated attitude of what, from 
the same perspective, is recognized as not anymore sufficient to understand experience, and 
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which  is  subsumed  under  the  label  of  ‘modern  approaches’.  Confronted  with  clear 
differentiations,  I  took  a  skeptical  position  in  front  of  the  divisory limit  that  created  the 
difference, and revised the context in which this limit was created, as well as which were the 
assumptions  that  made  those  differences  necessary.  An  important  element  in  these 
perspectives  of  inquiry  to  which  I  refer  as  postmodern  is  that  they  search  to  formulate 
questions  that  somehow step  back  from the  ‘actual’ topic  of  discussion  and  ask  what  is 
implicit in the way chosen to envisage this topic in this specific way and discuss it in this 
manner. This is why some authors see the beginning of postmodernity “with the first doubt in 
the thought of the eldest of the forerunners” of modernity, like Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), 
René Descartes (1596-1650) or Isaac Newton (1642/3-1727) (Dietrich 2008, 253).  In this 
sense, postmodernity is envisaged as a “state of mind and soul” based on doubt, in the non-
belief in the all-encompassing explanations, the big narratives or méta-récits, of modernity. In 
the words of Jacques Rancière (*1940), “somehow postmodernity was simply the name under 
which a number of artists and thinkers have become aware of what modernity was” (Rancière 
2006, 47)20. 
Equally, criticism in front of law, and more specifically in front of law's hierarchy, is not 
new in legal philosophy and legal theory. On the contrary, already classics of legal sociology 
like  Karl  Marx,  Max  Weber,  Eugen  Ehrlich  (1862-1922)  and  a  myriad  of  contemporary 
theories have confronted the paradoxes of law. In fact, as I have argued before referring to the 
role of reform in law, this critique is part of the functioning system of law and the state, which 
as  constructions  designed to  develop always  in  direction  to  an ever  better  world,  require 
opposition. As Gunther Teubner (*1944) writes, the paradoxes within law were long known 
“jurisprudential conundra” (Teubner 1997, 771). As an example, “noncontractual foundations 
of  contract  and  nonorganizational  foundations  of  organization  have  been  politicized  by 
Hobbes,  historicized  by Savigny,  and  socialized  by Durkheim”  (Idem).  Equally,  Ruskola 
states regarding the presence of Orientalism in law, that the assertion of a ‘real’ civil law 
beyond  the  West  is  a  figure  that  legal  scholars  have  been  offering  for  sacrifice  and 
resuscitating cyclically (Ruskola 2005, 271). Nothing different is the case with many other 
aspects of the most wide-spread conception of law, that have been put as the background for  
legal research and practice. How come that now we, researchers and practitioners of the law, 
but  also other  individuals  and social  groups outside  of  the rather  small  circle  of  persons 
related  immediately  with  the  field  of  law  and  legal  theory,  develop  again  new  critical 
20 Importantly, referring to art, he states, that modernity was the “desperate attempt to base the ‘particular of 
the art’ on a simple teleology of evolution and of historical breaks” (Idem).
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perspectives in front of law and return to the elder questionings with increased impetus? Is it 
this time any different than in the past, when all these critiques were raised? Why is it worth 
to reflect now again on these questions? Why would they make a difference now?
I would not go as far as Teubner, when he states that all the past critiques have been 
insufficient to provoke changes in the practice of law (Idem, 767 f.). Especially using a broad 
concept of law that includes more than the actions of state officials, and taking into account 
the political developments at an international level, it is possible to assert that a lot of changes 
have happened, even if they were seldom made explicit or if they passed unnoticed by civil 
society or  even by legal  scholarship.  However,  what  is  easy to  perceive  is  an increasing 
nervousness in the academic and political field around the question on how is it possible to 
justify the ways to deal with law as we have been doing until now. The calls for a different 
approach have turned louder. The need for a change of perspective, and thus, a change in how 
we do things, has become more urgent, even if the question about the direction of that change 
is still unresolved. 
Some  authors  ascribe  the  main  changes  in  legal  practice  to  the  challenges  that 
globalization poses,  understanding globalization as  the  development  of  a  worldwide  legal 
system that emerges from the fact that “legal communication takes place on a global scale” 
(Idem, 769). The main factor in the questioning of legal hierarchy could be the existence of a 
‘fragmented globalization’, meaning “the difference between a highly globalized economy 
and weakly globalized politics”, so that “a global law” emerges “that has no legislation, no 
political  constitution,  no  politically  ordered  hierarchy  of  norms  which  could  keep  the 
contractual paradox latent” (Idem, 771 f.). The globalization of law, bringing about laws that 
are being produced without the state, even though partly in interaction with it, as Teubner 
exemplifies  with the  lex  mercatoria, is  accounted  as  the phenomenon “that  is  killing the 
sovereign-father and making the legal paradox visible” (Idem).  
Nevertheless, the same can be said about the local level. While at a global level, the 
state seems to loose its role as only protagonist in regard to the development and enforcement 
of a working normative system, also at an intra-state level it starts to evidence fractures that 
cannot  leave  the  perspective  on  a  monolithical  state-law system intact.  For  example,  the 
outburst  of  claims  of  regional  autonomy made mainly by indigenous  groups in  the  most 
different regions of the world (Gabriel/Latautonomy 2005) as well as the relentless critiques 
stated against  the abuse of  the state  power argued by politically engaged NGOs, and the 
existence of social  groups with enough power to enforce their  own normative parameters 
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beyond the state's concern21 have been scratching the state's image as the only legitimated 
authority which could grant a guarantee in terms of normative enforcement. Wider awareness 
of these local scratches within the state and local perception of the effects of situations at a 
global level beyond the state, change equally the actions taken within, without and beyond the 
state (law) system. Globalization and vernacularization are two strains of the same impulse. In 
any case, the predictability and certainty of law with its center in the Nation-State is rent. 
This crisis of the certainty of law is just an aspect of a more comprehensive struggle. At 
a more general level, the socio-political developments in the aftermath of the Second World 
War have been decisive in creating a field where all these questions became decisive. The 
alternatives available after 1945 were restricted basically to two positions in clear opposition, 
that became more and more hardened.22 The social movements critical of the state as a source 
of repression gained force and their combative attitude from this circumstance, pluralizing the 
foci of tension. It is the generation which grew up in this context of post-World War II and the 
parallel building up of the Cold War the one that was going to be the leading force of strong 
social rights movements in the 1960's.0's. Several revolutionary movements reacted in front of 
their social environment, which they perceived as oppressive. Thus, freedom and peace turned 
to be leading claims, framed, nevertheless, by a contestatory attitude. The movements fighting 
for  civil  rights,  for  women's  rights,  for  nuclear  disarmament,  against  racism,  against  the 
Algerian War, against the Vietnam War, amongst many others, can be seen as expressions of 
different types of resistance; a resistance that is always defined by its opposite. This resistance 
found expression equally in diverse movements with revolutionary character at both sides of 
the divide of the Cold War, like the Prague spring (Pražské jaro) and the French May (Mai 
68). In Germany, the students protests were directly linked to the critical engagement with the 
Nazi-past of contemporary society, most directly with state institutions, and to the theoretical 
background offered by the Critical Theory of the School of Frankfurt.  While in France the 
protests almost caused the collapse of the president General Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970), 
and in Germany they formed the base for the creation of the terrorist organization Rote Armee 
Fraktion (RAF), in other contexts the movement acquired anti-dictatorship character, like in 
Spain against Francisco Franco (1892-1975) and in Argentina against the ongoing dictatorship 
presided at that time by Juan Carlos Onganía (1914-1995). Hence, the oppositional character 
21 A well known example in this regard is Sousa Santos’ research on the favela (slum) of Pasárgada in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil (Sousa Santos 1977).
22 In fact, belonging to a ‘third party’ of Non-Aligned countries was a position difficult to maintain and it did  
not mean the non-involvement in the conflict between Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and 
United States of America. The price to be paid, as we will see later, was to be doomed into the category of 
the underdeveloped Third World.
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and the radical attitude of the social movements in this period can be found in very different  
socio-political environments. This time, a period of big  turmoil had been ignited without a 
formal war declaration with clear battlefields.
It is important to remark that the majority of the most combative movements were either 
successfully suppressed by the state (partly in cooperation with paramilitary forces), like in 
Spain, Argentina and Mexico, or lost their force quite quickly, like in France after the call for 
parliamentary elections. In fact, after the outburst of radical critique, some of the opposed 
structures of power emerged with more force than they had originally, as it was the case with 
the Gaullist party. Equally, in the United States as well as in other parts of the world, the 
diverse  social  movements  calmed  down,  mostly  because  the  rebellious  momentum faded 
away and the rhetoric of civil rights, women's rights and racial equality was incorporated in 
the  main  structure  of  the  state  (the  same  as  the  hippie style  was  partly  incorporated  in 
mainstream culture in the United States). The movements basically lost their opponent and 
their reason to be. Thus, an overwhelming resignation and disappointment on the one hand, 
and a sense of meaninglessness and loss of all reasons to fight for was established amidst the 
same  groups  which  once  were  leading  in  their  resistance.  Despite  the  fact  that  these 
movements produced some social changes, the political flop was patent. This failure of the 
protestors,  who  were  to  a  large  extent  linked  to  intellectual  circles  with  leftist  political 
perspectives,  caused  a  deep  reflection  and  a  determinant  turn  in  political  criticism  and 
intellectual  engagement,  as  can  be  seen  even  in  personal  vitae,  for  example  in  Michel 
Foucault's (1926-1984) intellectual trajectory. Many of the intellectuals who lived this shift, 
when the concept of  being against  changed its  meaning and lost  great  part  of its  appeal, 
formed a central element of what developed then as postmodernist approaches. To be against 
a specific model of state or of economy was not enough. In turn, the whole conception of the 
world, including the left/right pendulum of politics, which then would be labeled as ‘modern’, 
was going to be put in question. 
In order to become aware of that ‘modern condition’ and exercise critique on it, however, the 
question of what does ‘modern’ mean had to be answered. In other words, the object of ‘the 
modern’ is  constructed  along  with  the  formation  of  the  ‘postmodern’.  As  the  concept  of 
‘postmodernity’ makes explicit,  whatever postmodern might mean, it is not detached from 
modernity. In fact, modernity builds its main point of reference. Being modernity its main 
concern, postmodern thinkers move around it, play with it, twist it. Postmodernity can thus be 
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conceived as twisting23 and radicalizing modernity through a critical engagement and not as a 
movement that says goodbye to ‘the modern’ (Dietrich 2008, 253). 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), often seen as the forerunner of postmodern critical 
attitude presented the problematic engrained in the premisses of modernity, stating: “This is in 
fact the characteristic of that ‘break’, of which everybody speaks as the primal affliction of 
modern culture, namely that the theoretical man is scared of his own consequences […]. He 
realizes how a culture that is based on the principle of science, has to perish, when it starts to 
be illogical, this is when it starts to withdraw from its own consequences” (Nietzsche 1983, 
650). However, what is interesting to observe in this context is that, using the terminology of 
Zima,  the  concept  of  postmodernity  itself  depicts  an  ambiguous  relationship  towards 
modernity,  because it  is  a  result  of  modern thinking that  yet  tries  to  be  different,  thus  it 
recovers modernity's ambiguity and ambivalence. It tries to be critical of the same thinking 
from which it emerges. In other words, postmodernity “twists rationality with rational means” 
(Dietrich  2008,  300).  Through  this  procedure  plural  postmodern  approaches  develop  that 
often contradict  each other.  Consequently,  the label of postmodern is in itself  elusive and 
contradicts  partly  postmodern  thought  itself,  since  it  creates  a  unity  that  can  (and  even, 
measured by its own rule, it should aim at) disintegrate itself. 
Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to say that postmodern thinking is just a name to gather 
some critical thoughts about past assumptions. As Zima underlines, this critical engagement 
takes with it a change in the way to deal with critique itself. Critique develops when reflection 
is  made  from a  different  standpoint,  with  a  different  method,  using  different  examples, 
achieving a different conclusion or when a difference in any other respect is present. When a 
socio-linguistic situation allows for a clear-cut difference amongst the concepts used and the 
values used to measure arguments, it  is possible to confront an opinion giving a different 
value to or shifting the content of the concepts used. But when the critique stated refers to the 
mere existence of the concepts and values themselves on which a statement is grounded, the 
argument of the other simply disintegrates. Nothing remains to be opposed to. The differences 
proposed  by  the  person  talking  to  us  are  blurred  and  they  do  not  have  a  meaning  by 
23 Dietrich refers in this context particularly to the German term ‘Verwindung’, which is used explicitly by the 
key thinker of post-modern philosophy Gianni Vattimo (*1936) in his interpretation of Martin Heidegger, 
who  utilized  this  word  in  his  ‘The  End of  Philosophy’ (1973).  Referring  to  the  relation  than  can  be 
established with metaphysics from a contemporaneous perspective, Vattimo argues that, instead of aiming at  
a futile negation of them or ‘overcoming’ (Überwinden) them, assuming a continuous movement to an ever 
better, ever higher, ever truer idea, one “cannot do otherwise than establish a relation of Verwindung: one of 
resigned acceptance of continuation, of distortion” (Vattimo 1997, 53). In this sense, the term refers to an  
incorporation that does not produce a more elevated result, but  a transformed, distorted or twisted one 
(Koppensteiner 2009, 18 ff.).
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themselves anymore, but their meaning resides exactly in the manipulation they are open to. 
The focus is not anymore in what the other says, but in what he does not say, the differences 
he does not make explicit, the continuities he leaves unstated. Thus, the discussion turns a bit 
spectral. I do not only discuss with you and the arguments you present. I discuss with you and 
all the phantoms of the things you consciously or unconsciously did not say but are present, 
behind your words. Even more, it is not only about your phantoms, but my own ghosts are 
part of the exchange. Is it possible to exchange at all? Who is the subject speaking if he is 
directed by all sorts of ghosts? And, most relevant for our topic, once differences are blurred, 
why would be one decision better or a statement more true? If it is not the argumentative 
difference, then what makes a decision better than another one? In short, after overcoming 
ambiguity  turns  impossible,  what  remains  is  the  question  on  how  to  deal  with  the 
impossibility of justifying a generally valid differentiation; absolute differentiation and total 
lack of difference are two sides of the  cul-de-sac  of the postmodern malaise. Postmodern 
sociolect is thus marked by the game with particular standpoints, and in its radical variants, 
with  their  exchangeability.  Thus,  the  twist  of  critique  has  serious  epistemological 
consequences,  being  critique  –  together  with  observation,  which  requires  equally  a  clear 
subject in front of a clearly limited world outside of the observer – at the base of science. At 
the same time, this twist is of great importance for political life, a realm based often on the 
exercise of critical opposition.
Assuming  that  the  standpoint  taken  is  the  result  of  a  choice  of  (or  at  least  of  a 
subordination under) a set of ideas, implies that this standpoint taken is only one possibility 
amongst many others with equal validity in their own context. Thus, it is no wonder that the  
concept  of  postmodernity  itself  includes  a  plurality  of  different  and  even  contradictory 
practices  and  expressions,  since  postmodern  discussion  itself  puts  the  focus  in  alterity, 
plurality and diversity. As Wolfgang Welsch (*1946) underlines, “plurality is the key concept 
of  postmodernity.  All  the  topoi known  as  postmodern  –  the  end  of  the  meta-narratives, 
dispersion of the subjects, decentralization of meaning, synchronicity of the asynchronous, 
impossibility  of  synthesizing  the  varied  lifeforms  and  patterns  of  rationality  –  are 
understandable  in  the  light  of  plurality”  (Welsch  1991,  xv).  In  fact,  according  to  Zima, 
although the topic of globalization is central for postmodern discussion in different areas like 
ecology, political studies and technological research, the tendency towards particularism is 
even  stronger  (Zima  2001,  31).  In  any  case,  these  two  elements,  globalization  and 
particularism, are not exclusive of each other, but they refer to each other. A perception of 
increasing interaction at a global level, remits to the question of the entities that participate in 
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that interaction and that, while forming the Oneness of the globe are somehow beyond its 
uniformity.  Who  forms  the  globe?  Who  has  agency  in  the  globe?  If  recognizing  that 
interaction has increased in a way that it involves the whole globe implies that we leave the 
national state in the second row of our spectrum of attention, then what remains are groups 
that do not respond anymore to the criteria of a Nation-State. The focus of attention goes thus 
to  the broader  (the globe)  and to the more specific (particular entities)  at  the same time, 
because it is the same motor that gives force to these moves from a centralized perspective to 
one that is decentralized or shows plural centers.
Most  importantly,  there  is  no  clear  unified  criteria  to  determine  which  groups  are 
relevant  and  thus  the  categories  used  for  addressing  particularity  are  not  exclusive. 
Consequently,  the  particularistic  tendency  Zima  talks  about  refers  equally  to  indigenous 
groups as to women or homosexuals. All of these categories are referring to groups that are 
not mutually exclusive. Mirroring this attitude, postmodern critiques are made from as many 
particular  perspectives  as  possible.  Thus,  postmodern  quests  can  be  found  equally  from 
feminist perspectives, as in the field of anthropology and cultural studies, in queer studies and 
in post-colonial studies, in neo-Marxist, politically conservative or ecological research. All of 
them though, have a strong focus in the question for the role of the particular and set it in the  
context of their own field of study. Naturally, contradictions amongst postmodern approaches 
are part of the results that can be expected of such a situation. However, this ‘problem’ of the 
existence of contradiction is no longer as serious, because from a perspective that puts in 
question  monolithic  rationality,  contradiction  is  not  anymore  a  no-go zone,  as  it  is  for  a 
mindset oriented to overcoming ambiguity.
This tendency towards particularism is a result of the rejection of the model of universal 
reason, that has been formulated by  Jean-François  Lyotard (1924-1998) clearly: there is no 
one reason, but only several reasons. This is an approach to reason that cannot and does not 
want to offer final truths. In fact it mistrusts itself and calls for a continuous reinterpretation. 
Consequently, Francisco Muñoz reasons that “events reach the human consciousness through 
a symbolic or conceptual mediation. […] In a certain sense, there are no events as such, just 
symbolically measured interpretations” (Muñoz 2006, 251). The central role of interpretation 
underlines the importance of context for postmodern research. Seeing experience as a never-
ending text that can be read in different ways, the context, which is outside of the text itself,  
gains a central position in order to develop and understand different interpretations.
These continuous new interpretations imply a pluralization of meaning and, even more, 
postmodern thought invites to a pluralization of the interpreter himself, since it is him the one 
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who is called to doubt of himself, of his own reasonable interpretation and create a new one. 
In the end, he has to abandon the coherent unity of himself as subject since it is based on an 
identity  that  was  never  given  as  such  in  its  totality  and  absoluteness,  but  was  always 
delineated through specific practice in specific contexts. It is just one amongst many possible 
subjects  (Foucault  1996,  10),  one  amongst  many  possible  identities  that  can  be  chosen, 
putting in question the structure they depend on. Thus, subverting that structure becomes an 
essential element of postmodern approach. Some of the most renowned exponents for this 
exercise  of  subversion  are  Judith  Butler's  (*1956) critique  to  the  concept  of  identity and 
subject  of  normative  heterosexuality  ('Gender  Trouble:  Feminism and  the  Subversion  of 
Identity’, 1990) and Said's equal critic  of the construction of Western and Oriental subjects 
('Orientalism’, 1978). As we will see later, the pluralization of meaning and the crisis of the 
subject will affect also the modern concept of legal development, and the structure of modern 
law will  be equally subverted.  But first,  I  will  recall  the changes produced regarding the 
academic treatment of identity, otherness and plurality in light of this new sociolect.
The problematic of identity expressed itself with particular gravity in a field of research that 
defined  itself  by the  study of  ‘the  Other’ as  such,  namely  anthropology.  The  process  of 
self-reflective engagement in this  field had been developing increasingly from the 1950's. 
Parallel  to  the  revision  in  1951  of ‘Notes  and  Queries  on  Anthropology'24,  an  important 
resource for academic anthropological research at the time, several publications appeared that 
are  symptomatic  for  the change of perspective,  like  Oscar  Lewis’ (1914-1970) ‘Life  in  a 
Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied’ (1951), who revised previous work on that area and 
questioned  the  clear  division  between  urban  and  rural,  a  division  at  the  base  of 
anthropological studies.25 It was also around this time, that the field of legal anthropology 
received a major impulse. At the same time, in 1951, Edward E. Evans-Pritchard (1902-1973) 
argued  that  “a  combination  of  the  notion  of  scientific  law and that  of  progress  leads  in 
anthropology […] to procrustean stages, the presumed inevitability of which gives them a 
normative quality”, rejecting thus that “social life could be reduced to scientific laws” as, 
24 First published in 1874 with the subtitle “For the Use of Travelers and Residents in Uncivilized Lands”, 
Notes and Queries was produced by the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and published 
by the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.
25 In tune with the call for development, this author would engage later in the research of what he named the 
‘culture  of  poverty’,  which  in  turn,  conformed  the  base  for  social  programs  for  economic-cultural  
development ‘out of poverty’ like the program ‘Oportunidades’ in Mexico (World Bank 2004, 2009 and 
2010). Interestingly, thus, the division urban-rural that he questioned originally was replaced later by the 
rich-poor  dichotomy.  ‘Culture’ was  no  longer  determined  by the  space  and  type  of  work,  but  by the  
economical question – a reduction that the same concept of development would suffer.
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according to his presentation, was the perspective taken by previous anthropological research 
(Evans-Pritchard  1951,  42).  As  he  asserted  for  the  new  generation  of  anthropologists  in 
comparison  with  their  predecessors,  “we  are  less  certain  today  about  the  values  they 
accepted” (Idem, 41), including the belief in progress and “the assumption they had inherited 
from  the  Enlightenment  that  societies  are  natural  systems,  or  organisms,  which  have  a 
necessary course of development that can be reduced to general principles or laws” (Idem, 
42).  In  fact,  in  previous research  on ‘Witchcraft,  Oracles  and Magic Among the Azande’ 
(1937), he inquired into the meaning of reason and rationality, taking a position of cultural 
relativism.
This tendency of self-inquiry continued with titles like the more encompassing revision 
proposed in ‘Reinventing anthropology’ edited by Dell H. Hymes (1927-2009) in 1969. Later, 
Clifford Geertz’ (1926-2006) works on interpretative anthropology (e.g. ‘The Interpretation of 
Cultures’, 1973) and David M. Schneider's (1918-1995) research of symbolic anthropology, 
started a movement that would lead, lastly, to a radical turn in the 1980's, exemplified by 
James Clifford's (*1945) ‘Writing Culture:  the Poetics and Politics of Ethnography’ (edited 
with George Marcus in 1986), a milestone of postmodern anthropology. From this standpoint, 
anthropology was seen as a “representational genre” (Nugent 2006, 442). Central concepts of 
anthropology were presented as illusions, as Adam Kuper (*1941) exemplified in 1988 with 
his  publication  ‘The Invention  of  Primitive  Society:  Transformations  of  an  Illusion’. The 
problematic of engaging with the Other is expressed clearly also in the title of Nicole Polier 
and William Roseberry: ‘Tristes Trops: Postmodern Anthropologists Encounter the Other and 
Discover  Themselves’  (1989).  Nevertheless,  postmodernism  had  a  very  differentiated 
influence in anthropology and developed differently in the various fields according to the 
different roles of the field of anthropology in academic traditions (Idem, 443).  Partly,  the 
development of postmodern anthropology has been presented as an opening into the new field 
of Cultural Studies (Idem).
This connection is not surprising, since also Cultural Studies dealt critically with the 
interplay between ‘the Other’ and ‘the observer’, taking distance, as a research field, from the 
traditional  academic  environment.  It  started  its  academic  career  parallel  to  the  change of 
perspective experienced in anthropological research, making its presence official in the 1960's 
0's with the establishment of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham in 
1963. Originally combining sociology and literary criticism, it  attempted to overcome the 
elitism that marked the idea of ‘high culture’ inherited from humanism in social research. In 
turn, scholars of Cultural Studies engaged in the research of areas left unattended until then, 
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like  mass-media,  and  concentrated  equally  in  the  research  of  highly  political  questions 
involving, for example, class inequality. The influence of Louis P. Althusser's (1918-1990) 
structuralism and Antonio Gramsci's (1891-1937) concept of hegemony in the 1970's prepared 
the terrain for the reception in 1980's of poststructuralism and psychoanalytic theory (Franklin 
2006, 134). Thus, with the participation of figures like the Jamaican Stuart Hall, very critical 
works  around  topics  of  racism,  postcolonialism  and  feminism  developed,  power  and 
inequality being the main foci of attention. 
Through an eclectic methodology and an interdisciplinary approach, Cultural Studies 
are dedicated to research diverse practices, especially practices of resistance to hegemonic 
authorities. Most importantly for our concern, is that the perspective in front of otherness and 
violence as something embedded in language and daily activities, takes a central place. In 
fact, Cultural Studies defines itself through plurality and the coexistence of diversity already 
through the varied personalities who took part in this field as active researchers, as well as in 
the academic form they chose to present their interests and in the questions they asked. Firstly, 
they aim to access research through a variety of perspectives related more loosely with each 
other than the form of a clearly delineated discipline would require. Secondly, they aim to ask 
questions  about  particular  and  concrete  practices  rather  than  to  address  coherent 
all-encompassing unities identified as ‘a’ culture. In this sense, Cultural Studies can be seen as 
an expression of the concern for plurality in a postmodern context.
  
Importantly, the approaches mentioned until now are connected in one way or another with 
the current of thought of poststructuralism. Poststructuralism, as most ‘posts’ here discussed, 
derives and reacts to its predecessor and name-giver, in this case structuralism. Although, the 
concept  of  ‘structuralism’ designates  a  number  of  different  currents,  it  is  most  generally 
applied  to  a  tradition  in  linguistics  leaded  by  Ferdinand  de  Saussure  (1857-1913),  that 
influenced several fields of knowledge, most importantly anthropology through the work of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009) in the 1960's. Importing into the field of anthropology the 
ideas  of  Roman  O.  Jakobson  (1896-1982)  regarding  ‘structural  linguistics’ that  based  on 
Saussure's phoneme theory, where units were defined “by means of establishing conventional 
arbitrary contrasts” (Bloch 2006, 530 f.), Lévi-Strauss organized cultural knowledge in sets of 
contrasting  oppositions.  Following the idealistic  tradition  of  Immanuel  Kant  (1724-1804), 
structuralism is based on the assumption of an existing structure behind singular events, i.e. an 
“order  of  relations  and  dependencies  of  parts  in  relation  to  each  other  and  to  a  whole” 
(Dietrich  2008,  286).  Thus,  meaningful  communication  was  seen  as  the  result  of  the 
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placement of units into a structure and their relationship with each other, which was framed 
by binary contrasts. Understanding culture as shared information in the minds of individuals, 
culture itself had to be organized equally in structures. Rejecting functionalist theories of the 
time, it proposed that anthropology had to concentrate on the patterns that allowed human 
beings to “operate mentally in, and with, their environment” (Bloch 2006, 532). Although 
Lévi-Strauss himself always underlined that culture “never forms coherent wholes”, that “it is 
a matter of continual communication and modification between individuals which leads to 
endless  transformation,  and  how  its  nature  is  a  consequence  of  specific  neurological 
requirements of living people” (Idem, 535), the concept of structure acquired a life of its own 
in social research. Most importantly, it was linked with neo-Marxism in the 1970's and 1980's, 
providing a theoretical background for leftist social criticism. 
The notion of  structure was equally developed and strengthened by Sigmund Freud 
(1856-1939), who operated with the metaphor of the iceberg, that was going to be marking for 
the  way experience  was  thought  from then on.  Behind what  we see stands  an  immense, 
overwhelming and unknown structure that exerts power over us without our knowledge about 
it and which is always ready to emerge again from the darkness of the sea, whenever we cut  
the exposed part. This image might serve to understand an underlying question of the context 
in which structuralism developed, namely the interest to understand what was it, that, hidden 
in the basic structure of human beings, guided  the participation of whole societies in fascist 
violence. In the end, it was this historical and political situation which determined the exile of 
many intellectuals  and pioneers  of  anthropology an other  social  science,  like  Franz  Boas 
(1858-1942), Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) (who is seen also as a forerunner of structuralism 
because of his work on symbolic forms), and Lévi-Strauss himself.26 
Later on, in conjunction with new social experiences, structuralism's general theory was 
destabilized. Following the failed revolts of 1968 in Paris, this current transformed partly in 
what is called today poststructuralism. Michel Foucault, referring to academic Marxism – a 
main field of the application of structuralist approaches –, formulated the basic shortcoming 
that was reproached to this current: it “supposes, lastly, that the human subject, the subject of 
knowledge, even the forms of knowledge, are somehow previously and definitely given, and 
that the economic,  social  and political  conditions of existence do not do anything but  be 
deposited or imprinted in this subject that is given in a definite way” (Foucault 1996, 3). Thus, 
it was not sufficient to inquire the pure linguistic, structural, regular elements, but also the 
26 It was as an exile that he co-founded in 1942 the École Libre des Hautes Études (Free School for Advanced 
Studies) in New York, a sort of university-in-exile for francophone academics, where also Jakobson, equally 
a political exile, taught.
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polemic and strategic aspects of discourse should be considered (Idem, 4). The main attention 
moved thus from investigating an overarching structure,  in  which all  elements  are  neatly 
placed, to the discontinuities in the structure that had not been regarded and questioned the 
notion of structure itself. The problem pointed at now was that any structure refers to a certain 
basic center or central axiom around which the structure is organized. But who decides what 
is this center? The binary oppositions were created and implied a certain hierarchy, predefined 
quitely by the conscious or unconscious position of the scientists that pretended to formulate 
generally valid conclusions based on the principles guiding objective observation.
In order  to  avoid the violence towards  difference  implicit  in  assuming an  universal 
center, post-structuralism puts particularism at the center of attention. Taking this thought to a 
radical  expression,  Bauman  asserts  that  postmodernity  is  “incurably pluralistic”  (Bauman 
1992,  30)  and  “a  plethora  of  multiple  realities  and  universes  of  meaning”  (Idem,  40). 
According to him, postmodernity recognizes that the “diversity of lifeforms is irreducible” 
and sets this “in the rank of a highest positive value” (Bauman 1995, 127). In this particular 
case,  however,  it  is  interesting  that  while  Bauman  argues  for  the  pluralistic  character  of 
postmodernity, he remains skeptical of the concept of culture, which he relates to hierarchy 
and the  tendency to  standardization.  Thus,  he  rejects  the  idea  of  a  “postmodern  culture” 
because  it  would  imply  an  oxymoron,  a  contradiction  between  the  radical  plurality  of 
postmodernity and the homogenizing force of culture. However, the topic of culture has been 
central to the development of postmodern critiques. At a level of conceptual and institutional 
academic development is exactly the development of Cultural Studies and research institutes 
dedicated to this field, what marks the establishment of a rhetoric of pluralism, particularism 
and diversity from a postmodern critical approach. Equally, in law, the reference to culture is, 
as we will see, the one that inquires into the violence of law and lastly puts in question the 
concept of law itself.
Basically, this is the question that postmodern approaches in all their guises will have to 
deal with in the end, and which many of these perspectives leave open. Because, however 
particular  these  perspectives  of  postmodern  research  might  be,  they  cannot  remain  only 
particular. They refer constantly to categories that are set with a certain general validity at 
least in the eyes of the researcher. Also these particular approaches claim somehow general 
validity. That is the reason for poststructuralists’ fighting against an overarching structure. 
This is the reason why, in the eyes of Dietrich, some of the postmodern  authors continue 
dealing with postmodern problematics in a somehow dualistic and idealistic way and thus, the 
critics to the existent situation degenerate in an idealistic “vision of the beauty of the small, 
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the plural, the weak, the slow, the vernacular” (Dietrich 2008, 308).  If their research is not 
oriented towards a broader claim of validity, the research itself is compelled to dissolve in the 
meaningless void of indifference. This other option, however, is the point that Zima remarks 
as dangerous, since indifference does not offer any  happy end  for the question of human 
interaction. In fact, it takes with itself the problem of incommunicability and a big potential 
for violence in all its forms. 
II.   Law and Postmodernity
After all these remarks around postmodernity, is it possible to speak of a postmodern concept 
of law? The first problem is, like for any concept, that it covers up the variety and diversity 
amongst the elements that it pretends to include and label. Most importantly, in this specific 
case,  we confront the problem that  the postmodern approach puts in question exactly the 
validity of unitary, homogenizing and seemingly uniform concepts, paying special attention to 
the violence implicit in  them. Law, as a term related directly with questions of violence and 
representation cannot stay immune to this affront. In fact, what I will present here under a 
conceptual umbrella of ‘postmodern legal thinking’ are the different ways to problematize law 
as a unified coherent concept.
To start with, we can underline that all of the questions presented in the first chapter are 
related to questions about the “mystic foundation of authority”, as Derrida puts it (Derrida 
1992).  Paul  Kahn as  well  as  Ruskola and other  critics  on which  I  based my analysis  of 
‘modern law’ in the first part of this investigation, refer to the founding authority of law not as 
something given, but as something created. In fact, as something created and invested with the 
label of ‘normality’ and ‘givenness’. The common basic structure of their arguments is to say 
that  there  is  something  else  guiding  the  ways  in  which  law is  presented,  perceived  and 
developed. There is something behind the assumed normal state that not only creates and 
maintains its  authority but  also makes us,  as  subordinates  to that  authority,  believe in its 
necessity and in its status as universally valid standard, and, most importantly, it compels us 
to recreate constantly that authority of the ‘normal’, which is in necessary opposition to the 
Other's exoticism. “What is that ‘it'?” is the question. Is ‘it’ a matter of identity? Is ‘it’ a 
perspective on time? Is ‘it’ a matter of power? Is ‘it’ a combination of all of this? Is ‘it’ just we 
– a ‘we’ lost in language? If the normality of law is a story we tell ourselves, who is the 
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storyteller? Why are we asking for a story? Can we step out of this story? Can we maybe just 
change the story, when we get at results that we do not like anymore?
In this section, I will present some of the theoretical discussions that put these questions 
on law to the foreground. Thus, I will first highlight some of the socio-linguistic elements that 
inform this critical approach to law, and, next, I will elaborate on some of the currents of legal 
theory  that  develop  from  this  background.  I  will  organize  this  review  on  postmodern 
approaches to law around some particular nodes that I see as recurrent in the questions posed 
in front of mainstream legal theory and practice.  It is not my intention here to propose a  
classification of postmodern topics, but rather to point at elements, actions and trends forming 
a thick fabric, where some aspects overlap, while others differ completely from each other. Of 
course, choosing these aspects evidences my own focus, which is determined by my interest 
on law's relation to plurality, on the one hand, and development, on the other. Although any 
other choice could be equally justifiable, with this approach, I just aim to offer an arguable 
interpretation that may be helpful at the time to understand some features of the ways we 
chose to deal with law, development and plurality. This inquiry will allow me later to ask how 
do these perspectives on law had an impact on approaches to legal development.
1.  One Justice for Many Subjects?  
Michel Foucault once summarized what could be named the ‘postmodern turn’ saying: “the 
Greek truth was once shocked by the simple sentence ‘I lie’. The sentence ‘I speak’ put the 
whole fiction of modernity to the test” (Foucault 2003, 208). While the confusion in the first 
case grounds lastly on the identity of the subject speaking and the object pointed at by the 
spoken ‘I’, in the second sentence, the apparent absolute certainty leaves the speaking subject 
disappear into an infinite echo – ‘I’ deludes into language. Is there an ‘I’ outside of language? 
If silence is its space, what are its boundaries, where its outside and inside, how can it take 
action, make decisions, be free and thus responsible? Thus, looking at his environment in 
France in the 1960's, Foucault asserted  that it has turned “important to think this fiction – 
while in former times it was all about thinking the truth –, because the ‘I speak’ works in the 
contrary direction of ‘I think’. The ‘I think’ led to the undeniable certainty of the I and its 
existence; the ‘I  speak’ recedes this  existence into the distance,  disperses it,  erases it  and 
allows only an empty space to appear” (Idem, 210). 
Postmodern thinking, as I have addressed it here, is the process and result of the tragic 
loss of certainty. It is tragic because it is a way of no return, the hero is dead. The critique is  
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no  longer  directed  to  an  object  outside  the  inquiring  subject,  who  could  achieve  more 
knowledge through further, more intense and accurate research. Moreover, the uncertainty, the 
mistrust, the inquiry, is uphold in front of the inquiring being itself. Postmodernist  scholars 
argue  that  the conception of  the  primacy of  the  subject,  based on Cartesian  and Kantian 
approaches to the subject, lies at the core of a modern perspective, setting it as the origin of 
the  possibility  of  knowledge  and,  consequently,  as  the  one  that,  through  application  of 
universal reason, made possible the access to truth (Foucault 1996, 4). But  knowledge does 
not have an origin, argues Michel Foucault. Referring to Nietzsche's ‘Gaya Scienza’ (1887), 
he criticizes this concept of one origin, and accentuates the role of invention as a result of the 
struggle amongst  plural forces that achieve a compromise, which is essentially a result of a 
game of power. Hence, the idea of a truth to be searched loses its foundation. Each truth has 
its ‘infamous’ characters, the non-represented and non-representable in the established order 
of things. For law, the question can be formulated in terms of judgment and justice. Which 
truth is the judge to seek for? Which justice are we looking for? If law and justice are just  
power-games, where is their legitimation? What is left out of the (allegedly all-encompassing) 
frame of law and justice?
If the origin of knowledge is doubted, equally, the correlation between knowledge and 
the object of knowledge is put into question. According to Foucault, the only guarantee for the 
modern assumption of the identity between the content of knowledge and the things of the 
world was God (Idem, 9). Once God was put in question by rational skepticism and put aside 
in regard to the justification of socio-political  life,  this certainty about the identity of the 
known with the outer world vanished. Applying this thought to the legal field, major problems 
arise. First, the conception that laws are created based on and addressing social facts turns 
void. Equally, we could say that there is no correlation between the judicial procedure and the 
final decision on the one hand, and the object of its decision on the other. How is it possible 
then to justify law and its application? Law as well as the subject are parts of an empty, silent,  
unreachable and unspeakable outside. Hence Foucault asserts that “law is not the foundation 
or inner prescription of behavior, but encloses it from the outside and deprives it thus of every 
interiority” (Foucault 2003, 220). Consequently, the law “is the dark, that wraps our behavior, 
the emptiness that involves it, that unconsciously transforms all its particularities into the gray 
monotony  of  the  universal  and  that  creates  a  room  of  misery,  of  dissatisfaction  and  of 
relentless eagerness” (Idem).
Loosing the subject's unitary identity has major consequences. Rights, understood as 
entitlements, always need a subject, and thus one of the main concerns of modern law was the 
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quality of the subject of rights: Who can have rights? And, more detailed, who can have what 
kind of rights? From the question of who is a (natural) person and which are the minimal 
limits  of age according to the law, to the problem if  there exists  a juridic person, and in 
international law the assertion of the state as a legal subject of law, the question about the 
subject of law is still central to legal theory and praxis. But postmodern approaches put in 
question this unified concept of the subject and its primacy. Thus, one of the main points on 
which the thought of law based, crumbled. If subjects are not anymore the governing owners 
over their rights, the powerful kings that make conscious use of their legal positions, how can 
law be conceived? Thus, the attention of postmodern approaches to law turned away from the 
subject of rights to the making of the law, the forces involved in that process (that surpassed 
the individual deeds even of judges) and the context in which they are embedded.
In this respect, Foucault's concern with the subject and its relation to law is shared by 
other postmodern authors like Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), whose influence on legal theory 
will be treated later. For now, it suffices to state that Derrida took a different stance on this 
respect. In fact, also for him, the subject as a category is blurred, with the result that there is 
not a ‘deconstructor’, as some followers of Derrida's work named themselves later (Balkin 
1994, 67). However, Derrida underlined the importance of bringing out the paradoxes of the 
subject, “and so of the responsible subject, of the subject of law (droit) and the subject of 
morality” (Derrida 1992, 8), thus invoking the subject back into his philosophy for matters of 
responsibility. Equally, the question on the accessibility to the category of legal subject, and 
thus to rights in the sense of formal law, was a central concern of Derrida (Idem, 18 f.).  
Bringing the subject back, as Derrida does, however, takes with it a plurality of difficulties, 
that I will examine in detail in the next section.
Also Foucault reincorporated the subject into his later philosophy. But this move did not 
mean a “return to a pre-archaeological – i.e. humanist or phenomenological – concept of the 
subject endowed with an inner essence or originary will that precedes and stands apart from 
the social” (Best/Kellner 1991, section 2.3.2). In fact, Foucault underlined that even assuming 
that “the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of the self, these 
practices  are  nevertheless  not  something that  the individual  invents  by himself.  They are 
patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested, and imposed on him 
by  his  culture,  his  society  and  his  social  group”  (Foucault  cit.  in  idem).  In  this  sense, 
Foucault's reborn subject, still embedded in a web of power relations, has his own power to 
define his own identity with certain freedom. Before he came back to the notion of subject 
and experience, however, his critique of an ultimate core of the subject inspired a review of 
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legal theory and many of the forming elements of law as formants of identities and specific 
forms of subjectivity, as the previously presented critics of Teemu Ruskola and Paul W. Kahn 
exemplify. 
Instead of assuming a core of the subject, the discourse analysis of Foucault asked for 
the continuous formation of this  subject through discourse, understood as an ensemble of 
strategies that are part of social practices (Foucault 1996, 5). In this context, law plays a major 
role as a social practice, or, better, as a complex of social practices, that allows to “locate the 
emergence of new forms of subjectivity” (Idem). Far from the restriction to formal, apparently 
fixed,  pre-established  law,  judicial  practices  are  conceived  as  ways  to  define  types  of 
subjectivity and relations between man and truth that go beyond the legal sphere (Idem). In 
fact, Foucault adduces that several forms of accessing and formalizing knowledge developed 
first in administrative and legal environments to be transferred later to the areas of science,  
like the inquiry during the Middle Ages and the later development of the examination in the 
19th century. 
Here, truth can be seen as having (at least) two stories: the first one as one that “corrects 
itself from its own regulatory principles”, the second one as one of the formation of truth 
through social interaction (Idem, 5). It is noteworthy that while the first form of truth that  
Foucault mentions, despite (or because of) its continuous re-alimentation for betterment, is 
identical with itself, and forms thus a unified entity, the second perspective on truth, has, from 
the start, a  pluralistic character. Firstly, being a second truth, it creates plurality itself in the 
field of  perspectives on truth;  secondly,  Foucault  speaks  of  “other  places”  where  truth is 
formed (Idem). He speaks thus of the “politics of truth” (Idem, 11). Knowledge and truth exist 
only in the “form of certain acts that are different of each other and multiple in their essence” 
(Idem, 12). 
Thus, the concept of ‘truth’, like many others, disgregates, loses its reason to be. In fact, 
truth becomes plural,  it  replicates itself in an infinite myriad of truths. As Gilles Deleuze 
(1925-1995) states: “We have the truth that we deserve, according to the place that we hold, to 
which time we are awake, in which element we are” (Deleuze 1991, 113). In this sense, truth 
is contingent, it  is dependent on time and space, and thus cannot claim universal validity 
(Dietrich 2008, 301). If truth is particularized and plural, it cannot build the base to solve any 
kind of conflict. Why should one truth weigh more than the other? As Jean-François Lyotard 
(1924-1998) reasons, understanding arguments as elements of heterogeneous language games 
to solve conflicts through a language that is beyond them, would be an act of injustice, it 
would  perform illegitimate  violence.  Through this  move,  the  parts  involved  in  a  conflict 
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would  be  subordinated  to  a  language  invested  with  a  higher  position  in  the  hierarchy, 
disregarding the intrinsic heterogeneity of language games, which Lyotard holds as a value for 
itself. 
In this sense, the use of law as a source of authority, subordinating the conflict to a 
specific language that declares itself as valid in the name of justice, would mean to commit 
injustice. Consensus, as, for example, Jürgen Habermas (*1929) puts it at the center of his 
philosophy of legitimation, does, in Lyotard eyes, “violence to the heterogeneity of language 
games” (Lyotard 1984, xxv). The search for universal consensus is put in question by Lyotard 
as basing on two wrong assumptions. Firstly, that “it is possible for all speakers to come to 
agreement  on  which  rules  or  metaprescriptions  are  universally valid  for  language games, 
when it is clear that language games are heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of 
pragmatic  rules”  (Idem,  65).  In  front  of  diversity,  how can we assume that  consensus  is 
achievable without exerting a form of violence? Secondly, Lyotard doubts that consensus is 
the goal of dialogue. In fact, for him, “consensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its 
end. Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy” (Idem, 65 f.). In the realm of science, this request 
for accepting different rules for the language game of knowledge finds its legitimation in the 
argument that “it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements” (Idem, 65). In social 
interaction, it is equally a matter of renovation and life, but, most importantly, it is a matter of  
justice, which, unlike consensus, has conserved its validity in Lyotard's view. In the context of 
the  assertion  of  the  value  of  heterogeneity,  Lyotard  argues  that  postmodern  knowledge 
“refines  our  sensitivity  to  differences  and  reinforces  our  ability  to  tolerate  the 
incommensurable”  (Idem,  xxv).  Law,  as  an  instrument  of  standardization,  would  thus  do 
violence to the justice it proclaims to enact, a justice that requires the interaction of different 
language games.
Through his remarks, Lyotard reacts in front of a perspective in front of conflicting 
diversity that is oriented to consensus, as Habermas proposes in his pursue for a balance in a 
world of pluralities. In his own terms, Habermas aims for the completion of the project of 
modernity, for a reconcilement of modernity with itself. Holding to a self-critical concept of 
modernity,  he  puts  to  the  front  the  need  to  realize  the  emancipatory  potential  of  the 
Enlightenment  into  modern  societies.  Although  he  sees  contemporaneous  society  from a 
critical  perspective,  he,  different  than  Lyotard,  regards  Enlightenment  highly  for  its 
contribution to the emancipation of the individuals from feudalism. Thus, modernity is, from 
Habermas’ perspective,  directly  linked  to  the  coexistence  of  diversity,  even  more,  to  the 
coexistence  of  diversity  beyond  (illegitimate)  oppression.  In  his  eyes,  the  problematic 
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situation we find us today in derives from a lack of emancipation, from the fact that humans 
continue to be objects, now not anymore of feudalism, but of money and power.
Thus,  he  invokes  a  liberation  of  humanity  from  that  reification  (Verdinglichung) 
postulating  the  lifeworld  (Lebenswelt)  as  a  common  horizon  of  understanding  that  is 
reproduced by the medium of communicative action (Habermas 1986, 546).  Interestingly, 
Habermas resorts to a differentiation between an ideal concept of lifeworld on the one side, 
and, on the other side, a sociologically ‘real’ lifeworld, which is the one where dissent and 
power play a role. The ideal abstract lifeworld is the one which poses the horizon of an ideal  
situation of dialogue as a universal constant. To be more accurate, we speak here about the 
generalized  ideal  that  Habermas  has  of  a  dialogue,  which  presupposes  a  sahred  will  to 
understand our interlocutor and a shared presupposition of our interlocutor's corresponding 
will (Habermas 1971, 136). Most problematic seems to me, Habermas’ assumption that in this 
ideal situation, which is itself – as an ideal – supposedly shared, the best argument wins. But 
the question is still:  the best  argument for whom, according  to which standards? Who is 
going to say which is the best argument? Ideally, it does not matter, because there is ‘a’ better  
argument valid for ‘all’ interlocutors. In an ideal lifeworld where power strategies are not 
embedded in the dialogue, no one has to take a decision of what is better, arguments simply 
‘are’ better or worse. In other words, in the ideal world, to be in dissent is just a looming, 
otherness just a mirage. This is the horizon of communicative action that Habermas proposes.
A subsequent problem is, as Zima observes, that “the ‘usage of sentences according to 
pragmatic rules'”, which builds the ground for Habermas proposal, “does not obey only to the 
rules of natural language and the communicative situation, but also to the norms of  group 
languages (sociolects) and to the resulting discourses as semantic-narrative structures that are 
teleologically oriented” (Zima 2001, 206, emphasis in the original). Again, this sociological 
level is neutralized and universalized in Habermas’ conception. Most troublesome is this step, 
if we see subjectivity, and thus identity, difference and otherness, as being constituted exactly 
through games of inclusion/exclusion in certain sociolects, in certain ways to live and ways to  
speak in  relation to  others.  In other words,  the infrastructure of communicative situations 
cannot be reduced to a universal scheme, since “sociolects and discourses, that obey their own 
specific  (terminological,  ideological,  religious)  rules” (Idem; emphasis in  the original)  are 
equally  part  of  the  infrastructure  of  communicative  situations.  We  cannot  simply  think 
discourse, as the place where subjectivity is articulated, away.
While creating a space beyond the conflict of heterogeneity, Habermas reinstalls the 
oppression he wanted to get rid of as part of the completion of the ‘modern project’. Thus, he 
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can speak of  a  “peculiar  unconstrained constraint  of  the  better  argument”and searches  to 
explain it through the “formal characteristics of the discourse” (Habermas 1986, 161). Now it 
is him who establishes a universally valid strict monosemic rule: “diverse speakers must not 
use  the  same  expression  with  diverse  meanings”  (Habermas  1983,  97).  Why  would  be 
dialogue  possible,  why  would  be  dialogue  needed  then?  Zima  summarizes  the  problem 
accurately when he states that: “In decreeing an abstract universalism, Habermas negates the 
discursive subjectivity of the interlocutors and sacrifizes their peculiarity to the indifference 
as exchangeability of roles and acts of speech” (Zima 2001, 207). Thus, he simply exchanges 
the oppression that he considers illegitimate for one that he calls legitimate and true.  
It is in response to this universalistic and universalizing violence that Lyotard calls for 
the recognition of the Other, or, in his own words, for “the recognition of the heteromorphous 
nature of language games” (Lyotard 1984, 66). Consequently, Lyotard pleads for the principle 
“that any consensus on the rules defining a game and the ‘moves’ playable within it must be 
local, in other words, agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual cancellation” 
(Idem). To be sure, this consensus differs clearly from Habermas’ proposal. Thus, remarking 
the unstable and local character of this always provisional consensus, Lyotard argues in favor 
of “a multiplicity of finite meta-arguments”, referring to argumentation concerning the rules 
regarding the admissibility of certain language moves, which is limited in space and time 
(Idem). The plurality of local sets of rules is going to be, as we will see later, a core question 
to be posed in legal philosophy, sociology and anthropology.
While asserting the relevance of “an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that 
of consensus” (Idem), Lyotard rejects an emancipatory approach to knowledge and thus to 
justice in the sense of Habermas’, whom he understands as assuming that “humanity as a 
collective (universal) subject seeks its common emancipation through the regularization of the 
‘moves’ permitted in all language games and that the legitimacy of any statement resides in its 
contributing to that emancipation” (Idem). On the contrary, Lyotard calls for an approach that 
sees the plurality as the only base for justice, and thus, lastly, he invokes a plurality of justices 
(Dietrich 2008,  302).27 This  concern is  translated in the sphere of  legal  philosophy,  legal 
anthropology  and  social  movements  as  approaches  on  ‘legal  pluralism’,  advocating  the 
principle that each culture should be judged according to their own settings of norms.  
In this sense, justice does not derive from the access to a generally valid truth, but is a 
result of the observing of plurality. As Dietrich points out, strangely, this perspective equates 
27 In the same sense, see also the critical formulation of Jacob Rogozinski: “But how is it possible to think of a 
‘justice of the multiplicities’ without thinking of a ‘multiplicity of the justices'?” (Rogozinski 1989, 64).
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the  concept  of  justice  with  the  situation  of  conflict:  a  plurality  of  positions  that  are 
subjectively seen  as  correct  (Dietrich  2008,  302).  In  this  case,  a  solution  of  the  conflict 
through interpretation of the truth or of the law is not sufficient. Neither the formal aspects of 
the law are decisive for determining the justice of a solution. Moreover, the question is how to 
engage with these pluralities in their dissent. Non-consensus is justice.
The approach of Lyotard sounds compelling, at first, when it comes to open the space 
from oppression to diversity. Nevertheless, it presents some basic problems. On a basic level, 
Lyotard's assumption of incommensurable languages would not suffice to explain the daily 
exchange between heterogeneous discourses. More troublesome is the fact that his pleading 
for plurality does not seem to apply to his own philosophical authority or to all of his objects 
of study, since he equally subordinates the diverse discourses he criticizes, like Christianity, 
Enlightenment and Marxism, under his own story-telling. 
In fact, this is one aspect of a broader problematic that has to do with the perspective he 
develops on difference itself. Emphasizing difference and particularism, Lyotard disregards 
the logical point that the statement of difference requires the statement of commonalities.28 I 
do not speak here about the banal point that difference with ‘you’ implies commonalities 
within ‘us’. I mean that talking about ‘us’ implies commonalities and differences amongst ‘us’ 
as well  as between ‘you’ and ‘us’.  And the same applies to  statements on all  imaginable 
‘you's’.  Translating  this  to  the  frame of  conflict,  which  is  determined by the  creation  of 
differences/commonalities, this means that an argument, “a contrariety or a conflict between 
cultures is only conceivable, if these […] have something to say to each other” (Zima 2001, 
199). In other words, to state a difference means to imply commonalities, et vice versa; a 
commonality is a form of difference, et vice versa. Thus, the question of identity grounds on 
the diverse combinations of difference/commonality, and to emphasize one of the two is ‘just’ 
a game between fore- and background – a game that, for sure, can have drastic implications.  
The point is that talking about difference, as well as about commonalities, is a choice. And 
also this choice of Lyotard is, as any choice, an exertion of power. 
This is not only a matter of the objects observed. The way we identify difference and 
commonality, and thus plurality or unity, amongst them might differ. But in any case, the 
objects observed share at least one thing: the observer. The observer herself is the last point of 
encounter of the diverse.  The subject as such might  be deconstructable,  but  it  is  her,  the 
observing subject, who sees herself as observer, who deconstructs herself, who remembers, 
28 To this point see also the analysis of Manfred Frank (*1945), who states that “no ‘différend’ can be total’ … 
[O]ne must go further and say: a ‘différend’, as determined by Lyotard, is logically impossible” (Frank 
1988, 79).
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compares,  classifies,  uses,  deconstructs,  reconstructs,  questions  and  answers.  Necessarily, 
because she cannot escape from being through herself (independently of what that means to 
her), she will stay always, however plural she might be, at the center of her own reasoning, 
her own feeling, her own perception, however constructed it might be and however aware she 
might be about it. Even to put herself in the shoes of other's, she can only do this as herself.  
Thus, the perspective assumed will necessarily maintain a certain priority  de facto. In fact, 
this is the reason why Lyotard is able to write about something at all.
If despite all this, we accept Lyotard's call for plurality, more serious difficulties arise, 
since the acceptance of colliding standpoints as equals leads to a ‘tolerant indifference’, which 
can easily turn into violence. As Zima puts it: “Where there are no generalizable measures, the 
other or the incommensurable must seem sometimes as meaningless, sometimes as destructive 
for the own identity and thus as menacing” (Zima 2001, 154). Actually, violence is inbuilt in 
Lyotard's  approach,  since  he,  as  Foucault  in  the  1970's,  calls  for  an  uprising  of  the 
particularisms  against the universals,  disowning every expression of centralism,  including 
reason, the state and capitalism. This call is explicit in Lyotard's work on the “patchwork of 
minorities”, where he invokes a movement of splintering that applies for nations as well as 
societies (Lyotard 1977). As the centralized administration of the negated ‘minority others’ 
turns  increasingly  complicated  and  difficult,  the  tendency  of  these  groups  to  organize 
themselves without going through all the “intermediations of the CENTER” grows (Idem). 
Thus,  Lyotard  underlines  the  importance  of  social  movements  and  their  capability  to 
‘radicalize the difference’,  as he states for the feminist  movements (Idem, 64).  Similar to 
Foucault's and Deleuze's approaches, Lyotard calls for a “pluralizing disruption of the power” 
(Zima 2001, 144). But while these French authors, continuing a long tradition of anarchism, 
envisage the patchwork of diversities as a bliss, Zima fears a “taking over of the power by one 
or more mafias – possibly together with army and secret service” (Zima 2001, 145). This is  
also the result of an extremely particularized view on languages, cultures and society groups. 
If particularisms are regarded as incommensurable, fragmentation is the natural result, and 
this leads either to total indifference in front of the cloistered away other or to a constant 
opposition  in  front  of  him.  Unintelligible  ‘otherness’ can  not  be  seen  as  fully  valid;  no 
engagement  and  no recognition  are  possible.  Communication  is  unthinkable  (Zima  2001, 
200). 
This is exactly the point where Habermas starts his critique and proposal of a further 
going emancipation through the consolidation of those elements that Lyotard rejects. As we 
can see, the criticisms against Lyotard take us to Habermas’ universalistic position, and those 
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against Habermas end up close to Lyotard's  particularism. As readers,  we are caught in a 
vicious cycle of counterarguments. Isn't it paradoxical, that these two authors, seeing their 
environment from a highly critical standpoint, argue in opposite ways and end up in the same 
problematic  space  of   indifference,  exchangeability,  and  lastly,  violence?  Ending  both  in 
exchangeability,  these  answers  are  themselves  equally  exchangeable.  In  the  midst  of  our 
struggle to be just in front of otherness, whatever we do, we end up destroying the bond with 
the  Other  and  the  possibility  of  encounter.  This  is  the  paradox,  in  which  postmodern 
approaches to law are caught.
2.  Speaking the Law  
One of the main motors of postmodernist approaches in law has come from the application of 
deconstruction on legal texts in very diverse contexts and following varied purposes. As Jack 
M. Balkin (*1956) puts it, “the deconstructive dictum that ‘iterability alters’ seems to apply 
particularly to deconstruction itself, for the meaning and importance of deconstruction in legal 
theory has continuously changed as it has been employed in different contexts and situations” 
(Balkin 1996, 9). Developed firstly and with particular force in academic fields related to the 
study of language and literary criticism, deconstruction became associated with other trends 
and came to be the name under which diverse currents of discursive analysis in various fields 
of  knowledge found a common roof.  Its  approach,  as characteristic  for  other  postmodern 
currents,  is  oriented  to  put  in  question  those  assumptions  that  make  certain  arguments 
possible. Analyzing language and making prolific use of word-games, this type of inquiry sets 
out to make explicit and put in question the whole structure that supports modern thought as 
well as structuralism itself. Not surprisingly, it is always moving around concepts such as ‘the 
Other’,  ‘the  limit’ and  ‘the  difference’,  emphasizing  the  connection  between  power  and 
language.
Deconstructionist emphasis lays in the blurring of differences taken for granted (and in 
the possibility of creating new differences). In this context, law becomes a central field of 
attention,  since  “legal  distinctions  are  often  disguised  forms  of  conceptual  oppositions, 
because they treat things within a legal category differently from those outside the category” 
(Idem, 2). Since deconstruction enables a new understanding of the relationship between these 
opposite categories,  it  allows scholars to study how the “instability or fuzziness [of these 
conceptual oppositions] is disguised or suppressed so that they lend unwarranted plausibility 
to legal arguments and doctrines” (Idem, 4). The consequences of this blur, however, are not 
58
understood in the same way by diverse authors  that  claim to use deconstruction.  For the 
Anglo-American current of Critical Legal Studies (CLS), it offered a tool of criticism against 
legal  liberalism as  an  ideology.  Later  on,  partly  because  of  the  diminishing  presence  of 
Critical Legal Studies at the end of the 1980's, deconstructive scholarship built a field of study 
of its own with figures like Jack M. Balkin and Pierre Schlag. In France, equally, figures like 
Pierre Legendre (*1930) developed deconstructive studies of  law.
In any case, one of the reflections on law from a deconstructionist approach that left a 
strong  impact  in  the  whole  development  of  postmodernist  legal  thinking,  was  made  by 
Jacques Derrida in his  key note to the Colloquium ‘Deconstruction and the Possibility of 
Justice’ held in October 1989 at the Cardozo Law School. The place and time of the meeting 
is  not  unimportant.  In  fact,  it  presets  a  specific  environment  for  the  discussion  on 
deconstruction and law. The Cardozo Law School, founded in 1976 by the Yeshiva University 
(New York),  was named after  Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo (1870-1938) who was a 
renowned US-American lawyer and Supreme Court Justice and who is considered one of the 
main representatives of the current of Legal Realism. As we will see later in more detail, this 
current of thought is directly connected to questions of the then emerging critical perspective 
on law, as well as to the search for legal development, of legal development aid and of the 
further approaches in legal transfer. Interestingly, the school of Legal Realism started to lose 
force after the Second World War at the time when the concept of development started to take 
new contours. It can be said that Legal Realism did not disappear, but its claim turned more 
specific through the development of Critical Legal Studies, feminist legal theory, economical 
analysis of law and critical race theory. These research fields, which were deeply interlinked 
with the social and academic movements of the 1960's and 1970's, are in one way or another 
intimately  related  to  the  postmodern  perspective  in  general,  particularly  to  the 
deconstructionist approach, that formed part of the revision of academic structuralism. 
Derrida  refers  directly  to  the  connection  of  his  work  with  Critical  Legal  Studies, 
exemplified by the authors Stanley Fish (*1938), Sam Weber, Barbara Herrnstein-Smith and 
Drucilla Cornell (Derrida 1992, 8). In his eyes their work responds 
“to the most radical programs of a deconstruction that would like, in order to be 
consistent with itself,  not to remain enclosed in purely speculative, theoretical, 
academic discourses but rather […] to aspire to something more consequential, to 
change things and to intervene in an efficient and responsible, though always, of 
course, very mediated way, not only in the profession but in what one calls the 
cité,  the  polis  and  more  generally  the  world”  (Idem,  8  f.,  emphasis  in  the 
original). 
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The conjunction of Critical Legal Studies and deconstruction was thus “inevitable” (Idem, 9). 
In fact, Derrida underlines that deconstruction has addressed the problem of law and justice 
continuously, even if, at first sight it could seem that it has been avoiding the realm of law 
(Idem, 9 f.). In this perspective, Critical Legal Studies developed the deconstructionist claims 
into more specific legal concerns, that I will address in the next section.
For  now,  I  will  sketch  Derrida's  presentation,  where  he  refers  to  some  of  the 
contradictions embedded in the category of justice from a deconstructionist perspective which 
form the background for the reflections that I have posed about the tension implicit in the 
concept of law and its relationship to difference. In his speech he schematizes some of the key 
elements of postmodern approaches to law and legal development, or, in other words, some of 
the main questions that were posed in front of modern law, and that I refer to as postmodern 
according  to  the  remarks  I  have  made  before.  Relevant  for  the  relationship  of  these 
postmodern arguments to modernity,  is  that Derrida refers explicitly to the fact that these 
contradictions  at  the  core  of  justice  were  recognized  long   before  deconstruction  was 
constituted as a method, as a practice, as an attitude or as a discourse of postmodern thought. 
In fact,  as he observes regarding the works of Blaise Pascal  (1623–1662) and Michel  de 
Montaigne  (1533-1592),  the  mistrust  towards  law  and  justice  because  of  its  inherent 
connection with violence and force was an important topic of discussion already in the 16 th 
and 17th  centuries (Idem, 10 ff.). Derrida, re-elaborating on this skepticism,  deconstructs the 
concept of law as well as the concept of justice, demonstrating a way of questioning that can 
be found in Critical Legal Studies as well as in other contemporaneous critiques of law. 
In a similar way as Kahn does, Derrida argues the lacking (or even undecidable) legitimacy of 
a past revolution that serves as legitimation for the present legal status quo (Derrida 1992, 6), 
linking the deconstructability of law with its very process of transformation or amelioration 
(Idem, 14). This is related to what Derrida names épokhè or moment of suspension, “which is 
[...] the interval of spacing in which transformations, indeed jurídico-political revolutions take 
place” (Idem, 20). At the same time this  épokhè characterizes any just decision because the 
appreciation as just or unjust presupposes the freedom of the judging individual, and thus the 
rule as an obligatory demand must be suspended in order to pronounce any kind of judgment 
on the justice of the decision (Idem 22 f.). Judgment implies thus always a performative act 
(Idem, 26 f.).
Elaborating on that, Derrida makes a point of the inherent violence of law saying that 
“the operation that amounts to founding, inaugurating,  justifying law (droit),  making law, 
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would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that 
in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding 
anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate” (Idem, 13). Equally, he builds a 
link of necessity between law and the use of force,  when he refers to the expression “to 
enforce  law”,  arguing  that  “applicability,  ‘enforceability,’ is  not  an  exterior  or  secondary 
possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to law. It is the force essentially 
implied in the very concept of justice as law (droit), of justice as it becomes droit, of the law 
as  ‘droit’  [...]” (Idem,  5  f.).  Consequently,  also  the  état  de  droit,  the  Rechtstaat,  are 
paradigmatic  for  a  problem of  justice  that  has  been  posed  and violently  resolved  in  the 
founding  of  law  or  in  its  institution  (Idem,  23  f.).  The  ‘rule  of  law’,  although  partially 
different in its semantics from the French and German expressions, equally bases on a violent 
founding of law and thus, also in this context, law has no other way to be than being violent. 
It  is  in this  repression and dissimulation of violence that  Derrida speaks of the ‘mystical 
foundation of authority’, as he titled his conference. He asserts that “even if the success of 
performatives that found law or right (for example, and this is more than an example, of a 
state as guarantor of a right) presupposes earlier conditions and conventions […], the same 
‘mystical’ limit will reappear at the supposed origin of said conditions, rules or conventions, 
and at the origin of their dominant interpretation” (Idem, 14).
Derrida's  claim of the violence of law is  related directly to  the question of  alterity. 
According to him, similarly to Lyotard's arguments, to subsume a concrete example under a 
general rule is an impediment at the moment to recognize the Other in its difference:
 “[...] Justice, as law (droit), seems always to suppose the generality of a rule, a 
norm or a universal imperative. How are we to reconcile the act of justice that 
must always concern singularity, individuals, irreplaceable groups and lives, the 
other  or  myself  as  other,  in  a  unique situation,  with  rule,  norm,  value or  the 
imperative  of  justice  which  necessarily  have  a  general  form,  even  if  this 
generality prescribes a singular application in each case?” (Idem, 17)
Consequently, Derrida gives a new form to the ‘idea of justice’ and asserts that, beyond 
an appeal to a third party who would suspend the singularities in dialogue, “to address oneself 
to the other in the language of the other is, it seems, the condition of all possible justice”, 
(Idem, 17). The proposal of legal pluralism, which I will examine later in detail, can be seen 
as an intent to follow this principle of addressing the Other in his language, even if, lastly, it  
might fail in its pursuit for the abolition of violence (as epitomized in formal state law), since 
any kind of  generalizing  law can  be  understood  as  violence  towards  the  particularity  of 
otherness exactly because of its general claim.
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Putting the concept of justice close to Emmanuel Levinas’ (1906-1995) understanding 
as the relation to others, Derrida characterizes justice as “infinite, incalculable, rebellious to 
rule  and  foreign  to  symmetry,  heterogeneous  and  heterotropic”  (Idem,  22).  The  infinite 
character  of  this  concept  of  justice  derives  from its  understanding  as  something  that  is 
“irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other, owed to the other, before any contract, 
because it has come, the other's coming as the singularity that is always other” (Idem, 25).  
Thus, the meaning of justice seems to be equated with the protection of particularisms. It is 
twisted and put against an idea of rationality and lawfulness: “This ‘idea of justice’ seems to 
be  irreducible  in  its  affirmative  character,  in  its  demand  of  gift  without  exchange,  […], 
without calculation and without rules, without reason and without rationality. […] This kind 
of justice, which isn't law, is the very movement of deconstruction at work in law and the 
history  of  law  [...]”  (Idem).  Justice  is,  from  this  perspective,  exactly  the  process  of 
questioning, the attitude of questioning the questioning itself, destabilizing oppositions, like 
natural law/positive law, and bringing out the paradoxes (Idem, 8). Thus, he identifies justice 
with  deconstruction  itself  (Idem,  15).  In  taking  this  step,  Derrida  rejects  to  equate 
deconstruction with a “quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-politico-juridical question 
of  justice and before the  opposition between just  and unjust”  (Idem,  19)  as  many of  his 
critiques have done. Moreover, he twists their argument, making of deconstruction the only 
possible ‘truly just’ way to deal with otherness.
Although Derrida was supportive of Critical Legal Studies, other researchers who recognized 
themselves as deconstructionists and who partly were involved in the Critical Legal Studies 
movement, launched harsh critiques around the appropriation of deconstructivism by legal-
political critical studies. Thus, Balkin argues that “the CLS argument seemed to assume an 
autonomous subject who was manipulating indeterminate language; this was in tension with 
deconstruction's antihumanist assumptions” (Balkin 1996, 5). Pierre Schlag, in turn, makes 
also a point of the self-deconstructive force of legal doctrines and pleads for a more general 
and radical  banishment  of  the  fantasy of  rational  autonomy from legal  theory,  criticizing 
Critical  Legal  Studies  also  because  of  its  instrumentalization  of  deconstructivism  for  a 
political  agenda  (Schlag  1990,  1991).  Equally,  Balkin  argues  that  also  the  oppositions 
underlined and utilized by scholars of Critical Legal Studies to back their arguments can be 
deconstructed, and thus deconstruction has not an intrinsic political position as this critical 
movement had and which was mainly opposed to legal liberalism. Furthermore, he criticizes 
that the ideas of contingency, instability and mutability of concepts have been confused by 
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scholars  of  Critical  Legal  Studies,  assuming,  via  a  deconstructionist  argument,  the 
contingency or mutability of certain concepts when deconstruction permitted only to assert 
their instability (Balkin 1996, 5). The analysis of rhetoric figures to show their ideological 
support to injustice, as performed for example by Peter Goodrich in ‘Legal Discourse: Studies 
in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis’ (1987), is, in Balkin's eyes, equally problematic, 
because  alternative  legal  constructs  would  equally need a  rhetoric  that  would  be  equally 
supportive of an ideology.
'Liberating’ deconstruction from a political bias as Balkin aims to do leaves, however, 
the  floor  open  for  recriminations  of  nihilism.  In  other  words,  if  every  argument  is 
deconstructable, and insofar ‘it does not make a difference’ what or how we argue, because 
any concept we might use is unstable, how can a critic of violence be coherent, make sense 
and  thus  claim attendance?  Thus,  a  certain  political  quietism has  been  a  reproach  made 
against deconstructivism, which denies the “certainty of all truths” (Balkin 1996, 7). In terms 
of  Zima,  Balkin  underlines  the  problem  of  the  exchangeability  of  arguments  that 
deconstruction can arrive at. Exemplarily, he argues that the instability of the boundaries of 
subjects of justice might be expanded through deconstructivism as Derrida reasons, but, 
“one can expand the boundary in two opposite directions — by expanding the 
scope of  what  is  assigned to  the “human,” who is  a  subject  of  justice,  or  by 
expanding the scope of what is assigned to the “nonhuman,” which is not a proper 
subject of justice. In this way, the instability of these boundaries might well be 
used, as it has in the past, to show that […] the distinction between women and 
animals, for example, is so unstable that it cannot fully be maintained” (Balkin 
1994, 18).
Thus, deconstructivism can be used for arguments with a certain political motivation or 
with the opposite one, in order to justify their claim. In this sense, 
“the egalitarian claims to rediscover the true similarity of the subjects of justice 
by  reclaiming  those  who  were  wrongly  grouped  with  nonsubjects;  the  bigot 
claims to rediscover the true similarity of nonsubjects of justice by rejecting those 
who  were  wrongly  grouped  with  the  subjects  of  justice.  Both  deconstruct 
boundaries and categories, and the act of deconstruction does not decide between 
them” (Idem, 18).
In  other  words:  “Deconstructive  argument  does  not  cease  to  operate  when  the 
conclusions one might draw from it are inegalitarian” (Balkin 1994, 17). However, Balkin 
argues, Derrida's speech makes it seem this way because he is partial at the moment of finding 
examples for his “mystical equation” of deconstruction with justice: “Derrida tends to pick 
targets for deconstruction that correspond to the injustices he perceives” (Idem, 56). Actually, 
he has made choices that allow him to argue in favor of an emancipatory and egalitarian role 
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of deconstruction. In turn he evaded  “to deconstruct or problematize the distinction between 
justice and injustice, between liberty and slavery, or between tolerance and bigotry” (Idem, 
17).
Recognizing  this  ‘trick’,  Balkin  states  that  interpreting  Derrida's argument  as  “an 
approach that asserts the infinite difference of each situation” leads to “normative nihilism 
and a failure of understanding” (Balkin, 1994, 39). This is the “dead end” of deconstruction of 
which Teubner speaks, saying of postmodernist legal researchers that “with growing unease 
they experience the open epistemological situation in which meaning worlds and knowledge 
systems are arbitrarily invented, varied, collapsing, reinvented, varied, collapsing...” (Teubner 
1997, 773). Derrida, however, argues that deconstruction is not nihilism and it is not futile, it 
is justice itself. But what kind of justice can it be that it is not on one side of an opposition and 
therefore  it  escapes  the  force  of  deconstruction?  Or,  the  other  way  around:  Is  every 
questioning legitimated and just? Is every deconstruction just?
Derrida's statement that deconstruction is justice has created great confusion.  In fact, 
Cornelia Vismann (1961–2010) has criticized this “affirmative” deconstruction as “caught in 
the paradoxical relation between an immanent law and transcendent justice” (Vismann 1992, 
261). Similarly, Teubner has denounced that “it is the direct experience of the demands of the 
Other, as a nonlinguistic, noncommunicative, nonmediated perception, the experience of the 
nonbridgeable alterity, the infinite uniqueness of the Other which throws the objective and 
general order of law into chaos but at the same time remains there as the continuing call for 
justice” (Teubner 1997, 774).
The question remains open of whether deconstruction reinforces the dichotomies it puts 
into question. Is deconstruction “complaining about a lost tradition and becoming, by this 
very  complaint,  dependent  upon  this  tradition”  (Luhmann  1993,  766)?  Although  Derrida 
claims the phenomenological symmetry of the Other, it relies equally on an Other which is 
always particular (Derrida 1992, 25) in front of the generality of the I. Does deconstruction 
truly deconstruct everything or does it rely on the enemy it opposes? In this line, Teubner 
accuses deconstruction, a movement born out of an anti-humanist attitude, to end up in a 
humanitarian appeal: “What else than a vague humanitarian impulse can one expect for law 
from phenomenological symmetry as deconstruction of the philosophy of alterity?” (Teubner 
1997, 776).
The critiques of Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998) and Teubner are specially relevant because 
they allow us to hear the perspective of legal systems theory in front of law and its relation to 
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deconstructivist approaches. Usually, both currents are depicted in opposition to each other, 
contrasting “the antirational gesture of deconstructivism with the superrationalism of systems 
theory”  (Idem,  766).  However,  as  Teubner  himself  underlines,  systems theory also “does 
away with any stable identity of law”, seeing law “as an iteration of recursive events that are 
transformed through their resonance with changing contexts” (Idem). When “diverse contexts 
construct multiple fictions of law”, “law's constructed identities change chameleon-like with 
the change of observation posts, each of which has an equally valid claim to truth” (Idem, 764 
f.). Since system theory “reveals that law's hierarchy is in reality a self-referential circularity” 
(Idem, 766), it recognizes the foundation of law in a paradox, and, lastly, in the “violence of 
an arbitrary distinction” (Idem, 765). Thus, the paradox and the foundation of law in violence 
have equally a prominent place here as in deconstructivist approaches. Resultants of the same 
crisis, both theories, “while rejecting unity, identity, and synthesis, begin with difference and 
end  with  difference”,  claiming  “a  postmetaphysical,  postdialectical,  and  poststructuralist 
character” (Idem, 766). The result of this self-referentiality is equally, that it leads directly 
into “a paradoxical oscillation that paralyzes the observer” (Idem, 765).
Nevertheless,  Teubner  looks  at  deconstruction  as  “modernity's  carnival,  a  funny, 
exciting,  and  at  the  same time  sad  and  desperate  reversal  of  its  tangled  hierarchies,  but 
basically an entertaining enterprise without consequences,  in its  negative mirror image of 
entangled and reversed hierarchies ultimately affirming the order of modernity” (Idem 1997, 
767). Basically, the critique against deconstructivism is that it is “not sufficiently critical, not 
radical enough!”, exclaimed Teubner (Idem, 767). Remaining in the field of semantics, he 
argues, deconstructivist approaches lack of the capacity to see links between discourse and 
reality, legal semantics and social structures. In the end, Teubner asks for a sociological base 
for deconstructivism, for a sociologically (useful) unfoldment of paradoxes and for a return to 
sociologically  relevant  reality  after  deconstructivism.  He  asks  thus  for  the  “structural 
conditions  so that  at  a  certain historical  moment,  law's  foundations  are  suddenly seen as 
paradoxical” (Idem, 771), criticizing the post-structuralist current of deconstructivism for its 
blindness  towards  the  structures  it  is  embedded  in.  Lacking  this  self-reflection, 
deconstructivism  cannot  offer  the  guidance  and  direction  that  Teubner,  like  many  other 
contemporary scholars, is looking for (Idem, 779).
Systems theory, aims thus to base its perspective on law on the link of semantic critique 
to social structure, in Teubner's case specifically to globalization, which “exposes law directly 
and  without  the  mediation  of  democratic  politics  to  the  fundamental  social  condition  of 
today's  world society:  to its ‘double fragmentation’ – cultural  polycentrism and functional 
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differentiation” (Idem, 780). Thus, the question in this case is “what does law look like in a 
doubly fragmented world society?” (Idem). 
However,  if  this  version  of  systems  theory  dissolves  the  founding  paradox  “into  a 
multiplicity of paradoxes of self-validation” connecting it to a plurality of social discourses 
and structures (Idem, 777), it does not give either an answer to the way we could deal with a 
patchwork  of  equally  valid  forms  of  law  production.  Reorienting  legal  theory  to  a 
“heterarchically relational logic of linkage” (Idem, 780 cit. Ladeur) still does not provide us 
with  tools  to  engage  into  a  dialogue  in  diversity.  Faced  with  the  “impossibility  of 
constitutionalizing legal multiplicity in the language of legal restraints on the arbitrariness of 
the sovereign” (Idem, 784), what remains? Although this  approach to law from a specific 
reading of systems theory opens up the realm of the legal to be in mutual influence with 
another subsystems of society, it still depicts law as an extremely stiff structure that is not 
permeable to changes at a small scale. The nodes of reality Teubner deals with are limited,  
and so, the social matrix he portrays does not have the depth a dynamic conception of system 
could provide. Having a pre-established numerus clausus of social systems, it is possible for 
Teubner to see that “social systems”, in this sense, “stick to their institutionalized ‘iron laws’ 
of superspecialized rationalities”, “are highly rational in themselves, but with regard to the 
whole society they are blind, uncoordinated, selfish, chaotic, expansive, and imperialistic”, so 
that  “world  society  tends  to  develop  self-destructive  tendencies”  (Idem).  It  is  clear  that 
Teubner speaks here of a specific ‘law’. In all its polycentricity, this systemic understanding 
of law does not include many of the ways of normativity outside of formal state law. The 
possibility that this self-destruction of ‘world society’ allows the emergence of new patterns 
of behavior in the systemic web, of new ways to approach normativity and social order is thus 
underestimated. In my opinion, the diversity present in the ‘world society’ is overrun, and so, 
the re-generative power of the exchange in diversity is overlooked. It is possible to follow 
Teubner in his claim to redefine the focus of law “from the sovereign's abuse of power to self-
destructive tendencies of colliding discourses” (Idem). But it is equally possible to go beyond 
self-destruction  to  envisage  ways  of  transforming  the  patterns  in  which  these  collisions 
emerge. This means, however, to change the perspective on law and order itself, since it is this 
law the one that participates in the creation of the collisions Teubner points at.
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3.  Justice as Value  
Naturally, the pragmatic difficulties of deconstructivism put to the front by Teubner, have not 
been overlooked by deconstructionists either. “The urgent question how law copes with the 
demands of justice in today's supercomplex society” (Teubner 1997, 776) has also come to the 
center of deconstructionists’ inquiries. Following these concerns, the blurring of differences 
has led partly to a pragmatist (re-)turn to transcendental values in deconstructionist analysis 
(Balkin 1996, 4; Balkin 1994). Thus, making an emphasis on the needs of a functioning socio-
legal  system  and  reasserting  the  meaning  of  justice,  Balkin  offers  a  reinterpretation  of 
deconstruction and its relationship to justice. Differently from Teubner, however, he develops 
this  new  understanding  in  the  name  of  deconstruction  itself,  arguing  that  he,  “as  a 
deconstructionist”,  is  “naturally  skeptical”  especially  “about  the  necessary  utility  and 
goodness of deconstructive practice” (Balkin 1994, 1). Thus, he handles with deconstruction 
in order to make sense of it for the practice of law.
The  pragmatist  attitude  of  Balkin  is  clear  from  the  start,  when  he  explains  that 
emphasizing some features of Derrida's texts and de-emphasizing others, which he regards as 
mistaken, is the only way in which deconstructive argument can be made a “useful tool of 
critical  analysis” (Idem, 2).  Furthermore,  he is  concerned about  escaping the criticism of 
nihilism addressed to deconstructionist critics in general and most importantly,  he aims to 
deconstruct Derrida's  approach to justice.  His quest regarding “what Derrida  really thinks 
about justice” (Idem, 7; emphasis added) allows to sense already the problem that we will 
face  with this  perspective.  Because while  Balkin,  as  a  deconstructionist,  argues  against  a 
conception of originality and purity; he still wants to get to the ‘real core’ of things, to a truth 
that  is  beyond  text.  Paradoxically,  he  does  this  applying  deconstruction  to  Derrida's 
deconstruction. If deconstruction can be deconstructed, then the law and justice it has blurred 
can be revived.
In a deconstructionist manner, he emphasizes what Derrida has silenced in his text on 
the ‘mystic’ foundation of authority and denounces thus his own subtext, his own exercise of 
power, his own violence in talking about violence. In fact, the address of Derrida refers to 
broad and hypothetical questions of justice, but does not refer at any point to a remarkable 
issue of justice in which he was involved and which was decisive in the further development 
of  deconstruction,  namely the  scandal  on  Paul  de  Man (1919-1983),  a  key figure  in  the 
development of literary deconstruction and a close friend of Derrida. In 1987, four years after 
de  Man's  death,  some articles  were  discovered,  that  he  had  written  when  he  was  in  his 
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twenties, and which conformed to the official Nazist rhetoric or were even overtly antisemitic 
(Idem,  5  f.).  The  academic  war  went  beyond  de  Man's  personal  history,  because 
deconstruction  itself  was accused to  serve as  a  tool  for  covering,  distorting  or  devaluing 
totalitarian violence. Its nihilism, so the critiques, served to justify violence. 
In this debate, Derrida himself played a major role, specially with the publication of two 
important articles: ‘The Sound of the Deep Sea Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War’ (1988) and 
‘Biodegradables:  Six  Literary  Fragments’  (1989).  In  these  articles  Derrida,  using 
deconstructivism, tries to defend his friend, deconstruction, and lastly himself from what he 
perceives as an unjust accusation. As Balkin argues, independently of the position we prefer 
to  take in  this  debate,  it  is  obvious that  also these arguments are  made from a particular 
perspective on what is justice, which place is given to the Other, what makes a legitimate 
judgment,  and  how  is  it  possible  to  deal  with  responsibility.  According  to  Balkin,  the 
accusations of nihilism that were originally raised against deconstructivism gained new force 
with this debate, and were present ghosts in Derrida's talk at the Cardozo Law School that he 
was trying to exorcize with his “mystical equation” that “deconstruction is justice” (Balkin 
1994, 58). 
Putting  this  speech  in  this  specific  context,  Balkin  pretends  to  find  a  proper 
interpretation of Derrida's understanding of justice, that at the same time justifies Balkin's 
own ideas on deconstruction, justice and law. Thus, Balkin destabilizes Derrida's arguments 
around law and justice using Derrida's  texts  regarding de Man's  scandal,  which are more 
explicitly loaded with all sorts of emotions. Doing this intertextual exercise, he argues, it is 
easier to understand or to develop deconstruction's contribution to legal theory than if we, 
reading  his  ‘Force  of  law’  isolated,  just  assume  that  Derrida  was  merely  making  a 
deconstructionist  analysis  in  front  of  a  random topic,  law,  taking a  distantiated academic 
perspective, from where he observes oppositions, plays with them, blurs them and lets the 
game of the eternal return of paradoxical oppositions start once again. According to Balkin, if 
deconstruction is not to be a nihilistic game, then the justice Derrida calls for in his writings  
on de Man, must be part of the understanding of justice that he develops in ‘The Mystical 
Foundation of Authority’. In fact, Balkin argues, this is the only way of making sense out of 
Derrida's text. A “charitable” reading is required “to avoid confusing and self-contradictory 
interpretations”  (Idem,  10).  Thus,  he  arrives  “at  an  important  variant  of  deconstructive 
practice,  which relies on the existence of human values that transcend  any given culture” 
(Idem; emphasis added). This understanding calls thus for a certain universality of values that 
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could  help  to  rebuild  the  puzzle  of  particular  interpretations  without  original  that 
deconstructionist practices have left us with.
Balkin's  interpretation  is  only  one,  a  contested  one,  amongst  many,  but  it  results 
particularly interesting for this inquiry, since it poses an interpretation of deconstruction and 
postmodernity that, recognizing this current as particularly valid, calls for the return of values 
into law. In terms of Zima, it could be interpreted as an intent to move out of indifference.  
This  movement between nihilist  critiques on postmodern approaches  and reinterpretations 
with moral-pragmatical arguments reappears in different guises in philosophical and socio-
legal discussion, like for example in Habermas’ work. It is as if the specter of the antagonisms 
that we inherited and recreated, like the opposition between iusnaturalism and iuspositivism, 
would  never  leave  us.  In  fact,  these  are  expressions  of  the  need  to  ask  the  ignominious 
question: what happens after deconstruction? If doubt is king and meaning is non-existent by 
itself,  but  a  void  subjected  to  power  structures  and  deconstructability,  how  can  we  live 
together? Both the theory and the practice of law have tried equally to give some answers to 
this conundrum. In this sense, Balkin calls for a transcending understanding of justice and 
deconstruction. 
The first argument to take into account is Balkin's critique to Derrida, where he asserts 
that  “deconstructive  argument  is  a  species  of  rhetoric,  which  can  be  used  for  different 
purposes depending upon the moral and political commitments of the deconstructor” (Balkin 
1994, 9). Secondly,  he argues “that a transformation of deconstruction becomes inevitable 
when deconstructionists begin to confront real questions of justice and injustice” (Idem, 10), 
and thus, he introduces a “transcendent idea of justice, which human law only imperfectly 
articulates”  (Idem,  9).  Derrida's  arguments  against  the  existence  of  a  “transcendental 
signified” and his statement that “there is nothing outside of the text” (Derrida 1976, 158) can 
not be valid for matters of law and justice, Balkin argues. In fact, according to him, this step is 
one of the major developments in Derrida's thinking (Idem, 10)29.
Hence, in his work, Balkin reasserts justice as a value. Noticeably, his conception of 
values differs from a a specific eternal and unchanging Idea in Platonic Heaven. Moreover, 
equally founding on Platonic concepts, Balkin pleads for justice as an indeterminate longing 
(Balkin,  1994,  12),  that  human  creation  can  never  satisfy.  Transcendence,  in  this  sense, 
describes  the  “relationship  of  inadequacy  between  culture  and  value”  (Idem,  13). 
Consequently, the goal of transcendental deconstruction is to “rediscover this transcendence 
29 See also Balkin 1994, 68 ff., where Balkin asserts for example that “the antihumanist vocabulary that has 
for  so  long  been  associated  with  deconstruction  must  be  abandoned  when  deconstruction  confronts  
questions of justice in the real world” (Idem, 68).
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where it has been forgotten”, and thus its aim is “not destruction but rectification” (Idem ref.  
to  Seung).  In  fact,  the  “deconstructor”  seeks  “betterment”  of  an  unjust  or  inappropriate 
conceptual  hierarchy  (Idem).  Contesting  the  criticism  of  nihilism,  he  admits  that  his 
deconstruction is founded on faith (Idem, 14), a faith on human values. This perspective on 
the value of justice does not help us though to decide which way of “rectification” would be 
appropriate, it just states that there is one, or at least that there is always a better one. 
Equally, when Balkin refers to the problem of speaking the language of the Other, he 
argues  that  Derrida cannot  refer  to a  theory of  absolute  difference,  because “it  would be 
impossible to decide any case, because no case can be compared to any other” (Balkin 1994, 
36). On the contrary, Derrida's claim can be understood in the sense that “each case is both 
similar to and different from every other, depending on how we look at it. The difficulty of 
just decision-making lies precisely in deciding what is the appropriate context of judgment” 
(Idem, 37). What still remains unclear is who will decide on the appropriateness of a specific 
context  to  make  a  judgment  and  how  this  choice  is  going  to  be  taken.  Similarly,  what 
deconstructivism amongst  other  postmodern  approaches  points  at  and what  Balkin  leaves 
unaddressed  is  the  question  of  what  defines  which  context  is  appropriate  or  not.  Most 
importantly, what do we do when the legal system itself is responsible for defining the context 
of the appropriateness of its own application?
Equally problematic is Balkin's assessment of the question about the possibility to speak 
the language of the Other. Contrasting Derrida's analysis of justice with his own reaction in 
the scandal on Paul de Man, Balkin concludes that “justice, it seems, does not always demand 
that one speak in the language of the Other, especially when the Other is not playing by the 
same  rules”  (Balkin  1994,  41).  Basing  on  this  contrast,  Balkin  argues  that  “all  of  the 
difficulties with the ethics of Otherness arise from the assumption that our responsibility to 
speak in the language of the Other is infinite” (Idem, 43). In turn, he proposes that this duty 
should be seen only as indefinite but not infinite. Consequently,  he opens a space for the 
Other insofar as he states that “when we try to understand what another person means, we 
usually do so by trying to envision how what they are saying makes sense” (Idem); we have to 
assume that the argument of the Other is coherent and might be more truthful than our own. 
We have to do our best to find the sense in the Other's argument. However, in the context of  
Balkin's interpretation, this means that the Other's argument has to make sense for whom? For 
Balkin, naturally. The claim of coherence must defend its validity in a world accessible to 
Balkin. The possibility that coherence can have a different meaning for the Other is not part of 
Balkin's perspective on the Other. Thus, he asserts that “there is the danger that our drive to 
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understand the truth in the other person's views will lead us to be co-opted by those views and 
brought  into  agreement  with  things  we  should  not  agree  with,  because  they  are  false, 
misleading, or unjust” (Idem, 45). In the end, this means that, when the Other's arguments do 
not make sense at all (in Balkin's mind), we should stop trying to make sense of them. Finally,  
there  is  a  limit  to  this  engagement  with  the  Other,  a  reasonable  limit:  “An  infinite 
responsibility to speak in the language of the Other can easily lead to perpetual justification of 
the  Other,  no  matter  how unreasonable  their  position.  This  is  not  what  justice  requires” 
(Idem). Again, Balkin appropriates justice's voice. 
As he argues later, “it is people who demand justice, and who demand it of one another” 
(Idem,  66),  but  the  point  missed  in  his  argument  is  the  same that  Hugo Grotius  already 
addressed more than 400 years ago: that justice can be on both sides, that everyone demands 
his own justice, what they consider as just. The possibilities of interaction in this tension have, 
for  Balkin,  clear  restrictions.  It  is  important,  he  emphasizes,  that  we do not  succumb to 
‘hermeneutic  cooptation’ nor  to  ‘hermeneutic  masochism’,  and  consequently,  beyond  the 
“right amount of effort to understand the Other”, it is “necessary for us to recognize that the 
Other's views are incoherent or unjustified, and that our own position is more reasonable” 
(Idem, 46). Justice, finally, can only be Balkin's justice. It is quite puzzling to observe how 
these arguments based on undefined and unquestioned concepts of reason and comparative 
reasonability, find their place in the speech of a declared deconstructionist. But it only makes 
sense, if we remember that Balkin's aim is to reinterpret deconstructivism in a way that it is 
practical for law's implementation, in a way that law can be somehow just. If the duty to 
speak in the language of the Other is indefinite but not infinite, what is the conclusion? That 
making  justice  is  difficult  because  it  is  based  on  indefinition?  But  this  is  clear  for  any 
decision, because a decision is only needed when there is indefinition. Instead of explaining 
that judges have a difficult job, this argument could equally express that judges form part of a 
problem of indefinition within our system to deal with conflicts. 
In the end, following Balkin's approach, deconstruction “as practiced by human beings 
always arrives at a conclusion”, when the “deconstructor believes that she has reached an 
appropriate degree of enlightenment” (Idem, 59). In the world of law, this means that justice 
is  there,  where  the  judge  feels  that  he  has  found  it.  However,  this  decision  to  outline 
conclusions “leaves unspoken the many further steps that could be taken” (Idem). Actually, if 
we assess deconstruction this way, it looks much more like Balkin's law, with its deciding 
judges,  than  like  Derrida's  justice.  A law that  works  with  a  judge that  has  to  come to a 
decision into a specific frame, leaving unspoken many other possible decisions and even steps 
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outside of the legal system. And thus it calls for a legitimizing value. Balkin's alliance with a 
iusnaturalist perspective is clear when he states that “to say that positive norms are inadequate 
— and hence in order to deconstruct them — we must refer to values that lie beyond the 
norms we are critiquing and that serve as the source of our criticism” (Idem, 55).
It is not my aim here to answer the question about how far  Balkin deviated from Derridean 
deconstructivism, or if Balkin's approach can be called deconstructivism at all. Let us leave 
these questions for the coming generations of deconstruction's taxonomists and dogmatists. 
Balkin's work has other relevant features for our purpose. One of the accomplishments of 
Balkin  is  to  put  Derrida's  approach  in  a  particular  context.  Most  importantly,  Balkin's 
arguments are relevant for this inquiry because they allow us to see some serious difficulties 
that legal scholars face when dealing with deconstruction and law. There is a struggle that 
goes beyond an uneasy feeling in front of the gambling with meaning in law. Balkin renders 
account of the perception of a limit in the deconstructionist approach to law. Thus, he searches 
for a new way, for a twist of the twist; in fact, for a deconstruction of the deconstruction. It is 
interesting to note the place where he lands with this search: the constant question for justice 
as  a  transcendental  value.  Equally  interesting,  of  course,  are  the  limitations  that  this 
interpretation faces.
The struggle with legal deconstruction relies therein that if there is no generally valid 
truth to be discovered by the judge or the legislator, the whole system deludes into a plurality 
of (positive)  laws than can claim equal legitimation. What do we do after acknowledging that 
the (democratic) state is only one possible law-giver and it is not by itself closer to reason or  
truth than the mafia it condemns? If truth and reason disappear as measure sticks, what can we 
rely on to avoid chaos? If we admit that justice is deconstruction, no law of whatever type can 
ever be just, so what remains to do? How can we deal with something that never ends, like 
Derrida proposes for deconstruction and justice, using a system that proclaims the end of a 
conflict (Idem, 33)? In other words, the problem is how to “mediate between a deconstructed 
law and deconstructing justice” (Teubner, 1997, 779). Either we forget about the link between 
law  and  justice,  assuming  a  semi-arbitrary  but  always  violent  law  and  a  contestatory 
(deconstructive) justice, or we search for a way in which we can stick to a certain legitimation 
of formalized social norms. 
While Derrida makes a point of a deconstructive justice in front of law, Balkin looks for 
a  transcendental  justice  that  may  allow  for  a  relative  coordination  of  law  and  justice. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that both Derrida and Balkin set out to deconstruct law and 
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end up talking about a specific perspective on justice.  Importantly,  Derrida underlines the 
relevance of talking  the language of the Other as justice. But this is it: there is one justice. To 
do something  different  would not be just.  Derrida's and Balkin's justice is a justice that is 
thought in singular, even though it might change with time. Here are again the mirages of 
modernity: a rational universal value that might change according to a linear perspective of 
time. 
In fact, Derrida's appeal to deconstruct is equally violent as the violence he pretends to 
deconstruct. His justice would then, in his own terms, be unjust. But for Derrida, as Balkin 
remarked, it is not always imperative to talk the language of the Others. There is one justice,  
the one of deconstruction. What kind of difference is the one that deconstruction can accept 
when it  wants  to  “change  things”  (Derrida  1992,  8;  emphasis  in  the  original)?  Although 
deconstruction works with instabilities, it refers equally to the same categories that it brings 
out of balance, like law and justice. In fact, Derrida's search for justice guides his endeavor 
with  deconstruction  (Idem,  25).  Consequently,  he  can  imagine  that,  in  engaging 
deconstructively, he can take a position that is without prejudice (Idem, 8), unbounded, free 
— a privileged position indeed. 
Despite all differences, Balkin is equally monolithic in his approach when he, following 
his interpretation of relative justice, underlines that “we are always uncertain — at least to 
some degree  — about  the  justice  of  our  decision”  (Balkin  1994,  39).  It  is  clear,  in  this 
expression, that the position that Balkin takes is the one of the judge that has to take a just 
decision. If he would, however, take the position of the involved parties, he could perceive 
that justice, most of the times, is a matter of interacting, maybe contradictory justices, which 
for each of the parties are equally certain. Equally, Derrida, reflecting on the role of language 
in a judicial context, thinks of legal language as being outside of dialogue, and of law as being 
void of dialogue (Derrida 1992, 17 f.), reinforcing the category of law that he criticizes. 
Summing up, the critical force of deconstruction turns into a self-questioning circular 
movement,  into  a  whirl,  without  offering  any possibility  to  transform that  force  against  
dichotomy  into  a  generating  force  towards innovative  responses  in  front  of  conflict. 
Nevertheless, Derrida asserts the positive side of the deconstructability of law, stating that it 
builds the political chance of historical progress (Idem, 14), a concept that has been fought by 
deconstructivism continuously. Equally, Balkin speaks of an increase of justice (Balkin 1994, 
23) following a model of progressive augmentation. But the problem relies therein that justice 
cannot be augmented if the concept of justice is unstable, or, in other words, if justice in the  
eyes of one party means injustice in the eyes of  ‘the Other’, especially if the Other is the 
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opponent.  In  calling  for  the  recognition  of  more  legal  subjects  as  more  justice,  Derrida 
disregards the problem that more rights means also ‘more people against other people’. Rights 
never come alone, they also have their counterpart, it is always a right ‘to’ something and 
‘against’ somebody, somebody else, the Other. This is a structure of dichotomic opposition in 
which modern law, but also Derrida's justice that aims to deconstruct this law, are engrained. 
Nevertheless, Derrida assumes that being recognized as a legal subject is better, is more just, 
than not being recognized, because access to a certain discussion field is granted. However, 
the recognition as subject does not mean per se a state of more justice in everybody's eyes. In 
fact, to be recognized as a subject of law means equally to have certain duties, to be subjected 
to an order and to be potentially restrained in the exertion of freedom. Beyond that, access to 
the law system as a legal subject might equally imply a concentration of political power, that  
does not lead necessarily to more justice in terms of the individuals or groups who have no 
access to such a position or who are subordinated to that power.30 These are points that turn 
obvious, when we put law in its socio-political context.
When  it  comes  to  matters  of  interpersonal  and  social  conflict,  the  deconstructive 
approaches of Derrida and Balkin are exponents of how postmodern thinking remains, equally 
as the modern thinking they criticize, in a dichotomous divide, between the language of the 
Other and my language, oppressed victims and oppressors (Derrida 1989, 820; Balkin 1994, 
39 ff.), law and justice, and justice and nihilism. Although Derrida underlines that he cannot 
give a satisfying answer to questions put in the form of “either-or” (Derrida 1992, 4), he 
remains  playing  on  that  seesaw.  In  fact,  Derrida  is  overtly  in  favor  of  the  classical 
emancipatory ideal (Idem, 28) that requires a perspective of certain universal ideals towards 
which emancipation shall bring us.”
Consequently, it is not surprising that, also in this frame, justice is always away from the 
present (Derrida 1992, 23 f.), that it remains always to come (Idem, 27).31 As Teubner argues, 
deconstructive approaches,  equally as the modern approaches  they oppose,  remain in  this 
longing for the future: The demands of justices are “infinite demands of the uniqueness of the 
Other [...]. Thus, justice is impossible but at the same time cannot be disconnected from law. 
It is ‘haunting’ the law [...]” (Teubner 1997, 774). Through this demand for an impossible,  
deconstructive justice “reformulates a relation of law to the sacred that has been lost with 
secularization”,  although  “it  is  remarkably  different  from the  usual  bridging  of  law  and 
30 In this sense, see also Balkin's discussion on the recognition of corporations as legal subjects (Balkin 1994, 
19 ff.).
31 On time and deconstructive justice see Teubner 1997, 776.
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religion” because it “opens the experience of an areligious, an atheological transcendence” 
(Idem, 775). 
Thus, how can I ever be just in front of the Other, right here, right now? How can law 
ever support a fair dealing or even an encountering with alterity, plurality or difference? This 
conflict within law found a clear expression in debates around the concept of law and its 
capacity to include or segregate ‘the Other’. Particularly,  this  question materialized in the 
proposals of ‘alternative law’ and ‘legal pluralism’, which derived from critical approaches in 
legal theory that I will present in the following section. 
III.  Critiques on Law – Twisting the Vertical Vector of Authority  
Although Derrida's speech does not mark a founding date for the emergence of an academic 
movement of critical legal thought, it does present a variety of elements that are recurrent in 
diverse fields of contemporaneous critical legal research. Summarizing, Derrida underlines 
the  inherent  connection  between  law  and  violence,  the  apories  implicit  in  juridical 
legitimation at a legislative and judicial level that form a ‘mystical’ authority, and the tension 
(if not the incompatibility) between modern law and the recognition of the Other. Finally, he 
tries to find his way out of the total aporetical paralyzation in front of the question: How can 
justice ever find materialization (through law) if law can never be just? So, what should we 
do? Dismiss law? Dismiss justice? Being an expert on speech acts, the only response he can 
call  for  is  a  speech  act:  deconstruct!  Or,  if  we  follow a  more  anti-humanist,  subjectless 
perspective:  Let  self-deconstruction  happen!  Point  at  self-deconstruction!  Recognize  the 
self-deconstruction!
Legal  researchers  developed  concrete  analysis  and  proposals  highlighting  similar 
problematics  and  envisaging  new  perspectives  in  front  of  these  questions.  Antônio  C. 
Wolkmer,  recognizes  four  influences  for  the  development  of  critical  theories  on law:  the 
Soviet  economical  perspective  of  Pēteris  Stučka  (1865-1932) and  Evgeny Bronislavovich 
Pashukanis (1891-1937), the interpretation of Marxist theory with Gramsci as developed by 
the group of Althusser, the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School and the archaeological 
thesis on power of Michel Foucault (Wolkmer 2003, 31). Equally,  the works of Hermann 
Kantorowicz  (1877-1940) and his  School  of  Free  Law as  well  as  processes  within  Latin 
American history like the Revoluciones Universitarias (University Revolutions) were central 
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to this development.  Many of the new perspectives on law often referred to the research of 
Foucault sketched above or took as their base and ally deconstructivist reflection. 
I will present here some of the main currents that evolved critical thought within legal 
discourse with an important impact in academia and politics. Clearly, many of these critiques 
came accompanied  by intents  to  develop  better  ways  to  answer  social  needs,  this  is,  to 
develop  better  concepts,  better  practices,  and  thus,  better  law.  If  the  existent  law  was 
perceived  as  insufficient,  the  search  aimed  to  find  alternatives.  Thus,  these  critical 
perspectives  start  recognizing  that,  from a  plurality  of  available  ways,  it  is  possible  and 
necessary to choose one which is different from the one in practice. The currents referring to 
plurality  and  alternativity  in  law  are,  consequently,  specially  interesting  for  this  inquiry 
insofar  as  they open the  question  for  matters  of  alternative  and plural  (legal  and social) 
developments. 
In the search for another law, the idea of alternativity, has been used in many different 
ways.  Following  authors  like  Luciano  Oliveira  (Oliveira  2003,  211  f.)32 it  is  possible  to 
differentiate two main ways to deal with the problem of the lacking unity of law from a 
perspective in search for alternatives. Often, these two approaches have been presented as ‘the 
alternative use of law’ and ‘alternative law’, separating both fields strictly from each other. 
Thus, on the one side we can find a movement like the one in Spain or Italy, started basically 
by judges who propose an application of law in the sense of social justice, while on the other,  
a  more  pluralistic  proposal,  developed  largely  by  scholars  in  conjunction  with  popular 
movements, aims to have a more radical character, doubting of the capacity of state law to 
deliver  justice  within  culturally  diverse  societies.33 While  one  approach  asserts  the 
determinant role and the capacity of the judge to interpret  the (state) law, calling for the 
judges to use their  power with a  specific  perspective in favor  of  social  justice,  the other 
approach,  puts  in  question  the  position  of  the  judge  and  the  state  law  in  general  as  a 
universally legitimate way to solve social conflicts. This last concern is actually linked to the 
32 Amilton Bueno de Carvalho, however, makes a different classification of the movement of ‘Alternative 
Law’,  dividing  it  into  three  currents:  1.  the  Alternative  Use  of  Law,  utilizing  the  “contradictions,  
ambiguities  and lacunae of  the  positive  law” in order  to  interpret  it  from a point  of  view oriented to 
democracy and social justice; 2. the Combative Positivism, through which positive law is used in the battle 
for making effective rights already stated in the law but not being applied in social reality; an 3. Alternative  
Law in Strict Sense, which refers to a “parallel, emergent, insurgent, found on the street, non-official law”,  
that coexists with the state law. “It is a living law, active, which is in constant formation/transformation” 
(Wolkmer 2002, 143 cit.  Carvalho).  Although de Carvalho's differentiation might  be more useful  for  a 
detailed observation of  the different groups active in Brazil,  in the context  of  this work,  it  suffices  to  
highlight two different spheres according to the role of the idea of plurality and its relationship to law.
33 In the words of Botelho Junqueira, while the first one has been developed from a group of judges and 
makes emphasis on the judicial praxis, the second one pursues to value normative praxis outside of the state  
legal system and underlines the importance of legal and political education of popular classes in order to 
develop an insurgent law (Botelho Junqueira 1993, 115).
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proposals of ‘legal pluralism’, which aimed equally to address an idea of social justice with 
the difference that the emphasis was directed now to a cultural understanding of law. 
Although the differences between the two currents are clear at first sight, it is important 
to remember that they developed from the same critical impulse. In fact, both currents are 
connected  historically  as  well  as  by their  rather  leftist  tendency (Guanabara  1996,  404). 
Hence, the passage from one form of alternativity, in which law can be given meaning in 
alternative ways, to the other one, in which alternativity is put in the concept of law itself, is  
smooth. A clear example of this, is the work of alternative legal services, which, exploring 
ways to use the law of the state in alternative forms oriented towards social justice, developed 
equally alternatives to the state law, including forms of mediation and arbitration as well as 
forms of political protest. The step from mediation and political protest in favor of the rights 
of  socially  marginalized  groups  and  individuals  (including  the  vindications  of  large 
indigenous groups) to the recognition of forms of conflict resolution different from law (for 
example indigenous law) as equally valid,  is  not a big step.  The interrelatedness of these 
spheres of knowledge and praxis has been testified by compilations like the one elaborated by 
Óscar Correas in ‘Pluralismo Jurídico, alternatividad y derecho indígena’ ('Legal Pluralism, 
Alternativity and Indigenous Law’, 2003). 
While paying attention to the different emphasis of the various currents, the aim of this 
section is not to present a clear differentiation between one type of proposals and another one, 
but to show the complex emergence of alternative approaches to law and their relation to 
concepts of development and plurality. I will address thus some important examples from the 
US-American, European and Latin American contexts, which, despite their differences, are all 
connected by their critical perspective on a modern concept of law, and often by their search 
for new alternatives.
1.  Critical Legal Studies  
In the development of critical legal thought, the contribution of deconstructivism has been 
central.  Emphasizing  the  political  aspects  of  judicial  decision,  some scholars  recurred  to 
deconstruction to support their claim of the instability of meaning arguing that legal ideology 
“rested on claims of the ‘false necessity’ of social and legal structures that seemed reasonable 
in theory but were oppressive in practice” (Balkin 1996, 5). Equally, deconstructivism has 
been used by Roberto Mangabeira Unger (*1947) to inquire into specific legal doctrines and 
show how they undermine themselves (Unger 1986). Also Robert W. Gordon and Jack M. 
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Balkin have been using deconstructivism to inquire into “political and legal ideologies” that 
operate “as a form of constraint on individuals”, constructing “a way of thinking about society 
that prevented individuals from considering other alternative orderings of social  and legal 
structures, and thus limited their thought” (Gordon 1987, Balkin 1991). Similarly, feminist 
theory  was  combined  with  deconstructivism  for  an  ideological  critique  of  law.  Drucilla 
Cornell  is  a  main representative of  this  current  who supported Derrida's  argument  of  the 
inherent justice of deconstructivism, arguing that his approach “values the Other as different, 
indeed as difference” (Cornell 1992, 88).   
What all these authors have in common, is that they take a contestatory attitude in front 
of the mainstream study of law. Embedded in the context of the civil rights movement, the 
women's rights movement,  and the anti-war movement of the 1960's  and 1970's, the first 
group of legal scholars that started this inquiry in the field of law, transposed this combative 
force to the critical assessment of the legal system as it is understood most commonly in legal  
academia and legal practice. Many of the scholars of the first generation of this critical wave 
gathered in the group of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS), formed partly by participants of the 
Law  and  Society  Association,  which  had  been  founded  in  1964.  In  general  terms,  their 
criticisms based, besides poststructuralism, on two elder groups of ideas. On the one hand, 
they ground on the works of Karl Marx, Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), and, most importantly 
on the Critical  Theory of the Frankfurt School, developed amongst others by  Theodor W. 
Adorno (1903-1969) as a theory concerned with the criticism of pervasive ideologies in the 
whole society.  Not surprisingly,  postmodern approaches in other areas,  including both the 
perspectives of Foucault and Lyotard on the one hand, and, for example, the standpoint of 
Habermas on the other hand, are connected equally to this critical strand. Equally, Critical 
Legal Studies referred to the current of Legal Realism with the works of Oliver W. Holmes 
(1841-1935),  Benjamin  N.  Cardozo  (1870-1938),  Roscoe  Pound  (1870-1964)  and  Karl 
Llewellyn (1893-1962), who emphasized the socio-political environment in which law was 
embedded and how it affected legal results and legal development. 
For several reasons, it is worth here, to take a closer look at the current of Legal Realism. 
Firstly, its socio-historical role is less known in Europe than the Critical Theory of Frankfurt. 
This  account  will  allow  us  to  see  how  the  struggle  between  modern  and  postmodern 
approaches found expression in the US-American environment, a setting that is interesting for 
this research not only because it is ruled by common law, offering a different background than 
the presented above. It is even more relevant, because it builds a center of development of the 
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most widely spread contemporary legal theories and equally, a political and financial center 
for international  legal  aid.  Moreover,  some of the scholars  involved in  this  current,  were 
equally important  for the conception of legal  development,  which I  will  treat  later.  Legal 
Realism is known, namely, as a turning point both in legal scholarship, orienting research 
towards a more sociological and critical view of the role of law, and in US-American socio-
political development, posing resistance against “obstructionist reactionary courts […] and 
helping to pave the way for the New Deal” (Tamanaha 2009, 731).34 As John Henry Schlegel 
puts it, “the combination of the death of progressivism in World War I, the swing to a socially 
conservative national government, and the gathering economic dislocation that by the end of 
the twenties had become the Depression, brought to the fore renewed left political activity”, 
which “joined with the twentieth century notion of science as empirical inquiry into a world 
‘out there’ to produce American Legal Realism” (Schlegel 1984, 404).
To be sure,  the socio-critical  approach of Legal Realism was neither the result  of a 
rebellious  band  of  scholars  in  the  war  against  US-American  traditional  legal  scholarship 
sunken in the “'formalist’ age” (Leiter 2008), nor was it an outburst of outrageous skepticism. 
As  Brian  Z.  Tamanaha  develops  convincingly,  “skeptical-realistic  insights  about  judging 
regularly emerge in the U.S. legal tradition, often linked to heightened social and political 
turmoil” (Tamanaha 2009, 783). He refers in this context to a chain of criticisms that use very 
similar arguments across time, from the first half of the 19 th century,  passing by the legal 
realists in the 1920's and 1930's and Critical Legal Studies in the 1970's and 1980's until the 
present. Tamanaha's account is insofar interesting for this study as it mirrors the perspective 
presented above about the mutual conformation of postmodern and modern approaches. Self-
reflection  and  an  attitude  of  critical  inquiry  was  continuously  present  with  more  or  less 
dominance  in  the  legal  discourses  prevalent  in  the  academy  as  well  as  in  the  courts. 
Interestingly, political realms do not seem to be truly relevant for the assumption of a critical 
attitude.  In  fact,  Tamanaha  underlines  the  fact  that  while  in  the  late  1950's  and  1960's 
conservative critics accused the Supreme Court of reading liberal values into the Constitution, 
in  the 1970's  and 1980's  it  was the leftist  Critical  Legal  Studies who embraced skeptical 
realism (Idem, 784). 
Equally, Tamanaha shows a clear overlap between Legal Realists and Historical Jurists, 
who are commonly taken to have set the base for a ‘formalistic’ view of law and thus to be the 
enemies  that  Realism  opposed.  It  might  seem  counter-intuitive,  that  Historical  Jurists, 
34 The ‘New Deal’ was a combination of social and economic reforms put in practice during the presidency of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) that sought to level the difficulties after the crisis of the 1930's.
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connected to socio-historical research, are positioned as formalists. However, the link between 
Historicism and Positivism is very tight, as I have argued above for the European current of 
the  Historical  School  of  Savigny.  In  fact,  positivism  and  a  historical  or  developmental 
perspective  are  not  contradictory  but  complementary  perspectives.  Nevertheless,  this 
connection does not change the fact that Historical Jurists and Legal Realists are connected by 
their common argument in favor of the primacy of society and social factors: “The Realists 
insisted that law is not autonomous from society, and that law must evolve with and serve 
social needs. Historical jurisprudence championed the same propositions” (Idem, 756). This 
link between law and society was equally determinant for the developmental approach in law. 
Thus, it is not surprising that Karl Llewellyn, as well as his wife Soia Mentschikoff (1915-
1984), participated in the wave of national legal development started in the 1940's acting as a 
principal drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 
The fact that Tamanaha asserts, in this context, that the “formalist-realist divide” cannot 
be taken to be as strict as it is usually portrayed (Idem, 755 f. and 782), recalls the ambivalent 
character of late-modern approaches and mirrors the presentation I have made above of legal 
positivism and legal historicism as two expressions of the same perspective.  Equally,  this 
blurring  of  differences  that  Tamanaha  pursues,  reflects  the  contemporaneous  postmodern 
concern about the insufficiency or exchangeability of the differentiations used until present. 
He underlines, for example, that both Realists and Historical Jurists shared the notion that 
law's “function is to serve social needs”, and that “law was and ever must be receptive to, 
infused  by,  and permeable  to  morality  and politics  produced  by society”  (Idem,  757  f.). 
Therefore, according to Tamanaha, the conceptualization of Historical Jurists as formalists 
and  as  totally  opposite  to  Legal  Realism,  is  inaccurate.  Although  the  two  currents  were 
separated  by  political  stands  as  well  as  by  several  decades  and  thus  by  diverse  social 
transformations  that  determined  some  of  the  points  on  which  they  made  emphasis,  it  is 
important  to  understand,  that  formalism and skeptical  criticism are  not  two opposite  and 
incommensurable realms, but, moreover, they base on the same ground of a certain trust in the 
development of law that they pursue.
Specifically, Tamanaha refers to the fact that Legal Realists were committed to the law 
and were not  only driven by an attitude of  (destructive)  critique (Idem, 764 ff.).  In  fact, 
“Realists believed in the law and they fervently labored to improve it” as he demonstrates 
citing, for example, Llewellyn, who proclaimed his “faith about the Good in this institution of 
our law” (Llewellyn cit.  in Tamanaha 2009, 764). This attitude is not surprising from the  
standpoint of social critique as a means to achieve a better law, in other words, in the pursue 
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of  legal  development.  Thus,  Legal  Realists  were  both  seen  as  “devoted  and  effective 
reformers” (Rostow cit. in Tamanaha 2009, 764), and they acknowledged themselves as such. 
Their interest for practical engagement with social concerns turns clear in the professional 
careers of many Legal Realists, who were very involved in the development of legislation as 
well  as  in  judicial  careers.  Tamanaha summarizes  the  “constructive  orientation”  of  Legal 
Realism: “The various goals of the Realists were to increase the certainty and predictability of 
law; to train better lawyers; to advance legal justice; and to reform the law to better serve 
social  needs” (Idem, 765). To achieve a better  law was the reason for legal realists to be 
skeptical-critical about it (Kalman 1986, 231). A big part of the scholars of Critical Legal 
Studies inscribed themselves in this tradition.35
There  is  however,  a  meaningful  breach  between  Legal  Realism and  Critical  Legal 
Studies, which at the same time can be seen as an expression of the twist that postmodern 
approaches apply to modern ones. Historically, this shift, included in a certain continuum, can 
be seen in the relationship of both research perspectives with the Law & Society Movement. 
This movement, started in the United States of America at the end of the 1950's, aimed to 
study law as an expression of social behavior. Naturally, it was influenced by Legal Realism 
in its approach to law as embedded in society. After the criticisms of Legal Realism were 
seemingly incorporated through “questions of process [that] were thought to have laid to rest 
questions of power” (Schlegel 1984, 406), socio-political disillusion called for an approach 
that dealt with more than policy analysis, focusing on what was ‘really’ going on ‘out there’.  
Furthermore, it reflected main concerns after the Second World War: How to direct societies 
to the right path? If positivism could not be the answer in front of an authoritarian state, and at 
the same time,  a  secularized  society requested  something different  from moral  law,  what 
could law still offer? In fact, the success of the New Deal, a legal step that changed the face of 
US-American society, called for the explanation of society as a result of law. In response to 
that call, the research of David Trubek grounded to an important extent “on the belief in the 
possibility of an objective and neutral knowledge that was at the base of North-American 
Realism”  (Botelho  Junqueira  1993,  38).  Being  embedded  in  a  reformist  discourse,  the 
movement of Law & Society received financial support from diverse agencies with interest in 
such reforms, like the Ford Foundation. Later on, some figures of this movement, like Richard 
Abel (*1941), and participants of the Law and Modernization group of David Trubek, like 
Tom Heller (*1944), were central to the foundation of the project of Law & Development. 
35 Beyond matters of content, which will be developed immediately, see for example the parallelization of 
discussions about CLS with the so called Great Realist Debate (Schlegel 1984, 673).
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Political struggle as well as the decay of the functional-structuralist paradigm led later to a 
revision of the perspective of neutrality stated by the Law & Society movement. It is from this 
new generation  of  legal  scholars  concerned  with  society  but  critical  to  the  bias  of  their 
teachers, that the movement of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) emerged. 
In fact, the Conference of Critical Legal Studies formed out of an intent to gather the 
younger  researchers  like  Duncan  Kennedy  (*1942),  who  had  studied  with  Trubek  and 
participated in his Law & Modernization group, with the older advocates of law and social 
science,  like  Lawrence  Friedman  (*1930).  Richard  Abel,  David  Trubek  and  Stewart 
Macaulay, all important figures of the Law & Society Academy, participated in the organizing 
Committee of the First Conference of CLS in 1977 (Botelho Junqueira 1993, 41 cit. Kelman).  
Furthermore,  Mark V. Tushnet (*1945),  who according to Schlegel's  account  was then “a 
relatively orthodox, Scientific Marxist”, was included in the organizing committee “out of 
material  necessity,  so  that  a  “third  leftist  perspective  achieved  prominence  in  the  group” 
(Schlegel 1984, 396). In the invitation, the “critical perspective in the study of law in society” 
underlined the “convergence between the two groups in their opposition to traditional law 
school  teaching  and  scholarship”  (Idem,  395),  although  it  was  clear  from the  start,  that 
critique meant very different things at the same time. While Trubek elaborated a Weberian 
assessment of law, CLS emphasized the independent character of law in front of ‘society’ 
(Botelho Junqueira 1993, 42 cit. Thompson), making emphasis on the ideological character of 
legal doctrine. The new generation conceived of itself as more concerned with the internal 
structure  of  law  “than  with  a  perspective  that  points  to  latent  social  functions”,  as  the 
invitation to the conference in 1977 stated (Idem, 41).  The dynamic was thus marked by 
partial  epistemological  superpositions  and  simultaneous  nemesis  amongst  the  different 
groups. 
Summarizing,  it  is  possible  to  say that  the  movements  of  Legal  Realism,  Law and 
Society and Law and Development based on related positions that contributed to a perspective 
on  law  centered  on  its  connections  with  society.  All  of  them  tried  to  avoid  the 
naturalist/positivist divide, speaking of ‘realism’ instead. However, they followed equally a 
positivistic approach with iusnaturalistic purposes incorporated in the idea of the betterment 
of society through law. Although the CLS developed from the Law & Society movement, it 
evolved in response and in rejection of its epistemological bases and its “call to work harder 
to  perfect  society”  (Schlegel  1984,  397).  It  is  in  reference  to  this  tension  that  Schlegel 
recounts an “attack on social science at the first meeting (and ever since)”, and points at the 
denunciations made by members of the Law and Society Association calling CLS scholars as 
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“the  new  doctrinal  barbarians”,  finally  remarking  that  the  “rapprochement  Trubek  and 
Kennedy sought with the law and social science group has been a conspicuous failure” (Idem, 
408).
Boldly stated, the difference between Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies is fruit of the 
same shift that caused a passage from the paradigm of ‘the social’ to the paradigm of ‘the 
cultural’. It is not difficult to admit, that this is a sliding change. What is the difference if I 
state that a judge takes certain decisions because of the social class it needs to be loyal to, or if 
I assume that a judge takes certain decisions because of the concept of law he has, the legal 
culture he is  embedded in (and which is  a result,  at  least  to  a large extent,  of the social 
positions the judge has been in throughout his personal history)? There is a difference, and 
this  difference  can  be  understood as  a  difference  of  the  plural.  Because  while  the  social 
paradigm understands behavior as an expression of a certain role in one society, the cultural 
approach speaks  of  one  culture  available  amongst  a  plurality  of  possibilities,  or  even an 
individual as a result of an intersection of cultures. While differences can be addressed in 
terms of ‘how things are done’ and what results they have for other parts of a social group 
from a social perspective, from a cultural perspective, the question is about how things are 
understood,  are  given meaning.  But,  where is  the place of meaning? Meaning is  elusive, 
changing,  relational,  constructed in  interaction and, at  first,  intangible.  Of course,  from a 
perspective of concerns for ‘social justice’ and the like, the problem is that a question of 
meaning can be used in terms of more or less equality, more or less freedom, more or less 
justice, as Balkin will argue later against what he understands as an ideological misuse of 
postmodernist deconstruction. If Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies both claim to a 
certain extent that law is politics, politics in the 1930's is related to a specific social class, 
while, in the 1970's it goes beyond class and includes all sorts of power-relation, referring 
thus to the politics of language,  the politics of the body, the politics of normality etc. As 
Botelho Junqueira argues, CLS goes beyond “accepting the criticisms formulated externally 
pointing at  the fragility,  fragmentation,  the incoherence and dispersion of a law that now, 
because it is perceived as ideology, mixes itself with society” (Botelho Junqueira 1993, 40). 
Thus, with the first official meeting at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1977, a critical 
reflection on the relationship between law and society elaborated since the 1960's  by the 
intellectuals  linked  to  the  Law  &  Society  Association,  was  introduced.  Naturally,  this 
engagement with law and society, changed importantly in the course of time. As Wolkmer 
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puts it, after a short period of engagement with classical authors of Marxism like Pashukanis, 
CLS  scholars  distanced  themselves  from  the  deterministic  currents  of  Marxism36 and 
dedicated their efforts more towards the study of a “relatively autonomous superstructure: law 
as  ideology [...],  as  legitimacy [...]  and as hegemonic force [...]” (Wolkmer 2002,  34 cit. 
Abel). 
In an effort to organize the contributions of the movement and following the lines of 
two  of  the  central  inspirational  backgrounds  of  CLS,  namely  Critical  Theory  and  Legal 
Realism, some authors distinguished still in the 1980's between two main tendencies in the 
Critical  Legal  Studies  movement.  The  divide  would  rely  therein  that,  while  one  side 
emphasized “the contradictory and manipulable character of doctrinal argument”, the other 
departed from the  standpoint that “law and legal doctrine reflect, confirm, and reshape the 
social  divisions and hierarchies inherent in  a type or stage of social  organization such as 
‘capitalism’ (Unger  1983,  675),  focusing  on  the  contradictions,  paradoxes  and  complex 
patterns of law itself. The first group would include researchers like Duncan Kennedy, whose 
writings ‘The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries’ (1979), ‘A Critique of Adjudication: 
Fin de Siècle’ (1997) and ‘Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic 
Against the System. A Critical Edition’ (2004), reflect some of the main fields of interest of 
Critical Legal Studies. In the same vein, Mark G. Kelman (*1951) wrote his ‘Interpretive 
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law’ (1981). In turn, the second trend comprises, 
for example, the works of David M. Trubek, who wrote ‘Complexity and Contradiction in the 
Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought About Law’ (1977), and 
who edited books like ‘The New Law and Economic Development:  A Critical  Appraisal’ 
(with Alvaro Santos, 2006). To this strand would belong equally Morton Horwitz (*1938), 
who in his ‘The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860’ (1977) sought to give a ‘thick 
description’, in the sense of Clifford Geertz, of the transformation of US-American law in the 
turn of the 19th century.
Divisions  amongst  diverse  perspectives  are  not  reduced  only  to  these  two  strands. 
Naturally, the more the movement grew, the more diversified it became. In any case, Unger 
emphasizes that “the contrast between these tendencies should not be overstated”, since both 
of these “tendencies criticize the dominant style of legal doctrine and the legal theories that 
try to refine and preserve this style. Both repudiate in the course of this critique the attempt to 
36 Regarding Critical Marxism, see for example, Trubek's expression at the end of the first meeting of CLS in 
1977, who “attempted to sum up ‘the problem’ with which the group had been grappling as ‘whether we are 
Marxists'” (Schlegel 1984, 398). However, even this question was put into question at the same meeting by  
Tushnet, who emphasized more questions around the relevance of material economic culture (Idem). In any 
case, the question remained a matter of identity in front of other research currents.
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impute current social arrangements to the requirements of industrial society, human nature, or 
moral order” (Unger 1983, 675). In fact, despite these divisions, the direction of the criticisms 
is in general to inquire into the relationships of power and the ideological background of law, 
and  more  specifically  of  judicial  decision.  The  main  point  of  criticism is  the  fallacy  of 
neutrality and objectivity of judicial discourse. Thus, at the same time as CLS analyzes the 
result  of  judicial  decision-making  process,  it  puts  in  question  the  formation  of  these 
paradigms through education and socialization. Although rejecting the reformist impetus of 
their predecessors, one important aspect present in large parts of the work of CLS researchers, 
is the intention of their critique to serve as a board of broad social change starting by the 
development of a critical attitude and envisaging a change in the function of law in society.
Summing up, the topics at the center of CLS’ criticisms marked the further development 
of law in academy, in particular its understanding in relation to power, alterity and plurality. 
Equally,  some of the methods applied by critical scholars influenced the further course of 
legal research, for example the emphasis put on diverse aspects of interpretation and culture, 
which determined both methodological perspectives and objects of investigation. It is exactly 
the matter of interpretation that was at the center of one of the main debates between scholars 
of CLS and their colleagues, namely the ‘indeterminacy debate’, meaning the question on 
how far positive law determines the outcome of a legal dispute. Summing up, CLS scholars 
put the relationship between law and politics to the front, arguing like Legal Realism that law 
can be understood as the expression of politics, and thus as a matter of power and force. The 
assumption  that  the  legal  subject  or  the  judge  are  basically  autonomous  was  challenged, 
highlighting the political and social structures, in which it is embedded. Consequently, it was 
discussed how far law tends to protect, in the name of justice, the  status quo, and thus the 
powerful and wealthy strata of society, disregarding and even opposing any social change in 
favor of the poor and the subaltern (a term that was borrowed from Antonio Gramsci's work). 
The capacity of social reform through law was put into question, emphasizing that the needed 
change was of more radical character. Equally,  legal education was criticized as a factor of 
reproduction of the social oppressive system to which it allegedly belonged.
Despite  the  central  importance  of  CLS  for  the  present  inquiry  on  postmodern 
approaches to law, it is important to remark that critical positions in front of law in the United 
States of America were not restricted to this movement. Take for example the movement of 
‘law and  economics’ (e.g.  Richard  Posner's  ‘Economic  Analysis  of  Law’ of  1973),  John 
Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ (1971), Robert Nozick's ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’ (1974), and 
Ronald Dworkin's ‘Taking Rights Seriously’ (1977) or ‘Law's Empire’ (1986).  Neither was 
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political criticism of law restricted to academia, as the case of Cappy Silver shows. He once 
characterized the CLS as a “lonely hearts  club for left-wing law professors”,  while being 
himself a “paralegal welfare advocate and antinuclear organizer who decided not to become a 
lawyer” (Schlegel 1984, 411). This anecdotal comment depicts the specific situation in which 
the concern for and the critiques of law went beyond the border of academic disciplines. In 
fact,  the  connection  of  different  forms  of  art  with  law  marks  an  important  aspect  of  a 
postmodern approach to law, that aims to envisage law in new ways, using another language 
that  allows  to  reconnect  legal  theory  with  life,  and  that  permits  to  leave  behind  old 
hierarchies, including the hierarchy that put law and academics above art.37
After  the  CLS movement  had reached  its  highpoint  in  the  1980's,  its  force  as  a  distinct 
movement diminished. However, its critical power continued to be present in legal academy. 
Tamanaha speaks, in the US-American context, for example, of a contemporaneous “steady 
drumbeat of skeptical realism” directed especially to the Supreme Court “from both the left 
and the right” (Tamanaha 2009, 784). In fact, that critical force seems to have changed places 
with  mainstream  conceptions  on  law  in  the  United  States  of  America.  Thus,  Tamanaha 
underlines  as  a  main  difference  between  present  and  past  criticisms,  that  “the  skeptical 
emphasis appears to have become a normalized aspect of discourse about judging” (Idem) — 
a tendency that he regards, in turn, with equal skepticism. 
The innovative  power  of  approaches  of  scholars  of  CLS  is  not  restricted  to  their 
contestatory gesture nor to their preferred objects of discussion. In fact, as Schlegel states, 
“the CLS movement may be less important as an event in the history of legal thought, than as  
an event in the history of legal education (Schlegel 1984, 403). As he puts it, “the central job 
of legal education has been to justify existing rules of law to the nascent members of the legal 
elite. The task is an important one; no society wants its priests wandering around doing their 
magic while doubting the one true faith” (Idem referring to Al Katz).
Beyond legal education, though, from a perspective of the development of academic 
institutions, it is remarkable that CLS emerged as part of a new tendency since the 1960's and 
1970's,  that  tried  to  access  research  beyond  the  limits  of  traditional  ‘disciplines’.  Thus, 
Cultural Studies, Gender Studies and Critical Legal Studies emerged emphasizing, through 
the form of their academic endeavor, the defiant attitude of their critiques. Negation, critique 
37 As we will see later with more detail, this search was oriented not only to develop new forms of law but 
also, in a broader sense, to develop new ways to think about social relations. It is not just a coincidence that  
the progressive rock band in which Silver was the singer, had the name ‘Balance of Power’ (Schlegel 1984, 
411).
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and opposition are common elements of these academic movements. CLS, as the other area 
studies, emphasized its interdisciplinary perspective, connecting law with other fields of study 
like literary criticism, psychoanalysis, aesthetics, post-colonialism, feminist theory and queer 
theory, amongst others. Its basic claim, namely that “LAW IS POLITICS” (Schlegel 1984, 
411, emphasis in the original), is as well an echo in resonance with the voices that conformed 
other contemporaneous perspectives in academia as well as outside of it.
2.  Critique and Legal-Political Activism in Europe  
While  the  movement  of  CLS  became  renowned  in  the  United  States  and  beyond,  it  is 
important  to  emphasize that  this  movement of  criticism was not  by far  restricted to  US-
American and British academy.  Also in continental Europe and other parts of the globe, the 
criticism of predominating positivism put law more and more in relation with matters of state 
ideology and power.38 Although this review cannot encompass neither the width nor the depth 
of  critical  movements  in  law,  it  aims  to  provide  a  certain  sensibility  for  the  variety  of 
approaches,  their  contexts  of  emergence,  their  connections,  and,  most  importantly,  their 
relationship with postmodernity as a reactive gesture in front of an universalizing foundation 
of law.
As with the movement of Critical Legal Studies in the United States of America, in Europe, 
equally,  it  was  in  the  1970's  that  critical  movements  in  the  legal  field  found  a  certain 
consolidation.  In 1978, for example, the French Association Critique du Droit39 (Law Critical 
Association), created that same year,  started publishing ‘Procès. Cahiers d'analyse politique 
et juridique’ ('Trial. Journal of political and legal analysis')  (Kaluszynski 2010, 1).40 A year 
before that, in 1977, a collection was created with an equal critical perspective: ‘Critique du 
droit’.41 Several conditions fostered this turn of perspective, mainly, the strong presence of the 
Althusserian-Marxist school in the 1960's, the re-discovery of Gramsci's work, the appearance 
of the first works of Foucault, the French May in 1968, the process of decolonialization and 
the organization of critical seminars and epistemological reflections in law faculties (Botelho 
38 For an interesting account on the transfer of Critical Legal Studies into Europe, particularly through the  
field of Comparative Law, see Mattei 2001.
39 For an account on the development of the critical movement in France with special attention to one of its 
main proponents, Michel Miaille, see Kaluszynski 2009.
40 The journal was published at the  Centre d'épistémologie juridique et politique de l'Université de Lyon II 
(Manaï 1979, 290).
41 The collection was published by the University Press of Grenoble and Francoise Maspéro (Manaï 1979, 
290). For a good resume of the development of critical theory on law, see  Kaluszynski 2010. 
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Junqueira  1993,  33;  Wolkmer  2002,  36  f.).  On  the  side  of  the  praxis  of  law,  so  called 
Boutiques de Droit, i.e. civil associations that offered legal services and conflict resolution 
outside  of  the  state  apparatus,  emerged,  participating  in  the  increasing  process  of  state 
deregulation and social regulation (Botelho Junqueira 1993, 34). Equally, the appearance of 
associations  of  judges  and  lawyers  similar  in  their  form  to  workers  unions,  shaped  the 
relationship  of  law and society anew. On the side of  the  academic  work with law,  these 
changes encouraged the formation of a movement of critical research by jurists from Lyon 
(Centre d'Epistemologie Juridique et Politique – CEJEP), Montpellier (Centre d'Etudes e de  
Recherches sur la Théorie de l'Etat – CERTE), Saint-Etienne (Centre de Recerches Critiques  
sur  le  Droit  –  CERCRID)  and  Grenoble  (Wolkmer  2002,  36  f.).  With  a  clear  socialist 
perspective42,  in  its  first  period,  the critical  movement in  France argued against  a  neutral 
perspective on law as a way to reinforce the domination of capitalist ways of production. 
Equally, it criticized the arbitrary distinctions between private and public law, legal science 
and political science and, lastly, between individual and collective (Idem, 37 f.). The criticism 
that  it  offered,  argued  Michel  Miaille  (*1941),  who was  a  figure  at  the  epicenter  of  the 
movement,  went  beyond  idealistic  ‘criticism’,  but  through  a  perspective  of  historical 
materialism, gave social and political content to the critical movement (Botelho Junqueira 
1993,  36  cit.  Miaille).  The  French  association,  source  of  inspiration  for  many critics  in 
Europe, changed from a rather general perspective on law with a Marxist perspective towards 
analysis of concrete modalities of social production of legal norms and their relationship with 
institutions and subjects (Wolkmer 2002, 39 cit. Jeammaud). After the first critical impetus, 
especially after the victory of the political left in 1981, a transition took place and it became a 
priority to underline the opposition against an authoritarian state, even if this meant, in the 
words  of  Antoine  Jeammaud,  “to  take  position  in  favor  of  the  bourgeois  Etat  de  Droit” 
(Botelho Junqueira 1993, 37 cit. Jeammaud).
The  changes  and  fragmentation  of  the  critical  jurists,  together  with  the  political 
developments in France, led finally to the silent vanishing of the movement as such (Wolkmer 
2002,  40;   Kaluszynski  2009,  7).  Nevertheless,  it  remains  clear  that  it  exerted  a  strong 
influence in the academic field. In France, for example, the CERCRID (Centre de recherches  
critiques  sur  le  droit)  (Mission  de  recherche  Droit  et  Justice  2008),  founded by  Antoine 
Jeammaud in the University Jean Monnet (Saint-Etienne) in 1982 remains an important space, 
42 For an example, see the expression in its manifest, published in the collection ‘Critique du droit': “Through 
a  privileged  use  of  historical  and  dialectical  materialism,  the  collection  will  seek  to  contribute  to  the 
understanding of legal phenomena from the perspective of a transition to new social relations, to socialism” 
(cit. in  Manaï 1979, 290).
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appreciated highly for its scientific performance (Aeres 2010). Equally,  at an international 
level, the French impulse had great repercussion, for example in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Italy and Great Britain, as well as in Mexico and Brazil. Some texts produced by 
the Association were translated into Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and Greek by journals with a 
similar  perspective  to  ‘Procès’,  like  the  Mexican  ‘Crítica’  and  the  Brazilian 
‘Contradogmàticas’ (Kaluszynski 2009, 8).
Regarding francophone literature, it is important to mention the Belgian engagement in 
legal  criticism  through  the  Séminaire  Interdisciplinaire  d'Études  Juridiques  (SIEJ) 
(Interdisciplinary Seminar for Legal Studies). In this context, François Ost (*1952) underlined 
the importance of Legal Ethnology and Comparative Law to demonstrate the plurality of legal 
forms, turning impossible to talk about a sole essence of law, and desacralized law as the only 
way  to  regulate  society.  Interpretation,  the  plurality  of  approaches  and  the  dialogue  of 
disciplines appear again at the center of discussion as well as the struggle with a seemingly 
generally  valid  reason  and  its  reconceptualization  as  a  myth  from  an  epistemological-
psychoanalytical meta-discourse43.
The French socio-political agitation had found thus its expression in law, and turned into 
a main reference for developments in other countries. In this line, the Swiss jurist Dominique 
Manaï-Wehrli weened in 1979 that  the critique on the institutions and disciplines in which 
lawyers  and  political  scientists  exercised  teaching  and  research,  as  aimed  by the  French 
journal ‘Procès’, would allow to debunk the institutional machinery from inside (Manaï 1979, 
290).  The  militant  perspective  of  the  French  critics  gave  her  hope  in  front  of  the  legal 
landscape  she  confronted,  where  she  noticed  with  surprise  “the  scarcity  and  poverty  of 
Marxist thinking about the legal phenomenon” (Idem, 279). In this vein, she underlined that 
the existence of “some works on Soviet law” were not sufficient, and remarked further that 
“Marxist Western perceptions of the legal phenomenon [were] embryonic and recent” (Idem). 
Thus, she encouraged an engagement with law from a socialist perspective, referring to the 
French development as well as to Ernst Bloch's (1885-1977) writings (Idem, 290 ff.).  
The critical efforts in Switzerland allowed to develop an association concerned with the 
“democratization of the law” in collaboration with political organizations and trade unions. 
This claim was received with critical concerns and warnings regarding an supposed threat of 
anarchy and dictatorship linked with this  ‘democratization’ (Albrecht 2003). This was the 
association ‘Juristes Démocrates de Suisse’ (JDS), founded the 11th of November 1978 as a 
43 See,  for  example  ‘Droit,  mythe  et  raison’ ('Law,  Myth  and  Reason')  published  in  1980  with  Jacques 
Lenoble.
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union of associations in the regions of Basel, Bern, Geneva, Waadt and Zurich as an answer to 
multiple  disciplinary  procedures  started  against  lawyers  (Schweizerisches  Sozialarchiv 
2010).44 Several participants of this association are active in the collective of lawyers, that 
functions since 1975 in Zurich-Aussersihl45, providing immediate accessible support in legal 
questions. Thus, this movement is also inscribed in the tradition  of Legal Services as many of 
the critical voices who claimed in general for a need to combine a theoretical position with an 
emancipatory praxis.
Also  in  Germany,  referents  like  Ernst  Bloch  and  Antonio  Gramsci  were  equally 
determinant for the development of critical currents in legal thought. Thus, during the 1970's, 
Wolf Paul, influenced partly by Jürgen Habermas, developed Marxist theory into a critical 
theory of law (Paul 1974), concentrating later on questions around the formation of jurists in 
Germany as well as in other countries.46 Interestingly, his focus developed later towards topics 
of environmental law and indigenous rights, maintaining a critical position in front of law and 
a certain focus on the role of the judiciary while getting more and more involved with social  
developments in  Latin America,  especially in Brazil.  He engaged equally with innovative 
proposals in the Latin American legal philosophy, like the ‘Tridimensional Theory of Law’ 
('Teoria  Tridimensional  do  Direito’,  1968)  proposed  by  the  Brazilian  legal  philosopher 
Miguele  Reale  (1910-2006).  It  is  not  a  coincidence  that  Paul  was  a  researcher  of  legal 
philosophy and criminal law at the university of Frankfurt, where once the Critical Theory in 
Germany found an institutional form through the Institute for Social Research. 
Of course, not only legal philosophers looked for new perspectives on law. Besides the 
internationally  renowned  Jürgen  Habermas,  also  other  philosophers  like  Dietrich  Böhler 
(*1942), presented relevant critical approaches inviting for a new reflection on the position of 
law  in  contemporary  society.  Most  interestingly  for  this  research,  however,  is  the  space 
occupied by jurists  and law students linked with the social  movements of the 1960's  and 
1970's. Symptomatically, it was the year of 1968 when the journal ‘Kritische Justiz’ ('Critical 
Justice') was founded. The circumstances are remarkable: it was founded in the Akademie der  
Arbeit47 (Academy of  Labor)  in  Frankfurt  Main following the impulse  of  Jan Gehlsen,  a 
44 The association publishes its own journal since 1976. Tellingly, until 1982 it was published by the local 
group in Basel as ‘Volk+Recht’ (People+Law), and since 1983 JDS is co-publisher of the national journal 
‘Plädoyer’ ('Pleading'). These changes reflect a transformation of context and attitude of the journal editors, 
showing a movement from a local publication in the name of ‘the people's law’ and fighting for popular  
justice to a more dialogical plea.
45 Since 1981 the collective is an association and uses the name “Rechtsauskunft Anwaltskollektiv” (Collective 
of Lawyers Legal Advice).
46 For a complete list of his work until 2003, see Paul 2007.
47 The Academy for Labor was founded on the 3rd of March 1921 at the University of Frankfurt. As its official 
web page declares: “The students, who were mostly workers, should receive here […] a special high school 
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recently graduated lawyer,  Fritz  Bauer  (1903-1968),  a  renowned public  prosecutor  whose 
engagement  was  decisive  for  the  Frankfurt  Ausschwitz  trials,  and  Hans  G.  Joachim,  the 
president of the State Labour Court. From the perspective of some of the editors of ‘Kritische 
Justiz’, this was the response in front of the situation of legal academy that rejected critical 
approaches and the engagement with the crimes during the national-socialist regime (Buckel 
et al.  2008, 235). More specifically, many of the positions at university were occupied by 
professors with a national-socialist perspective and democratic-socialistic oriented scientists 
were relegated to the periphery of the law academy (Idem). But the moment of crisis went 
beyond law faculties. The whole social model was undergoing an important transformation, as 
Buckel  and  her  colleagues  affirm:  Not  only  the  socio-economic  phase  of  the 
Wirtschaftswunder  (economic  miracle)  was  starting  to  decline,  but  with  it  also  “the 
bureaucratic welfare state, the male-breadwinner-model48 and not least: the bourgeois nuclear 
family, the ordinarius-university” amongst other socio-cultural bases (Idem). 
In  this  situation  of  radical  change,  groups of  extraparliamentary opposition like the 
Kampfgruppe Jura (Fighting Group Law) and  Republikanische Hilfe (Republican Help) as 
well as collectives of lawyers developed. In turn, the ‘Kritische Justiz’ aimed, according to its 
foundational document, at the “uncovering of the relationship between law and society, its 
political, social and socio-political implications” (cit. in Idem, 236), and connected Marxist 
theory  with  an  orientation  to  democracy and  the  rule  of  law.  In  the  1980's  accumulated 
concerns  on  feminist  perspectives  on  law  confluenced  to  found  the  law  journal  ‘Streit’ 
('Struggle') and also further topics were put to the front of critical legal approaches by the 
environmentalist and nuclear disarmament movement.
Interestingly, it was in the end of 1980's, the time when also Derrida was presenting his 
speech at the Cardozo Law School, that ‘Kritische Justiz’ suffered an important inner break, 
which reflects a more general turn and is related partly to the US-American development of 
the Critical  Legal Studies. While some adopted a “deconstructive aversion in front of the 
tradition  of  rational  law”,  others  opposed  this  position  arguing  the  danger  of  fascism 
embedded  in  this  attitude  (Idem,  238).  However,  other  initiatives  started,  like  the 
Bundesarbeitskreis  kritischer  Juragruppen  (BAKJ) (Federal  Working  Circle  of  Critical 
education.  This  educational experience  with  focus  in  social  policies,  economy and Labor  Law should 
strengthen  them in order  to  exercise  the manifold democratic  participative  rights  in  State,  society and 
industry in the interest of the workers” (Europäische Akademie der Arbeit 2012). Since 1951, the academy 
is organized as a foundation of the State of Hessen and the Confederation of German Trade Unions and 
cofinanced by the city of Frankfurt. In 2009 its name was changed into Europäische Akademie der Arbeit in  
der Universität Frankfurt  am Main (European Academy of Labor in the University of Frankfurt  Main) 
(Idem).
48 English in the original.
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Groups of Jurists), which, according to its own description, works since 1989 through legal-
political congresses and the journal ‘Forum Recht’ ('Forum Law'), for an “antifascist, basis-
democratic and emancipatory society” and against any form of discrimination (BAKJ 2012). 
Equally,  it  was in 1989 when the first number of the Austrian critical journal ‘Juridikum’ 
appeared (Oberndorfer 2008, 244).
Slowly, the critical research in law lost its aggressivity, was incorporated into broader 
legal  discourse  and  by  the  1990's,  the  ‘Kritische  Justiz’  was  reconsidered  as  socially 
acceptable in the academic environment and quotable in legal research (Oellers 1998). This 
process is read by some critical legal jurists in terms of the Gramscian transformismo, in other 
words, as the domestication of an anti-hegemonic project by incorporating it into hegemonic 
discourse  (Buckel et al. 2008, 240). Interestingly, this change, and the consequent loss of 
force  of  the  critical  project,  reminds  of  the  loss  experienced  by  natural  law  with  the 
positivization of some of the main principles that it postulated. In both cases, it is possible to 
say,  in general terms, that the loss of identity went hand in hand with the loss of a clear 
opponent. 
Despite  all  these  changes  and  many others,  including  important  renovations  in  the 
publication background, ‘Kritische Justiz’, as many other contributions, still calls for a critical 
attitude  in  front  of  mainstream law.  Interestingly,  Buckel  and her  colleagues  refer  to  the 
process  of  internationalization  and  more  explicitly  to  the  Zapatista's  movement  in  South 
Mexico as a marking point for the renewal of its critical power (Idem, 241). Following this 
example, it is remarkable the conception of critique that the editors of the journal, in occasion 
of the 40th anniversary of the publication, underline as a perspective for future development of 
critical studies: “there is always a chance for emancipatory legal science, when it does not 
only criticize the judicial system, but also binds its  critique to social forms of resistance” 
(Idem, 241 f.). Equally, the authors recall a Gramscian rhetoric of critique to the hegemony 
developed by organic intellectuals in constant process of self-reflection (Idem, 242). Thus, 
critical  research  in  this  context  is  envisaged  as  a  counter-hegemonic  endeavor  and  thus 
perceived predominantly as an attitude of opposition, resistance and negation.
The pursuit for emancipation was equally guiding for the Italian critical movement, which 
developed in a context of strong social revolts and terrorism, and was formalized by a group 
of judges united under the name of Magistratura Democratica (Democratic Bench) in 1964.49 
49 Magistratura Democratica was founded the 4th of July of 1964 in Bologna by 27 judges (Pepino 2002, 1). 
The group Magistratura Democratica has developed greatly since the 1960's. Today it counts with circa 900 
adherents  (Magistratura  Democratica 2007a).  It  forms  part  of  the  National  Association  of  Judges 
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Magistratura  Democratica is  not  only  a  strong  critical  association  with  socio-political 
relevance in Italy and abroad until  today,  but it  builds also a common referent of critical 
jurists in diverse countries in Latin America, reflecting the internationally pervasive character 
of critical legal currents. An overview of its goals will suffice to give an idea about the main 
aspects  of  the  Italian  movement.50 These  goals,  as  written  in  the  official  homepage  of 
Magistratura Democratica, underline the importance of the development of a judicial culture, 
on the respect for the principles of the democratic Statto de diritto (Etát de droit, rule of law) 
(no.1),  the  support  of  European  integration  as  concerned  with  social  justice (no.3),  the 
defense of the independence of the judicial power from other powers and particular interests 
(no.  4),  and the democratization of the bench,  replacing the hierarchical principle  by the 
democratic  one  (no.  6).  Most  importantly for  the  question  of  this  research,  Magistratura 
Democratica declares as its goal also the “protection of the differences amongst human beings 
as well as the protection of the rights of minorities, especially the rights of immigrants and the 
less  well  off,  in  a  perspective  of  social  emancipation  of  the  weakest”  (Magistratura 
Democratica 2007b; emphasis added). 
The emphases that I added allow to perceive that if, on the one hand, this movement 
was and is embedded in a leftist rhetoric of emancipation of specific portions of society, on 
the other hand, it holds strongly to the idea of a state with a certain legitimacy as long as it  
responds to social justice. Equally interesting is that the first of these goals makes a point of a 
‘judicial culture’, referring to a certain way to do things, to understand the position of the 
judge and the  law.  This  perspective  is,  thus,  in  tune  with  the  concerns  mentioned above 
regarding the possibility to choose a culture, to develop a certain culture. ‘Judicial culture’ 
implies at the same time a way to perceive, a way to interpret the world, and refers thus to the 
problem and chances of judicial  hermeneutics as Horácio Wanderlei  Rodrigues will  relate 
later for the Brazilian critics (Wanderlei Rodrigues cit. in Guanabara 1996, 408). In this sense, 
(Associazione nazionale magistrati – ANM – and, at an European level, it participates in the association  
Magistrats  européens pour la  démocratie  et  les  libertés  (Medel).  Nevertheless,  it  seems to maintain a 
certain autonomy from these broader associations.  In  fact,  Magistratura Democratica produces its own 
publications  like  ‘Il  Notiziario’ ('The  Bulletin'), ‘Questione  Giustizia’  ('Justice  Matters')  and  ‘Diritto,  
immigrazione e cittadinanza’ ('Law, Immigration and Citizenship’ together with ASGI – Associazione per  
gli  Studi  Giuridici  sull'Immigrazione).  For  a  detailed  historical  perspective  from  the  inside  of  the 
movement, see Pepino 2002.
50 Interestingly, despite its claim of autonomy, regarding its  goals,  Magistratura Democratica refers to the 
statute of the European association Medel of 1985. However, the quote of art. 3 of the Statute in general and  
of the specific goals in particular as cited in the official homepage of Magistratura Democratica is wrong. It 
refers, in fact,  to art. 2, which has actually a very different formulation. In  this sense,  it  is possible to  
underline the claim of  Magistratura Democratica   of its autonomy, understanding these principles as its 
own.  In  this  paragraph,  my quotation  refers  exclusively to  the  Italian  version  ‘quoted’ in  the  official 
homepage of Magistratura Democratica. It is important to remark that, despite the changes on the political 
orientation of the movement since the 1960's, some aspects have remained equally strong.
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it reaffirms the power of interpretation of the judge and its freedom to interpret in a certain 
frame.  The  questions  of  freedom  and  interpretation  are,  as  I  showed  above,  central  to 
postmodern approaches, and they will remain at the core of critical perspectives on law. 
According to its goals,  Magistratura Democratica pursues the ideal of a democracy, 
where the differences are protected, but where, at the same time, particular interests do not 
subordinate the independence of the judge.51 If  the  Statto  de Diritto  shows thus a  certain 
dynamic in interaction with social plurality, at the same time, it has to be strong enough to 
work as a protector of rights and to maintain, in the field of jurisprudence its independence 
from the exercise of power from the side of some of the particular positions present in society.  
The movement of Magistratura Democratica developed as a movement against the prevailing 
repression perpetrated by the executive power and availed by the lacking judicial control, 
which was supported partially on the aura of the judge and the dogmas of neutrality and 
apoliticity (Pepino 2002, 9 f.).  In other  words,  also this  voice claims that  law is  politics. 
Neutrality and apoliticity are  the  elements  that  the  Magistratura Democratica pursued to 
oppose, first in a move for democratization and then with an emphasis on demystification 
(Idem, 12 ff.).52 Finally, its activity was oriented to use the existent state legal and judicial 
system in a way beyond hierarchical oppression; its proposal was thus the ‘alternative use of  
law’. In the background of this development is, of course, also an academic movement. Its 
founding stone was set by the work of Pietro Barcellona ‘L'uso alternativo del diritto’ (The 
Alternative Use of Law) in 1973, which was a reference to many other movements.
We  are  going  to  encounter  similar  topics  and  tensions  in  currents  like  ‘Direito 
Alternativo’ ('Alternative Law') and ‘Jueces para la Democracia’ ('Judges for Democracy')53, 
which  developed  in  contexts  of  political  transition  in  Brazil  and  Spain  respectively.  As 
Wolkmer, with a leftist spin, remarks, these critical movements in Italy, Brazil and Spain do 
not propose “an alternative or substitute paradigm for the positivist legal science, but only the 
different application of the predominant dogmatic, exploring the contradictions and crises of 
the same system and searching for more democratic ways that overcome the bourgeois order” 
51 Regarding  the  struggle  for  ‘judicial  independence’,  it  is  interesting  to  remember,  that  Magistratura 
Democratica,  after  its  third  congress  in  1977  in  Rimini,  when  the  excessive  politicization  of  judicial  
decisions was criticized, turned more to the current of garantismo giurídico, as developed mainly by Luigi 
Ferrajoli  (*1940),  who  was  himself  connected  to  Magistratura  Democratica (Souza  1998,  233  ff.). 
Regarding the further changes in the perspective of the Italian movement, Wolkmer asserts that “in its more 
ideologically orthodox phase, the movement of Alternative Use of Law had repercussion principally in the 
areas of Civil Procedural Law; while, later, it incurred more frequently in Criminal Law and criminology, 
advancing in direction of pluralistic, analytical and neo-Marxist variants” (Wolkmer 2002, 45).
52 To the different tendencies within the Italian movement, see also Sousa Santos 1989.
53 The Spanish association was founded officially in 1983 and the first number of its homologous journal was 
published in 1987. As an example of the academic production of this critical group, see Andréz Ibáñez 
1978.
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(Wolkmer 2002, 42).54 In this context, several Spanish authors developed critical perspectives 
on law in the time after  the death of Franco in 1975. Many of them combined a social-
democratic  or  Marxist  perspective  with  methodological  principles  of  the  analytical 
philosophy, that, due to its claim of neutral formalism, would allow to justify a disempowered 
leftist discourse (Idem, 48 f.). The elaboration of Gramsci's theories as well as questions of 
democratization and social pluralism were in the center of discussion. Importantly, some of 
the researchers  of  critical  legal  thought  were directly connected  with the  development  of 
critical thought in Latin America. It is worth noticing for example, the participation of Joaquín 
Herrera  Flores  in  the  II  Encontro  Internacional  de  Direito  Alternativo (2nd International 
Meeting of Alternative Law) in Florianópolis, Brazil (1993), which in turn was published in 
the journal  Jueces para la Democracia  (Herrera Flores 1993).  Equally, his former student, 
David Sánchez Rubio55 based his proposal of an alternative legality on the teachings of the 
Latin American liberation philosophy56.
If an increasing interest for Latin American political and academic developments can be 
noticed in the diverse critical approaches to law in the 1980's and 1990's, it is the work of the 
Portuguese jurist and law sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos (*1940), professor at the 
University of Coimbra graduated from Yale and distinguished professor of the Institute for 
Legal Studies of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, which became most renowned for his 
fieldwork in Brazil. In his prolific work, Sousa Santos criticizes current perspectives on law 
as dependent of a capitalist and state-bound conception that results in oppression of society. 
Thus,  he  underlines  the  need  for  alternative  forms  of  justice  that  allow the  “creation  of 
processes, instances and institutions relatively decentralized, informal and deprofessionalized, 
which substitute or complement ,[...] the traditional administration of justice and turns it, in 
general,  quicker,  cheaper  and more accessible” (Sousa Santos  cit.  in  Wolkmer 2002,  61). 
Throughout his work, Sousa Santos underlines, like many of the contemporary critics, the 
need for  an  emancipatory and liberating  change in  the treatment  of  law,  invoking a  new 
54 In fact,  ‘alternativists’ in this line have always emphasized that it  is  not  their wish to “break the legal 
harmony, which is considered as nonexistent, neither is the intention to drag a judge in the political game 
(…) because the truth is that neither the limits between Politics and Law are so clear, nor is it possible that  
the magistrate stops being [...] judge-citizen, with all that it implies” (Andréz Ibáñez cit. in Wolkmer 2002, 
44).
55 See  also  his  doctoral  thesis  of  1994: ‘Proyección  Jurídica  de  la  Filosofía  Latinoamericana  de  la  
Liberación. Aproximación Concreta a la Obra de Leopoldo Zea y Enrique Dussel’ ('Legal Projection of the 
Latin  American  Liberation  Philosophy.  A concrete  approximation  to  the  oeuvre of  Leopoldo  Zea  and 
Enrique Dussel'), published as ‘Filosofía, Derecho y Liberación en América Latina’ ('Philosophy, Law and 
Liberation in Latin America') in 1999.
56 The Latin American Liberation Philosophy is a contemporary philosophical current related to the Liberation 
Theology.  Its  main  exponent  is  Enrique  Dussel  (*1934),  who  wrote  ‘Filosofía  de  la  Liberación’ 
('Philosophy of Liberation') in 1975.
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paradigm emerging in post-modernity. The connections with other thinkers of the time are 
quite  obvious,  since  Sousa  Santos  not  only  visited  the  University  of  Wisconsin-Madison 
several  times  (1982  onwards),  where  the  Critical  Legal  Studies  held  their  foundational 
meeting, but he also participated in the CIDOC ('Centro Internacional de Documentación’, 
International Documentation Center) founded and directed by Ivan Illich (1926 – 2002) in 
Cuernavaca, Mexico (1974) and in post-doctoral training directed by Immanuel Wallerstein 
(*1930) at the Fernand Braudel Center in Binghamton (1994).57 Equally, through his writings, 
his association with a postmodern critique of law, is patent. Take, for example, his book ‘O 
Discurso e o Poder – Ensaio sobre a Sociologia da Retórica Jurídica’ ('Discourse and Power 
– Essay on the Sociology of the Legal Rhetoric’, 1988), where he analyzes the structure of 
law as the articulation of the components of rhetoric, bureaucracy and violence. 
However, from the beginning of his academic career with the research of alternative 
normativities in a slum in Rio de Janeiro in the beginning of the 1970's (Sousa Santos 1977), 
his focus of attention has not been only the critique of a certain approach to law, the violence 
it  implies  at  a  socio-political  level  or  the  vision  of  a  better  or  alternative  law,  but,  most 
importantly, all of these aspects can be connected through the quest for pluralistic approaches 
to law. This is the case not only for Sousa Santos’ research but it is equally a mark of many 
critical approaches. The question on pluralism in law is central for the postmodern critique, 
but it is equally at the core of the creative development of new approaches. I will highlight the 
importance of the question for pluralism in legal praxis in chapter C, focusing on the meaning 
that this change of paradigm had for the legal development in Latin America. Nevertheless, 
before taking that step, it is mandatory to review the spectrum of critical approaches in this 
region, what will allow me to situate the concern for alternativity and pluralism in a wider 
context of criticisms against a modern and dogmatic approach to law.
3.  Critical Thought in Latin America  
Very often the Latin American developments  are  portrayed as  derivations  of processes  in 
Europe and the United States. Nevertheless, although it is important to underline the influence 
of Critical Legal Studies, Uso Alternativo de Diritto and the Association Critique du Droit in 
the critical currents in Latin America, especially in Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, it is equally 
decisive to see that the criticism in this region had an own context. Furthermore, the new 
57 Ivan Illich and Immanuel Wallerstein are, as we will see in the next chapter, key thinkers of postmodern  
reflections on development.
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perspectives were also built upon own stories and had thus their own struggles, which were, to 
a  certain  extent,  independent  of  other  currents.  In  turn,  the  developments  in  this  region 
inspired and influenced academic reflection in other parts of the world, as I have already 
mentioned, for example regarding the theoretic  currents of ‘Tridimensional Theory of Law’ 
of  Miguele  Reale  or  the  Liberation  Philosophy  as  well  as  political  struggles  like  the 
Zapatista's movement.
One clear example of the early development of critical thought in Latin America is for 
example the contribution of the Argentinean Carlos Cossio (1903-1987) in the 1940's  who 
developed his egological  theory of law in the aftermath of the university reform of 1918 
('Teoría egológica del derecho y el concepto jurídico de libertad’, ‘Egological Theory of Law 
and the Legal Concept of Freedom’, 1944) Combining some aspects of the thoughts of Kant, 
Husserl, Heidegger, Roscoe Pound amongst others, and in response to the then popular theory 
of Hans Kelsen, he developed a concept of law as the study of conduct in intersubjective 
interference. This was thus a search to transcend the Kelsenian formalism, according which 
law was reduced to the study of the (positive) norm. Cossio connected law thus explicitly with 
a certain axiology, this is with certain guiding principles or values that needed to be put in 
balance through the exercise of law. Remarkably, his concept of justice, the guiding principle 
for the whole axiology changed with the passage of time, transforming from “creations of 
equalities in freedom” to “a better social understanding” in the end of his work (Parma 2012, 
Parma 2009). The critical vein pervades the whole enterprise of Cossio. In fact, he is not 
satisfied with a mere naturalist or a positivist approach and develops this perspective in order 
to formulate critiques of legal practice. It is no coincidence, thus, that Cossio's most renown 
work was entitled ‘Ideología y Derecho’ (Ideology and Law, 1943). His work, as typical for 
the critical currents presented until now, is directed to the judge in an attempt to change the 
praxis  of  law.  However,  naturally,  his  position  of  critique  was  very  different  from  the 
approach of Critical Legal Studies and its predecessors of Legal Realism and is more related 
to  a  relationalistic  approach  that  goes  beyond  mere  opposition  to  an  established  order. 
Interestingly,  regarding ‘order’,  which is a value in his axiology, Cossio remarks that this 
value has two counter-values, namely disorder and ritualism (Parma 2012). Thus, the idea of 
order here is distant from an idea of oppression, but rather incarnates the search for balance. 
This search for balance permits to relate Cossio's work rather to newer approaches of conflict 
transformation that envisage a relational perspective oriented to re-create balance in inter-
subjective interaction (Lederach 1995), than to the movement of reactive criticism described 
above. 
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Another  interesting  development  in  the  Latin  American  region  was  marked  by the 
critiques of the philosophical current of Latin American thought, that addressed questions of 
socio-cultural identity and with them also the validity of an imported social order hereditary 
of the colonial rule. These critiques do not derive in a linear manner, as could be assumed for 
other currents, from European or US-American perspectives.  While these discussions will 
become more relevant in the next chapters, mentioning this perspective now allows to put the 
Latin American criticisms in a context of their own, that is often neglected from a ‘Western'-
centric approach to the development of law and legal theory.
In  any  case,  it  is  important  to  remark  that  these  critiques  and  any  other  critique 
regarding the  status  of  law,  particularly state  law,  were,  in  the  political  context  of  Latin 
America, extremely difficult to pose in the 20th century, since several dictatorships affected 
most countries of the region. The development of critical  voices had to wait  until the re-
opening of  political  space  in  the  1980's  to  unfold  openly its  whole  strength.  During  this 
period,  many  currents  of  critical  thought  took,  during  this  period,  the  shape  of  political 
resistance in the margins of law, meaning, on the one hand, that they operated in the limit of 
the legally permitted and, on the other hand, that they worked at the limit of what can be 
considered the realm of legal research, turning for example towards artistic work. In many 
cases,  this  was a subliminal and indirect  critique,  or,  in other words,  a critique that used 
another language than law and academic argumentation like the language of music and other 
arts. This is an approach that has been continued until present as I will show here and in 
chapter C.
The connection of law with society on which was made a  clear stress in the movements 
presented  above,  was,  of  course,  not  totally  new in  the  Latin  American  region.  In  fact, 
Rodríguez and García Villegas underline the fact that “law in Latin America has always been 
seen as an important social and political phenomenon” (García Villegas/Rodríguez). Probably, 
this aspect of a Latin American perspective on law is the result of the colonial environment in 
which law, understood as the law of one of the first European modern states, was introduced 
in the region. The question of legitimated domination determined the socio-political relevance 
of law ever since the question of ruling on the Americas was posed. As we have seen, this was 
in  fact  one  important  aspect  of  the  argument  between Las  Casas  and Sepúlveda.  For  the 
indigenous groups first and for the ‘criollos’ or settlers later, the question of ‘who ruled’ made 
all the difference. Reflection on law as a socio-political issue has been thus required since the 
very entrance of Latin America into the European ruling sphere and political consciousness. 
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Moreover, from the beginning of colonial rule, a new category of law was founded in the 
portions of Latin America governed from Spain, namely the Derecho Indiano58 which was a 
response to the obvious challenges posed by the intersection between social reality and the 
Spanish rule in the New Provinces.  The need to reflect on the connection between social 
reality and law was, thus, prevalent in the region, and, most importantly, was part of the duty 
of any person linked to law in the time. 
With ups and downs, the concern for the complex law/society remained alive during the 
building of the Latin American Nation-States (Botelho Junqueira 1993, 17 ff.). In this context, 
taking the beginning of the life of Latin American states in the 19th century as their starting 
point, Rodríguez and García Villegas identify three main currents in the reflections on law 
from a socio-political perspective. Firstly, they point at the classical institutionalist view on 
law, according which law, and thus the state, has to be strong to compensate social weakness. 
Secondly, they identify visions of Marxist inspiration according to which law has to be strong 
in  order  to  compensate  the  weakness  of  the  political  system.  Finally,  they  speak  of  a 
perspective on law as  an  emancipatory tool  for  social  movements  and minorities.  As the 
authors argue, studies of alternative law and legal pluralism appeared in Latin America during 
the 1970's and 1980's following the second perspective mentioned and opposing the first one. 
Later,  in  the 1990's, vast  literature  with an emancipatory perspective,  i.e.  the  third  strain 
identified, has been produced, developing the earlier criticisms further. 
As  Botelho  Junqueira,  a  Brazilian  legal  sociologist  shows,  institutional  changes 
happened in interaction with the development of critical theories on law. Taking the example 
of Brazil,  she argues that, more specifically, the development of critical theories of law is 
directly linked to the development of the academic field of legal sociology59 or sociology of 
law.60 Thus, it was in the 1970's and 1980's when sociology of law started its career in the 
58 For a detailed account on ‘Derecho Indiano’, see Bonifaz 1961.
59 The same is true for other states  as  well  as for the development of  international  associations,  like the  
Research Committee on Sociology of Law of the International Sociological Association, the International  
Institute for the Sociology of Law (Oñati, Spain) (created in 1989) and the Law & Society Association, 
created in 1964, which institutionalized the  movement of Law & Society. The interest for social reform 
drew foundations like the Russell Sage Foundation to support this kind of initiatives following an interest  
for public policies.
60 Some scholars explicitly draw a line between the concepts of ‘legal sociology’ and ‘sociology of law’,  
suggesting  that  the  perspective  of  legal  sociology,  different  than  for  sociology of  law,  is  oriented  to 
investigate law as defined in legal academy. Sociology of law would allow, on the contrary, to deal with law 
as redefined by social sciences through the theoretical and epistemological schemes of thought developed 
by them independently of the discursive field of law (Botelho Junqueira 1993, 4).  Since this particular  
division is not made necessarily in the whole academic endeavors dealing with law and social sciences, and 
despite the importance of this conceptual division for a study that concentrates on the institutional link 
between these fields, like Botelho Junqueira's work, in this text, I use both terms as synonyms, pointing out 
the different emphases of the relevant approaches.
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academic curricula of the law faculties of the country61,  hand in hand with “the principal 
movements  of  deconstruction  of  the  traditional  legal  paradigms that  influenced  the 
professionals [...] compromised presently with the ‘idea law and society'” (Botelho Junqueira 
1993, 29; emphasis added). Importantly,  one of the main impulses that Botelho Junqueira 
identifies for this ‘deconstruction’ in Brazil relies in the political context of the authoritarian 
regime  of  the  1960's  and  1970's,  where  the  questioning  of  a  legal  order  experienced  as 
illegitimate served as a uniting motor for diverse approaches. During the subsequent process 
of  political  democratization,  this  united  force  impulsed multiple  developments  in  the law 
faculties. Key actors in this political transformation were the social movements which gained 
force in the end of the 1970's, multiplying their social impact through the occupation of land 
in urban and rural areas, and making explicit a new capacity of social vindication and the 
“urgency  to  widen  the  defense  mechanisms  of  collective  interests  through  a  profound 
questioning of the liberal legal culture” of Brazil (Idem, emphasis added).62 The concern for 
victims of political persecution was thus reoriented to a wider range of marginalized groups. 
Equally,  through  the  process  of  re-democratization,  the  study  of  constitutional  law  was 
revitalized as a law with eminently political character, as guarantor of citizenship (Idem, 26 
f.), and the critiques to law from a perspective of human rights gained central importance. In 
the  same  line,  popular  legal  counseling  turned  into  a  priority  in  the  context  of  critical 
approaches  to  law  in  the  region  (Wolkmer  2002,  60).  While  a  sentiment  of  collective 
citizenship arose in the 1980's, also the pressure for recognition and protection of collective 
rights  increased,  and  thus,  the  figure  of  the  popular  lawyer  compromised  with  social 
movements turned more and more important, both as a consultant and as a key participant in 
the “conscientization of the subalternalized sectors” (Idem).  In  this  role  of  educators,  the 
lawyers mirrored at the national social level the structure of development aid, important at 
that time at an international level, as we will see shortly. 
61 As Botelho Junqueira remarks, this development was not welcomed by everybody, since incorporating legal 
sociology in the curriculum of law would make it even more a domain of lawyers. In the same vein, Botelho 
Junqueira criticizes that Brazilian sociology of law was then and even later in the 1990's rather a concern of 
jurists who appropriated some research techniques of social sciences than a field of intellectual production  
of sociologists. In her view, the scholars involved in these heterogeneous critical movements, adopted rather 
a philosophical than a strictly sociological approach, since the main representatives of these critiques on law 
were  not  formed  in  social  sciences  (Botelho  Junqueira  1993,  49).  Sociology of  law remained  thus  a 
discipline with little recognition by lawyers and sociologists (Idem). In this concern, Botelho Junqueira 
depicts the Brazilian institutional development as different from the one occurred in the United States of 
America,  where Legal Realism “opened the closed world of law to the social  sciences” (Idem, 11, cit.  
Trubek). 
62 In this sense, see for example the title of Joaquim Falcão's work: ‘Cultura jurídica e democracia: a favor  
da democratização do Judiciário’ (Legal Culture and Democracy: In Favor of the Democratization of the 
Judiciary) of 1981.
100
A central  expression of this link between legal criticism and re-democratization in Brazil, 
which exemplifies a variety of processes of politicization of law in the whole region, is the 
current of  Direito Alternativo  (Alternative Law), more accurately described as ‘Alternative 
Use of Law’. While the movement drew its main strength from judicial praxis, the concept of 
‘alternative law’ appeared in Brazilian legal literature first in the book ‘Direito Alternativo do 
Trabalho’ ('Alternative  Labor  Law')  of  Carlos  Arturo  Paulon  in  1984,  where  the  author 
underlined  the  critical  perspective  of  his  work  and  called  for  the  utilization  of  the 
contradictions of the state legal order at the service of the workers (Oliveira 2003, 211).  
Naturally,  many of the aspects of Brazilian Alternative Law were nurtured by other 
critical currents. In this sense, Hermann Kantorowicz’ works on ‘Free Law’ ('Der Kampf um 
die Rechtswissenschaft’ – ‘The Fight around Legal Science’ – under the pseudonym Gnaeus 
Flavius, 1906, and ‘The Definition of Law’, 1958) were an important inspiration and, clearly, 
the influence of the Italian movement Magistratura Democratica, was determinant. Equally, 
the French critical movement had particular influence in Brazil, and Latin America in general, 
through the work of Michel Miaille, who argued that the obstacles in the legal world were 
derived from ideological ties (Botelho Junqueira 1993, 35). In this context, both iusnaturalism 
and iuspositivism were perceived as ideological constructs that should be replaced (Idem, 29). 
Thus, the presentation of Miaille in 1981 in the VI Meeting of ALMED at Rio de Janeiro is a 
marker of the ties with the French critical production, which, in the words of Jeammaud, had 
more influence outside than inside of France (Jeammaud 1986, 77). In interaction with these 
critical ideas, Brazilian law scholars and practitioners looked for new approaches to law, that 
allowed them to envisage a new space of law beyond the oppression of authoritarianism.
The quest for alternative approaches to law gave birth to diverse critical currents, which, 
nevertheless, are intimately connected.  As Wolkmer puts it,  the expression of ‘Alternative 
Law’ (Direito  Alternativo)  configurated  the plurality of  professionals  who formed part  of 
diverse battlefronts inside of the established legality and the insurgent legality requesting to 
be established, this is, the ‘alternative use of law’ of the judges, on one side, and the claims of 
‘legal pluralism’, on the other (Wolkmer 2002, 142). Hence, the concept of alternative law 
was from the beginning charged with ambivalence. In any case, the aspect that needs to be 
highlighted here is that all these alternativist currents intended a transformation of the practice 
of law following the criticisms posed against modern law. As Horacio Wanderlei Rodrigues 
states: “Traditionally the critique on law was concerned about showing the effects of law as 
domination, however, ‘Alternative Law’ pretends to rescue the transforming possibility of the 
legal, posing it at the service of liberation” (Wolkmer 2002, 142 cit. Wanderlei Rodrigues).
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Regarding the idea of alternativity and its later division into at least two currents, the 
one proclaiming an ‘alternative use of law’ and the other searching for a pluralistic more 
radical approach to alternativity, it is interesting that Paulon referred in his work to writings of 
Roberto Lyra Filho (1926-1986), the driving force of the Brazilian New Law School (Nova 
Escola Jurídica Brasileira – NAIR). In fact, it was through the work of Lyra Filho and, in a 
more general sense, through NAIR and its publication ‘Direito e Avesso’ ('Law and the Other 
Way  Around'63),  that  mainstream  legal  thought  suffered  important  critiques  in  Brazil. 
Although Lyra Filho's work went more towards the development of a pluralistic approach to 
law, advocating for the recognition of a ‘Law of the Street’ (Direito da Rua), the influence of 
his work right in the beginning of the elaboration of alternative law shows the link amongst 
the ‘Alternative Use of Law’, the search for alternative ways to think of conflict and law, and 
‘Alternative Law’ or ‘Legal Pluralism’. 
Regarding  the  concrete  development  of  the  Brazilian  movement  itself,  first  steps 
towards a more profound solidification and institutionalization of  Direito Alternativo  were 
made in the 1980's, starting with a congress of the Association of Judges of Rio Grande do Sul 
in 1986. Tellingly,  the aim of this meeting was to collect suggestions for the “Assembléia 
Constituinte” (Constituent Assembly) held between 1986 and 1990, which should develop a 
new constitution to restart democracy in Brazil. Recognizing common interests and points of 
view, some of these judges formed the group of Philosophy of Law of the Judicial College of 
Rio Grande do Sul. In this setting, a Chair of ‘Alternative Law’ was created in 1989, the only 
63 Tellingly,  to  find an accurate translation is,  in  this  case,  considerably difficult,  since English language 
equates with the term ‘law’, what in other languages, like Portuguese and other Romance and non-Romance 
ones (exemplified here by German),  is  clearly differentiated with two terms:  direito and  lei,  Recht and 
Gesetz. What in Latin is called respectively ius and lege, is in English all ‘law'; and ‘right’, as a noun, is 
conceived only in a subjective sense. In turn, direito or Recht could be translated as ‘the just’, even if, in our 
examples, there exist specifically different translations for ‘just’ and ‘justice’, like justiça and Gerechtigkeit. 
Equally, direito can be understood as the ‘legal order’, like in the reference to national legal orders: Direito 
Brasileiro,  Deutsches Recht. Arguably, this  direito  and this Recht  go beyond the mere written norms and 
encompass not only the judicial decisions and the doctrine, but also customary law and with them certain  
valorative perspectives expressed through all these forms of law.
In this case,  a  possible translation of ‘Direito e  Avesso’ would be ‘Right  and the Other Way Around’, 
‘avesso’ meaning the inside of a piece of cloth in opposition to its outside, called ‘direito’. However, the 
title refers to the totality of law and to its valorative aspect, and not just to ‘rights’. Thus I have chosen a  
translation that seems to me easier to understand than the rather rare use of the singular ‘Right’ in the  
English language for this context.
Going beyond the linguistic difficulties,  the (non)existence of concepts like ‘direito’ and the difference 
amongst languages and with them, amongst (legal) cultures, lead to a philosophical discussion about the 
identity between ‘what is right’ and ‘what is stated’. This is, actually, the confrontation between legitimacy 
and legality, and even more, between the Kantian categories of Sein (what is) and Sollen (what should be), 
which are equally at the core of the discussion of the meaning of law and its identity. In fact, the problem of 
derecho/ley, Recht/Gesetz, but law/law contains the whole discussion on positive law/natural law presented 
above in a  nutshell,  and exemplifies  once again the ambi-  or polivalence existent  within modern legal 
understandings.
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one in the country, by the judge Amilton Bueno de Carvalho.64 Just a year before that, the new 
constitution had been promulgated, including ‘progressive’ elements, that stated clearly the 
principle of social responsibility and the aim of social justice (Oliveira 2003, 215). Thus, the 
(re-)interpretation  of  the  law  according  to  parameters  of  social  justice  claimed  by  the 
movement of ‘Alternative Law’ could be grounded in constitutional (positive) law. 
It is important to highlight here the relevance of the idea of ‘progress’ as linked to the 
process of redemocratization. Interestingly, this progress seems to be intimately connected 
with attitudes of defiance in front of the status quo enacted in the (state) law. The right and 
desirable development is not linked anymore directly with the compliance with the norm itself 
as a trustworthy frame for social  organization,  but, on the contrary,  social development is 
connected  to  a  certain  insurgency.  Nevertheless  this  insurgency  is  guided  by  certain 
preestablished hierarchical values. Lyra Filho, a main referent for diverse critical alternative 
approaches to law in Brazil, was very clear about this point already in 1982: “In the hypocrisy 
of doing the contrary of what they say (this is,  to say that they will realize justice in the 
norms, at the same time that they keep their privileges), the powerful contradict themselves, 
leaving ‘holes’ in their laws, customs and doctrine, through which the most capable jurists of 
the vanguard can  prepare the avalanche of  progress” (Lyra Filho cit. in Oliveira 2003, 212, 
emphasis added). Thus, it  is an idea of progress in a modern sense the guiding line for a 
specific interpretation of law, namely one that is perceived as the just one.
What made ‘Alternative Law’ a popular issue and settled its concept as the name of a 
broader movement towards a better society,  was an unexpected turn of events. The rather 
anecdotal  account  that  follows  shows  firstly  the  environment  in  which  the  movement 
developed, and which determined the self-image presented by alternative jurists until today. 
Secondly and most important, the form of the development of ‘Alternative Law’ is, as we will  
see,  already an  expression of  methods  and contents  characteristic  for  postmodern  critical 
approaches to law.
According to Lédio Rosa de Andrade, who participated in the group of critical jurists, it 
was in October 25th 1990, that a journalistic article was published in the renowned ‘Jornal da 
Tarde’ (Evening Journal)  of São Paulo,  where Luiz Maklouf pretended to demoralize the 
critical studies group of judges. The title of the article denounced: ‘Southern Judges place 
rights above the law’ ('Juízes gaúchos colocam direito acima da lei')65. The journalist denoted 
64 Carvalho inspired himself in the title of Paulon's book (Oliveira 2003, 214). 
65 Similarly as in footnote  63, also in this case the translation of the word ‘direito’ is very difficult. Here it 
seems to me that the value-judging content of direito is what the author tried to highlight. Thus, although 
literally the title could be translated as “Southern judges put the right above the law”, or even “Southern  
judges put the law above the law”, I have chosen here the concept of ‘rights’ that is more related to the  
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the movement then as ‘Alternative Law’ (Direito Alternativo) and alluded through his title a 
sort of rebellious attitude on the part of the judges against the law, from which participants of 
this movement try to distantiate themselves until today. As a consequence of the discussion of 
the article by the critical group, which counted with around 30 judges and a similar amount of 
sympathizers (Guanabara 1996, 405), the First International Meeting of Alternative Law was 
organized in September 1991 in Florianópolis.  Consequently,  the book ‘Lições de Direito  
Alternativo  I’  ('Lessons  in  Alternative  Law  I')  was  published,  setting  a  key  stone  for 
‘Alternative Law’ in Brazil.  The response went beyond all expectations and thus the idea of 
‘Alternative  Law’ became  internationally  renowned  and  epitomized,  in  Brazil,  all  of  the 
critical approaches that preceded its appearance (Oliveira 2003, 215). Later on, however, this 
current that aimed at interpreting the law in a socially just way, was characterized as ‘Uso 
Alternativo do Direito’ (Alternative Use of Law), like the Italian and Spanish movements they 
were linked to.  The conceptual  confusion around the meaning of ‘alternativity’,  however, 
remains until today along the lines on the question about the identification and aims of the 
movement.
Interestingly, these events say something about the nature of this critical current, which 
is shared by many critical counterparts of the time. It is important to underline that the leading 
force in this case came from a group of practicing judges, who, in response to a socio-political 
need of transition and transformation, recovered academic works with leftist critiques against 
social hierarchies. It was against a past of repression and recognizing themselves as forming 
part  of that  repressive system, that the judges looked for another  place for themselves in 
society. It is the awareness that there is a  plurality of possible understandings and that they 
could use their position differently, what led to an ‘alternative use of law’. Equally, a different 
interpretation  of  themselves  as  representative  figures  of  justice  and  law  could  lead  to  a 
different  interpretation  of  the  law. However,  this  does  not  mean  the  rejection  of  the 
authoritative position itself or the validation of all possible understandings of law. In fact, in 
front of this plurality of possibilities, the movement of an alternative use of law, pleads for the 
use  of  one  understanding,  which  is  more  correct,  more  just.  The  political  pursue  for 
democracy, after a period of strong repression, was linked thus with an economic notion of 
social justice. That is why we need a judge, namely one who uses law ‘alternatively’, because 
someone has to decide on things the right way. Plurality and the authority of the right (use of) 
law were, from this perspective, still in conflict.
meaning of ‘direito’ in this context.
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The interaction with socio-political discussion is clear equally in the role of media in the 
development of the movement, which, in the beginning, had a skeptical position. Both, the 
article of Maklouf itself and the use of its critique as a propellant for discussion, have an 
ironical character (Paupitz Dranka 2005, 3), since they take the original statement, dislocate 
its  meaning and thus,  finally,  the  original  intention  is  turned into  its  opposite.  These  are 
strategies that we know from other postmodern approaches, like the deconstructivist one. In 
fact, the blurring and the irony are already present in the idea of ‘Alternative Law’ itself, since 
it refers to a law that is different from the one expected (Idem, 3 f.). Thus, many researchers 
of alternative law are concerned firstly with clarifying what ‘alternative law’ is not. However, 
since alternativity is defined by an otherness (an alter), always related to plural possibilities in 
front of the clear and seemingly monosemic central term, here ‘law’, the tension does not 
disappear, it multiplies. This is a tension that will persist and which is possible to recognize 
equally in other currents of critical movements in law, like legal pluralism.
Although the initially ardent debate has calmed down, ‘Alternative Law’ has not ceased 
to exert influence in discussions on law and justice, inside the courts and legal academia as 
well as outside of these spheres. While some of the representatives of the movement require 
the consolidation of an alternative legal praxis and the beginning of a new theory of law, for 
the movement to continue growing (Andrade 1998, 26), others underline the present role of 
the  movement  as  a  renovation  of  the  ‘legal  culture’ (Oliveira  2003,  216).  In  fact,  the 
movement has gone from being formed mostly by judges to include professors, students and 
lawyers amongst  individuals from other social sectors. Interestingly, these changes and the 
penetration of the movement in the faculties of law and Escolas da Magistratura have been 
seen, different from Tamanaha's skeptical statement on the current presence of critical Legal 
Realism in the United States, as fruitful evolutions of the alternative project, since they could 
mean a certain ‘normalization’ of the movement (Idem). In fact, the obligatory introduction of 
legal sociology in the curricula of law faculties in Brazil has opened a space in the established 
institutions for this critical perspective in Brazil (Idem, 216 f.). Thus, the critical efforts in 
legal academia mingled with the development of alternatives in legal praxis, resulting in a 
more encompassing view of law as embedded in society and, consequently,  in the power-
structures that conform it. Most importantly, the call to see ‘law as politics’, as formulated by 
scholars of Critical Legal Studies, found expression in  Direito Alternativo as the search for 
alternative understandings of law in order to produce alternative politics and, through these 
means, an alternative society.
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Still related to the Brazilian context, it is worth mentioning some important aspects of this 
process of increasing criticism in the academic field concerned with law and society, which 
had an impact  in  the whole Latin American region.  In  1979, for  example,  the  Grupo de 
Trabalho Direito e Sociedade (Working Group Law and Society) was created, which lasted 
for ten years, amongst increasing institutional tensions in the field of sociology. From the list 
of works presented already in the first reunion of the working group, its connection with the 
critical movement exposed above is evident. In 1979 Nelson Eizrick presented his ‘Notas  
para uma teoria crítica do direito’ ('Notes for a Critical Theory of Law'), Joaquim Falcão 
talked about ‘Cultura jurídica liberal e ordem política autoritária’ ('Liberal Legal Culture and 
Authoritarian Political Order'), José Eduardo Faria inquired legal education with his talk on 
‘O ensino jurídico e a função social da dogmática’ ('Legal Education and the Social Function 
of Dogmatics'), and  Otávio Frias Filho and Pedro Paulo Cardoso de Oliveira presented an 
‘Exercício contra a teoria geral do direito”’ ('Exercise Against the General Theory of Law'). 
It is noteworthy, in this context, that not only critique itself is explicitly mentioned, but also 
other  elements  that  have  been  discussed  as  central  for  the  development  of  postmodern 
perspectives  like the central  role  of  ‘culture’,  the question for its  relation with order,  the 
confrontation with liberalism and authoritarianism, the inquiry of education as a central aspect 
of a particular culture, the questioning of dogmatics, the emphasis put in positioning research 
‘against’, and most specifically against something considered as generally valid, in this case a 
legal theory. Later on, matters of ideology and economic order (de Souza, 1982), ethnology of 
judgment (Kant de Lima, 1982; Pastore Schritzmeyer, 1989), connections with psychiatric 
order (Cittadino, 1982), Marxism (Lyra Filho, 1983), femininity and sexuality (Muller, 1983), 
legal  assistance  (Botelho  Junqueira,  1985),  customary  law  (Moura  and  Barbosa,  1986), 
informal  courts  (MacDowell  dos  Santos,  1988),  amongst  other  topics  appeared  in  the 
discussion of the Working Group as critical approaches to law under the name of sociology of 
law.66 
Another  important  part  of  this  development  was  marked  by the  work  of  the  Latin 
American Association of Methodology of Legal Education – ALMED (Asociación Latino-
americana de Metodología de la Enseñanza de Derecho) organized in 1974 on occasion of a 
meeting of Argentinean and Brazilian  jurists. Based in Santa Catarina (Rio Grande do Sul, 
Brazil),  a  region that  later  would be known for  the approaches  to  ‘Alternative Law’,  the 
association created the journal ‘Contradogmáticas – Revista Latino-Americana de Estudos  
Políticos e Jurídicos’ ('Counterdogmatics – Latin American Journal of Political  and Legal 
66 For a detailed list of the works presented in the Working Group see Botelho Junqueira 1993, 200 ff..
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Studies')67, as well as the journal ‘Seqüència – Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos do Curso de Pós-
Graduação em Direito de Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina’ ('Sequence – Legal and 
Political  Studies  of  the  Postgraduate  Course  in  Law  of  the  Federal  University  of  Santa 
Catarina').68
Amongst  the principal  objectives  of  ALMED, as  formulated  by Luis  Alberto  Warat 
(then president of the association) in 1984, stand out the ideas of revision of the traditional 
concept of legal science, as a discourse that, organized in the name of truth and objectivity, 
looses sight of the socio-political conflicts (Warat cit. in Botelho Junqueira 1993, 45). Warat 
criticizes  the  conceptualization  of  these  tensions  as  individual  relations  which  can  be 
harmonized  by law.  Equally,  he  criticizes  the  prevailing  reductionist  perspective  on  law, 
conceiving of it namely as a punitive discourse, morally commanded, disregarding the role of 
law in the organization of specific types of relations of economic, political and ideological 
production.  These  critiques  derive  in  the  inversion  of  the  “dominant  legal  reason”, 
characterized by an apolitical analysis of the state, putting in its place a discourse that aims to 
talk politically about law (Idem). As we have seen in other critical approaches to law, Warat 
intended to insert categories as “the spoken, the unspoken, the repressed, the things that we 
are obliged to say or interpret from a legalistic culture” (Idem). He proposed to elaborate a 
“semiology of power” using a Foucaultian approach (Idem). Regarding the role of lawyers, 
Warat envisages a change by which a participative conscience can be created, so that lawyers 
can act as the transmitters of social demands and not, as he puts in contrast, as “state agents” 
(Idem).  Equally,  he  was  concerned  with  the  education  of  lawyers.  Clearly,  this  concern 
derives from the position of the legal profession during 20 years of dictatorship that Warat 
experienced himself in Argentina before his emigration to Brazil. As we will see for several 
Argentinean critical approaches, the critiques and proposals of ALMED have mixed academic 
affiliations. In this sense, Eliane Botelho Junqueira characterizes the approach of ALMED 
presented by Warat as a strange and curious combination of statements derived from Freudian, 
Marxist perspectives, from the pragmatist semiology of Pierce and from the Levy-Straussian 
project of deciphering myths (Idem, 46). 
Despite these regionally relevant efforts in theory and praxis, García Villegas and Rodríguez, 
whose perspective on the development of Latin American socio-legal studies I have presented 
above, argue that the field of critical study of the relations between law and society in Latin 
67 The journal was edited until the end of the 1991, no. 9 (Wolkmer 2002, 76).
68 ALMED organized its last conference in 1988 (VIII  Jornadas Latinoamericanas) in Santa Cruz do Sul 
(Brazil).
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America has not, in the beginning of the new millennium, consolidated yet. In this strive for 
consolidating the field from a regional perspective, the congress ‘Bases para la construcción  
de una sociología jurídica latinoamericana’ (Bases for the Construction of a Latin American 
Legal Sociology), was held in July 2001 at the International Institute for Legal Sociology in 
Oñati, Spain. Regardless the awkward situation created by the fact that a congress occupied 
with  the  development  of  an  ‘own’ regional  legal  sociology  was  organized  in  another 
continent,  and  in  fact,  in  a  country  that  still  symbolizes  a  common  referent  of  colonial 
oppression, the conference marks an important point for the development of a regional idea of 
socio-legal criticism. The conference gathered all sorts of approaches, and not only traditional 
sociological ones, but also perspectives on discourse theory, legal culture and systems theory.
This is an interesting example for the continuation of the criticisms developed mainly 
during the 1970's and 1980's, and allows further to see some connections amongst the diverse 
international movements of critical legal research. In this sense, the background of the two 
authors who played a major role in this calling for a regional consolidation of legal sociology 
and critical legal studies is telling.69 Mauricio García Villegas has, as affiliated researcher of 
the Institute for Legal Studies of the University Wisconsin-Madison important ties to the place 
where  Critical  Legal  Studies  developed.  Equally,  his  stays  as  visiting  professor  at  the 
University of Grenoble and at the International Institute of Legal Sociology in Oñati relate 
him with the institutions participating in the broader critical debate on law in Europe. In his 
works, some aspects appear that we already know from other regional developments.  For 
example, in his title ‘La eficacia simbólica del derecho’ ('The Symbolic Efficacy of Law) and 
‘El  caleidoscopio  de  las  justicias  en  Colombia’ ('The  Kaleidoscope  of  the  Justices  in 
Colombia'),  which  he  co-edited  with  Boaventura  de  Sousa  Santos,  make  the  personal 
connection  to  the  critical  movement  clear.  Equally,  the  reference  to  the  realm  of  the 
‘symbolic’ as well as the use of the plural when speaking of ‘justices’, and the associations 
that  the  word  of  ‘kaleidoscope’ conjures,  underline  the  intellectual  kinship  with  currents 
presented above. Similarly, César A. Rodríguez was related to the University of Wisconsin 
Madison, where he studied, and participated as well in the above mentioned work of García 
Villegas  and  Boaventura  de  Sousa  Santos.  Equally  important  is  his  membership  in  the 
Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos (ILSA – Latin American Institute 
of Alternative Legal Services), which co-published the work of García Villegas and Rodríguez 
that followed the conference in 2001 in Oñati (García Villegas/Rodríguez 2003). This short 
69 In 2001 García Villegas and Rodríguez initiated the above mentioned congress in Oñati submitting a paper 
to general discussion by many Latin American researchers with diverse socio-legal perspectives.
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presentation of two contemporaneous researchers of the field of socio-legal research might 
serve as an exemplary presentation of the strong links between Latin American and other 
currents of critical legal thought and their strength until present.
Common to most of the Latin American cases is that it was the dictatorial context which 
marked the  development  of  critical  social  theory of  law.  A very important  aspect  of  this 
situation is  that  the movement of  criticism was marked by important  migrations  amongst 
diverse countries determined by the increasing dictatorial violence, an experience that became 
central to the development of a certain skepticism in front of mere positive law. Thus, in the  
case of Argentina, several of the social critics of law ended up emigrating to Mexico (Óscar 
Correas and Graciela Bensusan), Brazil (Luis Alberto Warat, José María Gómez) and Spain 
(Roberto Bergalli) amongst other countries. 
For example,  one of the leading  Mexican groups of legal critique is  coordinated by 
Óscar  Correas,  who left  Argentina  in  the  context  of  military dictatorship.  In  Mexico,  he 
founded at the University of Puebla the journal ‘Crítica jurídica’ ('Legal Critique'), which 
nowadays is published in Curitiba, Brazil. In his work ‘Ideología jurídica’ ('Legal Ideology’, 
1983) as well as in ‘Introducción a la Crítica del Derecho Moderno’ ('Introduction to the 
Critique  of  Modern  Law’,  1982),  Correas  analyzes  and  criticizes  law  from  a  Marxist 
perspective. Interestingly, in his work on legal pluralism and indigenous law, he pursues to 
elaborate an interpretation of the Kelsenian theory in support of legal plurality. Furthermore, 
he  includes  an  interesting  difference  between  ‘Legal  critique’  and  ‘Critical  theory’, 
emphasizing his interest for ‘legal critique’ as a social research that aims at a transformative 
political praxis (Wolkmer 2002, 62).
Although using different referents, the Mexican philosopher Jesús Antonio de la Torre 
Rangel (*1952) aims equally at an emancipating praxis, when he bases his critique on Latin 
American  Liberation  philosophy.  Recalling  the  proposal  of  Enrique  Dussel  (*1934),  an 
Argentinean philosopher and theologist living in Mexico since the 1970's, de la Torre Rangel 
puts the law at the service of a political liberating ethic. While putting law in the context of 
Latin  American  Liberation  theory,  he  calls  for  a  law  that  is  ‘born  out  of  the  people’, 
organizing  socio-political  struggle  according  to  categories  of  center/perifery, 
dependency/emancipation,  domination/liberation,  amongst  others  (Torre  Rangel  1986, 
Wolkmer 2002, 63). Assuming that the present injustice in Latin American society derives 
from the application of unjust given law, de la Torre Rangel, in tune with an emancipatory 
approach, searches for a law that has “the oppressed” as creators, and which is oriented to 
serve as an instrument of social struggle and change (Torre Rangel 1984, 14 f.). While he 
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argues for a variety of iusnaturalism oriented by the concept of justice, he emphasizes equally 
that it is a different justice than the ‘conservative justice’ present in current legality (Idem, 
29). In his proposal, he aims to criticize the concept of justice starting from the experience of 
social reality, in order to overcome modern law by “the truly just” (Idem 1986, 55). “The 
modern juridicity”, he continues, which in his eyes exists to maintain profit and power, “will 
be overcome at the level of philosophical reflection [...],  when the other is  recognized as 
other” (Idem, 55 f.).
It is remarkable that, in this argument, while criticizing ‘modern law’, the author equally 
utilizes  dichotomous  pairs  of  categories  which  are  at  the  base  of  modern  thought.  Not 
different from other critiques I have presented above, he pretends to overcome the problems 
he sees in social practice with the statement of a truer justice. The logic, in this case recovers  
the idea of a vectoral development.  Equally,  as typical for other critiques of the time, he 
incorporates the problem of the recognition of ‘the Other’ at the center of his proposal. Thus, 
his approach is marked by questions of identity and recognition. 
The idea of law as an obstacle for social change, as Torre Rangel posits it, is rather 
consistent throughout Latin American criticism. In fact, this concept of law was portrayed 
clearly in the book ‘Law as an Obstacle to Social Change’ of the Chilean researcher Eduardo 
Novoa Monreal (1916-2006) ('El derecho como obstáculo al cambio social’, 1975), who was 
a legal assessor of Salvador Allende's government between 1970 and 1973. In his renowned 
text, the author developed severe critiques against  a plurality of legal mechanisms which, 
reproducing the principles, concepts and values of capitalism, end up making the development 
and change of social structures more difficult. Later on, his association with other postmodern 
critical  currents  was  made  clear  in  the  work  titled  ‘Elementos  para  una  crítica  y  
desmistificación del derecho’ ('Elements for a Critique and Demystification of Law’, 1985). 
Interestingly,  although  arguing  in  opposition  to  the  idea  of  law  as  an  instrument  for 
development, Novoa Monreal puts law as an obstacle for development. The common base of 
this positions is evident: Not only both assume the existence of one correct development, but 
both conceive of law as an instrument, a tool, a technique, which can be used in one way or 
the other.
Remarkably, several critiques in the Latin American environments start from a criticism 
against capitalism as an oppressive form of socio-economic organization, a position that is 
understandable from the position that most Latin American countries held in the international 
order of the 20th century. However, Latin American legal thought was not constrained to that 
political view. In fact, the  development of new perspectives on law, be it as alternative law or 
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as pluralistic approaches to law, is a central aim of the project of these critiques oriented to a 
change in the praxis. 
One  of  the  most  important  examples  for  this,  is  the  Latin  American  Institute  for 
Alternative  Legal  Services  (Instituto  Latinoamericano  de  Servicios  Legales  Alternativos, 
ILSA), with seat in Bogota, publisher of the journal ‘El Otro Derecho’ ('The Other Law'). One 
of the biggest merits of this organization lays in its emphasis in the study of informal legal  
cultures as well as in the incentive for the national coordination of new and insurgent legal 
practices in all Latin America. These informal and insurgent groups that propose alternative 
approaches  to  law,  will  be focused on in  the next  section as examples  of the struggle to 
overcome  the  difficulties  of  a  modern  model  of  law.  What  is  important  for  now,  is  to  
emphasize their proactive attitude in developing new ways to deal with law beyond socio-
political criticism. 
In  a  similar  vein,  it  is  important  to  remark  that  many of  the  authors  and  currents 
presented,  going beyond Marxist  critiques,  present  a clear  perspective on law as relation. 
While  many of the approaches develop a relational  notion of law starting from a critical 
Marxist approach of ‘relations of production’, the idea of law as relation goes much further 
than that, pointing at the socio-cultural context of law and its creative power to enhance new 
relations, as elaborated, for example, in Carlos Cossio's work. Furthermore, see, for example, 
the publication ‘El Derecho como Norma y como Relación Social. Introducción al Derecho’ 
('Law as Norm and Social Relation. Introduction to Law’, 1989) by Jorge Rendón Vásquez 
from Peru. Equally, Óscar Correas speaks of law as a ‘social form’, meaning one of the forms 
of existence of social relations (Wolkmer 2002, 61). 
As part of this search for new perspectives on law and new relations, the proposals of 
some other Argentinean authors can also be seen. Naturally, the strength and type of critique 
took diverse shapes following the changes in the international political arena and national 
political developments. In this sense, Wolkmer equates the situation of ‘antidogmatist’ thought 
in Argentina in the 1980's with the situation of Spain in its transition to democracy after the 
death of Francisco Franco (1892-1975): “The same way that Spanish critical iusphilosophers 
transformed, with the arrival of socialism to power, in analytical justifiers of the legality in 
force,  many  insurgent  jurists  in  Argentina  ended  up  compromising  and  exercizing  high 
functions  during  the  administration  of  Raúl  Alfonsín”,  the  first  democratic  president  of 
Argentina  elected  in  1983  after  decades  of  dictatorship  (Wolkmer  2002,  70).  Thus,  the 
political-ideological intention of some critical theories has been put in question by authors 
like Warat, himself of Argentinean origin, and Wolkmer. 
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Nevertheless, the variety of epistemological and critical orientations resulting in this 
environment is impressive. In the Argentine environment, the spectrum goes, for example, 
from Ricardo  Entelman  who  uses  an  interdisciplinary  approach  and  works  partly  with  a 
Foucaultian perspective and with a psychoanalytical inspiration, to Enrique Zuleta Puceiro 
who reflects law from a historical-sociological perspective with systemic character (Idem, 71, 
73). Amongst these, a current with particular strength has connected law and psychoanalysis 
in direct exchange with French authors like Pierre Legendre. Being the Freudian and Lacanian 
theories of psychoanalysis a central area of academic and public interest in Argentina (and 
France),  the  intersection  between  law  and  psychoanalysis  has  been  pervasive  in  many 
research  approaches,  like  in  the  works  collected  by  Entelman  ('El  discurso  jurídico.  
Perspectiva  psicoanalítica  y  otros  abordajes  epistemológicos';  ‘The  Legal  Discourse. 
Psychoanalytical Perspective and Other Epistemological Approaches’, 1982) and Enrique E. 
Marí  ('Derecho  y  psicoanálisis.  Teoría  de  las  ficciones  y  función  dogmática';  ‘Law  and 
Psychoanalysis.  Theory of the Fictions and Dogmatic  Function’,  1987).  In this  vein,  it  is 
important to mention also the work of Alicia E. C. Ruiz regarding feminine identity and legal 
discourse ('Identidad femenina y discurso jurídico’, 2000).
In any case, seeing these examples from Argentina, it is remarkable the importance put 
on an interdisciplinary approach for the revision of law. Thus, Carlos M. Cárcova points that 
while, in the beginning of the critical movement in Argentina, the researchers searched for an 
answer to  legal  problems from a materialistic  perspective,  later  on,  the intention was put 
towards understanding law as a ‘moment’ of the social totality, that could only be explained 
from  a  transdisciplinary  discourse,  a  discourse  of  intersection  of  different  knowledges 
(Wolkmer 2002, 72). Carlos Cárcova himself expressed the need for a new paradigm and the 
crucial  role  of  articulating  for  its  constitution  a  new  notion  of  scientificity,  referring  to 
Bachelard, as well as to Gramsci, Legendre, Lefort, Castoriadis and the School of Frankfurt 
(Cárcova 1991).
The epistemological question around a new notion of science, and thus of legal science is, in 
fact, at the core of critical currents in and beyond the realm of law. Remembering Foucault's 
argument, it is the same problem of the ‘subject’ in its different forms, the one that lies at the 
base of the postmodern struggle regarding knowledge as well as law. The subject looking for 
justice is the same one who is looking for truth. And the difficulties that law envisages in front 
of the loss of a subject that can know what is justice are expressions of broader difficulties  
with a lacking unifying subject who could be able to state a final truth or find perpetual peace.
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This is the struggle of identity, unity and unicity at the core of post-modern critique that 
pervades the criticisms of law. One major aspect of this struggle with identity in the realm of 
law can be formulated with the question on ‘whose law’, this is: ‘can I identify myself with 
these norms?’, ‘to what extent are they part of my own system of meaning?’, in other words: 
‘is this law my law?’,’ is this law part of my system of meaning, of my culture?’. Another 
major aspect of this struggle can be resumed with the question on ‘which law’, and refers to  
the possibility that a choice between laws might be needed, that law does not equal law, this 
is, that ‘law’ is not identical to itself. In other words, it questions that the idea of ‘one law’ is 
true,  necessary,  real,  just,  good or even possible.  These struggles are  the nourishment for 
questions on the internal (in)coherence of law, as well as the starting point for the search for 
‘other laws’. In this search for another law, which implies an existent plurality of laws and the 
possibility of choice, a strong movement of proactive criticism started, which I will present in 
the following pages focusing on some examples of alternative and pluralistic approaches to 
law.
4.  Legal Pluralism  
I started this thesis discussing a specific development of a variety of related concepts of law 
as classical, traditional or particularly widespread which I called, following the description of 
most key authors in the academic legal field, ‘modern law’. In turn, I presented how this 
perspective on law, because of the contradictory claims it poses, suffered ground-breaking 
criticisms that put in doubt its legitimacy both in the academy and in legal practice. As I have 
shown, it is a central aspect of these criticisms that these two fields, academia (or theory) and 
practice, can in no way be considered autonomous or independent from each other without 
neglecting the political importance of legal argumentation in the judicial and parliamentary 
decision-making  process,  the  normative  role  of  (legal)  education,  and lastly,  the  political 
aspect of language at all. These critiques go hand in hand with the blurring of the assumed 
lines  dividing not  only (legal)  theory and (legal)  practice,  but  also academy and politics, 
abstraction  and  concretion,  and,  as  we  will  see  later,  law  and  custom,  amongst  other 
grounding epistemological divisions.  As I have been arguing, these unquestioned dividing 
lines at the ground of reflection and action have been questioned by postmodern approaches 
and presented as deliberated and interconnected choices, and thus as results of exercises of 
power, in other words: as political decisions.
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Putting  the  mirror  of  self-reflexive criticism in  front  of  this  whole  debate and thus 
twisting the vector of the question posed to ‘modern law’, we have to ask where does the 
present  inquiry draws  questionable  divisions.  As  the  author  of  this  work,  I  made  certain 
choices, this is exertions of power. I chose to tell you a story, a somehow coherent story I 
believe, about changing visions of something I called (modern) law. But why is the choice of 
speaking about law in this way legitimate? Certainly, I invoked various recognized authors in 
my support, so that my choice could be justified in the environment I am presenting this work. 
But, in the end, who author-ized me to compose this story? Otherwise stated, why should you, 
why did you, dear reader, follow me until here? Some implicit basic aspects of what I have 
stated here to begin my research must be valid for you too, if only the mere semantics and 
grammar of the sentences I wrote, maybe even the traditions of thought I invoked, and, most 
probably the law I started to speak about. The question is why does this story make sense to 
you? Why does this story mean something to you (and to me) at all – and so far unites us, 
even if we may not agree? And if it does not make sense to you – and so far it divides us, why 
is this so?
Meaning-making ‒ this is a common aspect of the questions of postmodernist authors: 
How is it that ‘things’ (for lack of a better word) become meaningful. In other words, how is it 
that ‘things’ become at all, this is, some things become so relevant that we identify them as 
such, they receive a name, a reference, an entry in the dictionary. And, furthermore, how come 
that they are attributed a specific meaning and not any other possible meaning? Formulated in 
a more individualized and polemic way: Who makes the dictionary of the existent, the usable, 
the right words and the correct grammar? And, consequently, who has the power to correct, to 
right wrongs? 
To get to the important point for our inquiry, how is it that ‘law’ means something to us? 
How come that ‘law’ means law and not ‘something else’, i.e. something that you and me 
with our ‘law-eyes’ identify as different. When, where, how was the decision made and who 
was the author-ity that put law in a space that is not the space of (what we now consequently 
call) morals, religion, custom, manners, or for that matter, crime? How come that ‘law’ means 
law, being that it could have meant law in so many other ways, or better, being that it could 
have meant so many other things?
From a variety of possibilities, one has been chosen, but who has chosen? Have you 
taken that decision out of the blue? Was I responsible for this constitutive act of dividing the 
world  between  ‘law’ and  ‘non-law'?  Whatever  decision  you  or  I  have  taken,  it  has  not 
emerged from nothing in a void space. And in most cases we probably have not made that  
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meaningful  decision even consciously.  But  even if  we may not  be responsible  at  last  for 
deciding on the meaning of law, you still can follow and hopefully understand my language 
and my story because we share some forms of meaning; we share enough meaning that we 
can engage in creating further meaning. In other words, this encountering around the topic of 
‘law’ is possible, because we participate of a community of meaning, we share certain cultural 
aspects. Thus, we are talking about a realm that although it forms part of you and me, it 
superseeds the individuals, the ‘you’ and the ‘me’. In this realm, there is something natural 
about writing and reading texts that operate quoting other texts; there is something logical 
about arguing in favor or against positions taken; there is something expectable in telling a 
story about law and about its ups and downs, criticizing, pondering and assuming authorship. 
All of this transcends the individual although it is performed by individuals, like you and me. 
Summing  up,  ‘law’ means  law  in  this  particular  way  because  there  is  a  certain  shared 
understanding. We live and participate within a culture where ‘law’ is this law. 
At least,  ‘culture’ is one possible answer – an answer that has occupied postmodern 
researchers intensely. If meaning and meaning-making, with all their implications on power, 
are at the core of the postmodernist endeavor, ‘culture’ is the leading figure in the framing of 
questions and the inspiration of answers. Not in vain the twist of postmodernity has been 
referred to not only as the ‘linguistic turn’ because of the constant reference to language and 
speech,  but  also  as  the  ‘cultural  turn’.  Despite  the  location  of  these  ‘turns’ in  particular 
historical  moments,  especially  after  the  second  half  of  the  20 th century,  it  is  worth 
remembering that  this  inquiry is  based on the idea of  postmodernity as  a  socio-linguistic 
situation which goes hand in hand with modern approaches. Thus, to say that ‘culture’ plays a 
major  role  in  postmodern  approaches  does  not  mean  that  questions  on  ‘culture’  were 
nonexistent before the 20th century. Quite the contrary: the concept of ‘culture’ itself played a 
major role in Kant's philosophy of the second half of the 18th century, whose rationalist claim 
is put often at the core of modern approaches; ‘the’ definition of ‘culture’ that was valid in 
academia for decades was presented,  following Darwin's natural evolutionism, by Edward 
Tylor (1832-1917) in 1873; and the idea of a national culture was central  in the political 
developments  of  the  19th and  20th centuries.  What  makes  ‘culture’ a  central  concept  for 
postmodern approaches is that it is used as a tool to put in question an alleged universally 
valid rationality,  arguing that rationality is dependent on specific systems of meaning, i.e. 
rationality is contingent and thus cannot serve anymore as a tool for overcoming ambiguity. In 
other words, through the understanding of social diversity in terms of culture, the possibilities 
of rational justification and legitimization according to a guiding principle are pluralized.
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Moreover,  the  emphasis  on  ‘culture’,  with  all  its  ambivalence,  has  allowed  for  an 
inquiry into the position of the observer, who can never get rid of her culture as the sets of 
meaning  she  is  embedded  in  and  which  provide  the  tools  for  her  observation.  As  a 
consequence,  the perspective on the formation of meaning changed and does not respond 
anymore  only  to  the  conceptualization  of  points  of  authoritative  decisions  enlisted  in 
encyclopedias,  nor  as  historical  lines  of  a  development  through  stages,  but  to  rather 
cartographic  approaches,  that  aim to  represent, in  a  (more  or  less  conscious)  incomplete 
manner, complex geographies of particular understandings through pluridimensional maps.70 
With this  choice over  a specific  map of representation,  enriched by the awareness of the 
contingency and the  power that  both  allow and limit  this  decision,  equally the notion  of 
responsibility gains new importance. Questions on the power of ‘representation’ and resulting 
problems on ‘responsibility’ turned visceral to inquire the role of law and lawyers, justice and 
judges. 
In  this  sense,  it  is  important  to  remember  Foucault's  reflection  on  the  role  of  the 
intellectual, who taking distance from a Marxist perspective and questioning the Gramscian 
postulate of an ‘organic intellectual’, does not bestow him with representative power. In other 
words,  the  researcher  is  not  anymore  “a  subject,  a  representing  or  representative 
consciousness” (Foucault 1978, 129). Echoing Foucault's concern, researchers dedicated to 
the  study  of  (cultural)  diversity  in  law  have  increasingly  seen  their  own  position  as 
intellectuals in the discussion on the law ‘of the Other’ as problematic, and turned to act rather 
as doormen for (in their eyes) marginalized groups to access spaces of academic and political 
reflection,  relate  their  normative  systems  and  request  recognition  or  autonomy,  like  for 
example indigenous communities. Consequently, as we have seen already in the currents of 
Alternative Use of Law, the limit between academic work on the connections between law 
and culture and socio-political activism blurs increasingly. 
In fact, the slogan of ‘law as politics’ of Critical Legal Studies (which is also implicit in 
other  critical  currents I  have presented above) is  just  an expression or a derivative of an 
understanding of ‘law as culture’. To make use of power in order to make a decision requires 
that  there  is  the  possibility  to  choose,  i.e.  that  there  are  diverse  meanings  available  and 
arguable.  To  speak  of  the  political  choice  over  the  meaning  of  law implies  that  ‘law  is 
meaning’. Only if law can mean different things, i.e. if it is a linguistic creation, a cultural  
feature, can someone chose one of these meanings. Only if the meaning of law is created, can 
70 For an extensive reflection on the role of cartography in relation to postmodern and symbolic conceptions 
of law, see Sousa Santos 1991, 213 ff. The same author develops the idea of legal systems as maps in Idem,  
221. 
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an authority create a specific meaning for the legal, the lawful and the law. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the view on ‘law as politics’ found manifestation in works that researched the 
creation,  establishment  and  maintenance  of  a  particular  legal  culture,  in  other  words,  of 
specific forms through which law acquires a certain meaning.
The  problematic  of  culture,  this  is  the  problematic  of  the  creation  of  meaning(s), 
appears in postmodern concerns around law in a variety of forms, in academic discussions and 
social confrontations as well, and is naturally accompanied by political questions. Amongst a 
myriad of approaches, it is possible to name, for example, questions regarding the taxonomy 
of  legal  cultures  in  comparative law,  the philosophical  concern with  law as  culture71,  the 
reflection of human rights as expressions of a culture encompassing all humans, the political 
concern with ‘cultures of illegality’, the emergence of anthropology and ethnology of law as 
fields of research, and last but not least the discussion of pluralistic approaches to law. 
While all these aspects are somehow related, in the following pages, I will focus on the 
connection between law and culture as a starting point for currents arguing for vernacular 
approaches to law, and, consequently, for legal pluralism. The relevance of this discussion 
will become more clear when we observe that pluralistic reflections on law are at the core of 
important concrete changes in the judicial structure and the legal argumentation in diverse 
countries, like Mexico and Colombia (chapter C). Importantly, the pluralization of ‘law’ is, as 
I  will  present  in  the  next  section,  coincidental  with  the  pluralization  of  perspectives  on 
development.  As  a  result,  we  will  see  in  chapter  D  how  the  modern  models  of  legal  
development  are  put  in  question  and,  particularly,  legal  transfer  is  challenged  both  as  a 
practical tool for social progress and as a conceptual tool for academic research. But before 
that,  I  will  engage with the conceptual development of pluralistic approaches to law as a 
central element for the further inquiry.
First of all,  it  is important to underline that the approaches to legal plurality are plural in 
themselves, and their practical consequences differ in many aspects. However, the question at 
the outset  of  the  variety of  approaches  subsumed under  the title  ‘legal  pluralism’ can  be 
summarized  as:  ‘how far  and under  which  conditions  does  it  make sense to  call  ‘law’ a 
71 In this sense, also the contribution of Hermann Kantorowicz (1877-1940), who influenced the movement of 
‘Direito Alternativo’ mentioned above, was decisive. As Monika Frommel (*1946) highlights, specially his 
text ‘The Definition of Law’ (1958), originally meant to be the introduction to a broader work on antique,  
oriental, middle-age and modern legal science, shows the basic outline for a ‘cultural study of law’, that 
aims  to  interpret  normative  orders  in  the  context  of  their  own culturally bound perceptions  of  justice 
(Frommel 1993, 631). Importantly, Kantorowicz’ approach intended to transcend Kant's  binary division of 
the realms of ‘to be’ (Sein) and ‘ought to be’ (Sollen), putting these two spheres in relation through the 
integration of a third one: meaning (Sinn) (Idem).
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specific type of normativity and not other types?’. Beyond all differences, common to these 
pluralistic approaches is the understanding of social normativity as composed by a variety of 
forms, amongst which state law has a limited role: it is only one regulative force in social  
interaction, while other forms participate equally in regulating (the same spheres of) social 
activity, engaging with state law in a variety of ways. The following questions are naturally 
‘(why) should we call ‘law’ this type of normativity and not all the other types?’, ‘what are 
the conditions and consequences of choosing this particular type of normativity as ‘law'?, if  
we accept the coexistence of diverse ‘laws’, ‘how can we think of normativity in a different, 
maybe  more  encompassing  way?’,  and  ‘how do  these  ‘systems  of  normativity’ or  ‘legal 
systems’ interact?. 
Legal pluralism represents thus the recognition of the ‘classical’ or ‘modern’ concept of 
law, i.e. law as state-law, as particular. As a consequence, it problematizes the encounter of the 
own with the alter, the own understanding of law and social order from a modern perspective, 
with other understandings of law and order. In other words, legal pluralism deals with the 
encounter of a culture around law (or ways to understand and give meaning to law) as state-
law with  other  ways  to  understand  and give  meaning  to  law or  to  what,  according to  a 
‘modern’ understanding, could be seen as ‘law’. Thus, the questions of legal pluralism point at 
least  in  two  directions,  one  with  a  conceptual  emphasis  and  one  with  a  more  socio-
anthropological emphasis: 1) what is meant by ‘law’, and 2) what is the role and form of  
normativities that would, from a ‘modern’ understanding, have a similar function or effect as 
‘law’.
But behind the question on diverse approaches to law, which has been to a certain extent 
a traditional part of philosophical discussion, another important problem is actually at work. 
This is the question of legitimacy. If other people accept and follow something as law that is 
totally different from the own approach is irrelevant as long as that other is seen just as a 
curious  exotic  stranger  living  far  away  and  disconnected  from our  own  reality.  But  the 
difficulties  start  when  it  comes  to  arguments  about  whose  law is  (more)  legitimated  for 
addressing an issue that involves both, the Other and me; when the interests and thus the 
objects of the diverse normative approaches overlap, then it turns relevant to speak about the 
legitimacy of one or more perspectives on law. In other words, the problem is the same as in  
the old discussion about the ‘just war’. In both cases the question is who is legitimized, and 
under which conditions, to exert power, be it physical, military, political or symbolic. 
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It  is  in this  sense that  the question over  the meaning of ‘law’ acquires a  particular 
meaning and weight and becomes virulent, as the discussion of ‘legal pluralism’ in the context 
of law sociology and law philosophy made by Óscar Correas (*1943) underlines. According 
to him, the idea of the ‘legal’ came to define, in the particular context of normative systems of 
the ‘developed capitalist world’, the line between “state and civil society, between state and 
citizen, between public and private, and, at bottom, between moral and law, between ethics 
and politics” (Correas 2003, 107). This divisory line between law and morals (non-law) was 
marked  by  the  element  of  sanction,  organizing  thus  (the  exertion  of)  violence.  Law  is 
legitimated to exert violence, non-law is not. However, the trick in modern law resides therein 
that the one entity determining which violence is legitimate and which is not, is the same as 
the  one  exerting  that  violence,  i.e.  the  sanctioning  state.  Thus,  the  legal  system,  which 
proclaimed itself as exclusive, “showed to have its others-than-it. [...]  And in studying them 
from an hegemonic position of the exclusive system, transformed the others in the other of the 
system that proclaimed itself as  juridical  [legal], this is, in  no-juridical”  (Idem). From this 
perspective,  ‘juridicity’ or  ‘legality’ “is  nothing  else  than  the  qualification  that  allows  to 
legitimate and to privilege a normative system above any other,  which is  thrown to anti-
juridicity” (Idem, 109).
It is this core question regarding the legitimate exertion of power, and its organization 
around pairs of opposites – legal vs. non-legal, just vs. unjust, I vs. other(s) –, the one that  
links the modern question around the ‘just war’ and the postmodern question around ‘legal 
pluralism’. In one case, the question is how to determine which one is a ‘just war’, in the 
other,  the  problem is  the  impossibility to  determine  exclusive legitimacy for  one  system, 
without reinforcing the hierarchy, power and violence of an authoritative self-legitimation that 
postmodern approaches  criticize in  the modern model  of  law.  The main difference relies, 
however, in the starting point or the perspective of these discussions. The theory of the ‘just 
war’ started as an attempt to argue for the justice of the claim of one party in front of the  
injustice of its opponent, to later arrive to the problematic conclusion that two conflicting 
states  can  both,  in  their  own  eyes,  fight  a  just  war.  In  other  words,  two  conflicting 
understandings  of  justice encounter  with each other,  and the question remains  how these 
conflicting understandings can be dealt with.72 Legal pluralism takes, in principle, the contrary 
starting point, arguing that the claim of justice (and of a legitimate law) is not owned by one 
entity in its totality to arrive at the same problem. Both discussions result thus in the same 
question: how is it possible to decide who is more legitimated when each party can argue for 
72 Already Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) recognized the paradox present in this problem (Grotius 2001).
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himself, according to their own standards, that justice (i.e. the legitimatory force behind the 
exertion of diverse forms of power, including law) is on their side? 
The connection between ‘just war’ and ‘legal pluralism’ is neither superficial nor a mere 
conceptual  game.  It  is  possible  to  say that  the  issue  of  the  ‘just  war’ and the  pluralistic 
approaches to law are two sides of the same coin. While the arguments around the ‘just war’ 
involve a conflict between two entities separated per definitionem (in space but not in time), 
‘legal pluralism’ refers to conflicting entities that participate  per definitionem  in the same 
whole (sharing the same space and time). To state the point bluntly, the discussion under the 
title ‘just war’ referred in its simplest version to the legitimation of one state to act beyond its  
formal  limits,  mostly against  another  state,  while  ‘legal  pluralism’ addresses,  again in  its 
simplest  form,  the  struggle  between  normative  understandings  of  communities  (e.g. 
indigenous communities) and state law within a state. Obviously, the division between these 
two  fields  of  discussion  depends  on  the  definition of  state  –  a  definition  that  can  be 
authoritatively changed. 
It  can  be  said  also  that,  basically,  the  issue  of  a  ‘just  war’ and  the  issue  of  ‘legal 
pluralism’ refer to the same problem, phrased in the first case in moral iusnaturalistic terms, 
where the claimed space of application of a concept of justice was the whole universe, and in 
modern iuspositivistic terms in the second case, where the claimed space of application of a 
concept of law (and justice) is delineated by a law on the national territory. In any case, both 
questions refer to the same problem of legitimacy in the encounter with a different perspective 
on who can determine and which is the right order of things. 
Summing up, the questions at the core of the arguments on ‘just war’ and on ‘legal 
pluralism’ are intimately intertwined through the basal issue of legitimacy. The question on 
the legitimacy of a certain rule can be framed, for example,  as a ‘simple’ question about 
whose law is more entitled to rule a group of people. If we take subjects of the Spanish Kings 
in the 15th century (or, for that matter also subjects of the current Spanish Monarchy) as an 
example,  it  might  seem  easy  to  answer  that  the  Spanish  state  is  entitled  to  rule  their 
interactions through Spanish (state) law. More problematic turns the same case if we look at 
the same Spanish subjects closer and see them as Catholic or Muslim or Jewish subjects, 
whose religions make equally normative claims to them as their adherents – claims that might 
not only differ amongst themselves but which might also be different or even in contradiction 
with Spanish law.73 This is  a discussion that could be framed today in  the field of ‘legal 
73 It is important to note, however, that the emphasis does not lay in the difference between claims, but that, 
even if the diverse systems of normativity request the same action, the justification or the demand to take  
that action derive from different sources.
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pluralism’.  However,  the  discussion  if  the  Spanish  Kings  were  legitimated  to  rule  over 
inhabitants of the Americas (formulated in a modern fashion, for example, the subjects of the 
Aztec Empire) developed around the question if that was a ‘just war’ (Haggenmacher 1992). 
Independently of the recognition of the Aztec Empire as a comparable state in front of the 
Spanish Kingdom, the question that remained after the annexation/invasion/conquest was if 
there existed entities,  for example traditional indigenous authorities or European religious 
entities,  with  (legitimate)  normative  claims  parallel  to  the  Spanish  Kingdom  –  again  a 
problem framed in terms of ‘legal pluralism’.
The  model  for  the  colonization  of  vast  regions  of  the  world  has  been  similar,  and 
consequently the difficulties have been comparable. Once that periods of military or political 
conquest finished, the question of conflicting orders of legitimacy remained within the newly 
created administrative units, be it colonies, protectorates, countries, etc: Whose law is more 
legitimate to rule over the people in the (Spanish) West Indies, the law of the Spanish Kings 
or laws of the conquered tribes? Whose law is more legitimate to rule over people in the 
Presidencies of British India: the British, Hindu or Islamic Law? Whose law should rule over 
the people in South Africa, the British, the Dutch or the diverse tribal rulings? How far and in 
which cases is it possible to accept the legitimacy of two or more of these systems to rule in 
the same time and space? Taking these examples into account, it  is not surprising that an 
important  aspect  of  the  contemporary  discussion  of  legal  pluralism  emerged  in  colonial 
contexts. The debate over legal pluralism is, in other words, a debate over a ‘just war from 
within’.  The questions  on  legal  pluralism are  intimately intertwined with  historically  and 
psychologically  entrenched  issues  of  cultural  identity  and  political  history,  reviving  the 
discussion on the just war and carrying all its characteristic emotional commotion. Thus, to 
address  the  problem of  legal  pluralism implies  to  deal  with  historically  and  emotionally 
loaded questions  of  identity and power,  which unsurprisingly reenact  entrenched political 
struggles.
Despite the fact that we must imagine that discussions around the legitimacy of more than one 
normative system in a shared space and time exist since the first encounterings of two groups 
of people, the current academic reflection on ‘legal pluralism’ has its own referential stories. 
The  center  of  attention  of  pluralistic  approaches  to  law has  been  to  put  in  question  the 
homogeneous and unified concept of law most widespread in legal academy and practice, 
where law is understood as a system of general norms, that is legitimized by an authority and 
which is applicable and enforceable in a specific territory. This unified concept of law was 
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problematized through the history of legal philosophy, but it was especially during the 20th 
century,  that  a  general  ‘crisis  of  law’ or  even  a  ‘decadence  of  law’ was  perceived  and 
discussed in academic circles as well as in the environment of political activism (Jeammaud 
1993). All the diverse critical approaches including a perspective of alterity and alternativity 
regarding law, contributed to the development of the concept of ‘legal pluralism’. In fact, as 
we will see, it is possible to envisage pluralism in law in various ways and thus, it is not 
accurate to speak of ‘legal pluralism’, but rather, it is helpful to recognize the existence of 
manifold  approaches,  in  order  to  grasp  the  complexity of  the  discussion and its  political 
expression. Legal pluralism exists itself in a postmodern manner, only in the unconsensual 
form of the plural, as legal pluralisms.
The contemporaneous discussion on legal pluralism found nourishment in diverse elder 
intellectual currents and social experiences, which generated the question on the unicity of the 
concept of law. In European academy, this question appeared with increased force in the end 
of the 19th century. Unsurprisingly, at the same time, the question on legal cultures started to 
acquire more academic relevance when, with the beginning of the century, comparative law 
was presented as a project of worldwide unification (Zweigert/Kötz 1984, 2 f.). In the realm 
of legal pluralism, as we will see, the arguments posed at that time serve even today as the  
foundation for contemporary discussions in law and other social sciences. Also the political 
questions that have been formulated more recently in other contexts, come nowadays back in 
a new shape. Amongst the most important are, for example, the question on the priority of a  
discursive model in front of socio-cultural diversity and the problem of the participation of 
social groups in the legitimate building of law beyond the formal structures of the modern 
state. It is interesting to observe that the discussion on ‘legal pluralism’ unfolded in a plurality 
of research forums and in diverse social spheres. Here, the main threads I will follow are the 
discussions  of  the  concept  of  ‘legal  pluralism’  in  the  academic  fields  of  jurists,  of 
anthropologists and of sociologists. Firstly, I will present several of the social experiences that 
pluralistic approaches to law intend to address along with some of the academic contributions 
that marked the conceptualization of pluralism in the socio-legal field. Secondly, I will refer 
to a few of the conceptual difficulties and to the plurality of ‘legal pluralisms’ which arose in 
the process of the discussion. Lastly, I will address some of the problems that these pluralistic 
approaches open up.
One of the first well known references for these inquiries is the work of the Prussian jurist 
Otto von Gierke (1841–1921), who dedicated himself to the legal-historical study of the law 
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of associations. In the four volumes of his ‘Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht’ ('The German 
Law of Associations’, 1868-1913), he argued on the base of historical research that human 
associations are capable of collective wills and acts beyond the fictitious personality attributed 
to them by law. On a more general note, his investigations on the Germanic aspects of the law 
in force in the Germanic territories, which by then were in the transition to build the German 
Empire and later the Republic of Weimar, show his position in the legal discussion of the 
time. In those years, a common private law for the whole German Empire was being drafted74, 
following mainly the German Historical School of Savigny, and being thus coined to a great 
extent  by Romanistic  studies.75 In  this  process,  Roman  law was  recreated  and used  as  a 
unifying model for the legal unification of the German Empire, neglecting the existing variety 
of legal customs. Gierke's study of the law of associations was relevant for this scientific and 
political conflict, because German law, according to his argument, was based on established 
legal customs which not only were of non-Roman origin, but even more, were the result of the 
continuous interaction between diverse social groups. 
While  Gierke  opposed  through  his  research  the  Romanistic  oriented  ‘conceptual 
jurisprudence’ (Begriffsjurisprudenz) he participated not only into a disciplinary discussion in 
the frame of legal history76, but, most importantly, he took part in a political discussion about 
the legal development of law in the Germanic territories, putting his main focus on the social 
role of law and in contemporary social politics. However, despite being acknowledged by 
many scholars as a historical reference for political pluralism, he never abdicated of the need 
for the monarchic state nor of the clear supremacy of Prussia (Bader 1964, 375). At the same 
74 Until the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) of 1900 came into force, in the territory of the German 
Empire diverse laws were applied, amongst  them the ‘gemeines Recht’ (common law derived from the 
interpretation of Roman Law), the ‘General State Laws for the Prussian State’ (Preußisches Allgemeine 
Landrecht; ALR) of 1794, the French Code Civil of 1804, the Code of Baden (Badisches Recht) of 1810, the 
Bavarian Code (Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis) of 1756, the Jutisch Code (Jüttisches Recht) of 
1241, the Sachsenspiegel and later the Saxonian Civil Code (Sächsische Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch) of 1865. 
Because  of  the  plurality of  territories  with diverse  traditions  and  formal  laws,  the  organization  of  the 
German Empire posed very clearly the problematic of what we today call ‘legal pluralism’ as a question of 
socio-political organization.
75 As Pier  Giuseppe Monateri  argues in detail,  the idea of ‘a’ Roman Law developed firstly at  this  time 
(Monateri  2000).  The pandectistic  elaboration of  Roman sources  and the  Romanistic  School  put  these 
historical  documents  into  a  certain  structure  and  a  system  of  meaning.  The  motivations  for  this 
structurization were diverse, but, in any case, the need to legitimize the contemporary political system was 
extremely relevant. This process resulted in the myth of Roman law as the original source of legal thinking 
and thus as one central element for the development of all civilizations in Europe. This myth is one of the 
founding stones of contemporaneous research in legal history as well as in legal discourse in general.  It is 
not surprising that, in a time in which referents for the identification of whole Europe are in need, this 
perspective wins new strength.
76 Interestingly,  these  two fractions  in  Legal  History,  namely Romanists  and  Germanists  are  still  clearly  
divided  in  German  and  European  academia.  See,  for  example,  the  different  sections  of  the  German 
publication ‘Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte’, which is divided in three sections: the 
Romanistic, the Germanistic, and the Canonistic (Böhlau Verlag 2012) 
123
time, emphasizing the Germanic aspects of law, he was making a claim for a unified cultural 
identity of the nation and the law. 
 Another of the often cited European pillars of pluralistic approaches to law is the law 
sociologist Eugen Ehrlich (1862-1922), who developed the idea of ‘living law’ as coexistent 
with case law and state law (Ehrlich 1989). He underlined the “sociological contingency of 
legal norms recurring not only to Roman jurisprudence, but also to the Austro-German law 
and Anglo-American legal  thinking”  (Döhring 1959).  ‘Living law’ develops,  according to 
Ehrlich,  on  the  base  of  diverse  organizations  in  which  individuals  take  part.  These 
organizations can, for example, be religious groups, families, associations or political parties. 
Important in this context is that they interact with each other and with the state and, in doing 
this, maintain a certain autonomy in front of the state. According to Ehrlich, the law develops 
in the internal order of these institutions, and thus the development of state law can not put in 
question neither the existence nor the socio-legal relevance of these other sources of social 
order.  This ‘living law’  is  independent  of the state  and is  grounded on measures that are 
different from the state sanctions. For example, sanctions consist of the social pressure that 
the same organizations exert, for example through exclusion, lack of credit or loss of honor, 
or, in commercial relationships, the loss of clientele. Most importantly, these measures are, in 
general, more effective than regular sanctions that the state can apply. Ehrlich underlines the 
role of law as an instance of organization of relations in every human interaction, including 
those beyond legal conflict. Consequently, Ehrlich opened the concept of ‘law’ as a product of 
social organization.
Equally, the theory of law sociologist Georges Gurvitch77 (1894-1965) (Gurvitch 1932 
1935  and  1942) is  recognized  as  one  of  the  most  important  founding  stones  for  the 
development of pluralistic approaches in socio-legal academy. Less known is, however, his 
77 It is interesting for this research to remember shortly Gurvitch's personal background. Born in the czarist  
Russia, he participated actively in the revolution of 1917, an experience that marked his academic interests  
to a great extent. In 1920, due to his opposition to the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and his position in favor of the 
self-government, he left the USSR to continue his academic career first in Prague and since 1925 in France,  
where he received the ‘nationalité’ in 1929. The year of the publication of his ‘Éléments de sociologie  
juridique’ (1940),  a text  that  built  the foundation for his renowned ‘Sociology of  Law’ (1942),  he left 
Europe to settle down in the United States until 1945. After the publication of the ‘Déclaration des droits  
sociaux’ (Declaration of Social Rights, 1944), he returned to France. His social and political engagement in 
favor of the colonies and particularly in favor of Algeria ended up in a bombing attack at his front door,  
which resulted lastly in a heart attack causing his death in 1965. For a concise but more detailed account on 
Gurvitch's biography and bibliography, see Cramer 1986. 
What  I  find interesting in his biography is not  only that  he,  as  many of  the social  researchers I  have 
mentioned above, had the experience of a personal ‘transplant’ through the emigration to the United States. 
Moreover, beyond that  transatlantic experience, he experienced a previous (and also a later) process of  
cultural transfer, all of which went hand in hand with his political and social engagement. The context of the 
Russian revolution as well as the circumstances of his death allow us equally to envisage the socio-political  
landscape in which these critical reflections on law developed in Europe. 
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primal source of intellectual inspiration for a pluralistic approach to law, namely the works of 
the Polish philosopher, jurist and sociologist Leon Petrażycki (1867-1931), who studied and 
lived in Russia until 1917, influencing Gurvitch greatly. In his research, Gurvitch argued the 
coexistence of multiple legal orders that are independent from the state.  He differentiated 
between a  social  law,  that was the product  of an organized society,  and an  individual or  
intergrupal law, that he described as the product of bilateral relations, for example the state 
law.  Because of  the  development  of  this  thesis,  Gurvitch is  acknowledged amongst  legal 
pluralists  as  a  researcher  that  sketched  legal  pluralism  as  an  expression  of  a  “liberal, 
democratic, decentralized and anti-state socialism” (Treves 1978, 72).
In the Italian context, a contemporary colleague of Gurvitch that equally fostered the 
research  of  legal  pluralism  was  Santi  Romano  (1875-1947),  who  in  his  ‘L'ordinamento 
giuridico’ ('The Legal  Order’,  1918)  pleaded for  a  broad understanding of  law that  went 
beyond the mere state norm. Throughout his work he presented his institutional theory of law, 
according to which law, “before being a norm, [...] is, above all an organization, a structure 
and a position of the society in which it develops” (Romano 1969, 113). Identifying the law 
with the institution, he questioned the monist perspective on law and researched on a variety 
of forms of normative orders, from the ecclesiastical to illicit or marginalized ones. Although 
the works of Santi Romano are less acknowledged in most of the literature on legal pluralism 
as those of Gurvitch or Ehrlich,  his socio-legal proposal is equally relevant,  especially in 
countries  of  Romance  tradition  like  Brazil.  For  our  purpose,  his  work  allows  to  add  an 
example  more  to  sense  the  geographical  and  theoretical  broadness  of  proposals  with  a 
pluralistic orientation regarding law existent already in the first half of the 20th century.
It is important to note, however, that the interest for (cultural) plurality in law existed, 
also at an academic level, long time before the innovative theories of the then emerging social 
science  appeared.  In  fact,  legal  comparativists,  whose  work  is  basically  to  discover  and 
research the plurality of approaches to law, go back to ancient Greece when they recount the 
eldest legal comparativist researches (Zweigert/Kötz 1984, 54 f.), what in the frame of the 
widespread ‘classical’ understanding of law from an European/euro-centric perspective is the 
cradle of (legal) reasoning. The concern with plurality and with the different cultures of law, 
was obviously a  longstanding interest  of  jurists,  historians  and politicians.  The emphasis, 
however, varies, because while legal pluralism started asking for a variety of normative orders 
within (or beyond) a state,  comparative law asked originally for the variety of normative 
orders amongst states (or comparable political units). The methods applied were, nevertheless, 
similar. The difference relies basically in the concept of law used: Using a concept of law 
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bound  to  the  Nation-State,  plurality  necessarily  will  mean  to  deal  with  the  differences 
between Nation-States, but when this concept is loose from the state, plurality gains a totally 
different perspective.78 
It can be said that these two different approaches are incarnated in academia by the 
disciplines  of  ‘Comparative  Law’ and  ‘Legal  Anthropology/Sociology’.  Interestingly,  the 
research of different (state) legal systems and the research of (non-state) normative orders are 
connected  through  a  certain  dynamic.  As  Konrad  Zweigert  (1911-1996)  and  Hein  Kötz 
(*1935) relate,  after  1850, the interest for ‘Comparative Law’ (in the academic centers of 
Europe  and  North-America)  declined  to  a  minimum.  The  concept  of  ‘Comparative  Law’ 
remained however in use with a different meaning, namely attached to ‘Legal Ethnology’ or 
to the study of an ‘Universal History of Law’ with an ethnological perspective (Idem, 65). 
With the turn of the century, however, the interest for current foreign state law increased, 
“parallel to the first bigger efforts for the unification of law and international cooperation” 
(Idem, 66). The year 1900, in the frame of the Exposition Universelle, where the progress of 
modern man was to be shown in all fields, the ‘International Congress in Comparative Law’ 
took  place  with  the  intention  to  contribute  to  the  development  of  a  “droit  commun  de 
l'humanité”, i.e. a universal law (Lambert ref. In Zweigert/Kötz 1984, 3). The widespread aim 
of legal comparison, “to search for and find better solutions” (Idem, 56), which Zweigert and 
Kötz still claimed in 1984, was already at the center of the Parisian proposal to “gradually 
eliminate  accidental  differences  of  the  legislations,  that  separate  the  peoples  of  the  same 
civilizatory  level  and  economic  composition”  (Lambert  ref.  in  Zweigert/Kötz  1984,  3). 
Importantly, Zweigert and Kötz underline that Comparative Law still “means to see the big 
common ground above all particular divergences and so to deepen the belief on the existence 
of a uniform thought of justice” (Idem, 3), acknowledging a certain “affinity to iusnaturalistic 
speculations” (Idem, 56). The calls to think about law in plural terms (within and beyond the 
state) in the first part of the 20th century respond partially to this impulse of unification. The 
perspective of a common civilizatory progress and of law as a wheel in the machinery of this 
modern progress, demanded to ‘eliminate the accidental differences’ and to see the core of a 
common civilization beyond the limits of the state. In turn, the strengthening of the Nation-
State required a call to the cultural unity of the nation, and thus of the national law. But this  
connection  to  culture  meant  at  the  same  time  that  law could  be  seen  as  not  necessarily 
78 The relation between the research of plurality in the sense of ‘legal pluralism’ and in the sense of ‘legal  
comparison’ is thus similar to the relation between the legitimacy claim discussed through legal pluralism 
and the one discussed in terms of a ‘just war’ stated above. 
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connected to the state, and, in turn, had to be seen in connection with diverse ways of life 
within, beyond or without the state.
Naturally,  the  new life  that  Comparative  Law gained  in  the  beginning  of  the  20th 
century was reinforced by the need to deal with the consequences of the First World War and 
the  international  agreements  signed  on  that  occasion,  by  the  increasing  academic 
institutionalization of ‘Comparative Law’, and by new perspectives on the object of research, 
including topics like common law. Especially this last development implied to change from a 
focus on the structures and dogmatics of the legal systems to be compared to the insight that 
“the true base of comparison lies in the equality of the function and the legal-political needs” 
(Idem, 70), i.e. it invoked a functionalist approach. It is easy to see that through the inclusion 
of  the  political  realm and through  the  openness  to  a  diversity  of  structures  (assuming  a 
determined function), law became increasingly intertwined with the political and the cultural 
realms. Once law is turned into a function of social order, the division between studies of 
‘Comparative  Law’  and  the  questions  of  legal  pluralism  connected  rather  to  ‘Legal 
Anthropology’ and ‘Legal Sociology’ blurs. 
If the realm of law opened up, it  opened equally for inquiries on the conceptual/political 
issues of law and plurality from other disciplines. Parallel to this development in (socio-)legal 
academy, the most commonly accepted concept of law presented serious difficulties when 
anthropologists and ethnologists in the beginning of the 20th century investigated diverse ways 
in which indigenous and often colonized groups dealt with law and social organization. In this 
context, the work of Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), specially his ‘Crime and Custom in 
Savage Society’ (1926), was decisive in confronting the universal and evolutionary scheme of 
Henry Maine,  and calling for detailed ethnographical  studies.  But  soon the difficulties  of 
putting ‘the primitive’ in a determined scheme showed to be embedded in the language of the 
ethnographer and his audience. The discussion between the anthropologists Paul Bohannan 
(1920-2007)  and  Max  Gluckman  (1911-1975)  regarding  the  conceptualization  of  social 
orderings as ‘law’ inquired how far the categories of research were adequate to investigate 
and understand a different social life.79 In other words, when law is seen as a cultural object, 
79 The main aspects of the different approaches of Bohannan and Gluckman can be appreciated in the book of 
Laura Nader (*1930) (Nader 1997), containing Bohannan's work ‘Ethnography and Comparison in Legal 
Anthropology’ [1969], at pp. 401-418; and Gluckman's ‘Concepts in the Comparative Study of Tribal Law’ 
[1969], at pp. 349-373. In a nutshell, Bohannan sustained that the use of legal terms with alleged universal 
value  in  indigenous  socio-cultural  contexts  impeded  the  understanding  of  the  native  forms  of  social  
organization and misrepresented them. He advocated in turn for the use of the ‘original’ native terms, while 
Gluckman considered this approach as a limitation for legal comparison.
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its form and content can vary endlessly up to the point that legal categories, including ‘law’ 
itself, loses its epistemological unity. How can I understand the Other's culture if I only think 
in my own culturally determined categories? In concreto, one of the central problems these 
discussions pointed at was: where should the division between ‘law’ and ‘custom’, or between 
‘law’ and other ‘normative systems’ be drawn? Until then, in general, while custom was seen 
as a “spontaneous, traditional, personal, commonly known, corporate, relatively unchanging 
[…] modality of primitive society“, law was characterized as “the instrument of civilization, 
of political  society sanctioned by organized force,  presumably above society at  large,  and 
buttressing a new set of social interests” (Diamond 2007, 260)80. However, when ethnographic 
research  showed  how  dense  and  formalized  the  webs  of  ‘customs’ could  be,  it  turned 
increasingly difficult to divide them from the organized power of law. And when the notion 
appeared that the position of the observer changes the observation and its object81, this is, 
when the categories of the observer are put in question, the inquiry of the Other's law turned 
into an inquisition of the own perspective.
Anthropologists  researching  law  recognized,  that  this  was  not  merely  a  conceptual 
problem. There lay a much more critical question implicit: If one would assume that customs 
were sanctioned by an authority that was sufficiently legitimated so that they equaled law, 
then the law of the colonial states saw itself in front of an equal autochthonous law, and not 
merely  in  front  of  loose  customs  or  foreign  morals.  It  was  not  anymore  the  opposition 
between a rational unity, law, in front of a plurality of unclear or pre-rational customs and 
religious ideas. Who should state if indigenous law was sufficiently legitimated? How was it 
possible then to reasonably justify the subordination of these type of ‘legal systems’ under the 
colonial rule? Was it necessary then to include a moral element in the concept of law, in order 
to re-state the order and the hierarchy between civilized and primitive? The division between 
law and morals  was,  however,  a  dogma that  was at  the base of the modern (positivistic) 
understandings of law and state, and which, at the same time, protected their autonomy from 
religious institutions.
80 However, this dichotomic division does not lead necessarily to an evolutionistic perspective in terms of 
custom evolving eventually into law. Custom, in this sense could be a sort of ‘primitive law’. Moreover, 
Diamond argues that law contradicts custom and erases it.
81 Associated with the realm of physics, this idea is usually addressed in connection with the ‘uncertainty 
principle’  formulated  by  Werner  Heisenberg  (1901-1976)  in  1927.  However,  this  problem  is  more 
accurately described by the so called ‘observer effect’ with a much broader application than Heisenberg's  
principle. The ‘observer effect’ is intimately linked with the concept of observer in quantum mechanics,  
where  several  interpretations  give  the  observer  a  key role.  What  is  interesting  for  us  is,  though,  that  
Heisenberg's principle, together with other aspects of quantum physics developed in the first half of the 20 th 
century, had a pivotal impact in the change of perspective on science and, at a more general level, in the 
view on human experience, as basically and inevitably uncertain. For more information about the role of the 
observer in quantum physics from a philosophical perspective, see Sonenthal 2005.
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If the concept of law should be also applied to indigenous normative systems, suddenly, 
the singular position of state law was weakened. Consequently, the monopoly on violence of 
the state82, which is a founding stone of general legal security as a legitimation for the state 
and its law, was put in question. If ‘custom’ was not that easy to separate from law, then it 
turned theoretically thinkable that several legal systems existed parallel to each other being 
equally legitimated. Consequently, the modern understanding of law (and of state) found itself 
in a cul-de-sac, from which it could not find a way out until today. 
More challenges for the conventional concept of law arose when the consequences of 
colonialization and decolonialization processes for legal interaction were investigated. After 
the declaration of independence of several African states, it became crucial to find answers to 
the  question  of  normative  plurality:  How  could  the  oppressed  but  never  abolished 
autochthonous normative structures be arranged with the forms of social organization that 
originally were imported by the colonial rulers? During processes of decolonialization, the 
indigenous traditions were explicitly underlined and a recognition, if not a return to the ‘true’ 
original roots was demanded. However, it was not possible to simply uproot the institutions, 
that, once they were introduced, formed part of social life for decades. Thus, normally, several 
indigenous  systems  and,  additionally,  one  or  more  imported  legal  systems  would  coexist 
(Daanaa 1994, Nina/Schwikkard 1996). 
But the problems that pluralistic perspectives on law aim to address are not limited to the 
environment of indigenous groups or colonialism.  As we have seen in the context  of the 
references that are generally taken as initiators of the academic discussion on legal pluralism, 
none of these elements, which gained particular attention with ethnographic research, were 
central to the discussion. Also experiences with different normativities within the frame of 
state law, amongst states as well as in urban environments inspired or even required pluralistic 
conceptualizations  of  law.  In  the  end  of  the  1970's,  as  part  of  the  general  wave  of 
epistemological  crisis  and  critical  approaches  to  law,  the  idea  of  a  unified  law  was 
increasingly put in question. This change meant an expansion of legal pluralism from the 
investigation of the environment of the colony, with colonized and colonizers, to the relations 
82 Following Max Weber (1864-1920) ('Politik als Beruf ’, ‘Policy as a Vocation'), the concept of ‘monopoly 
on violence’ (Gewaltmonopol), or ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force’, which is valid in legal 
scholarship until today, means the renunciation of the citizens to use their own physical force to carry their  
claims through. Instead of the private use of violence, the organized and legitimized force of the state takes 
over the responsibility of solving interpersonal and social conflicts. Thus, at least in theory, the security of  
the citizens is insofar enhanced as everybody is brought to account only by specific legal institutions of the  
state and undergo specific preset processes and norms (Weber 1919 and 1980, 29).
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between  “dominant  groups  and  subordinate  groups,  such  as  religious,  ethnic,  or  cultural 
minorities, immigrant groups, and unofficial forms of ordering located in social networks or 
institutions”  (Merry  1988,  872  f.).  From  this  last  perspective,  the  superposition  with 
politically engaged research connected to the Critical  Legal Studies is  clear.  This change, 
however,  did  not  mean  a  clear-cut  break  with  the  ‘classical’ (post-)colonialist  tradition. 
Moreover, it was a smooth process of innovation in the field of research. It is not by chance 
that researchers of this new pluralism, like Richard Abel, David Engel, Marc Galanter, Peter 
Fitzpatrick,  Sally  Falk  Moore  (*1924),  Boaventura  de  Sousa  Santos,  and Francis  Snyder 
began their socio-legal investigations in post-colonial societies, where legal pluralism could 
not be overlooked because of its historical importance (Idem, 874). 
An  important  part  of  the  approaches  on  legal  pluralism  that  concentrate  on  topics 
beyond colonial and postcolonial backgrounds studies the fractures of the unified concept of 
law inside of state law. Formal state law is itself composed of a variety of diverse fields that  
develop, execute and enforce norms quite autonomously. A clear example of these fractures 
can be seen in the federal approach to law, that has been applied in different ways in diverse 
countries of the world, for example in Germany, the United States and Mexico. In Germany 
for example, areas like culture and education are to be ruled, in principle, solely by the federal 
states (Bundesländer) (Art. 30  Grundgesetz – GG, ‘Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany'; Maihofer 1995, 1233 f.). Consequently, diverse legal orders coexist in the national 
territory and these can collide in different ways with federal law. At the same time, these 
systems  are  organized  with  own institutions  to  enforce  and  control  their  own normative 
systems. The possibility of collisions, however, is taken into account within the system of 
state law and addressed through provisions establishing primacy and processes for settling 
disputes over competence (Art. 70 ff. GG for the regulation of competence between federal 
states  and  the  German  federation,  and  Art.  93  I  and  II  GG  for  the  competence  of  the 
Constitutional Court to decide in case of disputes over the competence). However, different 
laws within the federal system are generally seen as belonging to the same legal system and 
therefore seldom treated as forms of ‘legal pluralism’.
In addition to that, there is also the relation of state law with the international field, 
which has gained crucial relevance from the second half of the 20th century onwards. It is 
known that international agreements have to be transformed into national law in order to be 
effective in national territory. However, it is equally clear that the reference to international 
law is a reference to an order which creates its own norms, follows its own rules to create law, 
has other addressees and in many cases other goals, is subordinated to a different logic, goes 
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beyond  national  ideas  and  customs  regarding  law,  has  other  enforcement  methods  at  its 
disposal, utilizes other forms of legitimation and, last but not least,  uses other agents like 
courts  and  administrative  organs  than  national  law.83 Beyond  the  relation  between 
international law and state law, it is also important to notice that the field of international law 
is itself structured by the actions of a variety of institutions and is controlled by a plurality of 
tribunals, producing a certain ‘fragmentation of international law’, which has been criticized 
consecutively  by the  presidents  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  (Koskenniemi/Leino 
2002).
In this context, institutions of regional integration require special attention, especially 
the European Union. The complex of institutions that form the European Union, goes beyond 
traditional international law, since it creates ‘supranational law’. The difference relies therein, 
that an important part of the law of the European Union does not require any transformation 
into national law, in order to be effective. In fact, in some cases, national measures might be 
even improper. Furthermore, due to the ‘direct effect’ of supranational law, even if national 
law might collide with it, the law of the European Union has primacy (Hartley 2007, 192 ff.). 
Also the activity of the Court of Justice of the European Union has evident consequences on 
the national orders (e.g. when the ‘direct effect’ of a norm is established), even if the rulings it 
produces do not come into being as it would be expected for national law.84
Beyond questions on the plurality within positive state law, from a legal-sociological 
perspective, it is also relevant in the context of legal pluralism, that one norm of formal state 
law can be interpreted in various ways. If we take the standpoint that law creates a relevant 
reality only from the moment when it is applied, then the question of the implementation turns 
to be the central question of every concept of law. Laws are namely formulated as general 
abstract norms, that require specification for the particular case. They are supposed to allow 
diverse possibilities to deal with daily life. As long as two diverse interpretations coexist, the 
unity of law is in question.85 Consequently, diverse systems are built in, in order to avoid these 
incongruities, like, for example, the outstanding position of the constitution or the hierarchical 
structure of  courts, that  culminate in the  national courts  or  even a  constitutional court. In a 
83 For a pluralistic approach to international law, see for example Berman 2007, 301 ff.; for a short discussion 
of this kind of pluralism in the context of globalization, see Tamanaha 2008, 375 ff.; and for a broader 
approach regarding the connections between law and globalization, see Twining 2000.
84 For two different approaches on the role of legal pluralism in the context of the law of the European Union, 
see: Barber 2006, 306 ff. and Avbelj 2006, 377 ff.
85 This is, lastly, the line of thought of Legal Realism as well as an important part of the criticisms of Critical  
Legal Studies presented above.
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tautological way, these institutions have the role to guarantee the security and unity of state  
law through their high authority recognized by the state and its law. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that these inconsistencies can only be solved in this way if a case 
actually arrives to the court and makes the long and difficult way through all courts until it 
reaches the national courts or even the constitutional court. ‘Legal life’ is, until then, full of 
insecurities and ambiguities. In fact, exactly these insecurities are the ones that allow law to 
live,  including  all  the  legal  professions,  institutions,  guilds,  journals  and  the  individuals 
working within them. In any case, it is not to be taken for granted that these incongruities can 
be decided unequivocally and definitely. In fact, inside of the interpretation of a norm diverse 
cases can be built in, that divide again the diverse possible solutions. With a judicial decision,  
only the plurality of (legal) interpretations is somehow limited, bound to certain criteria and 
thus, legitimized by the state, but unity is not secured and plurality itself is not at all out of the 
world.86
As  Correas  argues  utilizing  a  reinterpretation  of  the  positivistic  concept  of  law  of 
Kelsen, in the frame of pluralist approaches to law is equally important to address the role of  
social institutions as well as private endeavors, like firms and universities, which have written 
(but  naturally  also  unwritten)  and  hierarchically  organized  norms,  as  well  as  forums  of 
decision and methods of enforcement, that allow them a certain autonomy and are comparable 
to  a  state  order.  Also  these  orders  are  an  integral  part  of  one  national legal  system,  in 
coordination with elements of state law like courts and legislative bodies (Correas 2003, 99). 
Regarding the role of firms and corporations in the pluralization and  globalization of law, 
Teubner has made a central argument for understanding  law in the context of global financial 
interaction (Teubner 1997).
In addition to the regulations of institutions within and beyond the state, also ‘informal’ 
normative orders, which have norm-giving, norm-control and norm-enforcement instances, 
have been at the center of research on legal pluralism. In this sense, the already mentioned 
Portuguese  sociologist  Sousa  Santos,  renowned  for  his  investigation  of  the  normative 
structures in a slum (favela) in Rio de Janeiro (Sousa Santos 1977)87, recognizes four different 
86 Similarly,  David Sugarman (1983,  230 f.)  argues that  state  law as  such is plural,  since it  incorporates 
diverse elements, including processes and general norms as well as ideological and symbolic dimensions.
87 It  is  an interesting detail  for us that  the title  of  Sousa Santos’ influential  article  was ‘The Law of the 
Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in Pasárgada’. The idea of ‘the oppressed’ is a 
recurrent element in several of the critiques and proposals in a postmodern context. Particularly in Brazil,  
we  will  refer  later  to  the  ‘Theater  of  the  Oppressed’ of  Augusto  Boal  and  to  the  ‘Pedagogy  of  the  
Oppressed’ of Paulo Freire. In fact, the argument I am presenting in this work is that the emancipatory ideas 
that pushed for breaking the limits of monolithic perspectives on law and justice (but also on theater, on 
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spaces in society, each with its own form of law, which not only coexist but also interact, as I 
will elaborate later (Sousa Santos 1991, 182 ff.). Importantly, Sousa Santos sets his pluralistic 
proposal in the context of a paradigmatic transition towards a postmodern science (Idem, 13 
ff.),  ”a  critical  science  and  a  science  of  opposition,  capable  to  recover  the  utopian  and 
emancipatory energies that modern science lost” (Idem, 11 f.). Through his critical approach 
he searches to transcend a modern epistemological and political scheme, incarnated in the 
state monopoly on law. Interestingly, he argues that 
“the centrality of the official state law does not contradict and, on the contrary, it 
presupposes  the  existence of  other  legal88 orders.  [...]  The social  and political 
domination of the modern state is based on two premises: the functioning of state 
law  presupposes  its  articulation  with  other  non-state  legal  orders;  through 
ideological manipulation, the legal character is negated to these latter, resulting 
that the state law emerges as exclusive and as the monopoly of the state” (Sousa 
Santos 1991, 16).
In Sousa Santos’ research, the oppression of certain conceptual understandings and the 
oppression of certain social groups are linked intimately. Consequently, his approach aims to a 
social transformation through a theoretic reconstruction of law (Idem). This reconstruction 
involves broadening the social space of communication and distributing in a more equitable 
way “argumentative competencies” through a reformulation of the concept of law that allows 
to recover and empower local knowledges instead of delegitimizing them (Idem, 14).
Remarkably, following the broadening path of legal pluralism, law can easily include 
illegal  organizations,  which  (like  the  state)  have  a  clear  normative  order,  with  a  strict 
hierarchy of norms, as well as pre-established and hierarchical institutions and methods for its 
enforcement,  as  it  has  been  researched  already  in  the  1970's  (Blok  1974).  From  a 
contemporaneous perspective, equally problematic for a classical understanding of law, is the 
inclusion in pluralistic approaches to law of social movements like the Ejército Zapatista de  
Liberación  Nacional (EZLN,  Zapatist  Army  of  National  Liberation)  in  Mexico  and  the 
Movimento dos  Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST, Landless  Worker's  Movement)  in 
Brazil.  Particularly problematic  in these cases is  the fact that several  of their  actions  and 
methods are clearly against the state's normative frame.
pedagogy, on science, etc.), this is ideas of liberation from oppression, produced an explosion of infinite 
plural approaches, that could not, because of the very emancipatory pluralistic call of postmodern critics, 
claim the lack of validity of positions with opposite perspectives. 
88 Sousa Santos, as it is typical for scholars writing in Romance languages uses the term  ‘jurídico’, meaning 
the context of  ius,  of ‘derecho’, of ‘law’ as a whole. Unfortunately the rare use of this term in English 
requires, for an easier reading and a better understanding, to translate ‘jurídico’ as ‘legal’, a term which 
obscures the amplitude of the author's object of research and critique. For the discussion on ‘jurídico’ see 
further footnote 63.
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What I  have presented in  the last  pages  is  a  variety of  social  experiences  that  pluralistic 
approaches  to  law aim to  address,  arguing that  the  division  between state  law and other 
normativities is unsustainable beyond a mere authoritative statement that equates law with 
state-law,  and inquiring  the usefulness  of  such a  definition.  In  the  search  for  appropriate 
concepts that would allow for a broader and, at the same time, more differentiated perspective 
on  regimes  of  normativity,  various  proposals  were  made.  In  this  sense,  one  of  the  main 
problems that the first legal-ethnographic investigations in (post-)colonial contexts posed was 
the  necessity  to  question  the  limit  between ‘law’ and ‘custom’,  while,  at  the  same time,  
allowing to address (and control) adequately the social realities, including the role of the state 
and the types of power involved in social interaction, that were beyond formal state law. To a 
certain extent, from the colonizers’ perspective, the existence of what was called later legal 
pluralism was part of a legitimizing scheme associated with the ideas of Enlightenment, by 
which the colonial rule would bring law to primitive peoples. It was because of practical and 
moral reasons that indigenous ‘customs’ were tolerated. Thus, indigenous customs entered the 
legal  system as  ‘customary law'89 as  long as  they were not  “repugnant  to  natural  justice, 
equity, and good conscience” or “inconsistent with any written law” (Merry 1988, 870).90
The ‘solution’ of customary law, however,  as a hybrid composition of the opposites 
law/custom, only developed the tension of this dichotomy further. The characteristic feature 
of this law seemed to be that it generally developed as custom out of an oral tradition and that 
the source of its authority was different from the colonial ruler (Snyder 1981, 49). However, 
although it  was  assumed that  customary law was preexistent  to  colonial  rule,  its  validity 
depended on an additional recognition by the colonial state. In the end, they were (and still 
are) jurists who determined if a certain behavior was part of relevant customary law or merely 
a legally irrelevant custom. Hence, customary law was itself an aspect and a product of a 
process of colonialization, where customs and customary law were perceived as closed, rather 
89 Naturally, ‘customary law’ is not a term that derives exclusively of the colonial context. The problematic 
that appears in the colonial context is, however, paradigmatic for the whole discussion of ‘customary law’ 
which cannot be addressed in this context fully. For a discussion on the topic from the perspective of the 
end of the 19th century, see Brie 1899, for a contemporary analysis: Perreau-Saussine/Murphy 2007.
90 These are examples of formulations that limit the validity of a system of norms to specific cases, being the  
first one a ‘repugnancy clause’ and the second one a ‘supremacy clause’. Lastly, both formulations aim at  
the same goal, namely to give priority to the official formal (state) legal system, although the emphasis vary 
in an interesting way: while the ‘repugnancy clause’ has a rather moral tone to it linked to a perspective of  
natural  law,  the  ‘supremacy clause’ refers  rather  to  a  positivistic  argument  more  classical  for  modern 
mechanistic argumentation on law. 
It is important to remark that these formulations are very similar to the contemporaneous expressions of  
recognition of  indigenous legal  systems in several  national  orders.  See for  example art.  2,  A II  of the 
Mexican Constitution (Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2005; for the original version in Spanish, see Estados 
Unidos  Mexicanos  2011,  and  for  the  text  of  the  decree  referring  to  the  whole  constitutional  reform 
regarding indigenous matters see: Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2001). 
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static, historically and culturally determined unities.91 
Following  these  questions,  Snyder  posed the  thesis  that  customary law was  not  an 
adapted version of autochthonous law, but rather a form of law, that had the colonial rule as its 
necessary  context.  He  worked  on  the  development  of  Senegalese  customary  law,  where 
Senegalese, who had access to European languages and customs, acted as communicators and 
translators of the indigenous law. The European colonists, in turn, accepted the versions that 
were most useful to them. Snyder summarizes the result of his research as follows:
“Produced in particular historical circumstances, the notion of ‚customary law’ 
was an ideology of colonial domination. The concept of ‘customary law’ itself 
manifested an attempt to reinterpret African legal forms in terms of European 
legal categories, which formed part of the ideology of those classes most closely 
associated with the colonial state. The designation of African law as ‘customary’ 
because  it  was  oral,  though  apparently  technical,  embodied  and  masked  an 
essentially political  conclusion that it  was subordinate to the colonial law of 
European origin” (Snyder, 1981, 74, 76).
Thus,  ‘traditional  law’ was,  at  least  from this  perspective,  a  construct  of  European 
expansion,  similarly as  the  ideas  of  ‘tribe’ or  ‘chief’ amongst  many other  ‘characteristic’ 
features of seemingly traditional social systems (Wolf 1982). As a result, the idea of ‘custom’ 
and ‘customary law’ as something essentially different from ‘real’ law was increasingly put in 
question.  The  problem  was  not  merely  to  propose  a  new  concept  of  ‘law’,  but,  most 
importantly, to find expressions that could take into account the plurality (and legitimacy) of 
normative systems and, at the same time, could serve as dividing categories in front of the 
plurality of social practices.
One proposal was to use the concept of ‘imposed law’ as a means of differentiation.92 
Lastly, this proposal was rejected, because, on the one hand, law is generally experienced as 
imposed in one way or another. On the other hand, any law is always accepted up to a certain 
degree  and  it  is  not  only imposed  (Burman/Harrell-Bond,  1979,  2).  Also  the  concept  of 
‘external  law’ was  discussed  (Kidder  1979,  296),  through  which  diverse  levels  of  legal 
organization were identified with diverse levels of externality. Although this proposal allowed 
to  have  a  perspective  of  interaction  amongst  the  diverse  levels,  it  was  still  problematic 
regarding which criteria should determine these externality levels and how far they implied a 
certain  hierarchy.  One  of  the  most  popular  proposals  was  to  characterize  the  normative 
91 Regarding the interaction between ‘custom’ and ‘official law’, see for example Fallers 1969, 59. Equally, 
see Falk Moore 1986 and Chanock 1985 for a perspective on customary law as an artificial creation of the 
colonial state. 
92 See, for example the symposium ‘The Social Consequences of Imposed Law’ in 1978 at the University of  
Warwick.
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systems outside of the official state law as ‘indigenous’ (Galanter 1981, 17). This approach 
was  criticized  especially  with  the  argument  that  ‘indigenousity’  in  the  sense  of  an 
uninfluenced  unchanging  (legal)  culture  does  not  exist  in  reality.  In  fact,  the  idea  of 
‘indigenousity’ was  often  used  to  mark  the  exotic  other  of  an  otherwise  dynamic  law.93 
Another  suggestion  was  the  concept  of  ‘folk  law’ (Bergh  1986).  However,  beyond  the 
question  if  through  this  approach  the  so  called  folk  law was  actually  romanticized  or 
trivialized,  the  biggest  difficulty  resided  therein  that  a  clear  limit  could  not  be  found. 
Moreover,  the  opponents  of  this  approach  argued  that  folk  law  and  state  law build  a 
continuum,  in  which  only the  way changes,  in  which  norms  are  differentiated  and  their 
processes of generation and application are organized.
The lack of success of these concepts in finding general acceptance even amongst the 
advocates of legal pluralism can be interpreted as an expression of a more profound and more 
subtle problem: is it possible to address plurality starting from a binary division? Especially 
problematic is the fact that these binary divisions implicitly draw on the basic perspective of 
law as state-law, putting ‘the rest’ of law as its antonym. Pluralism requires by its own claim 
of plurality something beyond a binary divide. In other words, a pluralistic approach implies 
that a plurality of variables are valid and relevant at the same time, and thus, linking plurality 
merely to one decisive variable will never be convincing to a consequent pluralistic approach 
because it contravenes its own premises. Consequently, a proposal that draws a line, be it a 
divisory line between categories or a grading line that marks fluid stages,  can always be 
legitimately  challenged  by  another  proposal  that  draws  a  similar  line  from  another 
perspective. One line will always be an easy object of criticism for approaches that are based 
and define themselves by the many. Furthermore, because of the dichotomy created by these 
forms of conceptualization, the variety of situations are overseen, in which ‘non-state-law’ 
(e.g. ‘custom') and ‘state-law’ develop, constituting and influencing each other.94 Moreover, 
the position of the observer as an imperceptibly active participant in the process of shaping 
the Other and ‘his law’ or ‘her custom’ was often disregarded. These insufficiencies called for 
a constant renewal of conceptual proposals. 
Lastly,  the  diverse  divisions  proposed,  and  with  them the  diverse  concepts  of  law 
introduced by pluralistic approaches, made explicit the variety of perspectives on what should 
actually be understood by ‘legal pluralism’ and which was its heuristic or academic value as 
93 In this sense see also the arguments of Said and Ruskola regarding the tendency to see the Western's ‘other’ 
as static and monolithic (Said 1978 and Ruskola 2005, 275 ff.).
94 For an account arguing the existence of diverse relations between state law and “other social forms”, see 
particularly Fitzpatrick 1984, and Sousa Santos 1991, 182 ff.
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well as its political and social contribution. In other words, the formulation of the questions 
that legal pluralism tries to address, not only created the field of ‘legal pluralism’, but with the 
recognition  or  non-recognition  of  these  questions  as  part  of  research  on  legal  pluralism, 
diverse  perspectives  on  what  is  legal  pluralism  were  stated,  or,  in  other  words,  they 
determined different ‘legal pluralisms’. 
What is then legal pluralism? This is the question that John Griffiths addressed in his seminal 
article of 1986 (Griffiths 1986), where he asked how far the diverse interpretations on legal 
pluralism were ‘truly’ pluralistic. In this writing, Griffiths developed the argument that there 
exist  a traditional ideology that decisively molds the study of law, which he called ‘legal 
centralism’. According to him, this ideology follows the principle that law is and can only be 
the law of the state, which is administrated by a group of state institutions, excluding at the 
same time all other norms (Idem, 3). This finds expression not only but most clearly in the 
education of jurists, who are specialized during their law studies on state law, as if this were 
the only true, only valid, only possible and the most relevant form of normativity that rules 
social interaction. Griffiths connects this perspective on law with the philosophies of Jean 
Bodin  (1530-1596),  Thomas  Hobbes  and  John  Austin  (1790-1859),  as  well  as  with  the 
positivist approaches of Hans Kelsen and Herbert L.A. Hart (1907-1992). As a conclusion, he 
argues that the factual power of the state is the condition on which this type of ‘law’  bases.
An important aspect of Griffiths’ argument is that he characterizes ‘legal centralism’ as 
an  ideology,  in  which  ideas  about  what  ‘is’ and what  ‘should  be’ according to  a  certain 
perspective are confused. Instead of observing normative plurality as it is given in ‘real life’, 
the  observation  of  ‘law’ within  the  paradigm  of  ‘legal  centralism’ starts,  according  to 
Griffiths’ critique, from a clear postulate on how normativity ‘should be’ organized, namely 
through  state  law.  Moreover,  this  postulate  is  presented  as  if  it  was  the  result  of  an 
disinterested objective observation of social events, while it is the result from a perspective of 
the hegemonic institutions, gathered under the state. Through the ‘trick’ of combining ‘what 
is’   and  what  ‘should  be'95,  these  hegemonic  institutions  present  the  conditions  of  their 
existence as a given reality (or as a needed medium for a functioning society). In Griffiths’ 
95 Interestingly, Griffiths recovers with this differentiation between ‘is’ and ‘should be’, which he puts at the 
core of his analysis, a basic division formulated by Kant, which relies at the base of the understanding of  
law according to a modern perspective. Law, in this sense, does not deal with questions of what ‘is’, but 
states what ‘should be’. Hence the apparent conclusion of the normative character of law as a field of study 
in opposition to descriptive sciences. From the beginning, thus, Griffiths argument against a modern state-
bound understanding of law is based on a modern worldview, where science deals with ‘what is’. In this  
sense, this is a revival of the question on how far legal studies build a ‘true’ science.
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eyes,  while  ‘legal  pluralism’ is  a  fact,  ‘legal  centralism’ is  a  myth,  that  poses  a  decisive 
obstacle  for an appropriate  observation and description of normative reality,  i.e.  of ‘legal 
pluralism’.
All these are arguments that echo the critiques presented above. From this perspective, 
the question of naming something law or not is a matter of power. Most importantly, this is a 
power  that  legitimizes  itself.  In  formulating  this  critique,  however,  it  is  remarkable  that, 
although the criticism of  legal  scholarship  as  an ideological  product  appears  in  Griffiths’ 
account, he, nevertheless, claims the pluralistic perspective (this is, actually, his perspective 
on legal pluralism) to be non-ideological, to be real and true. In this sense, Griffiths repeats 
the attitude he puts in question on his object of criticism, namely ‘legal centralism’, because 
he does not inquire the ideological background of pluralistic approaches to law. Consequently, 
at least in this article, Griffiths lacks the self-reflection he asks of his opponents. Equally, he 
approaches law as if  its aim and function should be necessarily to rule social  interaction. 
Thus, the pluralism Griffiths argues for is directly linked to a certain essentialism as well as to 
a functionalist perspective on law. This is one of the main critiques against pluralistic models,  
which I will present later.
Basing  on  this  perspective,  Griffiths  examines  and  criticizes  diverse  pluralistic 
approaches  to  law  existent  by  the  1980's,  differentiating  between  ‘weak’  and  ‘strong’ 
perspectives.  The  ‘weak’ approaches  are  connected  with  the  contexts  of  colonialism and 
postcolonialism  and  aim  at  the  recognition  of  customary  laws  or  customs  by  the  state. 
Griffiths argues that this  is  only an adaptation inside the oppressive system, that  remains 
truthful,  nevertheless,  to  a  centralist  ideology.  Even  the  question  for  ‘recognition’ is,  in 
Griffiths’ eyes an expression of the idea that law, in the end, has to be dependent of a single 
source of validation, namely the state.96 Contrary to that, a descriptive investigation of law 
would be necessary, that would present a ‘strong’ legal pluralism, assuming the existence of 
legal pluralism as a given fact.97
Naturally,  parallel  to the division weak/strong, other classifications of approaches to 
legal  pluralism  have  been  offered.  Also  Sally  Engle  Merry  has  identified  basically  two 
different  approaches  to  ‘legal  pluralism’.  On the  one  hand,  she  gathers  researches  in  the 
(post-)colonial context under the concept of  classic legal pluralism, while she reserves the 
term new legal pluralism (Merry 1988, 872 ff.) for approaches more linked to urban and intra-
state pluralism. Another relevant proposal in academic discussion has been the one advanced 
96 This ‘state legal pluralism’ has, nevertheless, major relevance. See for example the international importance 
of the case  ‘Otieno’ in Kenia in Doren 1988.
97 In this context, he refers explicitly to Sally Falk Moore's research, which I will address later.
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by Gordon  Woodman  dividing  between  ‘deep’ legal  pluralism and  ‘state’ legal  pluralism 
(Woodman 1996),  which,  although linked to  Griffiths’ approach,  accepts  the  validity and 
importance  of  pluralism  within  state-law,  emphasizing  that  “a  straightforward  distinction 
between unitary and plural legal situations will not be possible because unitary situations do 
not exist” (Woodman 1998, 54). Moreover, he argues that “all ideas of a tightly structured 
model  of  legal  pluralism  are  indefensible”,  addressing  legal  pluralism  as  a  “continuous 
variable” (Idem). 
But besides offering a classification of ‘legal pluralisms’, what has been key in Griffiths 
approach, causing admiration and rejection, has been the clear political emancipatory aim he 
linked to the project  of (strong)  legal  pluralism. This call  inspired many researchers with 
similar  political  interests  and  affiliations.  Similar  to  Griffiths’ call  to  liberate  academic 
research from the chains of ‘legal centralism’, another approach to legal pluralism that claims 
the need to go beyond state recognition to advance a more profound form of pluralism was 
developed  by  the  Brazilian  legal  sociologist  Antônio  Carlos  Wolkmer.  In  his  argument, 
Wolkmer advocates for a pluralist perspective not only as a result of scientific interest in order 
to understand social phenomena, but, most importantly, he follows with his proposal explicitly 
a political program of ‘emancipation’. Naturally, his reflections derive from the situations that 
he perceives in his socio-political environment in Brazil and other Latin American countries 
as a dysfunction of social institutions. According to him, “if and as long as the totality of the 
institutional models are unable to fulfill  their  functions so that they make social  relations 
foreseeable and regular, a series of dysfunctional symptoms trigger a crisis of the system. 
Consequently,  new  alternative  forms  emerge,  that  still  lack  an  appropriate  recognition” 
(Wolkmer 2006, 32 f.). Hence, he links the existence of legal pluralism explicitly with the 
crisis of the state as a regulative and legitimizing social institution.
Importantly, criticizing naive perspectives on pluralism that perceive it necessarily as a 
turn towards more social justice, Wolkmer underlines that the acceptance of a multiplicity of 
equally  valid  competing  normativities  might  be  equally  oppressive.  This  is  the  case 
particularly with legal pluralism in the context of a neo-liberal model, in which resorting to a 
common normative system that could protect powerless individuals or groups could be easily 
dismissed. Consequently, he pleads for the creation of a ‘new pluralism’ that goes beyond the 
diverse modalities of pluralism that have been drafted until now. The challenge of our time 
lays,  according to  Wolkmer,  in  making a  connection  between this  ‘new pluralism’ and a 
process of participative democracy. Hence, he highlights the need for the coexistence of the 
new concepts that arise from this pluralistic perspective,  which should be supported by a 
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variety of and autonomous associations conscious of their capacities and social role, on the 
one  hand,  with  a  state  that  is  “transformed,  controlled  and  organized  by the  democratic 
society” (Wolkmer 2006, 33), on the other hand. Thus, he does not reject the idea of a state as  
such, but he demands a process of transformation of the existing institutions and methods. So 
far,  he  aims  to  develop  a  legal  pluralism  with  a  participative  and  integrative  character 
(Sánchez Rubio 2006, 18; Wolkmer 1991, 29 ff.).98
Naturally, these conceptions of legal pluralism, as well as Griffiths’ combative proposal, have 
been contested in diverse occasions. What is relevant for us for now, is to note that there have 
been argued diverse pluralistic approaches to law. Most importantly, it has become apparent 
that the discussion over plurality in law requires,  for political  and academic interaction, a 
certain theoretical organization of the categories ‘legal pluralism’ is expected to deal with. In 
other words, to exchange meaningfully about plurality in these terms, we need to agree on 
one common  concept.  The  same  is  valid  for  critiques  that  aim  to  go  beyond  academic 
reflection.  Problematically,  these  theoretical  settings,  i.e.  also  the  categories  to  organize 
approaches to plurality in law, are varied and difficult to combine because they respond to 
different interests and different perspectives on the socio-political role of the discussion on 
‘legal pluralism’ and of academic research as a whole.99 Consequently, pluralistic approaches 
have become hindered by their own plurality. 
Because  of  the  own dynamic  of  claims  basing  on pluralistic  perspectives,  once  the 
monolith  of  ‘law’ as  a  feature  only  linked  to  the  state  was  put  in  doubt,  the  fields  of 
observation of legal pluralism increased constantly. Pluralism multiplied itself. Here relies, I 
think, one of the main reasons why the concept of legal pluralism is impossible to grasp: 
because it defines itself through the negation of a monolithic concept of law. The negation of 
an established definition opens the door for all the elements that were so far excluded from 
the definition. As a result, ‘legal pluralism’ itself claims the validity of diverse approaches 
and,  in  one  of  its  extreme  versions,  the  incommensurability  of  categories  of  validation 
amongst different legal systems. Problematically the negation of the one model of law does 
not set by itself a defining limit or a new category. To create a new definition would imply 
98 Similar in its conception and political  stance is Sousa Santos’ differentiation between ‘progressive’ and 
‘reactionary’ forms of legal pluralism (Sousa Santos 1991, 16).
99 Beyond the discussion on the term ‘legal pluralism’, it is important to note the existence of other related  
approaches which I have not addressed in detail in this chapter. Take for example the concept of ‘legal 
polycentricity’ or ‘polycentric law’, developed by Bruce L. Benson (*1949) (Benson 1990) and investigated 
further by a research project titled ‘Polycentric Law’ under the coordination of professor Lars D. Eriksson at 
the  University  of  Helsinki  from  1992  to  1995  (see  Hirvonen  1998).  For  a  Danish  approach  on 
polycentricity, see also Bentzon 1992.
140
again the authoritative imposition of a limit, and, with it, a certain undesired exclusion. If 
through the blurring of the concept of law, everything can theoretically be framed as law and 
the  concept  loses  its  analytical  value,  through  the  blurring  of  ‘legal  pluralism’,  its 
communicative and heuristic value vanishes. The result is, as Tamanaha sums up, that “legal 
pluralism is everywhere. There is, in every social arena one examines, a seeming multiplicity 
of legal orders, from the lowest local level to the most expansive global level” (Tamanaha 
2008, 375)100.  Thus,  the once combative statement of ‘legal pluralism’ turned into a mere 
statement of the co-existence of various normative systems that results somehow trivial when 
we do not integrate the central question of the conflicts of legitimacy that result from the 
relationships existing amongst these normative systems.
Going beyond the mere statement of the existence of coexisting legal systems, what becomes 
important to ask is how these diverse orders relate to each other, especially if and how they 
interact with each other. Interestingly for our inquiry, in the later research of the 1960's and 
1970's, state law was presented as having the power to shape the other social orders (Diamond 
1973; Burman and Harrell-Bond 1979).101 It was this perspective on law that encouraged a 
range of developmental practices through law that I have mentioned above. This hierarchical 
perspective on normative systems was, however, criticized later on (Trubek/Galanter 1974). 
The consequences of the transfer of legal models in order to change ‘undeveloped’ societies, 
were often unforeseeable and undesirable.  After  several  studies,  the impression arose that 
while state law was changed with difficulty,  the vast  majority of the population remained 
untouched by legal changes and followed their ‘customs’, even if they were incompatible with 
the new law.102 Sally Falk Moore explained this problem saying that: “new laws are thrust 
upon going social arrangements in which there are complexes of binding obligations already 
in  existence.  Legislation  is  often  passed  with  the  intention  of  altering  the  going  social 
arrangements in specified ways. The social arrangements are often effectively stronger than 
the  new  laws”  (Falk  Moore  1973,  23).  With  this  argument,  the  assumption  of  the  all-
pervading force of state-law was clearly weakened.
100 This claim, naturally, has not been made exclusively by Tamanaha. See, for example Woodman 1998, 54:  
“Plurality of laws exists everywhere, because everywhere there are ‘different rules for different situations’ 
(Griffiths), or ‘cultural heterogeneity and normative dissensus’ (Geertz […]). Consequently legal pluralism 
exists everywhere”.  Tamanaha, however,  takes this ubiquity of legal pluralism as a starting point  for a  
thorough critique of the concept of ‘legal pluralism’, which I will present at the end of this section.
101 To this perspective could be counted, for example, Pospišil's proposal of ‘legal levels’ which I will present 
shortly.
102 See for example the work of June Starr and Jonathan Pool to the consequences of the incorporation of the  
Swiss Civil Code in Turkey in 1926 (Starr/Pool 1974, 534).
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Especially  some researches  from the  1980's  onwards  underlined  a  reciprocal  effect 
between state law and other normative systems of order. The perception of this interplay went 
hand in hand with new perspectives on the law itself,  which was seen, for example,  as a  
symbolical and ideological system.103 The investigation of the symbolic aspects of state law 
and their influence on other normative systems turned to the center of attention. Mirroring 
these investigations, the corresponding strategies of resistance, the possibilities of evasion or 
appropriation of state law, and the idea of the hybridization of legal systems were put at the 
center of research.  Equally,  the question on how non-state normative structures constitute 
state law, gained academic relevance.
One of the basal works regarding the relationship amongst several normative orders 
from a broad theoretical perspective was developed by the Czech ethnologist Leopold Pospišil 
(*1923), curator and professor at the University of Yale, who presented an encompassing view 
for  the  coexistence  of  diverse  normative  systems  in  his  ‘The  Anthropology  of  Law:  A 
Comparative Approach’ (1971). There he assumed that the society is a mosaic of subgroups, 
in  which  “every functioning subgroup [...]  has  its  own legal  system which is  necessarily 
different  in  some respects  from those of the other  subgroups” (Pospišil  1971,  107).  With 
subgroups, he referred to unities like the family, the clan, the community and the political 
confederation.  According  to  his  proposal,  each  society  has  as  many  legal  systems  as 
functioning  groups  conform  it.  Moreover,  he  conceived  these  systems  as  organized 
hierarchically, depending on how far they were more or less inclusive. Inside this hierarchy, 
Pospišil collected the subgroups of equal kind and inclusivity in ‘legal levels’.104 
Despite the fact that his proposal at first  sight allows for some clarity on the social 
organization and interaction of diverse legal systems, it is the hierarchical structure of his 
approach the aspect of his work that was most challenged (Griffiths 1986, 15 ff.). In fact, 
Pospišil was guided by an idea of a hard structure, which was organized vertically and had 
state law at its highest vertix. Thus, his model does not allow for sufficient place to notice and 
analyze different influences that come, so to say, from ‘lower’ unities to the ‘higher’ spheres. 
Pospišil's proposal is grounded furthermore on a certain stasis, which does not consider the 
changes inside the levels nor the superposition between some of them. 
Taking distance from Pospišil's  structuralist  viewpoint,  the anthropologist  Sally Falk 
103 The relevance of this perspective on law can be seen, for example, in the edition of a Special Issue on Law 
and  Ideology by  the  Law  & Society  Review  in  1988. In  this  field  belong  naturally  also  the  critical 
approaches to law referred to above.
104 Naturally, Pospišil's contribution to socio-legal studies goes beyond the legal-anthropological elements that  
are most known and that I can highlight in this particular inquiry. For an account of the broader and less 
recognized influence of Pospišil's oeuvre, see Goodale 1998.
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Moore  (*1924)  developed  a  perspective  on  social  organization  that  conceives  of  diverse 
groups which are not only organized vertically. In her ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-
Autonomous Social  Field as  an  Appropriate  Subject  of  Study’ (1973),  she elaborated  the 
concept  of  ‘semi-autonomous  social  fields’,  the  limits  of  which  can  be  marked not  only 
according to their organization, but according also to the procedures through which norms are 
developed, applied and enforced. According to her proposal, these fields can articulate with 
each other, so that a complex chain of social relations emerges. While this approach has been 
a central reference for questions on the interaction of diverse normative systems, including the 
state, the problem of Moore's proposal relies in the difficulty to state the boundaries of the 
‘social fields’ she sets at the beginning of her argument. As Woodman states, “Moore's field 
may  have  ragged,  vague  or  undiscoverable  edges”,  and  thus,  he  concludes,  “[i]t  seems 
unlikely that the concept of the semi-autonomous social field can restore to legal pluralism 
that feature of defined constituent elements which was lost when the bounded, self-consistent 
‘legal system’ dissolved into the indiscriminate ocean of social norms” (Woodman 1998, 53 
f.).
An equally ‘horizontal’ approach to the interaction amongst diverse normative spheres 
has been made by the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos (*1940), who posits 
his research in a clear political line oriented towards the emancipation from neo-liberal social 
models.  Summing  up,  he  postulated  that  the  functioning  of  state  law  itself  implies  its 
articulation  with  other  normative  orders  of  non-state  character  (Sousa  Santos  1991,  16). 
Interestingly, Sousa Santos concludes that some of these orders complement and support the 
order of the state, while others pose resistance and open spaces for conflict, so that social  
change  is  made  possible.  Importantly,  Sousa  Santos   recognizes  the  state  order  itself  as 
fragmented and heterogeneous turning  turns the opposition between one homogenous state 
law and other forms of normativity void of meaning (Idem, 17). 
A key element in Sousa Santos’ research is a “structural map of capitalist societies” 
(Idem,  181),  where  he  distinguished  amongst  four  autonomous  structural  spaces,  each 
corresponding to one form of law: the domestic space governed by domestic law, the working 
space governed by the law of production, the civil space governed by territorial law and the 
world space governed by systemic law (Idem, 183 f.).  Importantly,  while he conceives of 
these  spaces  as  structurally  autonomous  spheres,  Sousa  Santos  underlines  that  they  are 
articulated with each other in different ways, limiting, selecting, mediating and reproducing 
(or not) developments in the other spheres. Since each sphere has its own forms to set law, 
through their interaction, a relationship of ‘interlegality’ arises, with different legal spheres 
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intermingling, overlapping and penetrating each other (Sousa Santos 2002, 97 and 417 ff.).
Similarly  to  Sousa  Santos’ argument  that  the  functioning  of  state  law  requires  the 
articulation with other social orders, the legal theorist Peter Fitzpatrick developed the concept 
of ‘integral  plurality’,  arguing,  in a Hegelian tradition,  that  “modern law exists  in  certain 
relations  of  opposition  and  support  with  other  social  forms”  (Fitzpatrick  1984,  115). 
Consequently,  and in the same line of what he called later ‘the mythological character of 
modern law'105, he takes the interesting standpoint that state-law is constituted through various 
relations to other social forms, including relations by which (state-)law and the other social 
forms support each other's existence, difference and validity as well as relations by which 
(state-)law as well as the other social forms reject each other. Thus, Fitzpatrick argues the 
existence of a continuous process of co-constitution of law and other social forms, stating that  
“law is  the unsettled product of relations with a plurality of social  forms. As such, law's 
identity is constantly and inherently subject to challenge and change” (Idem, 138).
If something remains clear after this potentially infinite map of plural pluralistic approaches to 
law, is that the idea of ‘legal pluralism’ was developed from a variety of perspectives and 
sources,  which  differed  in  their  disciplinary  and  political  conditions.  In  this  sense,  it  is 
remarkable that ‘legal pluralism’ has become a relevant notion in a variety of disciplines, what 
is rather unusual since each research project tends to posit itself in a specific field and each 
scientific field tends to demarcate its limits through the establishment of its own paradigms 
and  knowledge  base.  The  polyvalence  of  ‘legal  pluralism’ has  allowed  the  concept  to 
penetrate a variety of disciplines successfully (Tamanaha 2008, 376). Insofar, the discourse of 
‘legal pluralism’, as it has been carried until today, appears as a typical postmodern endeavor 
that aims to dis-cover mechanisms of power behind seemingly self-evident concepts and to 
deconstruct them, taking their context as a starting point of inquiry. Therefore, it is no surprise 
that this project of re-contextualization is carried out in diverse disciplines with a variety of 
results. In this sense, Sousa Santos names the concept of legal pluralism “the key concept in a 
post-modern view of law” (Sousa Santos 1987, 297). 
As postmodern drafts, however, these pluralist approaches suffer basic difficulties. We, 
as readers, are left in a vacuum, in which the old can not stand anymore, but a real outcome 
out of confusion is not put in sight either. The old definition of law as monolithic cannot 
stand, but an approach to social life from a pluralistic understanding of law seems to dissolve 
in a myriad of particular perspectives that appear as incommensurable and irreducible. Once 
105 Regarding this argument see chapter A.
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we recognize the normative of language as contingent and law as plural, which shall be the 
ordering  concept,  the  constant  variable  around  we  can  organize  our  own  thought,  our 
intellectual exchange, our social interaction and our political participation?
With the blasting of the unified concept of law, suddenly, law could refer to all sorts of 
social control (Comaroff/Roberts 1981).106 In this sense, main advocates of ‘legal pluralism’ 
referred to the undesired possibility of a trivialization of law, because “if law is everywhere it  
is  nowhere”  (Sousa  Santos  2002,  384).  Consequently,  the  usefulness  of  the  project  of 
pluralistic  approaches  to  law has  been put  in  question.  Is  this  broad perspective  actually 
helpful when it comes to research social processes or is it  just a source of confusion and 
arbitrariness because of its incapacity of delimiting a sphere of research? How far have been 
and are pluralistic perspectives on law actually useful in order to create categories, organize 
data and analyze it,  and, lastly, to formulate conclusions that can be combined with other 
results of research and make possible an improvement on insight and knowledge? If we desist 
from these goals, the remaining possibility is to reduce legal research on pluralism to a mere 
interpretative game that does not aim to produce specific generalizable insights and social 
changes.107 
In response to these difficulties, while a big part of the literature on legal pluralism has 
been  concerned  about  opening  up  the  concept  of  law  to  go  beyond  a  state-bound  idea, 
concomitantly, a certain cautionary retreat from that broadening movement started. Already 
Merry pointed out, that it might make sense to maintain the category of state law as a clearly 
distinguishable concept, since it “exercises the coercive power of the state and monopolizes 
the symbolic power associated with state authority“ (Merry 1988, 879). Moreover, the state-
law “shapes other normative orders as well as provides an inescapable framework for their 
practice” (Idem). To abandon the concept of law as state-law would blur differentiations that 
are  needed both  for  academic  as  well  as  for  political  purposes.  From another  viewpoint, 
regarding ‘law’ and ‘legal pluralism’ in the context of sociology of law, Griffiths stated in a 
more recent reflection that “the word ‘law’ could better be abandoned altogether for purposes 
of  theory  formation  in  sociology  of  law.  […  ‘L]egal  pluralism’  can  and  should  be 
reconceptualized as ‘normative pluralism’ or ‘pluralism in social  control'” (Griffiths 2005, 
64). Specially interesting is this statement because, back in the 1980's, Griffiths was one of 
the most important advocates for ‘legal pluralism’.
In this sense, Brian Z. Tamanaha asserts that the main problem in the discussion on legal 
106 In fact, Griffiths writes that “all social control is more or less ‘legal'” (Griffiths 1986, 39).
107 Legal pluralism confronts thus the same criticisms that have been posed traditionally in front of cultural  
relativism.
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pluralism relies in the lacking unity in the definition of law used by the different approaches 
(Tamanaha 2000, 296 ff.). Of course, this is not an exclusive characteristic of the pluralistic 
perspectives.  Nevertheless,  this  lack  of  clarity  determines  the  usefulness  of  pluralistic 
approaches  to  law.  Continuing  with  his  critique, Tamanaha  poses  a  fundamental  critique 
against  approaches  of  ‘legal  pluralism’,  arguing  that  they  are  based  on  functionalist  and 
essentialist concepts of law.108 In general, Tamanaha asserts, legal pluralist approaches assume 
that “law is a fundamental category which can be identified and described, or an essentialist 
notion  which  can  be  internally  worked  on  until  a  pure  (de-contextualized)  version  is 
produced” (Tamanaha 1993, 201). On the contrary, he argues, “law is a thoroughly cultural 
construct.  […]  Law  is  whatever  we  attach  the  label  law  to  […]”  (Idem  2000,  313). 
Consequently, “concepts that [...] specify what law is, and what legal pluralism entails, are not 
testable or falsifiable: they are more or less useful, and their use value is a function of the 
purposes for which they are constructed” (Tamanaha 2000, 300). In this sense, law cannot “be 
formulated in terms of a single scientific category” because the “various manifestations of law 
do not all  share the same basic characteristics – beyond the claim to represent legitimate 
normative authority” (Idem, 2008, 396). 
On this base, instead of delivering a specific concept of ‘law’, he specifies the criteria 
according to which ‘law’ can be identified and limited. According to his suggestion, “law [is] 
whatever people identify and treat through their social practices as ‘law’ (or  recht, or droit, 
and so on)” (Idem 2000, 312). The decision on what should be understood by ‘law’ remains 
by  the  people  themselves  that  deal  with  a  specific  form  of  normativity  (Idem,  314). 
Nevertheless,  it  remains  dubious,  if  this  approach  is  sufficient  to  contain  diverse 
understandings of ‘law’, which are not mere translations of the word ‘law’, but imply other 
understandings of human interaction as a whole. Most importantly, who should identify that 
something is ‘identified as law'? Tamanaha argues that it is possible to avoid the conceptual 
problem of positing a definition of law “by accepting as ‘legal’ whatever was identified as 
legal by the social actors” (Tamanaha 2008, 396). But who are the social actors to look for  
and which are the characteristics of such an identification remain unclear. 
For our purpose specially interesting is that Tamanaha gives up on finding the identity 
of law, recognizing law as a cultural  feature and taking this  thought allegedly to its final 
conclusion. Law turns hence into an apparently infinitely polyvalent and thus hollow concept. 
In fact, it turns into a mere claim, a ‘claim to represent legitimate normative authority’. In 
108 In a similar vein,  Sharafi  spoke of “the legal-pluralist sequel to the ‘what-is-law’ debate between legal 
positivists and natural-law advocates” (Sharafi 2008, 141).
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doing so Tamanaha intends to value the perspective of the Other, subjectivizing ‘law’ – a 
radical  turn  from  a  monolithic  seemingly  objective  and  neutral  concept  of  law. 
Problematically,  he assumes that a researcher is able to find what some ‘other’,  i.e. some 
social actors, see as law in ‘their own terms’. A following problem is the question on the 
capability to  accurately or  even transparently  represent that  ‘other’ in  academic  research. 
Arguing that the problem of ‘law’ is solved by just accepting and recognizing the Other's 
truth, Tamanaha seems to present the observer as transparent, as an observer that does not pre-
set the conditions of observation and can thus find the Other's ‘claim to represent legitimate 
normative authority’, similarly to the way a (naively conceived) archeologist or a biologist 
find a temple or a bee.
Somehow, framing the problem of legal pluralism in these terms, the discussion seems 
to return, in an infinite cycle of self-reflection, to its origins in unresolved debates around the 
then  emerging  ‘anthropology  of  law’ (Roberts  2005,  21).  Bohannan  argued  equally  to 
privilege the perspective of the observed ‘other’ through what he called the ‘folk system’ 
(Bohannan 1957, 6), while Gluckman argued a common rationality in approaches to law and 
an analytical need for a unifying concept of ‘law’. Tamanaha, apparently, sets out to recover 
the  idea  of  a  ‘folk  system’,  while  obscuring  that  the  frame  he  puts  to  read  the  Other's 
understanding  of  law  is  equally  dependent  on  concepts  that  implicitly  claim  universal 
existence in  order  to  have  analytical  value,  this  is  concepts  like  ‘claim’,  ‘representation’, 
‘legitimacy’, ‘normativity’ and ‘authority’ to start with. In other words, what Tamanaha seems 
to forget is that to look at ‘the Other’ he uses his own eyes.
This  is  a  difficulty  that  pervades  the  whole  discussion  on  legal  pluralism  and, 
noticeably,  does not disappear in Tamanaha's argument just because he transforms the ‘legal 
pluralism’ into a ‘pluralism of claims to legitimate normative authority’. The difficulty relies 
therein  that,  once  the  absolute  difference  of  the  Other  is  stated,  two  contrary  but 
complementary approaches are possible: either the Other turns completely inaccessible, or, 
following the pragmatical argument that we constantly relate with a variety of ‘others’, the 
Other is accessible only through my (conceptual) frame of experience. 
In fact, ‘weak’ approaches to legal pluralism in Griffiths’ sense posed this problem from 
the beginning, when they fought for a recognition of diverse normative orders as law from the 
perspective of state law. While they claimed a ‘radical otherness’, they argued for its equal 
validity in  front  of  state-law following an argument  of  sameness.  But  also Griffiths  own 
proposal of a ‘strong’ legal pluralism, that criticized this approach and pretended to pluralize 
‘law’ itself, included the Other into his frame of what law is. That is the only way he could 
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argue that a perspective that recognizes law merely as state-law is ideological and false, while 
his legal pluralism is (allegedly) purely descriptive. Tamanaha tried to avoid this definitory 
violence, but setting the ‘criteria’ to identify law, does not result in a freer observation of the 
Other.
 In  this  sense,  the  postmodern  search  for  pluralization  ended  in  the  same  modern 
violence  it  rejected.  Going  back  to  what  this  basic  problem means  for  ‘legal  pluralism’, 
Roberts hits the nail on the head when he argues that approaches on ‘legal pluralism’ “self-
consciously privileg[e] the folk categories of Western law” (Roberts 1998, 105). Importantly, 
addressing the emergence of ‘legal pluralism’ as “a creature of the law school” (Idem, 97), he 
argues  that  “[i]inaugurating  an  explicitly  legal  pluralism,  lawyers  have  done  more  than 
register their interest in a particular field of study: they have marked some rather varied forms 
with the distinctive imprint of ‘law'” (Idem, 99; emphasis in the original). While law as a 
particular category has its own history bound to a large extent to the emergence of secular 
government  in  Europe  and  the  management  of  colonial  expansion,  it  “is  now,  in  its 
contemporary enlargement, graciously embracing others in its discourse, seeking to tell those 
others what they are” (Idem, 98; emphasis in the original). Importantly, in ‘telling them what 
they are’, legal pluralists re-enact the violence they criticize in modern state-law. While ‘legal 
pluralism’  aimed  to  transcend  the  dichotomy  ‘tradition'/'modern’,  it  built  on  another 
dichotomy  based  on  oppression/emancipation:  “'formerly  suppressed  discourses’  are 
identified, appropriated, represented in a particular way – as law” (Idem, 98). In other words, 
what Roberts claims is that “negotiated orders have their own rationalities” (Idem 2005, 23). 
Consequently,  no  one  makes  any ‘other’ any favor  addressing  diversity  in  terms  of  one 
encompassing rationality, which is always our own.
The problem is if we make anyone any favor not addressing diversity in terms of one 
encompassing rationality (assuming that it is possible at all). Noteworthy, addressing different 
‘normative rationalities’ as legal, responded, as Correas highlighted, to a claim of legitimacy 
that  remains  at  the  core  of  the  problematic  of  ‘legal  pluralism’.  Therefore,  in  front  of 
Tamanaha's proposal (as well as of other pluralistic approaches that take a broad perspective 
on ‘law’ to the extent that naming it ‘law’ or not turns irrelevant), it is worth asking what does 
a radical subjectivization of ‘law’ means for social activity.  Even in the case that we would 
accept that we can observe plural claims to represent legitimately a normative authority, what 
remains problematic is how to deal with these plural equally valid claims. If, from a point of 
view of legitimacy, we accept two competing claims as valid, an argument which was at the 
core  of  the  political  aspect  of  the  discussion  over  ‘legal  pluralism’,  then  how  is  social  
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interaction possible without continuous and violent clashes of power? From the perspective of 
a  modern  paradigm,  contradictory  claims  of  legitimacy  could  be  solved  by  a  claim  of 
legitimacy regarded as superior, as more legitimated and/or more powerful – in its positivistic 
version, state-law, in its naturalistic version, natural law. Thus, the claims of legitimacy were 
organized according to a certain process of recognition, usually, in our contemporary context, 
a formal legal recognition.  When the legitimacy of that superior claim of legitimacy falls 
apart, who is going to legitimately decide on the legitimacy of any claim? 
In this sense, Tamanaha addresses a variety of conflicts amongst ‘systems of normative 
ordering in social arenas’ (Tamanaha 2008, 400 ff.), arguing that clashes can exist within or 
amongst coexisting normative systems. Most importantly, he identifies questions of identity 
and power on the one hand and strategic choices on the resort to a normative system on the 
other hand, as two main sources of fuel for these conflicts.  Equally,  he addresses diverse 
forms of interaction and various strategies in case of inconsistency, be it that it derives into a 
clash or not. Similarly, Fitzpatrick argues a variety of relationships amongst diverse social 
forms (1984). What remains, lastly,  is a palette of possibilities to engage into conflicts of 
legitimacy. 
The problem from the perspective of political participation is that the mere statement of 
this pluralistic approach does not contribute directly to argue for a change in the relationship 
established between different claims of legitimacy, because any type of relationship, including 
an  oppressive  relation  between  different  normative  systems,  can  be  legitimated.  In  other 
words, what does the statement that there exist conflicting ‘systems of normative ordering’ 
say about the way we shape the world with our conflicting claims of legitimacy, and if or how 
we can change that?  It  might be easy to understand that an indigenous normative system 
relates to a (obviously complex and even self-conflicting) state normative system in various 
ways of tension, mutual support, etc. And it might be important to grasp how certain aspects 
of those indigenous understandings of law are doomed to illegality with all its consequences 
for social life (from legal security to cultural segregation, from personal assimilation to social 
disruption,  from  reinforcing  group  identities  to  all  sorts  of  negotiations,  including  very 
practical  matters  like  political  corruption  and  intransparency).  And  it  might  be  equally 
relevant to see that this strategy of state-law is contingent and is responded in turn by other 
strategies of the indigenous normative system in question. But what remains unaddressed, and 
this was a key reason for the outburst of ‘legal pluralism’ in the 1970's and 1980's, is the 
desire  to  change  that  relation.  The  claim  of  the  indigenous  groups  that  argued  for  the 
recognition of their normative practices as law, and thus argued in favor of legal pluralism, 
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was oriented (amongst other interests) towards the recognition of a way of life as equally 
valid in order to avoid being thrown into illegality and the social disruption this generally 
meant.
However, from a practical perspective, the shattering of law in a plurality of legal orders 
carries evident complications, some of which can be seen exemplarily in the context of the 
debate over the ‘cultural defense’ (Sharafi 2008).109 The cultural defense, employed both in 
civil  and criminal contexts, refers to the resort to arguments regarding the belonging to a 
specific cultural group in order to justify an action that, according to official state-law, would 
be illegal. This type of defense has played an important role specifically in circumstances of 
domestic violence,  and particularly in  cases that  led to accusations of murder.  While this 
defense became relevant specially in contexts of immigration, the questions around how far 
the invocation of ‘culture’ is legitimate are also valid regarding ‘home-grown subcultures’, 
showing  the  potentially  infinite  field  for  pluralistic  arguments.  Most  importantly,  some 
feminist scholars have recognized that “the cultural defense decriminalizes violence against 
minority women” to the point of arguing that “multiculturalism (in this particular form) is 
indeed  bad  for  women”  (Sharafi  2008,  145).  Interestingly,  Sharafi  argues  that  while 
discussion on legal pluralism seems to be detached of colonial questions, “this multicultural 
turn has meant that work on nonstate, nonethnic norms in western contexts has been drowned 
out by the deluge of work on immigrant and indigenous people's normative orders, themselves 
replete  with post-colonial  resonances” (Idem).  Most importantly,  what  the example of the 
‘cultural  defense’  puts  to  the  front  is  the  problem  that  relies,  as  Sharafi  underlines 
remembering Marc Galanter's concerns (1981), in celebrating “nonstate law as inherently less 
objectionable than state law” (Idem, 146). As with the whole problem of pluralism, what is at 
the bottom of this  discussion,  is  the question of how is  it  possible  to  determine that one 
objection is more legitimate than another objection in the contrary direction. If neither state-
law nor  any other  approach to  law is  the  beacon  of  truth  and justice,  then  how are  we 
supposed to judge legitimately and feel secure about (potential) judgments made on us?
Despite the lack of conclusive answers for these questions, the importance of the debate and 
of the increasing questioning on ‘law’ as a monolithic concept is undoubtful. In any case, as 
Merry assured already in the end of the 1980's, through the questions of legal pluralism (and, 
we have to add, through the general criticism of modern law), the relation between law and 
109 For an example of this topic in the context of the presence of the indigenous groups of the Guarani in the 
border area of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, see: Moreira 2005, 137 ff.
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society has been moved to another level. A key result of the critical approaches to law that I 
have presented in this section is that the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ methods of social order 
have been conceptualized from a more complex and interactive perspective, as for example 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Peter Fitzpatrick have elaborated. From there, it results that 
instead of observing two separate entities, namely ‘official  law’ and ‘unofficial  normative 
systems’, or ‘law’ and ‘politics’, or ‘law’ and ‘culture’, a plurality of forms of order can be 
seen, that participate in a common social interaction. 
This determines, in turn, that the ways in which these relations take shape are always 
contingent and never static. Features like hybridity and fluidity gain importance in the legal 
field (Tamanaha 2008, 403). And, most importantly for our research, the concepts of ‘transfer’ 
and ‘development’ change meaning in a radical manner, as we will see in the next chapters. 
Moreover, after having recognized that a plurality of systems exist parallel to law, and that 
there are diverse strategies put in practice amongst the normative systems to exert their claim 
on  legitimacy,  it  seems  totally  ‘normal’ that  ‘state-law’ does  not  always  ‘work’ in  an 
all-encompassing  way as  it  is  presented,  because  it  actually  ‘works’  within a  context  of 
relations  with  other  claims  of  legitimacy,  it  ‘works’  through continuous  fights  over 
demarcation of legitimacy territories with a variety of social orders. 
Lastly,  what  results  of  this  ‘normality’ of  the  plurality  of  entities  and  relations  in 
tension, is that the mere one-sided claim of legitimacy results insufficient to address the whole 
complexity of  conflicts.  Mere power supporting  such a  claim results  equally insufficient, 
because every sort of power is based on interaction with other sources of power; it is brittle 
and it is fragile because it is embedded in a wider system in continuous flux. In this sense, we 
are speaking always of an adjectivized power, a contingent power, it is always power within a 
system of relations. Being aware of the fields of tension in which power, and with it all types 
of law and their claims of legitimacy develop, the question we need to address is how do we 
want to engage in this system of relations. Because, while plurality might create confusion, it 
requires us to become aware of our pick. Diversity demands choice. Importantly, a diversity 
of legitimate approaches to law requires us to choose not only amongst mere norm systems, 
but, at the same time, it requires us to consciously choose an approach on the role of these 
norms in social change, it requires us to choose an approach to development. 
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IV.  Critiques on Development – Twisting the Horizontal Vector of Time  
I have presented already the connections between the idea of development and a rationality 
conceived in modern terms that aims always to overcome previous irrationality, and works 
thus with a vectoral perspective on time. When human groups are positioned in this straight 
line according to certain characteristics that differ from the ideal goal,  then the originally 
diachronical  division  becomes  equally relevant  for  a  hierarchization  of  differences.  From 
there, it is only a small step to a hierarchization of groups sharing the same historical moment. 
In  other  words,  recognized  plurality  is  categorized  according  to  one  model  that  claims 
universal validity. This is the base for the idea of development that justifies development aid, 
while the ‘aid’ part of it requires, in addition, a moral type of argumentation: ‘aid’ requires an 
extra step from this perspective on time and development to the actual conception that the one 
assumed to be less advanced needs to be helped by the one considered more advanced; that 
there is a humanitarian duty of the more developed one to help the less developed one towards 
achieving a higher stage of development. But what happens, when the vectorality of time and 
development are twisted in the sense of self-reflective inquiry?
We have seen so far some of the consequences that this twisting had for the concept of  
law as a system intended to establish generally valid norms. Summing up, self-reflexivity led 
to the acknowledgment of two seemingly contradictory aspects of the concept of law: on the 
one hand, that it is empty, and, on the other hand, that it is full and runneth over of superposed 
and  more  often  than  not  conflicting  meanings.  Remembering  the  link  between  law  and 
development  I  have  presented  in  the  first  chapter,  it  is  possible  to  envisage  some of  the 
difficulties that this self-reflexive twist has had for the idea of development. If law's promise 
is justice, equality and order, the promise of development is equally access to that true justice,  
economic equality and social order and security. The question of development is a matter of 
access because development implies a passage, a change: from lacking to having, or, in a 
negative sense,  from having to  lacking.  To achieve development  can only be just,  and to 
access justice can only be a marker of development. And since justice, from a secular modern 
perspective has to be realized through positive law, development is a matter of access to law, 
and law is an expression of development. 
Having set a standard for the possible and the desirable in terms of law, justice and 
development, the way to achieve a good mark according to that standard was more or less  
delineated, and the question was only related to the concrete steps to take. But once the norm 
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is lost, once we shift the question from how to get a better mark, or even which is the better  
measure stick, to who is the creator, the user and the object of the measure stick, once it is 
possible to think of a multitude of measure sticks with the same legitimacy, then the goal of a  
better mark becomes a matter of definition and thus of power.  Consequently,  the need to 
achieve that  better position changes from being the unquestioned base for action to be the 
content  of the question at  stake.  The question of  how can someone achieve development 
changes  into  why  does  anyone  needs  (a  particular)  development  at  all.  Consequently, 
questions  arise  regarding  the  ‘invention’ of  the  need  for  development,  the  hierarchies  it 
creates,  maintains  and  serves,  and  the  silenced  alternatives  to  that  development  or  to 
development at all. These are the problematics that emerged when development researchers 
started asking themselves when, where, why and how ‘development’ developed. 
To understand the relevance of this moment of self-reflection, it is important to realize 
that the twist of the idea of development is, at its core, the twist of the idea of time itself, a 
time that could only be conceived as a straight line from past to present to future to its further 
future to its further future … It touches, thus, directly upon deep questions of becoming, and 
thus,  necessarily  upon  questions  of  identity  and  agency.  Questioning  the  source  of 
development presents an aporia, in which time stops moving forward. It is as if development 
researchers needed to hasten down an escalator that goes upwards towards infinity.
As we have seen, the intellectual and political arena experienced an important crisis at the end 
of the 20th century in different parts of the world, in which not only mere concepts were 
reviewed, but the capacity of the subject to access knowledge, truth and justice were put in 
question. The critiques of law I have presented took special force from philosophical and 
politically activist currents that, on the one hand, underlined the power of discourse and the 
incoherence of language, and, on the other hand, referred to realities that did not match the 
promises  of  the  models  proposed.  Equally,  deception  with  the  means  and  results  of 
development strategies, and an awareness of power, accompanied by the interest to overcome 
that deception and subvert power-structures, was at the core of critiques of the concept of 
development.  In  this  section,  I  will  present  some of  the most  prominent  critiques  on the 
concept of development, linking them to questions of plurality. Later on, in chapters C and D, 
I  will  concentrate  on  critiques  and  new  approaches  that  emerged  in  the  area  of  legal 
development.
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1.  From Development to ‘Development’ or ‘Who Needs Development?'  
To state this question might sound cynical and disconnected from the actual, real, immediate 
needs  of  a  vast  majority of  humanity.  Thus,  at  a  first  glance,  it  seems to  be the  perfect 
argument of socially disinterested or egotistic, powerful orators satisfied with their position at 
the center of socio-economic structures. All the more relevant it becomes to look at these 
critiques, since they were put to the front especially by scholars who did not occupy the most 
powerful positions regarding their academic or their geopolitical environment. In terms of the 
developmental discourse, the positing of the problem in these new terms was supported and 
repeatedly enforced by thinkers and activists of the so called Third World, those who were 
theoretically in need of development.  The call was: ‘Please do not help! Your help is not 
helping’.110
This  was  the  dramatic  expression  of  a  radical  attitude  in  front  of  the  idea  of 
development.  Importantly,  the  critiques  on  the  modern  concepts  of  development  and 
development aid started almost at the same time that development began to be an important 
issue  in  the  international  political  agenda.  It  is  noteworthy,  that,  although  the  term 
‘development’ was widely used in diverse environments, it was just after the World War II 
that it  turned central  to the international order pervading all  fields of human life.  A clear 
example of this turn in international politics can be found in the preamble of the Charter of the 
United Nations from 1945 that states the determination of the UN “to promote social progress 
and better  standards of life in larger freedom” and, for this  end, “to employ international 
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples” (United 
Nations 1945). 
The idea of an underdeveloped Other that needed help to achieve development was 
envisaged more  concretely in  1949 when US president  Harry Truman gave his  inaugural 
address (Truman 1949). There he emphasized the duty to “embark on a bold new program for 
making  the  benefits  of  our  scientific  advances  and  industrial  progress  available  for  the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Idem). After underlining the miserable 
living conditions of these “victims of disease”, and the threat that their poverty meant “both to 
them and to more prosperous areas”, Truman stressed the given capacity, “for the first time in 
history” to “relieve the suffering of these people”, pointing at the timeless suffering of them in 
opposition to the rapidly evolving US-American “we” he identified with (Idem). Importantly, 
110 In fact, one of the first shocks that the world of ‘development’ suffered with this kind of critique was stated  
by Gustavo Esteva in 1988 with his text ‘Detener la ayuda y el desarrollo, una respuesta al hambre’ ('To 
Stop Help. An Answer to Hunger') (Esteva 1995, 65 ff.). Similarly, Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian economist,  
who once worked at the World Bank, made a call to stop help in 2009 (Moyo 2009).
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Truman made a point of differentiating his aim “to help the free peoples of the world” “to 
lighten their burdens”, from two different forms of international engagement (Idem). Firstly, 
this form of help was clearly differentiated from the programs for ‘world economic recovery’, 
culminating in 1948 in the Marshall Plan in Europe, that followed the hope that the European 
partners would “achieve the status of self-supporting nations  once again” (Idem, emphasis 
added). Development was oriented to enhance a growth that has not been there ever, while in 
contrast,  Europe just  had to recover its  old strength.  With this  impetus,  the World Bank's 
original  institution  was  founded,  namely,  the  ‘International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development':  reconstruction  for  the  developed  and  destroyed,  development  for  the 
undeveloped.111 In  fact,  it  is  possible  to  see  these  two approaches  to  the  socio-economic 
growth of different geo-political regions as complementary, since the reconstruction of Europe 
depended to a great extent of the materials that actual or former colonies could supply. Thus, 
while in the 1940's the politics of the United States, interested in the recovery of Europe for 
its own exports, “supported European efforts to maintain control of the colonies” (Escobar 
1995, 31), after the anti-colonial struggle led to the formal political independence of several 
states, these interests and efforts were redirectioned in terms of development.
Secondly,  and  most  relevant  for  the  subsequent  critiques,  Truman  underlined  the 
difference between his development project and “the old imperialism-exploitation for foreign 
profit”  (Truman  1949).  Against  the  model  of  colonialism,  he  envisaged  “a  program  of 
development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing”, inviting thus to the transfer of 
technological knowledge as well as to the investment of capital (Idem). As Gustavo Esteva 
(*1936) argues, “what Truman succeeded in doing was freeing the economic sphere from the 
negative  connotations  it  had  accumulated  for  two  centuries,  delinking  development  from 
colonialism” (Esteva 2006a, 199). The justification for this program relied on the combination 
of  a  capitalist  argument  with  a  belief  in  science  and technology.  The core  idea  was  that 
“greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a  
wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge” (Truman 
1949). The duty to offer this help was finally reinforced by the call: “Only by helping the least 
111 The name ‘World Bank’ is used to refer, in a broad sense, to the World Bank Group as the parent institution  
of  the  International  Development  Association – IDA, the International  Finance Corporation – IFC,  the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency – MIGA, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes – ICSID and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – IBRD. However, in a 
strict sense, the World Bank consists only of the IBRD and the IDA (Worldbank 2011). The agreements to 
set up the IBRD, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later became the WTO, and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were signed during the United Nations Monetary and Financial  
Conference, commonly known as the Bretton Woods conference (1-22 July 1944), where the international 
monetary and financial  order  was  regulated  after  the conclusion of  World War II.  Consequently,  these 
institutions became known as the ‘Bretton Woods institutions’.
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fortunate  of  its  members  to  help  themselves  can  the  human  family  achieve  the  decent, 
satisfying life that is the right of all people” (Idem). The logic is obvious: there is no right 
without a respective duty, ergo development aid is the burden of the developed man, who is 
enjoying the  decent and satisfying life that everybody should enjoy. Through this logic, the 
‘natural law’ of all human beings was connected with the ‘natural development’ of all human 
beings, and the consequent duty of the developed man was to enforce that law. 
It  is  necessary to  underline that  Truman's  speech is  just  one expression of a  whole 
school  of  thought  concerned with the topic of development,  that  unsurprisingly takes  the 
name of ‘modernization theory’. This approach was theorized later, especially in the ‘Non-
communist  Manifesto’  (1960)  of  Walt  Whitman  Rostow  (1916-2003),  but  international 
institutions referred continuously to the idea of development in the sense of the modernization 
theory already before the theory was established as such. Truman's speech is a key testimony 
of the modernization doctrine and of the political environment it emerged in, not only because 
it was at the base of the further institutional development of development, but also because its 
rhetoric makes reference to many aspects that were central to the postmodern critiques on 
development, as we will see shortly.
Before  postmodern  critiques  could  start  to  question  the  way  to  speak  about 
development,  however,  other  critiques  emphasized  problems  regarding  the  way to  access 
development, and started to foster doubt around the certainty of the development path that 
modernization theory propagated. The critiques were first articulated in form of a different 
development  theory  that  emphasized  the  structure  of  power  existent  in  international 
economics and international politics: the dependency theory. Raúl Prebisch (1901-1986), one 
of the main advocates of this theory, argued that the economic and political scheme of power 
present in international relations was an impediment for the development of the Third World, 
and thus he proposed a different economic approach for the development of the region.112 This 
theory was further developed in the frame of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLAC or CEPAL) based in Santiago de Chile, which Prebisch directed from 1950 to 1963. 
The difference between modernization and dependency theory can be reduced to the diagnosis 
of the cause for underdevelopment and to the resulting necessary treatment for the disease of 
underdevelopment. Arturo Escobar (*1952) resumes the difference between these approaches 
stating that dependency theory “argued that the roots of underdevelopment were to be found 
in the connection between external dependency and internal exploitation, not in any alleged 
112 The titles that gave the kickstart for this proposal were Prebisch's ‘The Economic Development of Latin  
America’ (1950; unpublished original in Spanish of 1949) and Hans Singer's (1910-2006) paper ‘Post-War 
Relations between Under-developed and Industrialized Countries’ (1949).
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lack of capital, technology or modern values. For dependency theorists, the problem was not 
so  much  with  development  as  with  capitalism”  (Escobar  2006a,  447).  Naturally,  this 
characterization  of  modernization  and  dependency theory  does  not  take  into  account  the 
diversity  of  opinions  within  each  of  these  currents.  However,  this  short  overview  might 
suffice to present some of the elements present in the critical engagement with development, 
that  are  going  to  be  central  for  the  later  contributions  of  postmodern  thinkers  to  this 
discussion.
Even if the modernization theory had a liberal character, and the dependency theory was 
very linked to Marxist  theory,  both approaches shared obviously some basic assumptions. 
Firstly, they operated with the category of development, which is not something to be taken 
for granted. Moreover, both theories saw development as expressible in quantifiable economic 
standards. Secondly, both argued that some nations or states were better, higher or further 
developed than others.  In other  words,  subsuming different  nations  under  one universally 
valid concept of development, they determined a hierarchy and a line of development. At the 
same time, a dichotomy between developed and underdeveloped was created. Thirdly, these 
theorists assumed that it was possible to transcend from one stage of less development to one 
of more development. Even if dependency theory aimed to go beyond the logic of stages 
presented by the modernization theory,  it  based its  proposals on stages of dependency.  In 
other words, it put the question of development in negative terms of non-dependency. Finally 
and probably most relevant, both of them assumed that this transition towards development is 
desirable. 
Because  of  the  mechanistic  underpinning  of  both  theories,  Dietrich  presents  these 
approaches as expressions of modern thought (2008, 281). However, the previous statement 
that, basically, the first modern thinker was also the first postmodern thinker, is valid also in 
this context. In fact, it is possible also to envisage the emergence of the international discourse 
on development itself as an expression of the ‘postmodern condition’. For itself, development 
was a buzz-word that was created in the process of the invention of a whole new structure 
after  colonialism crumbled down and thus  a  plurality of  new states  were  created.  In  the 
middle of the century, World War II had left massive destruction and the ruins of the promises 
of human progress on the ground. Colonial rule could not show a good saldo either and the 
cruelty against humanity shown in the colonized areas just underlined the humanitarian failure 
of that modern project.  Development came, in this  sense,  as an attempt to restructure the 
world in front of the insecurity caused because of the crumbling down of the old order. In this 
sense,  the  modernization  theory  and  the  dependency  theory  can  be  conceptualized  as 
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responses to  that uncertainty,  responses that  are  reminiscent of modern mechanicism, and 
thus, inadequate to respond to the challenges posed by the diversity and insecurity of the 
postmodern social environment where they pretended to be used. 
Dependency  theory,  which  argued  relying  on  the  idea  of  power-structures  at  work 
behind the developmental strategies and called for a flight from the domination schemes, had 
a structuralist conception at its base, and thus allowed later, as I have shown for structuralist  
proposals in other fields also, for post-structuralist critique on development. In the case of 
dependency  theory,  one  concrete  expression  of  this  change  can  be  seen  in  Immanuel 
Wallerstein's proposal113,  where he visualized capitalism as a world system amongst many 
other possible systems, taking thus an important distance from seeing international politics 
and thus international development as the result of the mechanics of states. However, also his 
model as well as dependency theory itself remained lastly caught in a concept of development 
that  in  one  way  or  another  was  organized  around  quantifiable  standards  that  could  be 
achieved, provided the right analysis, prognostic and diagnostic (Dietrich 2008, 282 ff.). 
In  search  for  alternative  conceptualizations,  the  critics  ended  up  adjectivizing 
development  remaining,  lastly,  caught  in  the  worse/better  division  it  proposed.  Rahnema 
emphasizes  that  these  differences  relied  only  “on  the  ways  development  had  to  be 
implemented":  While  for  one  group  “economic development”  was  central,  for  another, 
“culture and the social conditions proper to each country had to prevail in any process of 
development” (Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, ix; emphasis added). Equally, some advocated for an 
“expert-based and professionally managed development and others [...] for an ‘endogenous’, 
‘human-centred’,  ‘participatory’,  ‘bottom-up’ or,  later,  ‘sustainable’ form of  development” 
(Idem).  But  these  were  merely  “'policy-oriented’ divergences”  (Idem).  This  was  a  clear 
expression of the fact that “development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social 
imaginary” (Escobar 1995, 5). 
Summing up, despite the postmodern context and the further attempts of development 
research to respond to an ever increasing certainty of the failure of the principle of linear 
growth, the reflection on development and the implementation of the new conceptualizations 
did  not  formulate  a  complete  turn  of  the  subject  matter.  The  most  radical  critiques  of 
development, that went beyond mechanistic conceptions and beyond the analysis of power-
structures from a structuralist point of view, were still to come.
113 Amongst his prolific work see: ‘The Modern World System’ (four volumes; 1974-2011) and ‘Geopolitics 
and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System’ (1991).
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On the political-practical side of the development of development, the 1950's and 1960's saw, 
parallel to the implementation of the theoretical fight between modernization theorists and 
dependency advocates, the continuous increment of institutions dedicated to enhance growth, 
development and progress, and, later, the increment in the revolutionary virulence connected 
with the fight for social justice. A myriad of development institutions were created, both at the 
global as well as at the bilateral and national level, while new and ever newer theories on 
‘better  developments’  challenged  each  other  introducing,  in  turn,  new  institutional 
approaches. That ‘development’ could be used to speak about a variety of processes from a 
plurality of contradictory points of view became evident for many. It is thus not surprising 
that, in the end of the 1970's, the first ideas on development as a myth were published.114 
The  assertion  that  development  is  a  myth  does  not  have  to  mean  for  us,  that  it  is  
rejectable or invalid from the outset. This statement gives us, certainly, a tool to understand 
the scope of the critique expressed by anti- and post-developmentalists. To start with, this 
‘mythification’ puts ‘development’ in the realm of symbolic narrative, a sphere that is rather 
associated with religious belief and traditional custom. At the same time, the concept of the 
myth is related to the figure of the hero as well  as to extraordinary events (Encyclopedia 
Britannica Online 2011). According to the most common understanding of this concept, a 
crucial characteristic of a myth, is that it “presents itself as an authoritative, factual account, 
no  matter  how  much  the  narrated  events  are  at  variance  with  natural  law  or  ordinary 
experience”, and thus, “there is no attempt to justify mythic narratives or even to render them 
plausible” (Idem). In this sense, “the unquestioned validity of mythos can be contrasted with 
logos, the word whose validity or truth can be argued and demonstrated” (Idem). Naturally, 
“myths that are dominant in one’s own time and society” are always difficult to recognize. 
The mere presence of a myth is sufficient to provide it with authority and requires no proof. 
Hence, “the myth can be outlined in detail only when its authority is no longer unquestioned 
but has been rejected or overcome in some manner by another, more comprehensive myth” 
(Idem).
Making use of this short but common understanding of the principal elements of a myth, 
it is possible to track down the new layer of meaning put on ‘development’, when considering 
it a ‘myth’. Firstly, its meaning changes from the sphere of presumably rational, formal and 
thus questionable science to the sphere of religious symbolism, where this type of justification 
is  neither  possible  nor  needed.  As  a  consequence,  more  than  a  process  to  be  proven 
scientifically,  development  is  connected  to  beliefs,  and,  as  such,  it  becomes  extremely 
114 See for example Attali 1977.
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resilient  to  rational  argument.  The  rationality  of  development  is  here  at  stake.  In 
mythologizing  ‘development’,  thus,  the  developmentalist  argument  that  called  for  an 
abandonment of outdated beliefs in the name of science and technology115 is put on its head; 
what is presented as the most  log-ical turns out to be a myth. Secondly, the content of the 
myth, while presented as ‘natural’ depicts extra-ordinary circumstances, a time-space out of 
palpable reality. In other words, ‘development’, based on a specific perspective on what is the 
‘natural’ evolution  of  a  society,  is  seen,  from  a  ‘mythological’ perspective,  as  a  story 
circumscribed  to  a  specific  time-space,  moreover,  to  a  time-space  that  only  exists  at  a 
symbolical level and is not attached to empirical experience. Consequently, ‘development’ is, 
from this perspective, neither empirically ‘real’ nor ‘natural’.  Thirdly,  a  mythos requires a 
hero, who, in his (generally speaking a modern hero is usually a ‘he') journey not only fulfills 
impossible tasks but also sacrifices himself in the name of a cause, often rescues the weak, 
and re-establishes order. This corresponds to the figure of the developer that, as the active 
protagonist of the story, requires an antagonist for his journey, a victim to save, an oppression 
to overcome.116 Furthermore, development mythifiers, point at the difficulty of being aware of 
‘development’ as a myth exactly because of its mythical qualities, because it justifies the own 
way to see the world, the own cultural identity, and putting it in question implies risking the 
coherence of the way one is able to live and understand the own environment. Subjectivity 
and identity are at the core of the problem of ‘development as a myth’. Last but not least, the 
recognition of ‘development’ as a myth, implies that there is already a breach in the authority 
of the denounced myth. Thus, Wolfgang Sachs (*1946) started his renowned compilation ‘The 
Development Dictionary’ (1992) stating the death of ‘development’ (Sachs 2010, xv). Most 
importantly, one aspect of the ‘mythification of development’ (and for that matter also of the 
‘mythification of law’ elaborated for example by Fitzpatrick 1998) that has not been fully 
acknowledged by most of the mythifying critics is that, at the same time that a breach in the 
authority of a myth is produced, a different myth evolves, which justifies the fall of the old 
115 The primacy of rapid economic progress,  and particularly its  incompatibility with a  variety of  cultural  
approaches, was clearly stated by the Department of Social and Economic Affairs of the UN in 1951 in its  
‘Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries': “There is a sense in which rapid  
progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social  
institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst [...]. Very few communities are  
willing to pay the full price of economic progress” (Escobar 1995, 3 f., cit. United Nations).
116 There are many other important and interesting elements in this aspect of the mythology of development,  
which I cannot present here in detail. A central reference to this topic is naturally the research on ‘heroes’ to 
which Joseph Campbell (1904-1987) dedicated his life. As the key-stone of his writings, which aimed to 
understand the structure of heroic myth, see Campbell 1949. It is no coincidence that Campbell's seminal  
research on heroes was published parallel to the establishment of a new international order after World War  
II, as well as at the beginning of the ‘development era’, receiving an important amount of attention of the  
public, both inside and outside of academic circles.
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(now visible) myth. Remarkably, this happens in an unacknowledged way, in the same form 
as the preceding myth operated before. Hence, in terms of ‘development’, it is legitimate to 
ask which myth is allowing for ‘post-development’ to emerge, and ‘development’ to be seen 
as a myth and fall. Equally problematic are questions like where is the profit of identifying 
‘development’  as  a  myth,  and  –  in  the  case  we  assume  that  myths  are  unavoidable, 
unjustifiable and irrational – how is it possible to have a direct experience with or beyond 
myths, act in consequence, and engage truthfully with each other. In a nutshell, these are some 
of the biggest challenges of post-developmental critique, echoing the difficulties of other post-
structuralist critiques I have presented above. Before we deal with these questions, however, it 
is worth understanding post-developmental argument and its context of emergence in detail.
After  having  presented  shortly  the  dimension  of  the  ‘mythical’  understanding  of 
‘development’,  the coordination between international  politics  and the political  aspects  of 
religion becomes an important field to look at. In many ways, the questions on the belief on 
‘development’ were accompanied by a crisis of the belief in (Christian) religions, and most 
prominently a crisis of their institutionalized structure. This link turns even more important 
when  we  observe  the  relevance  of  theological  argumentation  in  matters  of  development, 
especially if  we remember  that  one of  the main  impulses  for  the first  European colonial 
enterprises, which functioned as a foundation and/or as a blueprint for the later imperialist 
endeavor, was guided by theological arguments of religious and human development, as it 
was the case with Latin American colonies. 
By the  end  of  the  1960's, the  Church  and  the  science  of  theology were  facing  an 
increasing amount of destabilizing criticisms. Confronted with the dramatic situation after 
World War II and the crumbling of the colonial order, the Church was questioned on its role as 
one of the most powerful institutions in the midst of worldwide use of immense violence. The 
Encyclical Populorum Progressio of 1967 intended partly to react in front of these important 
criticisms, when, in the climax of developmental discourse, the pope Paul VI (1897-1978) 
spoke the language of international politics and declared development to be “the new name 
for peace” (Paul VI 2007, 76 f.), underlining as well the central role of international social 
justice (Idem, 5 f.).
Parallel to that, the concept and project of Theology of Liberation was being developed 
by Gustavo  Gutiérrez  Merino  (*1928)  (Gutiérrez  1971),  who  argued  that  the  concept  of 
development  was  insufficient  to  address  the  immensity  of  the  social  situation  in 
underdeveloped countries, where conflict and injustice decimated the population. Liberation 
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was, in this sense, more reflective, in Gutiérrez’ eyes, of the need for radical change, and 
furthermore, opened the idea of development to spheres that went beyond the economical 
perspective. The II General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate made its appeal in 
the  same line when it  stated in  1968:  “For  our  true  Liberation,  we humans need a  deep 
change, so the empire of Justice, Love and Peace may come” (cit. in Dietrich 2008, 295). 
Thus,  the  modern  concept  of  development  found  a  radical  expression:  Liberation.  This 
liberation, however, did not call only for an emancipation in a linear sense of evolution, but at 
the same time, pretended to recover the value of vernacular traditions as valid ways of life 
subjected to oppression by traditional theological (and developmental) interpretations. In this 
sense, the proposal of liberation was, on the one hand, dependent on a project of development 
as liberation, while, on the other hand, it posed itself against a developmentalism that aimed 
to  violently  overrun  vernacular  cultures  in  the  name  of  science,  technology and  capital. 
Liberation of oppression and suffering in pursue of a better world in peace and justice was not 
only the goal of Marxist theologians, but was also set as an aim of philosophical engagement 
and, with it, of all efforts of the humanities and the arts. In this context, the ‘Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed’ (1970) of Paulo Freire117, together with the ‘Philosophy of Liberation’ (1975) of 
Enrique Dussel, appeared, amongst many other contributions in different battlegrounds. In the 
arts, Augusto Boal's ‘Theatre of the Oppressed’ was, as we will see, equally a remarkable 
proposal that emerged in this period carrying as well the message of liberation.
Being close to this struggle for liberation, particularly to the Latin American ‘Liberation 
Theology’, a key figure in the postmodern turn of development in the second half (and more 
dramatically towards the end) of the 20th century, was the Austrian philosopher, theologian 
and  catholic  priest  Ivan  Illich  (1926-2002).  While  working  in  diverse  institutions  of  the 
Vatican, he held an extreme critical attitude regarding its participation in the modernization of 
the ‘Third World’,  especially through the CIDOC, or Intercultural  Documentation Center, 
which he founded in 1961 in Cuernavaca, Mexico. Interestingly, Illich speaks himself of his 
paradox relation to tradition and institution, two concepts which, being he a theologist, have a 
special  link  with  the  environment  of  the  Church (Illich/Cayley 1992,  242 f.).  This  inner 
division resonates with similar expressions of inner division of other late modern and post-
117 It  is  worth mentioning here,  that  Ivan  Illich,  whose  work I  will  present  immediately,  and  Freire  were 
initially close friends, political allies and colleagues. Nevertheless, while both engaged in radical criticism 
against  the school  system, they had  different  views on the  topic  and engaged in overt  theoretical  and  
political disputes during the 1970's. However, what unites them for our purpose is their critical impetus, 
which, as I have stated above for other postmodern critical approaches, often take not only plural forms but  
contrary stands. For a contemporary perspective on a critical engagement with education and schools that 
recovers inputs from Ivan Illich and Paulo Freire (as well as John Dewey), see Kahn/Kellner 2007. 
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modern  critics,  who,  in  the  realm  of  law,  for  example,  criticized  the  institution  of  law 
recklessly while, at the same time, it seemed unthinkable for them to reject legal traditions 
and/or their justice totally.
While Illich's most renowned areas of criticism are education, health and transportation, 
his research is particularly valuable for questions on development and growth, which were at 
the core of his concern in these very diverse fields. Specially health and education are good 
examples of applied notions of development: a linear movement from sickness to health, from 
ignorant to educated. As such, these are key areas and aims of international development aid. 
In fact, in an interview conducted in 1997, he explicitly said that he refused to do an analysis 
in the areas of law or social  work like the one he had done, for example,  in the area of 
education,  adding that he “refused to restrict  [his] analysis  to the unwanted technical and 
social consequences of education, health and productivity” (Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, 107), 
thus pointing at the broad complex and the implicit critique of other areas his work aimed at. 
Starting from the primary role of economics for the concept of development, Illich and 
many others  engaged in  a  critical  appraisal  of  modern  economics,  investigating  its  basic 
assumptions, and how they permeated all sorts of relations that were seemingly independent 
from economical concerns. One of these basic assumptions, and probably the most important 
in the analysis of economic growth, is the assumption of scarcity, which according to Illich 
began to spread into all aspects of life in Europe in the Middle Ages. Development meaning 
“the transformation of subsistence-oriented cultures and their integration into an economic 
system”, it “always implies the propagation of scarcity-dependence on goods and services 
perceived as scarce” (Illich 2006, 178). With the appearance of the idea of scarcity, the idea of 
conflict, the ways to confront it, and finally the idea of peace, changed. Naturally, law being 
arguably presented as a means to deal with conflict in pursue of social peace and order, also 
the meaning of law changed. 
The main argument of Illich is that, under the assumption of scarcity, which is at the 
base  of  the  concept  of  development,  “peace  came  to  mean  pax  economica”,  meaning  a 
“balance among formally ‘economic’ powers” (Idem, 176). In contrast to that concept, peace 
had a very different meaning before the definitive transition from a subsistence economy to a 
trade-based economy.118 As Illich argues,  in  Central  Europe,  before the breakthrough of a 
trade-based economy, the peace to be guaranteed aimed “to protect the poor and their means 
of subsistence from the violence of war” (Idem, 179) in order to sustain also the war itself.  
118 For a variety of profoundly reflected testimonies of diverse concepts of peace, see Dietrich et al. 2011.
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“The  ‘peace  of  the  land'119”,  Illich  continues,  “was  thus  distinct  from the  truce  between 
warring parties” (Idem), as it is basically understood today. 
The big change started to be noticeable with the rise of the nation-state, when peace 
changed its meaning of protecting “that minimal subsistence on which the wars among lords 
had  to  be  fed”,  thus  protecting  concrete  real  communities,  to  mean  the  protection  of 
production and trade as abstract entities in the pursuit of an utopian perfect peace (Idem). The 
basic idea behind this last peace through economic relations, was that states which are trade-
partners,  and  thus  economically  dependent  of  each  other,  do  not  wage  war  against  each 
other.120 Development as the organization of all communities under this scheme, is thus, a 
deadly needed element for the  pax economica. In this context, it is worth remembering for 
example  the  ‘threat’  of  poverty  mentioned  by  Truman  in  his  speech.  Consequently, 
development and its particular form of peace is in opposition to all other sorts of peace and 
equally of economies that are not based on those specific ideas of scarcity, of the nation-state, 
etc. Hence the title of Illich's text: ‘Peace vs. Development’ (1981).
It is not surprising, thus, that the main outburst of post-developmental arguments, at least at 
the level of academic publications in the Euro-American centers of intellectual production, 
emerged in the 1990's, recovering and deepening to some extent Illich's early critiques. After 
the so-called ‘lost decade of development’ of the 1980's, the contrast could not be starker: 
While researchers cried out the failure of development programs, the United Nations’, and 
with  it,  the  new post-World-War  II  world  order,  celebrated  its  50th  anniversary  and  the 
delegates unanimously declared their full support to ‘development’, setting it as “one of the 
founding  pillars  of  the  modern  ‘global  village’ programmed for  the  twenty-first  century” 
(Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, x). In this sense, Rahnema speaks openly about the bitter experience 
of disillusion experienced my the majority of the contributors to his reader.  As one of the 
reasons for his writing, Escobar equally expresses the frustration experienced in the struggle 
for development: “The debt crisis, the Sahelian famine, increasing poverty, malnutrition, and 
violence  are  only  the  most  pathetic  signs  of  the  failure  of  forty  years  of  development” 
(Escobar 1995, 4). 
119 Illich refers here particularly to the German concept of ‘Landfrieden’,  which literally translated means 
‘peace of the land’.
120 This is the same assumption at the origin of the formation of the European Coal and Steal Community 
(ECSC), and the subsequent European Economic Community (EEC).
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This effort to put in question the concept of development itself, resulted for example in 
Majid Rahnema's course on ‘The Myth and the Reality of Development’ at the University of  
California  at  Berkeley in  the  1980's, and  his  text  ‘Global  Poverty:  A Pauperizing  Myth’ 
(1991). Later, Rahnema would explain in the introduction to the influential compilation ‘The 
Post-Development Reader’ (1997), what he considers to be a central element in the creation of 
this myth: “the myth of development emerged as an ideal construct to meet the hopes of” 
three categories of actors: the leaders of the independence movements, who “were eager to 
transform their  devastated  countries  into  modern  nation-states”,  the  ‘masses’,  who  “were 
hoping to liberate themselves from both the old and the new forms of subjugation, and the 
former colonial masters, who “were seeking a new system of domination, in the hope that it  
would allow them to maintain their presence in the ex-colonies, in order to continue to exploit 
their natural resources, as well as to use them as markets for their expanding economies or as 
bases  for  their  geopolitical  ambitions”  (Rahnema/Bawtree  2008,  ix).  Thus,  Rahnema 
continues, development “mainly served to strengthen the new alliances that were going to 
unite the interests of the post-colonial foreign expansionists with those of the local leaders in 
need of them for consolidation of their own positions” (Idem, x). 
From a  similar  starting  point,  Escobar  wrote  his  ‘Encountering  Development.  The 
Making and Unmaking of the Third World’  in 1995, which, as he stated in the preface to this 
publication,  could  “be  read  as  the  history  of  the  loss  of  an  illusion  [the  illusion  of 
development], in which many genuinely believed” (Escobar 1995, 4). Equally, he refers to the 
idea  of  development  as  a  “dream”  that  “progressively  turned  into  a  nightmare”  (Idem). 
According to him, more than a reality that had to be fought against, the Third World was a 
product of “the discourses and practices of development” which was incepted in the early 
post-World War II  period (Idem).  Therefore,  Escobar explained,  it  had to  be put between 
quotation marks,  as it  was the case with many other ‘phenomena’ that postmodern critics 
reflected as created concepts.
In this line, Escobar depicts his own perspective on development along three axes which 
Foucault proposed before (1986), and which also can be seen equally as three main aspects of 
post-developmentalist's analysis in general. Escobar aims thus to research ‘development’ in 
terms of “the forms of knowledge that refer to it and through which it comes into being and is 
elaborated into objects, concepts, theories, and the like; the system of power that regulates its 
practice; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this discourse, those through which people 
come to recognize themselves as developed or underdeveloped” (Escobar 1995, 10; emphasis 
added).
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Putting development in this specific context, it loses its implicit aura as universal truth, 
turning into one of many possible ways to understand human, social, cultural and political 
moments and their change. Thus, the psot-developmental proposal can be summed up in terms 
of speaking of “development as a historically singular experience, the creation of a domain of 
thought and action, by analyzing the characteristics and interrelations” of these three axes 
(Escobar 1995, 10). I will present some of these post-developmental voices in the next pages.
2.  Post-Developmental Voices  
A central  question  for  ‘development’ critics  has  been  its  connection  with  a  particular 
perspective  on  economy,  as  I  have  presented  briefly  above  for  the  case  of  Ivan  Illich's 
reflections, particularly with a discourse of development that defines underdevelopment by 
economic standards. However, a major point of attention of post-developmentalists relies on 
notions  of  poverty and economic  disadvantage,  so  that  many of  them remain  trapped in 
questions over economy in a similar manner as the developmentalism they criticize. Arturo 
Escobar,  for  example,  presents  his  book as  an  “attempt  to  develop  a  cultural  critique  of 
economics as a foundational structure of modernity, including the formulation of a culture-
based political economy” (Escobar 1995, vii). In this short sentence, Escobar makes explicit 
his  aim to criticize the ‘structure of modernity’ ascribing special  relevance to the idea of 
‘culture’. This is another example in line with others that we have seen in different post-
modern critiques, where ‘culture’, its contingency, its connection to power, and the variability 
of the creation of meaning determine the perspective of the critique.121
Following  this  concern  with  economy,  Esteva,  as  well  as  Escobar,  present  how 
especially during the 19th century, the economic sphere was excised from society and culture 
as an autonomous sphere, “installing it at the centre of politics and ethics” (Esteva 2006, 199). 
In turn,  both authors try to incorporate this  sphere,  that  had become disconnected,  into a 
cultural, symbolic and discursive inquiry. While according to the model of the 19 th century, 
scarcity was put at the center of the economic theory, as an universal condition, and thus 
transformed into a ‘law of scarcity’, what post-developmentalist critics emphasize, is that “it 
is precisely the universality of this assumption that is no longer tenable” (Esteva 2006, 201).  
Responding to the omnipresent logic of poverty, Escobar states that “vernacular societies had 
developed ways of defining and treating poverty that accommodated visions of community, 
121 For this aspect of Escobar's work, see especially Escobar 1995, 58 ff.
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frugality,  and  sufficiency”  (Escobar  1995,  22),  and  did  not  subordinate  to  an  allegedly 
universal ‘law of scarcity’.
Equally interesting for the development critique is the diversity of ways to deal with the 
assumed  poverty.  In  colonial  times,  Escobar  argues,  “the  concern  with  poverty  was 
conditioned by the belief that even if  the ‘natives’ could be somewhat enlightened by the 
presence of the colonizer, not much could be done about their poverty because their economic 
development was pointless. The natives’ capacity for science and technology, the basis for 
economic progress, was seen as nil” (Escobar 1995, 22 ref. to Adas). However, according to 
Escobar (1995) and Rahnema (1991), in the following epochs, these conceptions of poverty, 
and thus its management, went through two important breaks. Firstly, they refer “the advent in 
the nineteenth century of systems for dealing with the poor based on assistance provided by 
impersonal institutions”, that transformed ‘the poor’ into ‘the assisted’ (Escobar 1995, 22). 
According to Escobar, this change made appear ‘the poor’ as a social problem, produced new 
mechanisms of control and intervention, and reshaped “ways of thinking about the meaning of 
life, the economy, rights, and social management” (Idem). Thus,
"pauperism,  [...],  was  associated,  rightly  or  wrongly,  with  features  such  as 
mobility,  vagrancy,  independence,  frugality,  promiscuity,  ignorance,  and  the 
refusal to accept social duties, to work, and to submit to the logic of the expansion 
of ‘needs’. Concomitantly, the management of poverty called for interventions in 
education, health, hygiene, morality, and employment and the instillment of good 
habits of association, savings, child rearing, and so on” (Idem, 23, ref. Procacci). 
Most importantly, this perspective led to “the setting into place of apparatuses of knowledge 
and  power  that  took  it  upon  themselves  to  optimize  life  by producing  it  under  modern, 
‘scientific’ conditions” (Idem).
In a second turn, according to Escobar and Rahnema, poverty was globalized, and thus 
the  parameters  applied  to  individual  persons  was  amplified  to  the  international  arena, 
constructing, based on the annual  per capita income, “two-thirds of the world as poor after 
1945” (Escobar 1995, 23). In fact, in 1948, the World Bank defined as poor the countries with 
an annual  per capita income below $ 100, creating poverty as the “result of a comparative 
statistical  operation”  (Sachs  cit.  in  Idem).  Consequently,  “poverty  became  an  organizing 
concept and the object of a new problematization” (Idem, 24), bringing “into existence new 
discourses and practices that shaped the reality to which they referred” (Idem). Through this 
conceptualization based on an allegedly universally valid standard, the development strategy 
“became a powerful instrument for normalizing the world” (Idem, 26). 
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Problematizing  the  concept  of  ‘poverty’  as  an  instrument  created  under  specific 
circumstances, and not as a given fact, is a main element in the post-developmental enterprise. 
But not only ‘poverty’ has been scrutinized as a dominating concept. In the renowned book 
‘The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power’ (1992) edited by Wolfgang 
Sachs,  a  variety of  contributions  in  the  same line  around concepts  like  ‘progress’,  ‘One 
World’, ‘production’, ‘standard of living’, and, explicitly ‘development’ were included. It was 
the Mexican Gustavo Esteva, who developed in this volume a concise and thorough example 
of the post-structuralist critique on development, which is oriented to put not only one theory 
of development in question,  but moreover,  to inquire the validity of ‘development’ at  all, 
including all the newer versions of the concept. In fact, Esteva argues that the critiques of 
authors like Julius Nyerere (1922-1999), Rodolfo Stavenhagen (*1932) and many others who 
called  for  a  new  perspective  on  development,  claiming  the  relevance  of  a  development 
according to the own objectives and the own culture, are counterproductive because they are 
based on the same assumptions on which the development they criticize is grounded (Esteva 
2006, 185). His radical critique, in turn, is against the assumptions of development as such, 
namely,  that  it  assumes  the  need  for  a  movement  from  an  underdeveloped  stage  to  a 
developed one. For two thirds of the inhabitants of this planet, this means, Esteva argues, that 
they  have  to  conceive  of  themselves  as  underdeveloped  and  of  their  own  position  as 
subjugated  and  undesirable.  Basing  on  this  conception  of  their  self,  the  simple  fact  of 
associating with development one's own intention tends to annul the intention, to contradict it,  
to enslave it. Thus, thinking in one's own objectives or having confidence in oneself and one's 
own culture becomes impossible, because the own objectives and the own culture are stained 
with the macula of underdevelopment.
Representative  of  many  other  detailed  critiques  of  development,  in  the  following 
paragraphs,  I  will  introduce  Esteva's  argument,  which  emerges  from a  genealogy  of  the 
concept  of  ‘development’,  and  which  is  still  one  of  the  most  influential  in  the  field  of 
developmental  and  political  studies  and  practice.  His  influence  derives  partly  from  his 
intellectual activism in diverse fields. One of the most important outcomes of his work has 
been the creation of the Universidad de la Tierra122 or Unitierra (University of the Earth) in 
the Mexican city of Oaxaca, which takes into practice Ivan Illich's teachings amongst other 
alternative educational proposals. Renowned as a main advocate of post-development for his 
theoretical work in the tradition of Ivan Illich, he was also politically active as an adviser for 
122 For more information about this project, which differs greatly from formal schools, see Unitierra 2011, as  
well as Unitierra 2008 and Esteva 2007.
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the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN) in Chiapas during negotiations with the 
Mexican  government.  Taking  into  account  this  political  engagement,  which  is  connected 
specifically with the struggle of indigenous groups in Oaxaca, it is easy to understand Esteva's 
point  of  view  as  one  that  is  concerned  with  cultural  diversity  and  economico-political 
oppression, as well as with the remnants of the colonial rule in the modern nation-state and its 
political and social institutions.
As Esteva argues from a perspective of discourse analysis, the ‘era of development’ 
started officially as an international political discourse the 20th of January of 1949, with the 
inaugural speech of Harry S. Truman I presented above, where he stated: “the old imperialism 
– exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of 
development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing” (Truman, 1949). With that 
token, according to Esteva, the ‘imperialist paradigm’ in international relations was replaced 
by  the  ‘development  paradigm’.  Furthermore,  Truman  used  in  the  same  speech  another 
relevant and new word in this context: ‘underdevelopment’, changing drastically the meaning 
of ‘development’. From then on, the diversity of two billion people disappeared behind an 
inverted mirror of the assumed unified reality of a selected ‘developed’ group (Esteva 2006a, 
184). That is to say that, with the introduction of the concept of ‘underdevelopment’, a large 
majority of human population turned into the negation of a ‘developed’ minority that was 
presented as being homogeneous and unified.
Naturally, ‘development’ had previously a different semantic than the one it acquired 
during the 20th century. Esteva points out that ‘development’ describes in colloquial language 
a  process  through which the potentialities  of  an object  or  organism are liberated,  until  it 
achieves its natural, complete form (Idem, 186). The idea of development, thus, refers to a 
‘natural way to be’. This idea of development, however, changed more and more from the 
idea of progress towards an ‘appropriate’ form to the idea of progress to an evermore ‘perfect’ 
form.123 Finally,  the originally biological  approach was incorporated as a metaphor in the 
social sphere in the 18th century. In this context, Esteva mentions, for example, the historian 
Justus  Möser  (1720-1794),  who  used  the  term  Entwicklung (development)  in  1768 
('Osnabrückische  Geschichte’,  ‘History  of  Osnabrück')  to  refer  to  the  gradual  process  of 
social  change (Esteva 2006, 186). Later on, in 1774, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-
1803)  related  the  life  phases  to  social  history,  applying  “the  organological  notion  of 
development” as part of his attempt to combine the theory  of nature with the philosophy of 
history  (Idem, 186 
123 Esteva refers here to the works of Caspar Friedrich Wolff (1734-1794) and Charles Darwin (1809-1882).
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f.). For him, “the historical development was the continuation of natural development; and 
both were just  variants of the homogenous development  of the cosmos,  created by God” 
(Idem,  187).  With  the  later  secularization,  development  became  autonomous  of  a  divine 
image, and the capacity to ‘self-development’ of human beings became central. Lastly, Marx 
explained development “as a historical process that unfolds with the same necessary character 
of natural laws” (Idem). 
Importantly, Esteva emphasizes that the transformation of the metaphor of development 
“acquired  a  violent  colonizing  power”  when  it  “returned  to  the  vernacular”,  converting 
“history into a program” (Idem). Social evolution had a clear destiny: the industrial mode of 
production  “came  to  be  seen  as  the  natural  culmination  of  the  potentialities  existent  in 
Neolithic man” (Idem). Consequently, the metaphor of development gave global hegemony to 
a specific genealogy of history which Esteva identifies with the West. According to Esteva, 
after a period in which ‘development’ was overloaded with meanings, “dissolving its precise 
significance“  (Idem) during the 19th century,  by the beginning of  the 20th century,  ‘urban 
development’ became widespread promoting “massive, homogenous industrial production of 
urban space”, and thus anticipating Truman's developmentalist missionarism.
After his thorough analysis, Esteva reaches the conclusion, that nowadays, the concept 
of development evokes a web of meanings in which the user of the word is caught, no matter 
how specific his alternative proposal might be. While the specific contours of ‘development’ 
are unclear, it means always “a favorable change; from simple to complex, from inferior to 
superior, from worse to better” (Idem, 189), implying at the same time that there is a right 
path, unchangeable and universal, a necessary law that leads to a specific and good goal. For 
two thirds of the world, however, this positive meaning of the word ‘development’ is just “a 
reminder of what they are not” (Idem, 189; emphasis in the original).
The diverse reflections on development that I have mentioned above, can be understood as a 
reaction in front of the uncritical general assumption of the existence of ‘underdevelopment’, 
which  required  an  explanation  of  the  ‘phenomenon’.  Assuming  the  reality  of 
underdevelopment,  a  search  for  real,  material,  historic  reasons  for  that  problem  turned 
imminent.  At  the  same  time,  at  a  political  level,  while  in  the  context  of  the  Cold  War 
‘evolution’ became an antidote for revolution, a myriad of programs and institutions rooted 
the complementary pair of development-underdevelopment in public consciousness. 
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Importantly,  also  critical  theories  participated  of  the  creation  of  ‘development’. 
Interestingly,  Esteva is specially critical  of leftist theories, that criticizing all development 
strategies,  ended  up  adopting  in  an  uncritical  matter  the  concept  of  ‘development’ and 
therefore strengthening the “colonizing force of the metaphor” (Idem). It becomes clear here 
the determinant role of language and the relative irrelevance of political (left/right) and social 
(theory/praxis) positions in this argument is clear, and underlines the pervasiveness of the 
discursive critique of postmodern arguments on development. As Esteva argues in the Spanish 
version of this fundamental text, “the word defines a perception. And this transforms, in turn, 
into an object, a fact” (Esteva 2006, 333). 
Summing up, Esteva's main concern is that no one contested fully the apparent reality of 
underdevelopment.  As  he  underlines,  nobody realized  “that  it  is  a  comparative  adjective 
whose base of support is the assumption, very Western but unacceptable and indemonstrable, 
of the oneness, homogeneity and linear evolution of the world” (Idem, 190). On the contrary, 
development was put more and more at the center of attention in national and international 
politics,  as  Arturo  Escobar,  with  the  same  post-developmental  worry  puts  to  the  front, 
particularly in his seminal work ‘Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of 
the Third World’ (1995). 
Being  Escobar's  works  a  central  reference  for  both  postdevelopment  critiques  and 
critiques on postdevelopmental approaches, it is worth to recover here also his analysis of 
1995 as a major voice in the postdevelopmental endeavor. Importantly,  also this figure of 
postdevelopment research, as well as Gustavo Esteva, presents a marked political activity, 
combining his theoretical work with active support of the struggles of diverse groups, like for 
example the social movement of black communities in Colombia, where he was born, as well 
as, on a more international level, of the World Social Forum (Escobar 2006b). This active 
participation is a clear consequence of his critique on development, which I present in the 
following paragraphs. 
First of all, Escobar strengthens Esteva's analysis affirming that “it is possible to speak 
of the invention of development in the early post-World War II period”, because while “during 
World War II the dominant image of what was to become the Third World was shaped by 
strategic  considerations  and  access  to  its  raw  materials”,  the  postwar  transformation 
reorganized drastically the relations between rich and poor countries creating an “entirely new 
strategy for  dealing  with  the  problems of  the poorer  countries”  (Escobar  1995,  31).  In  a 
complementary manner to Esteva's critical genealogy of development, Escobar emphasizes 
the relations of power that played a major role in the development of ‘development’. Amongst 
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the  most  important  factors  that  shaped  the  development  discourse,  Escobar  counts  the 
anticolonial struggles in Asia and Africa, growing nationalism in Latin America, the cold war, 
the need to find new markets, the fear of communism and overpopulation, and faith in science 
and technology (Idem, 32). As a consequence of the emergent constellation of forces, “forms 
of  power  in  terms  of  class,  gender,  race,  and  nationality  thus  found  their  way  into 
development  theory  and  practice”  (Idem,  43).  With  the  post-World-War  II  arrangements, 
colonies, ex-colonies and countries under state intervention were all put in a new frame, the 
Third  World,  as  part  of  a  redefinition  of  the  actors  of  world  politics.  The  notion  of 
underdevelopment and Third World, Escobar argues, “emerged as working principles within 
the process by which the West – and, in different ways, the East – redefined itself and the rest  
of the world” (Idem, 31).
That  ‘underdevelopment’ was  presented  in  a  politically  effective  manner  with  the 
speech  of  US-American  president  Truman  and  through  a  variety  of  institutions  with 
headquarters  in  the  ‘First  World’,  serving  particular  interests,  does  not  mean  that  these 
concepts were unilaterally pushed onto the so called ‘Third World’. Regarding specifically the 
Latin American context, Escobar underlines that  intertwined with the demise of the good 
neighbor policy124 of the United States in the mid-1940's, representatives of Latin American 
countries referred increasingly to the need for development.  The end of the ‘good neighbor 
policy’ reflected the increasing divergence between the interests  of the United States  and 
Latin American countries,  which was manifest  especially during the three Inter-American 
Conferences held during the decade of 1940: “while the United States insisted on its military 
and security objectives, Latin American countries emphasized more than ever economic and 
social goals” (Escobar 1995, 29 ref. to López Maya). Interestingly, the 1945 conference in 
Chapultepec (Mexico)  as  well  as the one held in  Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)  in  1947 should 
concentrate,  according to  their  titles,  on the problems of  war  and peace  and the need to 
maintain peace  and security.  However,  Latin  American  presidents  made emphasis,  during 
these meetings, on the importance of industrialization in the consolidation of democracy and 
asked the United States to help with a program of economic transition from the production of 
raw materials to industrial production (Escobar 1995, 29). Development was clearly part of 
‘Third World’ countries’ agenda. As a response,  doctrines of national security an pacts of 
124 The ‘good neighbor policy’ was launched officially by US-American President Theodor Roosevelt in his 
inaugural address of 1933, and was based on the principle of non (armed) intervention in Latin American 
countries, after a period characterized by military interventions since the end of the 19th century. One of the 
main aims  of  this  policy was  to  create  new economic  opportunities  through the  enforcement  of  trade 
agreements with the region. As a consequence, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank), 
i.e. the official export credit agency of the United States, was established in 1934. 
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military assistance were linked to development strategies. In fact, “the fear of communism 
became one of the most compelling arguments for development” (Idem, 34). 
Finally, during the 9th Pan-American Conference held in Bogotá (Colombia) in 1948, 
the Organization of American States (OAS or OEA) was created as a continuation of the Pan-
American Union and, most importantly, as a response to the pledge to fight communism. The 
motto adopted by the OAS makes clear  how far questions  of  peace and security became 
entangled with questions of socio-economic and politico-legal development: “Democracy for 
peace, security and development” (OAS 2011). Regarding the role of law in this context, it is 
interesting to observe that in the same meeting where the OAS was created, also the American 
Declaration  of  the  Rights  and  Duties  of  Man,  the  world's  first  general  human  rights 
instrument,  was adopted.  According to Escobar,  these Latin American demands for socio-
economical improvement in the 1940's, reflect “changes that had been taking place for several 
decades”,  like  the  beginning  of  industrialization,  the  growth  of  the  organized  labor,  the 
modernization  of  the  state,  some  of  which  “were  becoming  salient  in  the  1920's  and 
accelerated after 1930” (Escobar 1995, 30).
Equally as a response to these demands, the Inter-American Development Commission 
was established in 1940 in order “to encourage Latin American production geared toward the 
United States market”, while the founded programs “often involved large-scale technical aid 
and the mobilization of capital resources to Latin America” (Idem, 32). Naturally, this aid and 
capital investment was loaded with some requirements: “The Third World was instructed to 
look at private capital, both domestic and foreign, which meant that the ‘right climate’ had to 
be created, including a commitment to capitalist development; the curbing of nationalism; and 
the control of the Left, the working class, and the peasantry” (Idem, 33). This right climate 
included, later on, also a legal dimension as Gardner elaborated (Gardner 1980).125
In the context of increasing tension at an international level, it is important to remember 
that,  as  Escobar  argues,  the  “Third  World,  far  from  being  peripheral,  was  central  to 
superpower rivalry and the possibility of nuclear confrontation” during the Cold War (Escobar 
1995, 34). Not only the several proxy-wars, but also a variety of pacts of military assistance 
made of the Third World one of the main arenas for the cold struggle. In this context, the fear 
of  losing  support  of  former  colonies  if  they  fell  into  the  Soviet  camp,  determined  the 
“ambivalent acceptance of the independence of former European colonies” (Escobar 1995, 
34).  AT  the  same  time,  the  ghost  of  communism  was  used  as  a  central  argument  for 
development,  and “doctrines  of  national  security [were]  intimately linked to  development 
125 For these reflections on the role of law in the modern race for development, see chapter A.
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strategies”  (Idem).  Correspondingly,  Esteva  cites  some  Latin  American  examples  of 
institutions and programs that emerged at the intersection of security and development, like 
the Peace Corps, the Point Four Program, the War on Poverty, and the Alliance for Progress, 
which “contributed to root the notion of underdevelopment into popular perception and to 
deepen the disability created by such perception” (Esteva 2006, 190). Thus, regarding the 
importance of the  ‘Third World’ during the Cold War, Escobar concludes, the “system that  
generates  conflict  and  instability  and  the  system  that  generates  underdevelopment  are 
inextricably bound” (Idem, 34). 
An important aspect of this underdevelopment generating system was the creation of the 
science of underdevelopment understood as a long standing but possibly curable economic 
disease.  As  Escobar  recovers  from  John  Kenneth  Galbraith's  (1908-2006)126 account,  “a 
different field of study, the special economics of the poor countries” was created with the 
strong support of diverse foundations (Escobar 1995, 57 cit. Galbraith). As Galbraith relates: 
“Over a somewhat longer period, the Ford Foundation contributed well over a billion dollars 
between 1950 and 1975, and the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and some CIA-supported foundations 
added smaller amounts.  [...]  Intellectual interest  in  the problem of mass poverty had also 
greatly expanded” (Idem). 
As a result of the tense international political context, and as a reaction to the restrictive 
economic perspective, the concept of ‘social development’ was soon used as a counterpart of 
‘economic development’, and so, reality was clearly divided between ‘social’ and ‘economic’, 
marking with this division the First Development Decade (1960-1970). In this context, the 
ECOSOC (United Nations Economic and Social Council) was created in 1962 and the United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (Unrisd) in 1963. The then formulated 
‘Proposals for Action’ established that the change needed was “social and cultural as well as 
economic,  and  qualitative  as  well  as  quantitative”  (United  Nations  1962),  marking  the 
division between social and economic concerns as well as maintaining the primacy of the 
GNP (Gross National Product) for development measures. Summing up, in the 1960's, social 
development was “seen partly as a precondition for economic growth and partly as a moral 
justification for it and the sacrifices it implied” (UNRISD 1979).
126 John Kenneth Galbraith was one of the most renowned Canadian/US-American economists of the 20th 
century. He served also as diplomat and adviser of diverse politicians and presidents of the United States, 
like Franklin Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. Amongst his 
most influential writings, it is worth citing here ‘The Affluent Society’ of 1958, and ‘The Nature of Mass 
Poverty’ of 1979, as well as ‘The Voice of the Poor’, ‘The Anatomy of Power’, and ‘Essays from the Poor 
to the Rich’ all published in 1983. 
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Nevertheless, with the passage of time, the social aspects turned into ‘social obstacles’ 
for development. After the failure of an approach that divided between social and economic 
questions, quite naturally, the next step in the development of ‘development’, was to integrate 
both concepts. And thus, the ‘Second UN Development Decade’ (1970-1980) witnessed a 
variety of proposals for a unified approach, “which would fully integrate the economic and 
social components in the formulation of policies and programs” (Unrisd 1980). The question 
was, however, what topic, what problem, what concept should serve as unifier. This is the 
decade  when  a  variety  of  ‘developments’  appeared  like  ‘participative  development’, 
‘integrated  development’,  ‘human-centered-development’  and,  interestingly,  ‘another 
development’ as the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation suggested in 1975 (Dag Hammarskjold 
Foundation 1975). The appearance of ‘anotherness’ in this context is not to be taken as a 
superficial aspect if we remember the political-intellectual context of the 1970's, which was 
embedded in struggles for the recognition of diversity and the respect of the Other. Equally, 
the Declaration of Cocoyoc of 1974127, underlined the importance of diversity in the sense of 
the need of “pursuing many different roads of development” (Cocoyoc 1975, 897). Parallel to 
the  “basic  needs  approach”,  proposed  by  the  Conference  on  Employment,  Income 
Distribution and Social Progress, organized by the ILO (International Labor Organization) in 
1976128, also the ‘endogenous development’ became a central proposal on the discussion on 
what is the best development to foster. Interestingly, as Esteva points out, if the concept of 
endogenous development as a development that corresponds to the “particularities of each 
nation”, is applied to its last consequence, it “leads to the dissolution of the very notion of 
development,  after  realizing the impossibility of  imposing a  single  cultural  model  on the 
whole world” (Esteva 2006, 196). 
The theoretical disorientation was paired by the practical failure of the development 
programs put  in  practice  until  then.  Thus,  the  1980's  were called the ‘Lost  Development 
Decade’ and the 1990's  had to answer with a new concept of development.  This form of 
‘redevelopment’, as Esteva calls it, took the shape of ‘sustainable development’, a concept 
inaugurated by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)129 in its 
127 The declaration of Cocoyoc was the result of a symposium on ‘Patterns of Resource Use, Environment and 
Development Strategies’ with participants from the UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) and 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) held on October 8-12 of 1974. For the 
complete text of the declaration see Cocoyoc 1975, 893 ff.
128 The ‘basic needs approach’ aimed at the achievement of a certain specific minimum standard of living. In 
1977 this approach was adopted equally by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.
129 This commission, which was convened by the United Nations in 1983, is better known as ‘Brundtland 
Commission’ because of its Chair Gro Harlem Brundtland (*1939). Consequently, the resulting report is 
often presented as ‘Brundtland Report’.
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renown report titled ‘Our Common Future’, published in 1987. Despite all the positive voices 
on  the  creation  of  ‘sustainable  development’  as  a  compromise  of  economists  and 
environmentalists,  of  First-  and  Third-Worldlers,  etc.,  Esteva  argues  that  “sustainable 
development has been explicitly conceived as a strategy for sustaining ‘development’, not for 
supporting the flourishing and enduring of an infinitely diverse natural and social life” (Esteva 
2006, 198). 
One more twist  was given to ‘development’ in 1990 by the UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program) in its first ‘Human Development Report’ (UNDP 1990). While the 
concept  of  ‘human  development’  is  intended  to  include  social  and  cultural  aspects,  it 
nevertheless remains in a quantitative structure, where ‘human development’ is expressed by 
an “'internationally comparative level of deprivation’,  which determines how far from the 
most  successful  national  case  are  the  other  countries”  (Esteva  2006,  198).  The  linear 
perspective of the endeavor is salient in the goal of creating a Human Development Index, 
“synthesizing,  along  a  numerical  scale,  the  global  level  of  Human  Development  in  130 
countries” (UNDP 1990), led by levels of deprivation of three variables: life expectancy, adult 
literacy  and  real  GNP  per  capita.  As  it  is  obvious,  despite  several  efforts  for  the 
“dethronement of GNP”, economic development continues to be referred to as an universal 
yardstick. In this sense, the turn of the century saw the First UN Decade for the Eradication of 
Poverty  (1997-2006),  and,  most  importantly,  the  creation  of  the  Millenium Development 
Goals,130 which inherited the development work of the 20th century.  While they focus on 
specific progress in the fields of poverty and hunger, universal education, gender equality, 
child health, maternal health, combat of HIV/Aids, environmental sustainability and global 
partnership (United Nations 2011), covering thus a broad variety of fields, the basic principles 
remain the same as in the past. Not only is the GDP explicitly the measuring stick for progress 
in many of these fields, specially in the first one (poverty and hunger), but also the logic of a 
linear progress towards a universally set ‘good life’ standard serves as the justification for the 
projection of ideals onto anonymous others through millionary projects.
As it has become clear in the last pages, while the connection with a specific understanding of 
economy  is  central  to  post-developmental  critique,  its  inquiry  does  not  stop  at  a  mere 
conceptual controversy with the discipline of economics. Moreover, the criticism against a 
monetarization of development is rather a superficial aspect of a more profound concern of 
130 The Millenium Development Goals (MDG) were established following the Millennium Summit in 2000, 
where the United Nations Millennium Declaration was adopted. The target date has been fixed for 2015.
176
subjugation of human diversity beneath a universal ougth-to-be standard. Most interesting for 
the objective of linking the concept of development to pluralism and diversity on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, to law and to legal transfer in a modern sense, is the connection 
between  development  and  colonialism  specified  by  most  post-developmental  researchers. 
Esteva, for example, refers to the transformation in the change of the name of the ‘Law of 
Development of the Colonies’ into the ‘Law of Development and Welfare of the Colonies’ in 
1939 as a milestone in the emergence of developmental discourse. According to Esteva, this 
simple change is one expression of a broader interest: giving “the philosophy of the colonial 
protectorate  a  positive  meaning,  the  British  argued  for  the  need  to  guarantee  the  natives 
minimum levels  of  nutrition,  health  and education” (Esteva 2006, 188 ref.  to  Arendt  and 
Hancock). With this change, the role of the ‘beneficiary’ of this law was somehow shifted 
from Britain as the colonial power with interest in exploiting its own colonial possessions, to 
the natives as objects that needed to be developed (and thus become more civilized, i.e. more 
‘British') for their own sake. Consequently, “after the identification of the level of civilization 
with the level  of  production,  the  dual  mandate  collapsed into  one:  development” (Esteva 
2006, 188 ref. to Sachs).
In the same line, Escobar argues, from a political perspective, that development was “a 
strategy to  remake the  colonial  world  and restructure  the  relations  between  colonies  and 
metropoles”  (Escobar  1995,  26).  Following  Frederick  Cooper  (1991),  who  investigated 
especially African cases, Escobar underlines that the British Act mentioned above, was “the 
first great materialization of the development idea” and responded “to challenges to imperial 
power in the 1930's and must thus be seen as an attempt to reinvigorate the empire” (Idem). 
Similarly, the process of decolonization, as Escobar continues arguing along with Murphy and 
Augelly (1993), was related to the system of mandates used by the League of Nations after 
World War I, and the promotion of development by international organizations later (Idem, 
27)
In a more general sense, it is arguable that the concept of development has been present 
in  one  way  or  another  in  diverse  colonial  enterprises.  As  I  have  presented  above,  the 
discussion  between Las  Casas  and Sepúlveda  on the  justification  for  the  invasion  of  the 
Americas in the end of the 15th century turned around the question if (and how) natives of the 
Americas were capable to transcend their religious, social and thus human stage. While there 
are clear differences between the colonial enterprise and the developmental one, for example 
in the type of power exercised and the discourse employed, it would be naive to deny any 
connection between both political-military endeavors. Thus, one of the primary concerns of 
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the critical currents around the idea of development questioned the innocence with which the 
term was  used,  and  which  covered,  as  the  critics  emphasized,  the  continuity of  colonial 
oppression through the discourse and the institutions at the service of development. While the 
relation  ‘(independent)  colonizer  –  (dependent)  colonized’ was  officially  in  regression  in 
many regions of the world during the zenith of decolonization in the middle of the century,  
colonialism and the asymmetry of power connected to it where transferred to the relationship 
between ‘(developed) developer – (underdeveloped) beneficiary’. 
In the same vein, Arturo Escobar refers to the work of Timothy Mitchell and argues that 
the regime of order and truth by which the colonial world was observed as an object “is a  
quintessencial aspect of modernity and has been deepened by economics and development” 
(Escobar 1995, 8). Thus, he argues that, assuming that the colonial world could be observed 
“from a position that is invisible and set apart”, the world was divided into “a realm of mere  
representations and a realm of the ‘real'; [...] into an order of mere models, descriptions or 
copies, and an order of the original” (Escobar 1995, 7 cit. Mitchell). This position, in turn,  
reflected in the world of ‘development’ “in an objectivist and empiricist stand that dictates 
that  the Third World and its  peoples  exist  ‘out  there’,  to  be known through theories  and 
intervened upon from the outside” (Escobar 1995, 8). It is worth noticing that this intervention 
from the outside refers not only to economical programs for development imposed as a result 
of  negotiations  with  international  institutions,  but  it  reflects  a  prescriptive  model  of  the 
solution of conflict, which implies not only a standard universally valid answer for problems, 
but  also  requires  a  hierarchically  positioned  prescriptor,  who  judges  the  situation  and 
establishes the proper solution to take. This is, in other words, the scheme of modern law I 
have referred to previously, that founds expression in the environment of social conflict and 
international development. The resulting image of an underdeveloped subject portrays him as 
“endowed with features such as powerlessness, passivity, poverty, and ignorance, usually dark 
and lacking in historical agency, as if waiting for the (white) Western hand to help subjects 
along and not infrequently hungry, illiterate, needy, and oppressed by its own stubbornness, 
lack of initiative, and traditions” (Idem). That this image exists, Escobar underlines “is more a 
sign of power over the Third World than a truth about it” (Idem).
Understanding the production of discourse “under conditions of unequal power” as a 
‘colonialist move’ (Idem, 9 ref. to Mohanty), and assuming that the development discourse 
takes place “in a world system in which the West has a certain dominance over the Third 
World”, most efforts for development can be understood as being part of a ‘colonialist move’. 
“This move”, Escobar continues, “entails specific constructions of the colonial/Third World 
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subject  in/through  discourse  in  ways  that  allow  the  exercise  of  power  over  it”  (Idem). 
Referring to Homi Bhabha's (*1949) definition of colonial discourse, as “an apparatus that 
turns  on  the  recognition  and  disavowal  of  racial/cultural/historical  differences”,  Escobar 
argues that “the development discourse is governed by the same principles”,  creating “an 
apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World” 
(Idem). Transposing Homi Bhabha's argument for the colonial context, it is possible to argue 
that through this apparatus, a form of governmentality is deployed that in marking a subject 
world, “appropriates, directs and dominates its various spheres of activity” (Bhabha 1990, 
75)131,  creating  at  the  same time  a  geopolitical  imagination  that  found  expression  in  the 
concepts  of  ‘First  World  and  Third  World’,  ‘North  and  South’,  ‘center  and  periphery’. 
Importantly, as I have shown, law has played a major role in the “production of differences,  
subjectivities, and social orders” that result in this subject-space (Escobar 1995, 9). As we 
have seen, the establishment of ‘legal cultures’ paired with the division between legal orders 
and normative regimes of ‘practices and customs’ defined a line that law comparativists still  
have difficulties trespassing. 
At this point, it is important to emphasize that, while other parts of the world, like most 
of  Latin  America,  had  become  officially  independent  from  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese 
monarchies  during  the  19th  century,  ‘development’  played  there  equally  the  role  of 
transforming a regime of political-economic dependency into a regime of development aid. In 
this  sense,  Paul  Drake,  studying the  period  between 1912 and 1932,  underlines  that  US-
American politics towards Latin America were oriented to “ideological as well as military and 
economic hegemony and conformity, without having to pay the price of permanent conquest” 
(Drake 1991, 34). After the ‘good neighbor policy’ of the 1930's  and 1940's, ‘development’ 
turned as relevant for maintaining the established hierarchy between the United States and 
most  of  Latin  America  as  it  was  central  for  the  European  ex-colonial  powers.  Thus, 
institutions like the OAS, the Ex-Im Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB or 
BID)  were  created  in  the  name  of  development,  maintaining,  however,  a  surreptitious 
US-American hegemony. Equally, the rhetoric of a helpless, hopeless and childish character 
of  Latin  American  cultures  was  at  the  base  of  this  development  aid  as  it  was  in  a 
colonial/post-colonial context. Hence,  it  was natural that George Kennan (1904-2005), the 
head of State Department policy planning could speak in the 1940's  of the “unhappy and 
131 Bhabha's text referring to the colonial context is: “the objective of colonial discourse is to construe the 
colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and 
to establish systems of administration and instruction. [...] I am referring to a form of governmentality that 
in marking out a ‘subject nation’, appropriates, directs and dominates its various spheres of activity” (1990, 
75).
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hopeless” background in Latin America and “pursuing the motif of the ‘childish’ nature of the 
area” argue “that if the United States treated the Latin Americans like adults, then perhaps 
they would have to behave like them” (Kolko 1988, 39 f.). In this sense, Escobar argues with 
Ashis Nandy (*1937), that “the infantilization of the Third World was integral to development 
as a ‘secular theory of salvation’ (Nandy cit. in Escobar 1995, 30). 
This critique has not remained unacknowledged by development institutions and development 
research.  In this  line,  Ilan Kapoor portrays several dilemmas that he has to confront as a 
development theorist and practitioner, referring specifically to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's 
(*1942)  work  and  to  post-colonial  critique  in  general.  In  a  self-critical  manner,  he  asks 
himself: 
“What are the ethico-political implications of our representations for the Third 
World, and especially for the subaltern groups that preoccupy a good part of our 
[i.e.  developmentalist's]  work?  To  what  extent  do  our  depictions  and  actions 
marginalize or silence these groups and mask our own complicities? What social 
and institutional power relationships do these representations, even those aimed at 
‘empowerment’,  set up or neglect? And to what extent can we attenuate these 
pitfalls?” (Kapoor 2004, 628).
Kapoor makes a clear argument in connecting developmental research with the field of 
literary criticism,  which  was  the  main  discipline  of  Spivak  as  well  as  other  well  known 
postcolonial critics like Edward Said. Similar to Said's argument on literary criticism, Kapoor 
states that working on the field of development, be it as an academic or as a practitioner, 
reproduce already forms of Western hegemonic power. In the case of development work, to be 
involved in this field implies necessarily to take a position “within a ‘development discourse’, 
where  the  North's  superiority  over  the  South  is  taken  for  granted,  and  Western-style 
development is the norm” (Kapoor 2004, 629). In this discourse, he argues, a clear us/them 
division  and  power  relationship  exists,  where  “'we’ aid/develop/civilise/empower  ‘them'” 
(Idem). 
Making  echo  of  Esteva's  and  Escobar's  arguments,  Kapoor  emphasizes  that  in  the 
modernization  theory  of  the  1950's  and  1960's  the  connection  of  development  aid  with 
colonialism was not made and thus, the oblique power relationship in development theory and 
practice  was  not  understood.  As  Kapoor  continues,  modernization  theory,  like  the  one 
developed by Rostow (1960), barely refers to colonialism, making Third World history begin 
after World War II, putting “First World growth patterns” as “history's guide and goal”, and 
obviating the colonialist background that allowed the incorporation of the colonies into the 
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international division of labor and their inclusion in a global capitalist system that put them 
necessarily in a subordinated role (Kapoor 2004, 629). 
Interestingly,  Kapoor  underlines  the  expression  of  this  pervasive  discourse  in 
contemporary practice, referring to the “structural adjustment and ‘free-trade’ policies of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, under which countries must liberalise socioeconomic and trade 
regimes” (Idem). This reference to the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF and the World 
Bank is central to this inquiry, since the agreements and credits offered by these institutions to 
countries in financial  difficulty require systematically legal changes in several fields,  both 
related  and  unrelated  to  the  economical  question  at  stake.  The  same is  the  case  for  the 
membership in the WTO, which was equally founded as a consequence of the Bretton Woods-
System. One of the contemporary better known cases in this sense is the membership of the 
Popular Republic of China in 2001, that encouraged a wide range of expectations regarding 
the  development  of  the  ‘rule  of  law’ (Kobayashi  2011,  Lam  2009).  The  development 
strategies usually linked to economical progress are thus intimately connected to ideas of legal 
development. In fact, the establishment of the rule of law has been seen as a main player in 
the economic growth of a country due to the trust that it can develop in foreign investors. 
As Kapoor argues, the work of the Bretton Woods institutions is clearly embedded in 
the modernization thinking when it states in its structural adjustment and ‘free-trade’ policies 
a  duty to  liberalize  socioeconomic  and trade  regimes.  As a  criticism against  this  type  of 
procedure,  Kapoor  argues  that  these  policies  “proceed  by a  disavowal  of  the  history  of 
imperialism and the unequal footing on which such a history has often placed Third World 
countries in the global capitalist system” (Idem, 629). In this sense, recalling Spivak's work, 
Kapoor underlines that these institutions, in doing this, buy “a self-contained version of the 
West”, which amounts to ignoring both its complicity in, and production by, “the imperialist 
project” (Spivak 1988a, 291). Importantly, if the economic agreements of the Bretton Woods 
institutions  aiming  at  the  development  of  Third  World  countries  rely  on  classical 
modernization  thinking,  their  legal  demands  are  based  equally  on  this  developmental 
paradigm. Thus, the imperialism implicit and silenced in the development project put into 
effect through these international institutions finds expression equally in the demands on legal 
changes that are put as a condition for the closing or continuation of the agreement.
While  Spivak recalls  the role  of imperialism and colonialism for the initiation of  a 
process of global inequality in the so called Third World, she equally points at the creation of 
the ‘Third World’ as a semantic-cultural aspect of colonialism, through which “the Western 
superiority and dominance are naturalized” (Spivak 1999, 114 ff.). According to Kapoor, this 
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‘worlding'132, allows “the Westerner to overlook the interrelationships between the West and 
imperialism or globalization and the conditions of homeworkers” while at the same time it  
reinforces Western ethnocentrism and triumphalism (Kapoor 2004, 629 f.). Consequently, the 
developmentalist's intention to ‘help the Third World’ is embedded in a logic of disavowal. In 
the  same line,  Linda  Alcoff  argues  that  “though the  speaker  may be  trying  to  materially 
improve  the  situation  of  some  lesser-privileged  group,  the  effects  of  her  discourse  is  to 
reinforce  racist,  imperialist  conceptions  and  perhaps  also  to  further  silence  the  lesser-
privileged group's own ability to speak and be heard” (Alcoff 1991, 26). 
In  other  words,  while  development  programs  and  the  worldwide  campaign  of 
conscientization  for  the  support  of  developing  countries  in  all  social  spheres  portrays 
development as an engagement between two predefined identities representing generally the 
First World on the one side, and Third World on the other, the argument of Kapoor and Spivak 
states that both entities in interaction are constructed through the engagement in development. 
This institutionally and geopolitically embedded representation circumscribes equally “what 
and how we can and cannot do (i.e. development discourse defines our type and mode of 
encounter)” (Kapoor 2004, 635). In the words of Spivak, “if the lines of making sense of 
something are laid down in a certain way, then you are able to do only those things with that 
something which are possible within and by the arrangement of those lines” (Spivak cit. in 
Idem). What remains clear with this formulation is that the place of the lines to make sense of 
things is not preset but can be extremely divergent. In other words, any sense, any meaning of 
‘us’ and of ‘the Other’, and lastly any ‘common sense’, is only a certain type of sense, for 
which specific lines have to be laid down; the ‘making sense’ of something is not natural, 
monolithic, unified and universal. The frame chosen to make sense, consequently, is central to 
the possibilities  of action that can be visualized.  Emphasizing the importance of ‘making 
sense’ for establishing that frame of action remits lastly to the question of culture, or better of 
‘cultures’ as a key element of post-modern reflection. Attaching meaning to things is what 
enables us to engage with them, as well as it constrains our interaction. So is it equally when 
we deal with markers of (un-)development, like specific types of economy and law. In other  
words,  ‘development’,  a  ‘good’ economy,  a  ‘good’ law,  all  of  these  are  not  matters  of 
‘common sense’ but of one specific type of voluntarily established and maintained ‘common 
sense’  that  can  change.  Most  importantly,  attaching  meaning  determines  the  type  of 
engagement with any imaginable Other, be it the Third World, the First World, the global 
132 With ‘worlding’, Spivak refers to the fetishization of the ‘Third World’ that obfuscates the production that  
brought it about, as well as the disavowal that it produces (Kapoor 2004, 629).
182
South or North. Thus, the lines of meaning do not only mark the limits of “what and how we 
can and cannot do” but also determines the subaltern, the Other and the ‘underdeveloped’ as 
well as the ‘developed’ as such. Referring to Said's ‘Orientalism’, Kapoor concludes that “we 
produce the  Third  World  or  subaltern”  (Idem,  635).  Most  problematic,  however,  are  the 
parameters and mechanisms involved in this production, because “to a large extent”, he adds, 
“we produce them to suit our own image and desire”, so that we “construct the Other only in  
as  far  as  we want  to  know it  and control  it”  (Kapoor  2004,  635).  Continuing with  this 
argument, Kapoor (following Spivak) challenges the altruistic perspective on development aid 
arguing  that  the  concern  of  knowing  the  Other,  usually  with  support  of  anthropologists, 
ethnographers and native informants, is entangled equally with a question of power. To frame 
the Third World discursively, and for that matter any Other and any difference, aims lastly, to 
“have a more manageable Other”, as Kapoor puts it (Idem, 632). 
Continuing with the argument, that development organizations should not be seen as the 
realm of pure altruism, Kapoor argues that “the construction of development as ‘aid’ and 
‘assistance’  to  the  Third  World  is  belied  by  what  can  be  called  the  ‘business’  and 
‘conditionality’ of  development”  (Idem,  634).  In  this  sense,  he  details  the  case  of  the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), that, in order to justify the aid budget 
to  Canadian  ‘tax-payers’ “boast[s]  that  70  cents  on  every  Canadian  aid  dollar  returns  to 
Canada through the creation of jobs and the purchase of goods and services […], ant that such 
aid sustains 30.000 Canadian jobs and provides contracts to 2000 Canadian businesses, 50 
universities and 60 colleges” (CIDA cit. in Kapoor 2004, 634). In the end, it might be unclear 
if this aid helps the global South, but what becomes obvious is that it helps the Canadian 
helper, maintaining in the end the global inequality that it claims to level. Furthermore, as 
Kapoor argues, the aid program is laced with power by dint of its conditionality. While in this 
case the conditionality means “tying the recipient to procurement  of Canadian goods and 
services, in other cases […], it could mean [that] the recipient must buy into an ideological 
programme (neoliberalism) and carry out serious socioeconomic structural reform” (Idem). 
Important for us is the fact that the ascription to a new ideological program as well as the 
socioeconomic structural reform are mainly linked to the structures of social order, and thus to 
law and legal reform. Kapoor refers here exemplary to IMF structural adjustment programs. 
In the same sense, Kapoor adds that “an aid programme can be used as a pretext to open up 
developing-country markets  for  Western  businesses”  (Idem,  634).  In  this  vein,  he  recalls 
Spivak's  argument against the  promotion of  access to  new technologies by the World Bank, 
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stating  that  the  by-product  of  ‘selling  access  to  telecommunications-as-empowerment’ is 
capitalist penetration by global computing and telecommunications industries (Spivak 1999, 
419).
While the content of development programs and the interests of the helpers, based in the 
First World as well as in the Third World, are central to the critique on development, equally, 
the  form  and  process  of  development  programs  depict  the  power  relationship  in  which 
developed and developing, helper and helped are engaged. Through the technicality of this 
form  and  process,  the  power  relationship  remains  often  sublimated  by  an  alleged  and 
unquestioned  ‘good’,  ‘proper’,  ‘transparent’  way  of  doing  things.  Despite  the  apparent 
cultural neutrality of technicality, this aspect of development expresses equally the idea of 
what is best, and thus higher up in a linear and vertical hierarchy, what is the standard and 
what the abnormal. 
This  disciplinary  power  of  the  form  of  projects  is  rooted  in  the  outset  of  the 
development project. See, for example, the comment of one of the World Bank economists 
that participated in the first loan made to an ‘underdeveloped country’ in 1948, namely the 
financing of a project in Chile: “we found that what we had really was more of an idea about a 
project,  not  a  project  sufficiently  prepared  that  its  needs  for  finance,  equipment,  and 
manpower resources could be accurately forecast” (Escobar 1995, 86 cit. Meier). As Escobar 
concludes from this example, “for World Bank economists, this was a clear indication of how 
far they would have to go to bring Latin American social scientists and government officials 
to the point where they could prepare a satisfactory project proposal” (Escobar 1995, 86). 
Similarly, regarding the form and process of development programming, Kapoor underlines 
the argument of postdevelopment analysts, who maintain that the bureaucratic procedures and 
interests (like technical requirements, deadlines, budgetary time frames and funding priorities) 
“are integral to the disciplinary and regulatory character of development institutions” (Kapoor 
2004, 634). The construction and strengthening of the bureaucratic and technical apparatus 
allows for the maintenance of spaces for development workers. 
The most  important  aspect  of  this  critique for  the individual  helper  is  probably the 
recognition  of  the  impossibility  to  be  beyond  the  institutional  interests  and  the  whole 
mechanism that  links  them,  as  Spivak  emphasizes.  Moreover,  to  pretend  “to  have  pure, 
innocent  or  benevolent  encounters  with  the  subaltern  […]  is  to  perpetuate,  directly  or 
indirectly, forms of imperialism, ethnocentrism, appropriation” (Idem, 635). But what turns 
this  conclusion  even  more problematic, is  that this  impossibility  is  given  not only for the 
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classical  developmentalist,  but  also  for  the  post-developmentalists.  In  their  critique,  post-
developmentalists  argue that  ‘developmentalism’ does  not  listen to  the Third-World-Other 
envisaged merely as underdeveloped, and, that it, consequently, cannot answer to the existent 
needs. In doing this, however, the post-developmental researchers claim that they can see and 
present these needs more transparently. The problem posed is thus, if post-development is 
equally  at  the  search  for  a  benevolent  or  naive  encounter  with  the  Other  as  the 
developmentalism it criticizes. 
3.  Development as a Culture of Oppression and the Challenge of Listening  
While ‘The Post-Development Reader’ (1997) might not serve as the unique authoritative 
source  for  post-developmental  thinking,  a  thinking  that  claims  to  go  beyond  mainstream 
academic forms of communication, it does present a broad overview on some of the main 
fields of interest  of post-development researchers existent by the end of the 20th century. 
Looking at the included essays, following topics appear: the vernacular, development as a 
paradigm and a discourse as a whole and through specific fields and concepts like ‘growth’, 
the ‘state’, ‘education’, ‘science and knowledge’, ‘media’ and ‘technical assistance’, concrete 
practices  of  development  and  their  consequences,  and  the  creation  of  new  perspectives 
through social movements, grassroots actions and local ‘home’ perspectives.
Observing this broad field of topics and interest areas, we can say that one of the most 
important merits of the post-developmental approaches was to put development in connection 
with other discourses and fields of knowledge, putting them, in turn, in a new light. Most 
importantly,  post-developmental  arguments  refer  to  colonialism  as  a  power  relationship 
determined by the  unequal  value  attributed  to  differences  established primarily along the 
parameters  of  race and culture.  Secondly,  to  capitalism as  a  socio-economic and political 
system that  gravitates  around  the  value  of  monetary  capital,  and  thus  gives  a  particular 
meaning to  poverty while  at  the  same time creates  the  recipe  for  its  betterment,  namely 
messianic  assistance  and  philantropy.  Last  but  not  least,  postdevelopmental  researchers 
connected development with a scientificism that promised the optimization of life according 
to preset standards by following specific quantifiable parameters of truth. In all these spheres, 
concepts recovered from religion acquire special relevance, prominently ideas of salvation 
and sacrifice for the weak (Escobar 1995, 25).
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Importantly,  while  the  ideas  of  poverty and philantropical  assistance  explicit  in  the 
concept  of  ‘development  aid'133 derive  from  an  interest  for  the  social,  the  criticisms  of 
postdevelopmentalists  emphasize the importance of a cultural  perspective.  In other words, 
what is at  the center of attention is the power of (giving) meaning. Thus, in his  critique,  
Escobar  states,  for  example,  that:  “development  was  conceived  not  as  a  cultural  process 
(culture was a residual variable, to disappear with the advance of modernization) but instead 
as a system of more or less universally applicable technical interventions intended to deliver 
some ‘badly needed’ goods to a ‘target’ population” (Escobar 1995, 44). Answering to this 
perspective  that  had  a  very  constricted  perception  on  the  role  and  space  of  culture, 
postdevelopmentalists  put the realm of the symbols and their power at  the center of their 
attention, expanding the field of cultural research. The emphasis of their research relies, thus, 
in studying the mechanisms through which development as a historical construct becomes an 
active,  real  force  (Escobar  1995,  45).  Understanding these  mechanisms as  “structured  by 
forms of knowledge and power”, postdevelopmental research aims to study the “processes of 
institutionalization  and  professionalization”  (Idem)  that  sustain  development.  The 
mechanisms and procedures sought by these professionals are a central object of criticism 
because  of  their  intention  “to  make  societies  fit  a  preexisting  model  that  embodied  the 
structures and functions of modernity” (Idem, 52). Significantly, in questioning the idea that 
one model of good life is suitable for all diverse forms of life, postdevelopmentalists do not 
only put  the  ‘structures  and  functions  of  modernity’ in  question,  but  also  their  founding 
theoretical currents of structuralism and functionalism, aspiring to go beyond their bipolar 
debate through post-structuralist argumentation.
This radical critique of development and the discourse of the ‘Third World’ responded, 
as I have shown, to broader changes in the epistemological perspective during the last decades 
of the 20th century. It is not surprising, thus, that these critiques based explicitly or implicitly 
on the work of Michel Foucault and other researchers of discourse, specially in the field of 
post-colonial studies. Escobar refers exemplarily to works of Edward Said, V. Y. Mudimbe 
(*1941), Chandra T. Mohanty (*1955), and Homi Bhabba (Escobar 1995, 5).134 Equally, the 
anthropological revision that I have outlined above contributed to this change of perspective 
133 It  is  important  to underline that  nowadays,  the concept of ‘development aid’ has been replaced by the 
allegedly more politically correct ‘development cooperation’. While the use of the term ‘cooperation’ seems 
to respond adequately to some of the critiques presented by postdevelopmental authors, putting the ‘Third  
World’ in a cooperation effort amongst equals, it is not possible to say that this change in the name given to  
the project is reflected in the carrying out of the project itself.
134 Another good marker for the intellectual orientation of many of these authors is given by the use of certain 
words,  like  for  example  in  Wolfgang Sachs’ ‘The  Archeology of  the  Development  Idea’ (Sachs  1990, 
emphasis added).
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regarding development. Making use of discourse analysis and other tools in order to single out 
‘development’ “as  an  encompassing  cultural  space”,  postdevelopment  theorists  envisaged 
“development as a regime of representation” (Idem, 6).
Naturally, not only in their critique but also in their proposals, postdevelopmentalists 
aim to focus the “attention on values and institutional patterns – in short, on the symbolic 
universe of  society”,  instead  of  highlighting “the  physical  energy processes,  in  short,  the 
world of material quantities” as other proposals for revision of ‘development’ have (Sachs 
1999, 88). It is due to the importance given to the symbolic universe, that the possibility of 
imagination, and thus to reimagine the core elements of development, gives a strong impulse 
for post-developmentalist's projection into the future. ‘Reinventing the Present’, as one of the 
essays in ‘The Post-Development Reader’ is titled, invites thus to re-invent and re-imagine not 
only the future, but the present itself, and in this sense also the own as well as the Other's 
identities, subverting previous meanings of an occupied signifier. 
It is interesting that, in this title, Emmanuel Seni N'Dione and his colleagues call to 
reinvent  the  present,  putting  again  the  question  of  time  on  the  table.  While  modern 
development envisages an ought-to-be-future based on a specific (vectoral) understanding of 
the past, the authors situate themselves and the reader in the only moment where action is 
possible: the present. This calling for an awareness of the here and now can be understood as 
an answer to postmodern uncertainty. Equally, turning to the local level, Escobar underlines 
that “the concepts of development and modernity are resisted, hybridized with local forms, 
transformed, or what have you; they have,  in short,  a cultural  productivity [...]” (Escobar 
1995, 51). This never-ending culturally diverse re-shaping of universalistic proposals, like the 
development Escobar opposes, builds the hope that guides postdevelopmentalists’ vision of a 
new perspective.
Related  to  the  cultural  stance  of  post-development  scholars,  but  different  from it,  is  the 
systemic and relational perspective assumed in many of their works. This becomes evident, 
for example, in the exposition of Rahnema that I presented above, where he underlined the 
relation  between  diverse  interests  and  needs  that  result  in  the  efficacy  of  the  myth  of 
development (Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, ix f.). Similarly, Escobar affirms that development was 
“the result of the establishment of a set of relations among” certain perspectives on the need 
of economic growth and the position of underdeveloped countries in the world, institutions 
like  the  international  banks  and  the  international  organizations  in  general,  and  practices 
conformed by policies and programs of these institutions to enhance economic growth and 
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education oriented to foster modern cultural values (Escobar 1995, 40). In this sense, Escobar 
emphasizes that the establishment of these relationships and their systematization to form a 
whole,  formed the development discourse and gave it its own force.  The importance of a 
relational perspective is explicit in the following paragraph:
"The development discourse was constituted not by the array of possible objects 
under its domain but by the way in which, thanks to this set of relations, it was 
able  to form systematically the objects  of which it  spoke,  to  group them and 
arrange them in certain ways and to give them a unity of their own. To understand 
development as a discourse, one must look not at the elements themselves but at 
the  system  of  relations established  among  them.  [...]  The  system  of  relations 
establishes a discursive practice that sets the rules of the game: who can speak, 
from what points of view, with what authority, and according to what criteria of 
expertise; it sets the rules that must be followed for this or that problem, theory, or 
object  to  emerge  and be  named,  analyzed,  and  eventually  transformed  into  a 
policy of plan” (Escobar 1995, 40 f.; emphasis added).
Thus,  Escobar  argues  that  “what  is  included  as  legitimate  development  issues  may 
depend on specific relations established in the midst of the discourse”, for example, relations 
“between  procedures  of  assessment  of  needs  [...]  and  the  position  of  authority  of  those 
carrying the assessment (this may determine the proposals made and the possibility of their 
implementation)”  (Escobar  1995,  44).  Furthermore,  he  emphasizes  that  although  the 
development practice regulated by these relations “is not static, it continues to reproduce the 
same relations between the elements with which it deals” (Escobar 1995, 44).
It  is  this  emphasis  on the relations what  allows Escobar  to  state  that  “although the 
discourse has gone through a series of structural changes, the architecture of the discursive 
formation laid down in the period 1945-1955 has remained unchanged, allowing the discourse 
to adapt to new conditions” (Escobar 1995, 42). At a political level, this means that diverse 
development strategies have been put into practice over and over up to the present “always 
within the confines of the same discursive space” (Idem), this is a relational space, a space 
where a specific relation of power is acted out. It is because of this stable web of relations that 
development  discourse  achieved  a  certain  “coherence  of  effects”  that  was  central  to  “its 
success as a hegemonic form of representation” (Escobar 1995, 53).
While underlining the importance of the symbolic and the relational, it is important to 
emphasize that post-development critiques do not claim generally that development strategies 
did not benefit people at any time. Neither is the goal of post-developmentalists to reject a 
specific materiality of unsatisfied needs. Rather, their point is that this materiality, meaning 
the conditions “baptized as underdevelopment[,] must be conceptualized in different ways if 
the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced” (Escobar 1995, 53). 
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The  accent  of  the  critique  is  less  oriented  towards  a  missing  material  change,  which 
nevertheless has been a starting point for many of the postdevelopmental reflections. The 
question is rather the type of relations that the discourse of development produces and re-
produces. The point is that “the work of development institutions has not been an innocent 
effort on behalf of the poor. Rather, development has been successful to the extent that it has 
been able to integrate, manage, and control countries and populations in increasingly detailed 
and encompassing ways” (Escobar 1995, 46 f.). In other words, the established relationships 
have enhanced unilateral control rather than equal understanding and mutual recognition. The 
problem relies  therein  that  while  “development  assumes  a  teleology to  the  extent  that  it 
proposes that the ‘natives’ will sooner or later be reformed, at the same time, however, it  
reproduces  endlessly  the  separation  between  reformers  and  those  to  be  reformed  [...]. 
Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference [...]” (Escobar 
1995, 53 f.). Interestingly, the recognition of difference in this context is not only one of the 
interests of this postmodern critique, but it equally turns into a central aspect of the problem 
of ‘development’. It remains here clear that it is not the mere recognition of difference what 
poses a problem for development, but most importantly, a question of  the type of relations  
established with that difference.
Equally, it is possible to read in the line of relationality one of the central conclusions 
(and starting points for further inquiry) of postdevelopmental approaches, namely that “the 
ends  are  always  affected  by  the  means”  (Rahnema/Bawtree  2008,  xix).  Against  a 
Machiavellian oriented goal-perspective that can conceive of an abstract goal,  a relational 
perspective puts at its center the type of relations created in order to achieve a goal, while the 
goal itself is defined particularly in terms of a specific relation. It is this redefinition of the 
idea of development in terms of a non-hierarchical relation as well as in terms of the relation 
between economic development, respect for cultural diversity and environmental concerns, 
that Sachs advocates for focusing “the social imagination on the revision of goals, rather than 
on the revision of means” (Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, 297).
Despite all emphasis made on the importance of the symbolic level as well as on the relations 
of interdependence within a dynamic system, post-developmentalist approaches return often 
to questions of overcoming oppression in a structural sense. It seems to me that Rahnema 
made explicit quite well some important aspects of many post-developmentalist perspectives, 
when he stated that “depending on the oppressive regimes to which the subjugated belong – 
be they developmentalist,  totalitarian,  ‘post-totalitarian’ or fundamentalist  – people indeed 
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have their different ways of preparing for the day when they all together cry out ‘the emperor 
is naked!'” (Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, xviii f.). Firstly, he refers to oppression as a main aspect 
of the situations post-development deals with.  Interestingly,  he refers to an emperor,  thus 
equating the development-oppression to an empire-like situation. Moreover, in his account, he 
speaks of a selection of political forms of organization and includes development in the same 
group as a political form. Thirdly, he foresees a day in the future, when (finally!) liberation 
will come. And how will liberation come? Through a desperate speech act: people will cry 
out.  A speech  act  that  ‘they’ will  express  ‘all  together’,  regenerating  “the  old  ideal  of  a 
community” as he states some sentences before. What they will shout will be, like in the story, 
a truth that everybody knows but no one wants to state,  the naked truth,  an obvious and 
measurable truth, the real truth.
As it  is  easy to  notice in  the arguments  that  link development  with colonialism,  in  post-
developmentalist  works,  the concept  of oppression and the image of  victimization play a 
central role. Sentences like: “Millions of men and women were thus [through development] 
mortally wounded in their bodies and souls, falling en masse into a destitution for which they 
had never been culturally prepared” (Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, x) invoke the oppressive power 
of development, claiming equally for the need to overcome that oppression. In doing so, some 
post-developmentalist  approaches  end up calling back into discussion categories like “the 
Truth”,  even when they refer  to  an “autonomous capacity to search for” it  that  has  been 
colonized (Idem, xii; emphasis in the original). Only from the perspective of a truer truth, 
Rahnema can refer to a text in his postmodern reader as an ‘unbiased testimony’ (Idem, xiii). 
Thus, invoking equally hierarchical and modern models of organizing knowledge, Rahnema 
can warn resistance groups “not to fall into ideological traps, the false promises of which 
often prevent their followers from seeing things around them as they are, and to learn from 
their own experiences” (Idem, xvi; emphasis in the original). Thus, as we often found in other 
‘post'-argumentations, as well as in arguments for ‘legal pluralism’, an opposition between 
ideology and true reality is created, relegating into oblivion one of the central premises of 
post-modern critique that reality is only insofar as it is interpreted, created and constructed. 
Who  can  say  that  the  ‘own  experiences’  of  resistance  groups,  meaning  ‘their  own 
interpretations’ if interpretations can be owned at all, are more truthful than the developer's or 
the colonizer's ones? Rahnema can, because, putting himself outside of the struggle, he can, in 
an  ‘unbiased’  way,  observe, have  a clear  picture and  judge  from  the  distance. Taking 
this 
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stance,  we are now in the problem field of representation,  and the questions on who can 
represent, and how can that representation be authentic or at least adequate.
Being post-developmentalist's interest to question the power exercised by regimes of 
representation, it is worth remembering that one main problem in the realm of the research of 
colonial discourse and its link with development, has been “the suggestion that colonial power 
is possessed entirely by the colonizer, given its intentionality and unidirectionality” (Bhabha 
1990,  77).  Translating  this  to  the realm of  development,  the  danger  relies  therein,  to  see 
development advocates and development institutions as the only ones in power in front of 
powerless objects of development. The result of this perspective is, however, the re-silencing 
of the colonized/underdeveloped voices. 
There are different ways to deal with this threat. Firstly, it is possible to argue that the 
colonial subjects are resistant and thus active agents in a struggle. Secondly, it is possible to 
argue that the colonial subject is himself active and intentional in his own identification which 
might match colonial subjectivity. Escobar, on the other hand, concentrates on the resistance 
and the  struggle  to  create  alternative  ways  of  being  and doing.  However,  as  Spivak  has 
pointed  out,  it  is  equally difficult,  in  following these  strategies,  to  avoid  the tendency to 
essentialize the colonial subject, the West, the struggling Third World, etc. 
The problem of re-silencing colonized/underdeveloped voices, i.e. the question on the 
representability  of  the  colonized  Other,  the  subaltern  or  the  oppressed135,  presents  itself 
equally to the researcher, who, embedded in his own struggle for liberation and emancipation, 
can easily become himself a re-silencing instrument while using the same language that he 
criticizes. Similarly, Escobar, referring to Stacey Leigh Pigg, argues that, for anthropologists, 
“the task is to trace the contours and cultural effects of development without endorsing or 
replicating its terms” (Escobar 1995, 15). However, one of the basic criticisms stated against 
post-developmental critique is exactly that in taking the ‘not-anymore-underdeveloped’ under 
protection, emphasizing the value of the vernacular forms of knowledge of the ‘not-anymore-
Third-World’, their perspective turns not only essentialist but also patronizing, disregarding, 
in the end the subaltern's own voice. The basic problem is thus the impossibility to hear the 
subaltern's own voice, be it that we take a ‘native’, a colonial, or any other perspective. In this 
context,  Spivak  says,  referring  to  the  status  of  women  as  subaltern  (particularly  in  her 
critiques regarding “white  men saving brown women from brown men"),  that  “[b]etween 
135 Although Spivak makes a difference between otherness, oppression and subalternity, for our purpose, the 
important shared aspect of these categories is that they have been used in the realm of underdevelopment 
and the ‘Third World’, and that the response in front of them has been a similar call for liberation. The 
problematic of an authentic or adequate representation appears in any of these cases.
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patriarchy  and  imperialism,  subject-constitution  and  object-formation,  the  figure  of  the 
woman disappears”, thus putting subject-constitution and object-formation as two aspects of 
the same silencing of the subaltern (Spivak 1988a, 297, 306).136
These  representations  of  the  Third  World,  Spivak  argues,  conflate  two  related  but 
discontinuous meanings of ‘representation’ (1988a: 275-276): 1) ‘speaking for’, in the sense 
of political representation; and 2) ‘speaking about’ or ‘re-presenting’, in the sense of making a 
portrait” (Kapoor 2004, 628). More problematic even is the fact that through this conflation, 
the  participation  and  complicity  of  the  speaker  in  the  representational  process  is  made 
invisible. “Representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent” (1988a: 
275). Interestingly, Spivak notes that this is also the case for Western diasporics, like Spivak 
herself  as  well  as  Escobar  and  Kapoor,  who  can  easily  become  “complicitous  in  the 
perpetration of a ‘new orientalism'” (Kapoor 2004, 631 cit. Spivak).
While speaking for the Other, this is speaking for the subaltern, oppressed, colonized or 
underdeveloped  other,  might  be  the  echo  of  an  imperialist  voice,  placing  oneself  as  an 
outsider in front of an authentic or even exotic ‘insider’ is, in the eyes of Spivak, equally 
dangerous. Most importantly,  this is a way to “duck [the] own complicity in North-South 
politics,  often  hiding  behind  naïveté  or  lack  of  expertise,  all  the  while  congratulating 
themselves as the ‘saviors of marginality'” (Kapoor 2004, 631 cit. Spivak). As a result, “when 
the investigating subject, naively or knowingly, disavows its complicity or pretends it has no 
‘geo-political determinations’, it  does the opposite of concealing itself: it  privileges itself” 
(Kapoor 2004, 631). 
In  relation  with  this  argument,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  the  post-developmental 
critique against the authority of the (development) expert. The discourse of development in 
most of its expressions has been marked by the idea that there are experts who can address 
specific problems, be it experts in economics, in ‘poor economics’ as Kenneth named it, in 
social issues, in education, in legal engineering, in health, etc. While “the professionalization 
of development [...] made it possible to remove all problems from the political and cultural 
realms and to recast them in terms of the apparently more neutral realm of science” (Escobar 
1995, 45), at the same time, the political and cultural realms themselves turned into expert's 
136 This  short  discussion  of  subject-constitution  and  object-formation  reminds  of  Boal's  struggle  with  a  
Hegelian conception of the theatrical character and the Brechtian objectified character (Boal 2010,137 ff.). 
As a consequence of his critique, Boal searches for the own voice of the ‘oppressed’, which is to come 
through their action on stage.  In  fact  the whole discussion on the representations of the ‘Third World’ 
reminds  over  and  over  of  Boal's  work,  since  it  is  from  the  same  concern  for  misrepresentation  and 
disavowal, that Boal invites the ‘oppressed’ of his ‘Theater of the Oppressed’ to speak and act himself. For a 
more detailed account of Boal's work, see chapter C, section I.
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knowledge. Lastly, development as such became a field of interdisciplinary expertise, where, 
for example, it became natural that “institutions such as the United Nations [...] had the moral, 
professional, and legal authority to name subjects and define strategies” (Escobar 1995, 41). 
Emulating  Illich's  and  Freire's  critiques  on  education,  the  basic  objection  of  post-
developmentalists against this world of experts is that their authority sublimates at the same 
time, the own capacity of the ‘poor’ and the ‘Third World’ to recognize and deal with their  
own needs in their own way.
In response to this system of experts,  post-developmentalists pretend to introduce in 
their  intellectual  endeavors,  a  different  attitude.  Thus,  Rahnema explains his  intentions  in 
front of the various authors he and his colleagues convoked for the compilation of ‘The Post-
Development Reader’ as follows: “we acted from the beginning as if we were inviting them 
[the authors] to a gathering of  friends [...]. It was important for us to think that even when 
they  disagreed  with  each  other,  they  did  so  as  friends,  not  as  experts  or  specialists” 
(Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, xi; emphasis in the original). But not only the authors are friends 
among  themselves.  Moreover,  Rahnema  underlines  that  the  demand  for  the  reader  he  is 
introducing came from a growing number of development students who “were eager to have a 
view  of  development  from  the  perspective  of  the  ‘losers’ and  their  friends”  (Idem,  x). 
Unnamed  remain  however,  the  ‘non-friends’,  who  necessarily  lack  a  voice  in  a  post-
development  reader,  namely the advocates of development  amongst  others.  This silencing 
might  be  absolutely  justified,  however,  the  seemingly  open  attitude  of  these  non-experts 
obviates the implicit expertise they allege in front of the silenced developer. They, as non-
experts take authoritative decisions when they chose to quote one and not another author, one 
of the alleged oppressed vernacular voices and not one of the alleged oppressors. In the same 
line,  the  editor  of  the  post-development  reader  claims  to  gather  articles  that  share  three 
characteristics, namely, they are: 1) subversive, in the sense that they look at a situation “'from 
the other side'; this is, the side of ‘people who have to die so that the system can go on'”  
(Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, xi, ref. to Arns); 2) human-centered, representing “a perception of 
reality from the perspective of the human beings involved in the processes of change"; and 3) 
radical in the sense that they aim to go to the roots of the questions (Idem, xii). Hence, these 
non-experts are allegedly much closer to the revolutionary, the human and the truth, in the 
same way as their friends, ‘the losers’, are.
It is no surprise, hence, that post-developmentalists have been often confronted with 
charges of romanticism, essentialism and misrepresentation. This critique refers not only to 
the romanticism and essentialism of the ‘objects of development’, but also for the alleged 
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friends and intellectual supporters as well as for the dominating subjects of this discourse. 
Take, for example, the use of the term ‘the West’, that has been repeatedly used by Escobar, 
Esteva and Kapoor in the examples I have presented above. In a similar sense, Rahnema, 
when presenting David Shi's article ('The Searchers after the Simple Life'), speaks of roots of 
‘simple living’ of ‘vernacular societies’ in “the history of the West, from the early Greeks to 
modern Americans”, thus reinforcing the validity of vague but powerful terms like ‘West’ to 
organize a debate that is trying to underline the value of cultural diversity. Being the United 
States a paramount example for pluriculturality in many of its senses, to label ‘Americans’ 
first as ‘Americans’ and then as ‘West’ seems rather counterproductive. The ‘West’ ends up 
being a  unifying  category repeated over  and over  again,  letting aside  the diverse aspects 
included within it.137 This essentialism leads, lastly, to the opposition of two incommensurable 
sides of the dichotomy. On the one side of the boxing ring are the development-oppressed and 
their friends and, on the other side, the development-oppressors, (who according to this model 
probably  do  not  have  any  sense  for  friendship).  Consequently,  these  postdevelopmental 
friends of the ‘losers’ are part of a battle and have a clearly demarcated group of enemies. In 
doing so, they remain within a dichotomy that is at the base of the same oppression they want 
to get rid of.
Regarding these questions of representation, it is important to underline the relationship 
between Escobar's and Kapoor's (based on Spivak's) arguments. All these authors refer to the 
discourses of the Third World and of development as discourses that produce themselves a 
power-relationship, deceiving lastly the alleged aims of development. Equally, they refer to 
developmentalism as a continuation of colonialism and imperialism, and, consequently, search 
for the voice of the subaltern of the Third World. However, Kapoor argues that Escobar's 
“anti-development stance issues in a blanket endorsement of social movements as political 
alternative”,  romanticising  the  ‘local’  and  presenting  social  movements  as  intrinsically 
benign, essentializing them through a monolithic representation, and forgetting thereby the 
real strive for development that many of the very diverse Third World movements depict. 
According to Kapoor, thus, Escobar, as well as Vandana Shiva (*1952)attempt “to produce an 
‘authentic’ and ‘heroic’ subaltern” (Kapoor 2004, 638). Finally, Kapoor continues, the critique 
of  development  raised  by  these  authors  depends  on  an  “hyperbolic  construction  of  the 
137 In  the same line,  it  is  important  to  remember,  that,  while  the argument made most commonly put  the  
responsibility for silencing the subaltern on the ‘First World’ or the ‘West’, Spivak as well as Kapoor argue 
that beyond geographical differences, the new global culture of management and finance equally tends to 
set  dichotomies  that  work  “projecting  developmentalist/ethnocentric  mythologies  onto  the  subaltern” 
(Kapoor 2004, 630). Thus, Spivak claims, that “it is as if, in a certain way, we [Western diasporics] are 
becoming complicitous in the perpetration of a ‘new orientalism'” (Kapoor 2004, 631 cit. Spivak).
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subaltern” inspired by the “desire of the intellectual to be benevolent or progressive” (Idem). 
Thus,  Escobar is,  in  Kapoor's  opinion, ultimately also silencing the subaltern,  because he 
“gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for 
this subject of knowledge “ (Idem cit. Spivak). 
In this sense, Kapoor underlines that decolonization is an unfinished project even in the 
cusp of post-developmental arguments. In other words, also the search for emancipation of the 
oppressed and the subaltern, ends up being an act of oppression of the subaltern. It is very 
interesting  for  our  purpose  that  Kapoor  stresses  the  value  of  Spivak's  critique  when she 
reveals “the extent and depth of anti-oppression thinking/acting that we all have yet to learn” 
(Kapoor 2004, 639). Kapoor claims, thus, that what we need to do is to develop this type of 
‘anti-oppression’. But if the engagement with the subaltern requires the creation of a subject 
and of a subaltern,  oppression will  be present,  even in  order  to develop ‘anti-oppression’ 
thinking and acting. Equally, it is necessary to ask for the meaning of this anti-oppression. The 
prefix ‘anti-’ denotes an opposition as well as an attitude of rejection. In other words, anti-
oppression means to try to get rid of oppression. Does Kapoor's message ends up thus into the 
paradox of calling for the oppression of oppression? In other words, Kapoor is caught in the 
same struggle  that  pacifist  movements  have  to  deal  constantly  with.  From a  dichotomic 
perspective on peace vs. violence, peace advocates cannot ever fight for anything, reducing 
themselves to passivity, stasis and objectification. Fighting for the end of violence, is, as well 
as the oppression of oppression, oxymoric expressions of a paradoxical call.
What remains clear after this short review, is that one basic problem of the postmodern 
approach to development relies therein that, on the one hand, it cannot, according to its own 
premisses, conceive of a transparent representation, but, on the other hand, it nevertheless 
conceives of an oppressor,  or an oppressive discourse, from which the oppressed need to 
liberate themselves. Moreover, the postmodern approaches have to emphasize this need to 
overcome oppression,  if  they do not  want to end in  indifference and cynicism. However, 
overcoming oppressionemulates  the modern responses criticized by postdevelopmentalists. 
Despite the contradiction that these modern responses produces in the post-modern argument, 
this is the attitude that can be found in Rahnema's introduction as well as in many other texts, 
as I have shown in the above analysis of Derrida's call for justice.
One of  the problems that  appear,  when we assume that  all  the  categories  we can  use to 
interpret  and  thus  engage  with  the  Other,  result  in  his  silencing,  and  thus  in  violence, 
oppression and justice, is that communication seems impossible. With the intention to defend 
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themselves from the criticisms of essentialism or cynicism amongst others, and to find a way 
out  from the  dilemma between violence  or  ostracism,  many critics  of  development  have 
formulated different answers and proposals to engage with the Other and his/her needs that I 
will address in the following paragraphs.
In the context of post-developmental arguments, is especially interesting the analysis 
that Kapoor makes of Arturo Escobar's work and the dialogue that Escobar establishes with 
the critics on postdevelopment. Although Escobar did not refer explicitly to the analysis of 
Kapoor that I presented above, he answered to similar critiques in his later writings (Escobar 
2000;  2006).  To  start  with,  he  identifies  three  main  argumentative  strategies  of  critiques 
against  post-developmental  approaches  which  take  three  different  banners,  namely:  1) 
arguments in the name of the ‘real’, 2) arguments in the name of a (better) theory, and 3) 
arguments in the name of ‘the people’. According to Escobar, these are expressions of the 
contrasting  paradigmatic  orientations  taken  in  contemporary  debates  on  development. 
Addressing the first main criticism, which claims that postdevelopomentalism forgets about 
the ‘real’ problem of capitalism (and which is not presented by Kapoor), Escobar argues that it 
is based on a naive defense of the real (Escobar 2006a, 448), more explicitely, it bases “on the 
(Marxist or liberal) assumption that discourse is not material, failing to see that modernity and 
capitalism  are  simultaneously  systems  of  discourse  and  practice”  (Idem,  449).  Thus,  the 
starting point for this critique rests on a different conception of the “nature of social reality 
[...]  and  about  the  character  of  political  practice  and  the  agent  of  social  transformation” 
(Escobar 2000, 12). In other words, the critics reject to accept the “importance of language 
and meaning in the creation of reality” (Idem) resulting from the lingusitic turn at the end of 
the 20th century. 
Secondly,  Escobar  refers  to  the  question  on  the  homogeneity  of  the  concept  of 
development that post-developmentalist's formed as their object of critique, expressing his 
clear  acknowledgment  of  the  diversity  emphasized  by  other  theories  and  their  proposed 
‘developments’.  Equally,  he  underlines  that  these  criticisms  that  pluralize  the  concept  of 
development,  could  develop,  to  a  great  extent,  because  of  the  deconstruction  of  the 
development  discourse  provided  by  post-developmentalists.  Nevertheless,  he  argues  that 
while  other  currents  intend  to  offer  truthful  representations  of  the  real  and  thus  made 
emphasis on the diversity of developments, the “poststructuralist project” intended to debunk 
the  existent  “capitalocentrism  in  political  economy”  (Escobar  2000,  13).  This  project 
intended, thus, to analyze “the overall discursive fact, not how it might have been contested 
and hybridised on the ground”, as a way to construct “an object of critique for both scholarly 
196
and  political  action  and  debate”  (Escobar  2006a,  449).  He  refers  in  this  context  to  the 
particular  needs  existent  in  the  historical  moment  of  conceptualization  of  the 
postdevelopmental  critique,  and  points  out  later  to  the  contemporary  need  to  overcome 
paradigmatic  differences  amongst  the  critical  approaches  in  order  to  encourage  an  inter-
paradigmatic dialogue.  In this  sense,  instead of positioning postdevelopment against  other 
theories, Escobar's proposal is to open the field of criticism and enter in a productive dialogue 
with these diverse perspectives.
While  the  strategy of  critique  against  postdevelopmentalism under  the  label  ‘in  the 
name of the people’ can take many forms, e.g. suggesting that “what is at stake is livelihood 
and people's needs”, or that postdevelopmentalists “patronize ‘the people’ and overlook their 
interests”, Escobar depicts this critique as being a “reflection of the chronic realism of many 
scholars who invariably label as romantic any radical critique of the West or any defence of 
‘the  local'”  (Escobar  2006a,  449).  This  strategy  of  argumentation  against  post-
developmentalism,  that  is  used  for  the  claim  that  it  is  ‘the  people’  who  build  social 
movements in search of development and that there exist power-relationships that cannot be 
avoided just by claiming a ‘post'-era, is linked to the realism of the first strategy mentioned. 
While Escobar claims that this strategy leads to a confusion between actual commodities, that 
might  be  desired  by ‘the  people’ and  the  search  for  development,  regarding  the  specific 
question of power, he also underlines that “in this strategy, there is a triumph of the realpolitik  
at  the  expense  of  other  visions  of  the  possible”  (Escobar  2000,  13).  This  formulation  is 
interesting because it puts in the center of the argument the need for a pluralizing way to 
envisage not only our present,  but also its  developments into unknown futures.  While the 
realpolitik,  a current in tune with legal positivism, claims to deal with the ‘hard truth’ of 
power, Escobar underlines the search for other forms of visualizing social relations in a way 
by which power, in the sense of realpolitik, is not excluded but it is neither the only element 
worth mentioning. This remark positions Escobar in an attempt for transcending the limits of 
poststructuralism,  emphasizing  that  the  treatment  of  development  proposed  within  this 
scheme of thoughtresponded to a specific political strategy in order to address epistemological 
and political needs of a concrete moment. It is no coincidence, thus, that one of his main texts 
for  this  discussion  is  titled  ‘Beyond  the  Search  for  a  Paradigm?  Post-Development  and 
Beyond’ (2000). Equally, in his later text of 2006, he welcomes the paradigmatical debate as a 
contribution “to the creation of a lively climate for more eclectic and pragmatic approaches”, 
adopting  elements  from  various  paradigms  in  a  context  of  “growing  inter-paradigmatic 
dialogue” (Escobar 2006a, 449 f.).
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Furthermore,  Escobar  argues  that  “if  we  [post-developmental  theorists]  refused  to 
theorize about ‘how things must be instead’, it was not because of a relativizing conceit [...],  
but precisely because, in the spirit of poststructuralist genealogies, we see all too well how 
this  normative  stance  has  always  been  present  in  all  development  discourses,  even  if 
naturalized  and  normalized”  (Escobar  2000,  13).  Nevertheless,  according  to  Escobar,  the 
journey through  the  discussion  of  a  variety  of  paradigms  on  development,  including  the 
postdevelopmental  approach, has importance by itself  “as a journey of the imagination,  a 
dream about the utopian possibility of reconceiving and reconstructing the world from the 
perspective of, and along with, those subaltern groups that continue to enact a cultural politics 
of difference as they struggle to defend their places, ecologies, and cultures” (Escobar 2000, 
14). He envisages, thus, a place beyond the post-structuralist discussion of post-development.
In this context, Escobar underlines equally the importance of the emerging awareness 
that “another development”, different from the “kind offered by neoliberalism”, is possible 
(Escobar  2006a,  450).  In  the  process  of  engaging  with  post-development,  he  argues,  the 
production of  knowledge itself  has  changed,  putting an end to  the  “dominance  of  expert 
knowledge over the terms of the debate” on development (Idem). He emphasizes in this sense 
the knowledge produced by social movements that do not accept the conventional notion of 
development, urging to rethink the base of globalization and other aspects of the neo-liberal 
developmental  agenda.  It  is  in  the  engagement  with  the  “intellectual  and  political  trends 
among the movements” that Escobar envisages the role of scholars like himself to deal with 
contemporary reality,  without forgetting the “always important aim of rethinking our own 
perspectives” (Idem, 451).
The encounter that Escobar envisages with social movements in pursue of the creation 
of new perspectives on development, is, thus, similar to the ethical encounter visualized by 
Kapoor through the reading of Spivak. Consequently, Kapoor's text of 2004, ends with a list 
of elements that he recovers from Spivak's work, and which yield “the possibility of an ethical 
encounter with the subaltern” (Kapoor 2004, 640). In so doing, Kapoor attempts to strengthen 
the claim that  “deconstruction can lead ‘to  much better  practice'” (Kapoor 2004, 639 cit. 
Spivak), arguing that while the musing, deconstructive style [of Spivak] tends to be averse” to 
a  systematical  layout  of  this  better  practice,  it  is  possible  to  “cull”  from her  writings  an 
emerging approach that allows for the desired ethical encounter. The deconstructivist position 
is, as he argues, “followed  by a process of self-implication” (Idem, 640; emphasis added). 
Taking this further step, Kapoor regains the hope of the reader to include deconstructivism 
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and the whole poststructuralist criticisms into a creative engagement with the Other and the 
realities we live in. 
Importantly, while Escobar claims the end of the reduction of knowledge production to 
the development experts and thus the need to a sincere engagement with social movements, 
hearing and caring for their voices, Kapoor underlines with John Beverly that “if the subaltern 
could speak in a way that really mattered to us, that we would feel compelled to listen to, it 
would not be subaltern” (Kapoor 2004, 639). In both contributions, the authors stress, thus, 
the ability to listen, which completes the speech act (a feature at the center of postmodern 
research) in the frame of a communicative situation. With this remark, Kapoor emphasizes 
thus, that Spivak's argument is not disabling of the subaltern but proactive in calling attention 
for the need to re-learn to listen.
The criticisms regarding the lack of proposals for concepts of development, which could 
replace the one postdevelopmentalists criticized, argued against theorists like Escobar, have 
been also addressed against Spivak's critiques on the silencing of the subaltern. Bart Moore-
Gilbert  (*1952)  argued,  for  example,  that  “while  Spivak is  excellent  on ‘the  itinerary of 
silencing’ endured by the subaltern,  particularly historically,  there is  little attention to the 
process by which the subaltern's ‘coming to voice’ might be achieved” (Moore Gilbert 1997, 
106),  thus  paralyzing  the  researcher.  Against  this  understanding,  Kapoor  presents  five 
Spivakian proposals to engage in this process of self-implication in order to build an ethical 
encounter with the subaltern in the development theory and practice (Kapoor 2004, 639 ff.).
These proposals consist, firstly, in developing deconstructive critique from the inside of 
the structures inhabited by the researcher or practitioner, since it is only being inside and 
acknowledging that relation, that it is possible to avoid a disavowal of one's complicities. In 
the context  of development,  and referring explicitly to Escobar's  work,  Kapoor reads this 
invitation as a way of cautioning postdevelopment critics against “throwing the baby out with 
the bathwater by being uncompromisingly ‘anti-development’ and arguing for ‘alternatives to  
development'”  (Kapoor 2004,  640 cit.  Escobar).  Kapoor thus  claims that  it  is  possible  to 
“retrieve from within [the ‘development business'] an ethico-political orientation to the Third 
World and the subaltern” (Kapoor 2004, 640 f.). Although he does not continue this argument 
in his text, it is worth asking how far is it possible to question institutions like the World Bank 
or the IMF from within, specially regarding the relationship they establish with the so called 
Third  World,  if  the  whole  structure  is  based  on  a  representation  of  the  Other  as 
underdeveloped  and  is  directed  by  the  interests  of  specific  groups.  Does  criticizing 
international organizations from the inside automatically makes their development work more 
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ethical? Certainly, the call of Spivak invites to reflect on the own position within the system. 
But the rescue mission of international development institutions that Kapoor begins on that 
base is, clearly, an interpretation that not everybody needs to follow.
As an implicit answer to this concern, Kapoor accepts that these institutions “may well 
be ‘imperialistic’ organisations” and thus adds to his argument the possibility to make them 
accountable to the subaltern (Idem, 641). While accountability might be an important step for 
developing more  trust  in  the  institutions  and strengthening them,  the  question  remains  if 
development institutions and the subaltern will have to stand in front of each other for ever,  
and even more, if the making of a ‘good livelihood’ necessarily has to do with international 
financial institutions that gather states around projects on development. 
While development “may indeed have become a shady business”, as Kapoor (2004, 
640) states, the question is not only if we can make this business accountable, but also if 
development itself can be conceived, experienced and created beyond business. Boldly stated, 
what if the subaltern envisages his own development in a way that does not consider business, 
or money, or the IMF? An “ethico-political orientation to the Third World and the subaltern”, 
as  the one Kapoor wants to  retrieve (Idem),  might  require  from the current  development 
agents,  in  fact,  to  transform themselves,  their  view,  their  position  and  their  capacity  of 
imagination. Naturally,  Kapoor's call  for accountability and his intention to retrieve ethics 
from the shady business of development, a development that he conceives as singular, derives 
from his own position in the field at  stake.  While embedded in development through his 
engagement with projects of the CIDA and UNDP amongst others, it is not surprising that he 
writes  from  that  experience  and  for  that  type  of  development  workers.  Equally,  in  his 
academic endeavor, the choice of the ‘Third World Quarterly’ for his periodical publications, 
sets equally the frame of reference of his work. But that does not mean that all relevant forms 
of growth and development must be thinkable in this frame. The criticism from within might 
as well imply that we expand the limits of the possible in our minds first, revising the goals 
and means of the institutions we take part in.
Nevertheless, what remains important is that the call of Spivak for the critique of the 
structures that we “inhabit intimately”, advocates for an engagement with the subaltern from 
within, and invites us to deal with our own space, and somehow with our own subalternity in 
the  structures  we  criticize.  Equally,  she  invites  to  developing  ourselves  by  “persistently 
transforming  conditions  of  impossibility  into  possibility”  (Spivak  1988b,  201).  This 
transformation  can  be  pursued  for  any  type  of  development  concept  or  strategy.  Most 
importantly,  this  proposal  presents  a  first  big  step  in  the  passage  from the  paradigm of 
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solution of conflicts to a new transformative perspective. In other words, she invites us to be 
aware,  reflective  and  proactive  regarding  a  change  that  does  not  pursue  a  particular 
pre-established goal, but moreover is determined by the own understanding of what each one 
of us desires as a transformation. 
After  emphasizing the importance of a  criticism from within,  Kapoor,  emphasizes a 
related issue, namely the need for “acknowledging complicity” and being “unscrupulously 
vigilant” regarding the structures and discourses that conform our view on things (Kapoor 
2004,  641).  This  vigilance  obliges,  in  turn,  to  “retrace  the  history and  itinerary of  one's  
prejudices and learned habits [...],  stop thinking of oneself  as better  or fitter,  and unlearn 
dominant  systems of knowledge and representation” (Idem).  In  the words  of  Spivak,  this 
requires a “transformation of consciousness” (Kapoor 2004, 641 cit. Spivak), and thus a deep 
and  personal  transformation  of  those  who  want  to  transform.  This  internal,  mental,  and 
somehow ethereal  development  of  the  developers  leads  further  to  “stopping oneself  from 
always  wanting  to  correct,  teach,  theorise,  develop,  colonise,  appropriate,  use,  record, 
inscribe, enlighten” the Other, the subaltern, the Third World or the underdeveloped (Kapoor 
2004, 642). In turn, the sincere atmosphere resulting from this change, allows a more humble 
openness in front of the Other and a more clear recognition of the needs at stake, including the 
needs of the observer.
What Kapoor (still building on Spivak) develops as a third strategy under the name of 
“learning to learn from below” refers in fact to the need for an openness to listen to and 
recognize the validity of the ways of the Other to address his needs. Needs, goals and means 
assumed as universally valid become, from this perspective, relative. In this context, Spivak 
refers explicitly to the concepts of ‘nation’, ‘democracy’ or ‘participation’, all of them clearly 
related with contemporary ideas of legal development, calling for caution against assuming 
the universal usefulness of these terms while forgetting that they were “written elsewhere, in 
the  social  formations  of  Western  Europe”  (Kapoor  2004,  642  cit.  Spivak).  A  sincere 
engagement with the Other requires that we put these concepts in standby, as well as their  
status as universal values that seem to be realizable only through the incorporation of specific 
strategies.
Developing the capacity to ‘learn to learn’ is closely related to Spivak's point on the 
importance  of  “working  ‘without  guarantees'”  (Idem,  644),  this  is  to  detach  from 
expectation.138 In this sense, the voice of the subaltern might as well be expressed through 
138 This premise seems to be opposite to Habermas’ approach presented in chapter A, which puts at its base the 
assumption and the guarantee of certain aspects of communication.
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his/her silence. There is no guarantee regarding the question if we will understand the Other's 
language.  The  ‘non-speakingness’ and  the  ‘non-narrativisability’ of  the  subaltern  can  be 
aspects of the Other's difference that emphasize “the impossibility of knowing it, accepting 
that it exceeds our understandings or expectations” (Idem). In terms of development, Kapoor 
understands this, on the one hand, as a call to learn to be open regarding “the limits of our  
knowledge systems” (Idem). On the other hand, however, he sees in this lack of guarantees 
equally  a  need  to  be  open  regarding  the  idea  of  “enabling  the  subaltern  while  working 
ourselves  out  of  our  jobs”  (Idem).  Although this  last  statement  makes  sense  in  terms  of 
accepting the failure of understanding as the success of the empowerment of the subaltern as 
having agency over him/herself, it does leave the reader with a certain awkward feeling. Does 
the subaltern needs to be enabled? Whose success is his silence? Does developmental work 
stops when the subaltern ‘speaks’ – or when we hear him/her? Only the kind of development 
job that Kapoor envisages becomes then useless, because it is a job that is never done by the 
one in the process of development.
Interesting  for  us  is  especially  Spivak's  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  opening 
ourselves  to  our  imagination  and  to  surprise,  which  Kapoor  sets  as  a  fifth  strategy.  The 
openness to be surprised is  what  happens when we listen without particular expectations; 
imagination takes place when we can envisage that what I understand and see as possible is 
just  one  of  many options.  Abandoning at  least  some of  the  pre-established boxes  of  our 
established knowledge, we allow ourselves to develop common and new categories and ways 
of understanding with the Other. In terms of development, this strategy calls, thus, to allow 
ourselves to be surprised by the perspectives and strategies we encounter in the pursue of a 
‘good life’, and, at the same time, to find strategies to enhance our imagination in order to 
understand and respond to the conflicts we perceive in this pursue. 
These five strategies are, in my opinion, Spivak's and Kapoor's versions of Escobar's 
wish to trascend paradigmatic opposition, in order to engage with political and intellectual 
trends among social movements. In this sense, the calls of these authors are similar. However, 
Kapoor  addresses  some  important  difficulties  regarding  the  particular  meaning  of  these 
strategies for the praxis of development. For example, while Kapoor underlines that Spivak 
does present forms of ethical encountering with the subaltern, he criticizes that her argument 
lacks “any adjudicative mechanism for sorting among and between greater goods and lesser 
evils”  (Kapoor  2004,  643).  Arguing  for  the  practical  need  to  make  decisions  on  which 
activities are more benign, he wishes to have a tool to distinguish between varying degrees of 
complicity. In other words, he argues for the hierarchization of complicities: Is a complicity 
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with the IMF better  or  worse than a  complicity with  a  local  NGO? Certainly,  this  is  no 
question that an approach that values the personal journey and the particular encounter can 
respond to in a general  manner.  The question of Kapoor,  again,  only makes sense in the 
context  he  is  coming from and which  he  envisages  as  the place  where development  and 
development struggles take place: institutionalized international development aid. Thus, he 
imagines  an  advocacy  group  that  has  to  spend  “efforts  and  resources”  efficiently  for 
“organising against” diverse activities  (Kapoor 2004, 643). The need for finding degrees of 
complicity that he argues derives from the purposes he has in mind, which are “strategising 
and  prioritising”,  and  finally  justifying  decisions.  Firstly,  it  is  important  to  observe  that 
Kapoor imagines a group that is trying to do something, basically to speak, for the subaltern, 
because  if  the  advocacy  group  he  imagines  was  formed  or  intimately  linked  with  the 
‘subalterns’ themselves, the question would be probably easier to answer: The strategy which 
allows the subaltern to find the most suitable place according to himself, is clearly the best 
one. A different advocacy group has probably a more difficult task, but the tools that Spivak 
gives, are in fact sufficient from a perspective of post-colonial studies that aims at the ethical 
encounter  with  the  subaltern:  The more that  a  system allows for  “learning to  learn  from 
below”, and thus to listen to the subaltern, completing the speech act and transforming it into 
a moment of communicative encounter, as well as inviting for a change of the speaker and 
encouraging to  review the  own truths,  is  the  most  adequate  from the  viewpoint  of  post-
colonialist subaltern studies. The problem of Kapoor results from his need to engage in the 
development of the subaltern, making of the encounter with the subaltern a tool, a mean, and 
not the main goal. 
His argument shows, in this point, a clear modern vein, with a certain economic aura. 
Thus, he writes about ‘degrees’ of complicity, about the need for strategising and prioritising 
actions  according to  an ‘assessment  of  more  or  less  benign’ activities,  about  ‘efforts  and 
resources’ that can be better or worse ‘spent’, and about a need to organize ‘against’ certain 
activities. While his arguments might be pertinent for the needs  of a practitioner of modern 
development, they follow nevertheless a linear perspective that goes from evil to good, and 
from having resources to their devaluation through use. It is no wonder, then, that, in this 
modern  impetus,  he  emphasizes  the  need to  find  “an  adjudicative  mechanism for  sorting 
among and between greater goods and lesser evils” (Kapoor 2004, 643; emphasis added). In 
doing this, however, he shifts the attention from entering into a common dialogue to achieving 
a better development.
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Equally, Kapoor questions the impracticability of Spivak's call for a “necessity of a one-
to-one relationship for it to be intimate, caring and non-exploitative” in all sorts of institutions 
(Kapoor 2004, 643). Thus, he asks “[h]ow does a personalised and micrological approach 
translate into institutional or macrological politics?” (Idem). The easiest answer is probably: it 
does not, an intimate relationship does not translate into the type of development that Kapoor 
imagines,  nor  in  the  institutional  or  macrological  politics  that  could  make it  effective.  A 
macrological politic of intimate relationships could be envisaged as a politic that encourage 
this  caring  exchange,  a  politic  that  is  embedded  itself  in  an  organization  built  on  non-
exploitative personal relationships. Most certainly, this is a question that needs to be answered 
very differently in each context. Kapoor's question, in the end, does not refer to the possibility 
of  macrological  politics  based  on  Spivak's  proposals,  but  to  the  possibility  of  achieving 
development  through  a  personalized  and  micrological  approach  or  the  correspondent 
institutional macropolitics. The doors of imagination for envisaging a macro-level through 
which a transformative encounter is made possible, however, are wide open.
In the line of these proposals, the questions on oppression and who actually is the victim have 
been reflected in a new manner in the latest phase of post-developmental engagement. In this 
sense, Illich underlines the idea that to be ‘a victim’ is not reduced to the worn-out categories 
of the underprivileged ‘masses’, but that to be a ‘victim’ of development can equally happen 
as an expression of privilege in the logic of development. The privilege of being well insured 
can derive thus in the unreflected abdication over the ownership of one's body, the privilege of 
education  can derive in  the  loss  of  awareness  of  the ownership of  vernacular  knowledge 
(Rahnema/Bawtree 2008, 108). However, it is clear that “these and their like got what they 
asked for; their fate was not imposed on them” (Idem). Regarding other types of ‘victims’, 
Illich answers countering the idea of a ‘social responsibility’ to engage with ‘the powerless’. 
In this sense, referring particularly to the first attempts of critical appraisal of development, 
Illich asserts that “the ‘social responsibility’ that once motivated us was itself the result of a 
belief in the same progress that spawned the idea of development. Social responsibility, we 
now know, is but the soft  underbelly of a weird sense of power through which we think 
ourselves capable of making the world better” (Idem). In this sense, Illich recognizes himself 
as relatively powerless, and in doing so, the concept of an Other as ‘victim’ or ‘oppressed’ 
turns questionable.
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The dialogue between Rahnema and Illich during the interview I referred to in the last 
paragraph, is specially interesting because it shows two different perspectives within post-
developmental  critique.  While  Rahnema  returns  over  and  over  to  concepts  like  ‘victim’, 
asking if there is “any chance for the victims [of development] to change their mind” (Idem, 
107),  or formulating romantic  and past-oriented sounding questions like if  “there are  still 
some untapped spaces left [...] where the old species of virtue have a chance to grow safely”,  
Illich's answers recall over and over the need for a more radical change of perspective. In fact, 
in  his  argument,  he  moves  the  center  of  attention  from  the  ‘other-victims’ to  the  ‘us-
powerless’, and turns ‘untapped spaces’ into the continuously reemerging moment of the very 
present,  where  a  personal  complementarity  can  grow in  a  world  marked  by living  ‘after 
virtue’.
It is remarkable, that, being Illich recognized by many as the founding stone of the anti-  
and post-developmental endeavor, it  is also him the one that comes, lastly,  to twist (once 
again) the perspective of post-developmental critique in a radical way, opening the door to 
unforeseen and unforeseeable experiences of encounter and transformation. In this sense, it is 
worth recovering Illich's own description of his engagement with development, which reflects 
diverse phases that not only he himself experienced, but, equally, the critical endeavor he 
participated in as a whole went through. Regarding his personal experience, Illich recalls: 
"During the 1950's  I  called on people to  recognize the surreptitious  injustices 
implicit  in  publicly  financed  professional  organizations  of  teachers,  social 
workers and physicians. In my battles against invasion by volunteers [in Latin 
America], I appealed to reason. [...] In a second stage, my rhetoric was inspired 
by the stories of myth. I called attention to the engineering of new mentalities 
[...]” (Idem). 
Illich  relates,  thus,  his  own critique  against  development  with  the  turn  I  presented 
above, from a discussion over reasonable arguments, i.e. over who has reason on his side, to a 
critique of concepts as stories, as myths, as engineered mentalities. As he clearly remarks, in 
his first phase, his “criticism focused on the procedures used in the attempt to reach goals that 
[he] did not then question” (Idem, 104). In a second phase, however, he “began to question 
the goals of development more than the agencies [...]. [His] eyes moved from the process 
toward its orientation, from the investment toward the vector's direction, toward the assumed 
purpose” (Idem). With time, his critique became increasingly radical. Taking the example of 
his work ‘Medical Nemesis’ (1976), he asserts: “my main concern was the destruction of the 
cultural  matrix  that  supported an art  of living characteristic  of a  time and place.  Later,  I 
increasingly questioned the pursuit of an abstract and ever more remote ideal called health” 
205
(Idem). In the same line, the fight against the stories and myths of development was fueled by 
the idea that the goals presented by development were “delusional and therefore destructive” 
(Idem). 
Interestingly,  in  a  third  moment  starting  in  the  1970's, Illich  continues,  his  “main 
objection to development focuse[d] on its rituals” (Idem, 104). In other words, not only the 
goals placed in the name of development are the result of stories,  but, furthermore, Illich 
arrives to the conclusion that the rituals of development generate “a non-ethical state of mind” 
(Idem,  104).  These  words  of  Illich  express  clearly  the  power  ascribed  to  language  and 
discourse  at  the  base  of  post-modern  questions.  The  corresponding  answer  came  to  be, 
naturally, “to tell stories” (Idem, 107). 
The  self-image  of  Illich  in  this  context  is  equally  quite  telling  for  the  mood  that 
accompanied  most  of  postdevelopmentalist  critique.  Illich  sees  himself,  as  a  researcher, 
endowed with the task “to explore how to trust and love and suffer in a milieu that drowns out 
our voices and makes our sparks invisible” (Idem, 108). This image depicts accurately the 
sense of being overwhelmed that arises often in dealing with post-modern critique, turning 
micrological responses into sadly heroic acts. 
It is important to recognize that all these attempts to find new responses, are the result 
not only of the discovery of the absence of truth in previously unquestioned assumptions, now 
unmasked as myths, but that they emerge equally from the belief in one truth. Thus, Illich can 
say that he and other post-developmentalists “have been far too slow in recognizing the truth”, 
being their mission now “to bear witness to what [they] have come to know” (Idem 107 f.). In 
this sense, paradoxically, ‘postmodern pluralism’ is an expression of ‘modern unicity’. 
Into a new area points, however, Illich's reflection on the “non-ethical state of mind” 
generated  by  development.  What  Illich  criticizes  is  that,  embedded  in  the  chase  of 
development, present awareness and satisfaction are frustrated, “so that one always longs for 
something better that lies in the ‘not yet'” (Idem, 104). Thus, “the unique beauty and goodness 
of the now” is obliterated, and the ‘we’ is weakened in the sense that it does not refer anymore 
to a sharing of convivial life (Idem, 106). In his call for an ethical encounter, Illich's invitation 
echoes also Spivak's latest efforts to engage in a deep personal manner with oneself and with 
the Other.
The basal critique of Illich is accompanied by the assertion that “we now live ‘after 
ethos’, or, as Alasdair MacIntyre notes, ‘after virtue'” (Idem, 109). In other words, in this 
‘post'-era,  “commitment  to  progress  has  extinguished  the  possibility  of  an  agreed  setting 
within which a search for the common good can arise” (Idem). But what remains then? The 
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awareness of this condition, can in fact explain the nihilistic indifference criticized not only 
on postmodern intellectuals, but moreover, on the contemporary youth. Rahnema puts this 
state of mind in words, when he wonders “whether the joy and indeed the inner clarity gained 
by this type of questioning does not sometimes hinder one's capacity to relate to the outer 
world and to participate in a meaningful social life” (Idem, 105). Similarly, David Cayley 
asked “once one has laid bare these certainties [...] what next?” (Idem). In other words, if all 
around me is just empty of truth, and all my language and my tools to communicate are the 
result of dreadful stories that can only reproduce violence, what is it worth participating in, 
how can I avoid indifferent ostracism, how can I engage with the Other, understand his and 
my needs, be truly care-ful(l) and thus be responsive to the Other and to ‘the social'? 
Confronted with this darkness, Illich's allegorical advice is: “Carry a candle in the dark, 
be a candle in the dark, know that you're a flame in the dark” (Illich ref. in Rahnema/Bawtree 
2008, 105). Elaborating on this image, Illich states that: “In a world set on development, no 
matter  the  economic  stage  reached,  the  good  can  only  come  from the  kind  of  personal 
complementarity which  Plato  [...]  had in  mind” (Rahnema/Bawtree  2008,  109 f.).  Illich's 
answer to the problem of  ‘a  non-ethical  state  of  mind’ furthered by development  as it  is 
championing social life, is, similarly to Spivak's proposal, clearly minimalistic: “Dedication to 
each other” (Idem, 110). As Illich concludes, this “is the generator of the only space” that 
allows for virtue to emerge: “a mini-space in which we can agree on the pursuit of the good” 
(Idem). Most importantly, since “the most destructive effect of development is its tendency to 
distract my eye from your face with the phantom, humanity, that I ought to love”, Illich's  
advice is to offer “a risky presence to the Other, together with openness to an absent loved 
third, no matter how fleeting” (Idem, 106). He calls thus, for a return to the present moment, 
to the own experience of this ‘here and now’ instead of advocating for a perspective based on 
an elusive ‘we’, where “the ‘I’ who experiences is replaced by an abstract point where many 
different statistical charts intersect” (Idem). Taking this last reflection of Illich, it is possible to 
say that after trying to save the world from development, post-developmental critique still has 
to complete the twist it started, applying self-reflection to a point where the final thing that 
matters is the shared present.
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V.  Closing Remarks  
In this chapter I have addressed a variety of approaches that might be called post-modern due 
to their usage of modern concepts and methods in a new twisting way, emphasizing, amongst 
others, the elements of plurality, culture and power in the decisions taken that establish certain 
standards of ‘normality’ and ‘otherness’, ‘stagnation’ and ‘development’, ‘law’ and ‘custom’. 
In the realm of law, we have seen for example how law's legitimation has been presented as a 
question of authority and power. This critique became very concrete in the studies of Critical 
Legal Studies as well as in the academic and political endeavor of a variety of foundations 
and activist groups in Europe and Latin America. In all cases, a revision of the established 
authority to proclaim what is law and what is not has taken place. 
Importantly,  while the theoretical underpinnings are central  to the emergence of this 
critical mindset and attitude, the socio-political experiences that go hand in hand with post-
modern reflection have been indispensable to the emergence and concretion of these new 
perspectives. Thus, the presence of social movements involved in political struggles in the 
name of  the  marginalized  others,  be  it  in  terms  of  gender,  race,  culture,  or  political  and 
economic status to name a few, has been key for post-modern reflection. Understanding law 
as politics, law (particularly legal adjudication) have become tools for developing political 
goals of social justice. The making of the law received special attention both in terms of the 
choices over authoritative interpretations and in terms of the making of the (appliers of the 
law), i.e. lawyers and judges. That law is a matter of interpretation is a key thought that results 
lastly in the validity of a plurality of approaches to law, in a variety of laws.
That law is plural has been highlighted particularly by the advocates of legal pluralism. 
Even if  the approaches collected under this  title are themselves very varied regarding the 
academic fields they emerged in and their political intentions, what remains clear from this 
discussion is that a variety of approaches to law is arguable, and, importantly, that naming a 
system of norms ‘law’ or not is a decisive exertion of power. How to legitimate that decision 
is a key problem. Importantly, this question of legitimacy has led many thinkers and activists 
prioritizing plurality over the monolithical authority of modern law, to recover concepts of 
truth  and  justice.  However,  these  answers  seem  insufficient  insofar  as  they  return  to 
dichotomic categories typical for the structures they criticize.
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Similar observations can be made in the realm of development critique. Authors in favor 
of a post-developmental approach have argued convincingly that the concept of development 
participates and recreates a web of meaning where ‘underdeveloped people’ and their way to 
live  are  envisaged according to  an  allegedly universal  standard.  They are  the  result  of  a 
comparison made according to particular economic expectations. Moreover, in the context of 
the Cold War, the discourse of development played a key role in reorganizing the world after  
the breakdown of the colonial system, reinforcing an economically and politically hierarchical 
relationship  at  an  international  level.  Despite  the  crucial  importance  of  these  critiques, 
problematically, the emphasis that critical authors put in understanding ‘development’ as an 
oppressive culture, run the risk to reinforce the hierarchy they criticize, putting the former 
‘underdeveloped’ as victims, and presenting themselves as legitimate representatives of the 
oppressed's  voices.  Equally,  they  present  their  perspective  as  more  just  and  more  true 
according to  implicit  generalized standards  of  the ‘good’,  reenacting the hierarchy of the 
speaking subject that they contest. 
Remarkably, there have been new approaches and reflections in this line that aim for an 
encounter, an ethical encounter, with the Other. The ability to listen, the openness to surprise 
and imagination, and the capability to be present are some of the new elements emphasized by 
few contemporary authors in order to engage with otherness in a way that transcends the 
postmodern problematic. However, these proposals have remained mostly unattended or have 
been reinterpreted in developmental practices that recover modern understandings.
In general, it is possible to say that the advocates of a critical attitude within a postmodern 
sociolect, have blurred a variety of monolithical unities with alleged universal validity into a 
plurality of changing forms of identification.  Insofar they have succeeded in shaking and 
breaking  many  of  the  generalized  standards,  including  the  categories  and  conceptual 
structures of ‘law’ and ‘development’. Nevertheless, these approaches find also difficulties in 
dealing with the poly-valence they defend. This process of destabilizing identities has opened 
the space for many questions, but the answers slip every time from our hands due to the same 
dis-equilibrating spin of postmodern critique.  The gravity of this  uncertain situation turns 
clear at the moment when we formulate the questions: what is lawful, what is right, what is 
just, who can judge, in which direction should we go and develop, and lastly how shall we 
live. The relevance of these questions becomes patent when we observe some examples of 
how  these  theoretical  emphasis  on  plurality  found  expression  in  political  demands  of 
recognition, participation and redistribution in the next chapter. 
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C. Making Place for the Other in the Law – Between Culture(s) and Politics
When a modern concept and a modern praxis of law are confronted with massive critique in 
terms of its violence against diversity, a central question that appears next is how is it possible 
to change those legal practices to incorporate plurality and leave a monolithic, unified and 
violent  law  behind.  This  search  for  a  new  law,  naturally,  goes  hand  in  hand  with  new 
approaches to legal development. If law cannot be conceived anymore as the expression of the 
one  justice  and truth,  then  development  cannot  aim to  produce  that  kind  of  law.  On the 
contrary,  a  new aim of  legal  development  becomes  to  incorporate,  integrate,  include  the 
marginalized  ‘other’ in  a  law  that  is  conceived  anew.  This  new  perspective  requires  a 
participative law.
In this chapter I will  address some examples of this search,  focusing again in Latin 
American examples, which, however, had an important international repercussion. I will refer 
firstly to the project of Legislative Theater developed by Augusto Boal as city councilor of 
Rio de Janeiro, and, secondly, to changes in the judicial structure and argumentation in other 
Latin American countries, particularly in Mexico and Colombia. 
I chose these cases particularly because of the strength of these movements and the 
relevance of their consequences. The examples of Brazil and Mexico will allow us to see 
some of the consequences of the critical approaches presented above from a new perspective. 
Specifically, these currents are interesting for us insofar as they open the question for matters 
of  development  and  pluralism  from  the  perspective  of  ‘the  ones  to  be  developed  yet’ 
according  to  a  modern  model  of  development.  The  alternative  proposals  to  law  in  the 
Brazilian  context  are  specially interesting  because  of  the  development  of  artistic-political 
practices like Theater of the Oppressed and Legislative Theater, which are influential until 
today across the world. The pluralistic proposals to law in the Mexican context, on the other 
hand, have ended in concrete changes in the judicial structure.
Last but not least, it seems to me central for a work dealing with pluralism in law and 
legal theory, to go beyond the developments made in (critical) theory of law by authors and 
institutions which have a prominent role in the mainstream academic discourse of law. The 
Latin American currents of alternative use of law, as well as the proposals of legal pluralism, 
have  strong  referents  in  European  developments,  and,  at  the  same  time,  have  their  own 
context  and  genealogy.  In  other  words,  if  ideas  like  the  proposed  by  Magistratura 
Democratica in Italy, were so important at a certain time in Brazil, or if the concept of Legal 
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Pluralism advocated by John Griffiths became so relevant for Mexican indigenous groups, it 
was also because it was possible to shape them in order to address relevant concerns in that 
concrete environment. To address this exchange of ideas on law, which could equally be seen 
as a form of legal transfer, as a one way street is, in fact, part of the assumptions of modern 
perspectives on legal development that are criticized from a postmodern view, and for which 
the idea of alternativity and plurality are determinant.
Taking a closer look at these examples, we will have the opportunity to see how new 
alternatives  to  modern  understandings  of  law  have  been  developed  within  a  postmodern 
sociolect, in different aspects of legal work, namely the legislative sphere and the judicial 
sphere.  Importantly,  these  new  approaches  show  also  how  law  is  conceived  as  a  field 
embedded in political and cultural settings. Their struggle to pluralize law and to create new 
forms of (legal) development, incorporating a variety of voices as the postmodern critiques 
claimed,  has  affected  millions  of  lives.  It  remains  to  be  seen  how far  they succeeded in 
transcending the modern schemes of unicity and hierarchy they opposed.
I.  Making Place for the Other in the Parliament: Searching for Alternatives to the Politics of   
Law through Cultural Activism through Legislative Theater in Brazil
In the section on critical legal thought, I have presented the current of Direito Alternativo or 
Uso Alternativo do Direito that  envisaged a  different,  an alternative approach to  law and 
social  order.  But  this  kind of  alternative  approaches  did  not  develop only inside  the  law 
faculties and the courts,  two main spheres of socio-legal reflection.  Moreover,  the critical 
movement  demanded,  as  I  have  stated  above,  a  new  language  for  law  and  thus  new 
epistemological premises. The question was: since law itself delineates the limits of legitimate 
arguments, how is it be possible to formulate emancipatory arguments with the same language 
of law? In response to  this  concern,  new aesthetic  forms of  dealing with social  conflicts 
appeared, looking, in a creative way, for a new language to approach law. Since the space and 
tools given by modern law were not anymore sufficient, the space was opened for  creative 
game and  improvisation as ways to discover something new. The arts played a major role in 
this inquiry. Importantly, their role went beyond functioning as mere spaces of criticism, a 
function they  often take.  Moreover, the art itself turned into a tool of investigation. Doing art 
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turned to be seen as a method to produce social change, because it implied a change in the  
way of thinking of society.
At the same time, recognizing law as a universalistic proposal, where the vernacular 
traditions seldom can find their space, the search for a new way to deal with social conflict 
and  order  was  oriented  equally to  the  search  for  answers  that  were  neither  imposed  nor 
imported, and in turn, were recognized as own and authentic by the population searching for 
its  own order.  This call for the vernacular traditions and for authenticity in the normative 
organization  of  society  is  more  clear  in  the  struggles  of  social  and  legal  activists  to  be 
discussed later. However, this tendency to search for authenticity can be recognized equally in 
other  currents  looking for  alternative  approaches  to  social  conflict  in  the  end of  the  20th 
century.
In the case of Brazil, we can find different expressions of this search for new languages. 
Poetry was and is until present, one of the privileged approaches to articulate social needs in 
front  of  law.  It  is  not  surprising,  thus,  that  many  participants  of  the  current  of  Direito  
Alternativo  have  written,  in  fact,  uncountable  poems  engaging  with  law  and  their 
contemporary struggles. Take for example the book of poems titled ‘Da Cama ao Comício.  
Poemas Bissextos’ ('From Bed to the Polls. Leap-Year Poems’, 1984) of Roberto Lyra Filho 
(1926-1986), or the works of Lédio Rosa de Andrade (de Andrade 2011). All of these efforts 
look for a change in the poetics of law and social order.
One  of  the  strongest  expressions  of  an  artistic  approach  to  social  order  and  social 
change can be seen in Augusto Boal's (1931-2009) work using theater, which has currently 
great  impact  at  an international  level.139 Nowadays,  his  Theater  of  the Oppressed,  Forum 
Theater and Legislative Theater have acquired recognition and are being practiced not only in 
Brazil but also in Germany, Austria, France, Portugal, Canada, Peru, Mexico, India, amongst 
many other countries.140 Through his practice, Boal invites the open and public reflection on 
social  issues and the participative artistic  creation of  new proposals in  order  to find new 
outcomes. His work is especially relevant for us not only because he developed a thorough 
theory for this theatrical practice that allows us to enter in dialogue with him also through 
abstract theoretical reflection, but, most importantly, because he developed this practice with a 
139 Given the context of a search for a new language, it is not surprising that Boal wanted to present his theater  
experiments first in the realm of the work with poetics, this is an aspect of philosophical reflection from the 
viewpoint  of  aesthetics.  In  fact,  he  originally  wanted  to  name  his  seminal  book,  published  finally  as 
‘Theater of the Oppressed’ ('Teatro do Oprimido'), as ‘Political Poetics’ ('Poéticas Políticas'). But following 
the advise of the bookseller who estimated that that was not a good selling title, he changed it first to ‘Poetic 
of the Oppressed’ ('Poética do Oprimido') and later to ‘Theater of the Oppressed’ (Boal 2001, 310 f.).
140 For  a  complete  list  of  the  countries  in  which  Theater  of  the  Oppressed  is  practiced  according to  the  
International Organization of Theater of the Oppressed (ITO), see ITO 2011.
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clear  political  interest  to  include a variety of  voices  in the socio-political  discussion.  His 
proposal  is  thus  from  the  beginning  pluralistic  and  addresses  conflicts  and  challenges 
regarding the use of common social spaces. 
It is not the aim of this inquiry to make a monograph on Theater of the Oppressed141, its 
history, its participants and its results. Moreover, the aim here is to see how the work with this 
dramatic method allowed to articulate, on the one hand, a critique of law from a pluralistic  
perspective, and, most importantly, how it developed, equally, proposals to recreate the idea 
of law orienting it to pluralistic concerns. Naturally, many forms of social activism share these 
aims of  critique and re-creation.  However,  Theater  of  the Oppressed shows at  least  three 
interesting characteristics that makes it especially interesting for this inquiry. Firstly, it is a 
clear  expression of  a change in the epistemological  paradigm, regarding how knowledge, 
dialogue and social change can be produced. Secondly, it actually worked in explicit direct 
connection  with  formal  state  law  through  the  work  in  Legislative  Theater,  and  it  was 
successful in developing formal law through theater-work. Finally, it is important to me that 
Theater of the Oppressed, as well as the critical currents mentioned above, did not remain a 
local expression, but found response in totally different corners of the world. Equally, it is 
interesting that Theater of the Oppressed as a proposal of socio-legal development goes in the 
opposite direction, from a geographic point of view, than developmental work usually aims to 
go: instead of going from so called ‘developed’ societies to ‘underdeveloped’ ones, it is the 
other way around, putting in question the traditional idea of development. 
In this section, I will firstly present Boal's theater work, which cannot be divided from 
his political theory nor from his later engagement explicitly with legal development. In fact, 
as we will see, all the reflections made by Boal regarding the aesthetic aspect of theater, are  
central elements of his approach to politics and law. After this general review of his approach 
to theater, I will present particularly his ‘Legislative Theater’, making special emphasis on his 
approach to development, law and plurality.
To understand Boal's endeavor, it is central to know, that the artistic-political proposal 
of Boal is marked by the context of dictatorship, in which he was embedded. Since he was 
politically compromised with the political left, the state censorship of art projects meant to 
141 The  Theater  of  the  Oppressed  includes  different  groups  of  techniques  like  Newspaper  Theater,  Direct  
Actions, Legislative Theater, Invisible Theater, Forum Theater, Image Theater and the Rainbow of Desire. 
In  fact,  all of these groups of techniques overlap and it is difficult (as well as unnecessary)  to make a  
taxonomy of the diverse aspects of the Theater of the Oppressed. In this text I will concentrate on some of 
these aspects, that seem to me central to highlight Boal's artistic-political proposal and its relation with  
development,  pluralism and law. For a  clear  introduction to Theater  of the Oppressed as  a  whole,  see  
Staffler  2009,  and  for  a  thorough  presentation  of  all  the  diverse  aspects  of  his  work,  see  the  list  of  
references. Short references can be found at ITO 2011.
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him much more than just a difficulty in his professional life. His search started thus as a 
search for new forms of artistic-political activity and resistance. Furthermore, the political 
crisis went hand in hand with an economic crisis that demanded creative responses from the 
artistic  sector.  In fact,  from Boal's  perspective,  the Brazilian theater was as a  whole in a 
critical moment during the 1960's. Due to insurmountable economic difficulties nationwide, 
traditional forms of theater not only lost official support but they lost also their audience. 
Consequently, new forms of making theater had to be found that responded to the new social 
circumstances (Boal 2010, 239 ff., 246).
Boal's description of the work of the collective  Teatro Arena in São Paulo, where he 
directed from 1956 until his exile in 1971, allows us to see some of the late modern questions  
in action in the field of theater. He starts stating that the Arena's work with realistic theater in  
the 1950's “meant a ‘no’ in front of the theater that was being presented” until then, which 
Boal  identifies  with  a  nostalgia  for  European  theater  (Idem,  243).  In  the  first  place,  the 
negative  in  front  of  the  pre-established model  is,  as  many other  movements  of  the  time, 
indicative of the social context of rejection of old structures. Although the positioning in front 
of an established tradition is nothing new in the history of arts, as we will see, the way to 
articulate this opposition shows particular features,  like the blurring of the limits  between 
actor, character and spectator. Furthermore, there is a clear post-colonial attitude in Boal's 
statement,  that  echoes  a  more  general  process  in  Latin  America  during  the  1950's.  The 
questions of authenticity, identity, an ‘own’ culture and the power of the speaking subject that 
the  then  new proposals  of  the  current  of  Latin  American  Philosophy or  Latin  American 
Thinking posed, were themselves a call for emancipation, and found expression in the most 
diverse fields of social life.142 From a realist theater that still followed European and North 
American authors, the Teatro Arena thus went to a period of work with Brazilian pieces that 
talk about Brazilian realities (Idem, 247). The turning point relies clearly in a change from the 
Europe that Brazilian art and society had as a model,  the Europe that Latin America was 
supposed to be, to the question of what Latin America was. In terms of development, this is 
the beginning of the question about the unified meaning of development and its universality. 
As Boal remarks, this period of artistic work was coincidental with “political nationalism, 
142 Some of the main thinkers that developed the idea of a Latin American philosophy are Leopoldo Zea (1912-
2004), Arturo Andrés Roig (*1922) and Roberto Kusch (1920-1979) amongst others. In order to illustrate 
the orientation of this current, two titles of the Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea might suffice for now: 
‘En  torno  a  una  filosofía  americana’ ('Around  an  American  Philosophy’,  1946)  and  ‘América  como 
conciencia’ ('America as Consciousness’, 1953). Later on, titles like ‘Colonización y descolonización de la  
cultura  latinoamericana’,  ('Colonization  and  Decolonization  of  Latin  American  Culture’,  1970)  and 
‘Dependencia  y  liberación  en  la  cultura  latinoamericana’  ('Dependency  and  Liberation  in  the  Latin 
American Culture’, 1974) of the same author would follow.
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with the blossoming of the industrial park of São Paulo, with the creation of Brasilia, with the 
euphoria of the appreciation of everything national” (Idem).
Equally,  this  type of realistic work implied the new relevance of particularism. The 
topics treated had to be particular of a region, the techniques used for its treatment underlined 
the particularity of the acts themselves, reproducing them on stage. No visual metaphor could 
replace the true, unique, particular, authentic reality, and thus, reality was played on stage. 
However, as Boal states for a second phase of the work with the Teatro Arena, he and 
his staff “wanted a theater that was more ‘universal’, that, without stopping to be Brazilian, 
would not reduce itself to appearances” (Idem, 249). The question was, thus: how to relink 
aesthetic experience from the absolute particular to the universal without losing one's own 
identity?  The result  was  the  nationalization  of  classical  works  like  Niccolò  Machiavelli's 
(1469-1527)  ‘The  Mandrake’,  interpreting  it  as  a  political  scheme  of  power  at  work  in 
contemporaneous Brazilian society. This means that a reinterpretation and an appropriation of 
the original text were at the core of the new theater. “[A] classic”, so the understanding, “is 
only universal insofar as it is Brazilian. [...] We are also universe” (Idem, 251). 
As Boal underlines, in the search of an appropriate universal, the interpretation itself 
changed: “The actors turned to construct their figures starting from their relations with others, 
and  not  starting  from  a  doubtful  essence”  of  the  character  (Idem).  This  step  was  very 
meaningful, as Boal describes, in terms of how the conception of a character, of an actor, and 
of human beings in general changed when figures started to be created “from the outside to 
the inside” (Idem). The character was seen as a reduction of the possibilities of the actor, that  
was himself, as a social human being, a reduction of all the possible performances and ways 
to experience available. Identity, and with it the possibility of action (on and off stage), turns 
thus into a choice over how to experience and how to perform. The job of the actor is, in this 
sense, to liberate himself from the daily mechanizations and (more or less conscious) choices 
of experience and performance that he made in his  own life,  and, after  this liberation,  to 
reduce his possibilities to those relations demanded by the character he is presenting (Idem). 
Already here is clear the emancipatory power that Boal ascribes to theater, since it demands 
from the actor to rethink his identity and his relations, allowing him to redefine his  plural 
possibilities of action. From this perspective, theater work is an exercise in awareness, in the 
flexibility of identification and in the recognition and creation of plural possibilities of action.
Interestingly, the relationship between realism and the critical theater that the Teatro 
Arena developed later  is  not  dissimilar  from the relationship between Legal  Realism and 
Critical Legal Studies exposed above. While both elder currents claimed to put reality, in a 
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critical  way,  to  the front,  leaving prescriptive,  puristic  or  essentialistic  theory behind,  the 
critical movements that followed revised the way to relate to that reality. Reality turned into 
narration.  Identity  into  performance.  Essence  into  interpretation.  Norm  into  culture  and 
choice.  Theater  and  Law  into  cultural  politics  and  political  culture.  And  the  objective 
universal outside of the researcher, actor and judge, into his subjective inside. The question 
that both currents in critical law as well as in critical theater try to pose and answer is how to 
link this subjective inside to an outside that allows us to communicate, to inter-act, and thus, 
to develop socially meaningful observations, judgments and actions. 
According  to  Boal,  it  was  with  the  production  of  ‘Arena  Conta  Zumbi’ ('Arena  Tells 
Zumbi')143 that “the phase of ‘destruction’ of theater, of all its values, norms, precepts, recipes, 
etc.”  culminated (Boal  2010,  255).  As he continues,  they “could not  accept  the practiced 
conventions,  but  it  was  impossible  yet  to  present  a  new system of  conventions”  (Idem). 
‘Arena Conta Zumbi’, or, as this play is referred to more commonly in the theater literature, 
just ‘Zumbi...’, was the first play of a series of plays that always started their title with “Arena  
Tells ...”144, emphasizing the appropriation and re-telling of specific stories as well as the role 
of the story-teller. In this case, ‘Zumbi...’ is based on the story of encampments of escaped 
slaves in the northeastern region of Palmares in the 17th century.  According to this semi-
historical  account,  when military expeditions were sent  there for  its  destruction,  a person 
called Zumbi assumed the leadership of the resistance against the Portuguese Crown. The 
hero was killed in 1695, and is remembered today by some sections of the Brazilian society 
(especially amongst Afro-descendents) as a symbol of resistance and freedom.145 The story 
reflects historical verifiable facts, even if some of its elements might have mythical character. 
Having this background in mind, it is not surprising that this mythical/historical event was 
selected by the Teatro Arena to be re-told in relation to Brazil's contemporaneous social life, 
this is in a political context of dictatorship, where resistance and freedom played a crucial 
role. On the limit between one real history and many true myths, Teatro Arena told the story 
of Zumbi as their own using diverse historical documents not only as implicit reference but as 
explicit part of the piece. In the search for a synthesis between the totally particular and the 
143 'Arena Conta Zumbi’ was written by Boal, Gianfrancesco Guarnieri (1934 – 2006) and Paulo José (*1937), 
and it was musicalized by Eduardo de Góes ‘Edu’ Lobo (*1943) and Vinicius de Moraes (1913-1980) in 
1965. For a more detailed presentation of this theater play and its context, see Milleret 1987.
144 The series  was  continued by ‘Arena Conta Bahia’ (1965,  with music  by Caetano Veloso (*1942) and 
Gilberto Gil (*1942)) and ‘Arena Conta Tiradentes’ (written with Guarnieri in 1967).
145 Furthermore,  in  1995,  the  anniversary of  his  death  has  been  declared  the  day of  ‘Black  Conscience’, 
presenting Zumbi as a symbol of freedom.
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universal,  ‘Zumbi’ juxtaposed  the  mythic  story of  Zumbi  with  documentary material  and 
referred that historical complex to the most recent facts of social life.
As Boal explains, the goal was to tell a story “not from a cosmic perspective, but from a 
worldly perspective clearly located in time and space: the perspective of the Teatro  Arena, 
and its  members.  The story was not narrated as existing autonomously:  it  existed only in 
reference to who was telling it” (Idem, 253). This statement reflects the intention to make a 
synthesis out of the work done previously, that swung to and fro between the expression of the 
particular and the universal (Idem, 252). This link between the particular and the universal 
was achieved through diverse mechanisms,  which at  the  same time destabilized  aesthetic 
conventions.  First  of  all,  the  relation  actor-character  was  decoupled,  making  every  actor 
represent  all  characters.  While  each  character  had  particular  qualities,  they  were  not 
dependent  on  the  personal  characteristics  of  each  actor,  recovering  the  idea  of  the 
establishment of characters through masks in the ancient Greek drama or in the traditional 
Chinese opera. Consequently, while the individual actors with their particularities could be 
replaced underlining the universality of the story and its characters, every time the story was 
retold it became a new and particular story. At the same time, it became more universal and 
more particular. 
As a second mechanism linking the universal with the particular, narration played a 
central  role.  Narration  itself  is  nothing  new  and  it  has  been  present  in  many  theatrical  
proposals, like, for example, in Bertolt Brecht's (1898-1956) dramas. However, while Boal 
refers to Brecht in several moments, he equally separates ‘Zumbi...’ from Brechtian narrations 
like the one in ‘The Decision’ ('Die Maßnahme’, 1930). He makes special reference to the 
temporal aspect, stating that ‘Zumbi...’ , as all the Theater of the Oppressed that followed and 
different from the Brechtian example, aimed to interpret every moment ‘in the present’ and in 
all its controversial nature, while the form of the piece maintained the frame of the narration 
of  the  actors.  The  unity  of  the  theatrical  piece  was  thus  destroyed,  since  “some  actors 
remained in the time and space of the spectators, while others traveled to other places and 
epochs”  (Idem,  258).  However,  the  narration  as  such  was  conceived  as  a  ‘collective 
interpretation’ (Idem, 259), moving again beyond the individual stories of each character. In 
this  intention  to  destabilize  aesthetic  conventions,  not  only  times,  spaces,  characters  and 
actors were pluralized, moved, exchanged and confused, but also styles and genres.  Summing 
up,  the  norms  of  theater  were  put  in  question;  all  the  traditional  elements  were  made 
exchangeable, void or ephemeral. According to Boal, all of this was oriented at the creation of 
necessary chaos before starting with the phase of proposing a new system (Idem, 259, 262).
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This phase of the proposal of new alternatives was inaugurated with the creation of the 
character and the system of the ‘joker’ ('coringa’ in the Portuguese original), an emblematic 
term and figure for a moment profoundly embedded in questions of identity and authenticity. 
With this incorporation of a joker, not only a new figure was created, but also a new system of 
theatrical representation with a specific structure of the dramatic text as well as a determined 
organization of the dramatic cast (Idem, 268). Characteristically, in this joker-system, besides 
the  figure  of  the  joker  himself,  the  other  key  element  and  the  only  firm character-actor 
relationship is the one of the protagonist, while all other characters can be exchanged amongst 
the actors. 
It is important to revise the two central figures of the Joker-system created by Boal, which he 
presents as opposed and complementary functions.146 The protagonist, on the one side, retains 
the realistic elements that give him an appearance of authenticity with the aim of creating a 
space for the self-identification of the audience with the dramatic action. While in ‘Zumbi...’ 
the  disintegration of  all  connections  amongst  actors  and characters  were destabilized,  the 
recovery of the protagonist as a traditional character, allowed to regain the empathy of the 
audience that had been lost and that did not allow the spectators to feel identified with the 
struggle  of  the  character,  turning  them  into  cold  observers  (Idem,  253).  The  immediate 
emotional contact with the character was then reduced to rational knowledge (Idem, 275). 
This  joker-system,  different  than  Zumbi,  intended  to  regain  the  connection  between  the 
character  and  the  audience,  engaging  the  spectator  emotionally  and  inviting  him/her  to 
identify with the protagonist, as well as it aimed to create some distance between character  
and audience in order to generate a space of rational and critical reflection on the character's 
actions. 
On the other side, it is the function of the joker to interpret, analyze and inquire into the  
actions of the protagonist. In contrast to the realistic world of the protagonist, the world of the  
joker is magical. He is omniscient and omnipotent. He can stop the action, rewind it, change 
the participants, explain the actions to the audience, query the characters etc. And not only 
146 The  original  proposal  of  the  Joker-system,  which  Boal  describes  in  his  text  of  1967,  included  other  
functions like  the  Choir,  the Orchestra  and  the  Coryphaei.  Equally,  the  structure  of  the  spectacle  was 
divided into seven parts: Dedication, Explanation, Episode, Scene, Comment, Interview and Exhortation 
(Boal  2010,  279).  These  other  functions  as  well  as  the  division  in  parts,  lost  importance  in  the  later  
development of the Theater of the Oppressed and, for the limited purpose of this research, it is not central to  
explain them in detail. What is certainly interesting about them, is that they allow to observe how the model  
proposed by Boal in the 60's reflected a determined structure and, within it, specific functions, while this 
structure turned later on in a much more flexible system of relations and interactions. As we will see later, 
also the functions thought originally by Boal changed according to the transformation of his perspective 
from structuralist to post-structuralist (Dietrich 2011, 272).
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that, he is, in contrast to the limitation of the protagonist who is doomed to be himself with all 
the mechanized aspects of his identity, completely polyvalent. This means that the joker, as 
his name states, can take any role in the dramatic action. This joker is, in terms of space and 
time, “above and beyond” the conscience of the rest of the characters (Boal 2010, 277).
Hence,  the  joker,  introduced  as  a  figure  at  the  intersection  between  the  aesthetic 
performance, the interpretative observation and the coordinating direction, was entrusted with 
several functions at the same time. Being the joker the one interpreting and explaining the 
theatrical action, he revealed the specific perspective of the play presented. This aspect of 
Boal's proposal is linked directly with his rejection of the camouflage of the intentions of the 
presenting actors. While other types of theater use choirs or narrators to analyze the aesthetic 
action, Boal argues that through the introduction of a conventional narrator in the play, a new 
character is created that is closer to the fantasy of the play and far away from the audience 
present. The joker, on the contrary, aims to show in a sincere manner the particularity of the  
interpretation presented. He is and is not part of the fantasy of the play. 
Equally, the joker maintained the unity throughout the play, which was otherwise full of 
discontinuities,  since  every  scene  was  presented  with  different  styles  according  to  the 
particular needs of the performance. Hence, the joker-system, allows for an eclectic freedom, 
establishing  a  certain  stability  through  the  presence  of  the  joker  and a  clear  structure  of 
interaction that is repeated independently of the styles used in each scene. Interestingly, the 
joker is an element of continuity and disruption at the same time, allowing for a common 
ground and a diversified set of expressions.
Importantly,  the use of a variety of styles responds not only to  a general rebellious 
attitude. Moreover, Boal explained this plurality of styles in evolutionary terms, what makes it 
especially interesting for this research. Boal's interest was clearly to be able to use all possible 
styles  created  throughout  the  history  of  theater.  Thus,  he  aimed  to  transcend  a  linear 
perspective of new styles overcoming past styles, to use them all freely according to the needs 
of the message to be sent. It is interesting the way he formulates this need in front of the 
velocity of changes in his time: 
"The modern theater has emphasized too much the originality. The two wars of 
this  century,  the  constant  war  of  liberation  of  the  colonies,  the  ascension  of 
subjugated classes, the advancement of technology, defy the artists, who answer 
with a rain of innovations, specially formal innovations: the velocity with which 
the world evolves results also in an impressive speed with which theater evolves” 
(Boal 2010, 269). 
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However, he argues that this development is self-phagocytazing and detrimental for the 
theatrical aesthetics. “Each conquest of science,” he states, “is the base for the next conquest, 
nothing  gets  lost  and everything  gets  conquered.  On the  contrary,  each  new conquest  in 
theater has meant the demolition of what has been conquered before” (Idem, 269 f.). Thus, he 
emphasizes the need for a structure that is “totally flexible and absorbing of any discovery 
and, at the same time, unchanging and always identical to itself” (Idem, 270). His aim was 
thus,  to  develop an  aesthetic  that  would  integrate  all  previous  developments,  using  them 
according to the concrete needs of each scene. However, putting all these developments at the 
service of a linear evolution towards emancipation, Boal, as we will see in more detail shortly, 
equally  assumed  a  linear  idea  of  development  and  remained,  lastly,  ambiguous  in  his 
perspective on development.
The joker-system aims, furthermore, to be an answer in front of the opposition between 
subjectivity/objectivity.  While  Boal  criticizes  the  Hegelian  approach  that  accentuates  the 
freedom of the character, he equally takes distance from what he understands as a Brechtian 
determinism,  according  to  which  “the  character  is  the  reflection  of  the  dramatic  action”, 
which  “develops  through  contradictions”  marked  at  least  partly  through  the  economic 
infrastructure of society (Idem, 272). Boal pretends thus to mediate between the character-
subject and the character-object, between the assumption that the action is determined by the 
subject's  mind or  the other  way around.  As he states,  the joker-system aims to present  a 
pervasive infrastructural conflict, in which the characters develop their action even if they are 
ignorant of that “subterranean development”, and thus act as free characters. Thus, it pretends 
to  “restore the full  freedom of the character-subject  inside of the rigid schemes of social 
analysis”  (Idem,  272).  At  the  same time,  Boal  tries  to  transcend a  “subjectivistic  chaos” 
through the coordination of the free action, where the figure of the joker plays a major part.  
For him, this coordination is central in order to evade the supremacy of subjectivity, as well as 
to make impossible “the presentation of the world as perplexity, as an ineluctable destiny” 
(Idem). Importantly, Boal rejects explicitly a mechanistic interpretation that reduces life to 
mere illustration (Idem). Thus, according to the argument presented here, Boal rebels against 
a modern deterministic mechanicism as well as he rejects a chaotic subjectivism. In the same 
line, Boal always underlined the importance of theater not only to know about reality, but to 
transform  it  according  to  ‘our’ (meaning  the  oppressed's)  way  (Idem,  21).  This  aim  of 
transformation requires a connection between subjective experience and a web of structures 
and relations of power beyond the subject.
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The same struggle between subjectivity and universality can be seen in Boal's intention 
to address universal questions from the perspective of a Brazilian reality, as well as in his 
reflections on the possibility of analysis and judgment on a piece of theater. As he argues, “a 
play has to be analyzed according to the criteria that it proposes, and not according a general 
theory of theater”, but also “if there are no ‘universal’ criteria established, the chaos of values 
overcomes”  (Idem,  284).  Thus,  Boal  tried  to  solve  this  problem inserting  “the  particular 
criteria of each text into more general criteria that do not need to be only artistic” (Idem). He, 
nevertheless,  states  which  criteria  of  validity should be  used  to  judge a  piece  of  theater,  
rejecting,  for  example,  the  preference  for  specific  schools,  genres,  styles,  tendencies  or 
epochs. In turn, he calls to take the audience as a starting point for any judgment, and thus 
measures the validity of a dramatic text according to its theatrical efficacy and social value, 
which  is  necessarily  the  “humanization  of  humanity”  in  order  to  des-alienate  society 
progressively (Idem, 285). In other words, restating the Machiavellian dictum that the means 
are not relevant as long as they serve the goal (Idem), Boal states the measure of validity of a 
piece of theater according to its emancipatory effectiveness. 
His  work  illustrates  the  struggle  of  the  postmodern  concern  with 
particularism/universalism posed  exemplary  by Zima  which  I  presented  in  chapter  A.  In 
theater,  the  question  of  particularism/universalism as  well  as  the question  of  identity and 
authenticity find expression, for example, in the freedom of the characters as subjects and/or 
objects of the situation presented, as well as in the position of the critic and judge in front of a 
piece. At the same time, as we will see, this struggle finds expression in the relation between 
actor and spectator as a political relation.
As  I  have  mentioned,  being  embedded  in  the  context  of  the  Brazilian  dictatorship,  the 
problems that  Brazilian theater had to deal with were not only of financial character, but 
moreover the strict censorship that hindered the theatrical production. However, the political 
problem  was  not  by  far  restricted  to  a  matter  of  the  authoritarian  rule  of  the  country. 
Moreover, Boal claimed that while the dictatorship imposed a corset to the expression in and 
outside  the  theater,  the  theater  itself  imposed  forms  on  the  expression  of  the  actors  and 
spectators,  imposing  equally  authoritarian  hierarchies.  Thus,  usually,  he  argued,  clear 
distinctions are made between those who are allowed to speak, and those who have to be 
silent, between the spectators who have to listen to a story, and the actors who do not need to 
listen to the stories of the audience, between those who do and those who watch them do. The 
spectator is thus doomed to passivity, anonymity and darkness. He is not invited to participate 
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and, if he tries, his audacity will be quickly repressed by the majority of obedient participants 
of the event and, lastly, by the security of the theater – a similar situation to any intention to 
voice own concerns and participate in political activity in the midst of an authoritarian regime. 
Thus,  for  Boal,  the  division  between  actors  and  spectators  was  one  of  the  most  clear 
expressions of social division, enforced hierarchy and political authoritarianism, no matter 
how emancipatory the content of the theater play intended to be (Idem 2010, 236 ff.).
Furthermore, Boal argued, the theater played a major role in the education of citizens to 
take a quiet attitude in front of the political stage. It educates the spectator to watch the story 
(and with it also his own history, as well as his present and future) as something possessed by 
a pre-defined group of people, to which he never has access. The story is possessed and told  
by others and the spectator has nothing to say and could never transform it. The story is one, 
linear,  monolithic, congruent, and belongs to one protagonist,  who is always an other, far 
away from the audience. Clearly,  the spectator can never turn into the protagonist or take 
action in the story.  In other words, theater gives power, both the power of action and the 
power of telling the story, to whom already has that power.
The critiques of Boal, as can be seen specially in his reference to the educative power of 
theater, were strongly influenced by the Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire (1921-1997), who 
wrote his ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed'147 in 1968.148 Hence, Boal developed his Theatre of the 
Oppressed  (TO)  in  clear  allusion  to  Freire's  contribution.  Moreover,  Boal's  work  follows 
Freire's  dialogical  concept  of  education,  making  of  theater  a  search  for  proper  forms  of 
dialogue (Staffler  2009,  30).  In  Boal's  own definition,  the  Theater  of  the  Oppressed  is  a 
system of physical exercises, aesthetic games and special techniques that have always as a 
goal to “transform society in the sense of the liberation of the oppressed” (Boal 2010, 19). 
This  transforming  aim  echoes  Freire's  emancipatory  proposal,  which  he  opposes  to  the 
traditional domesticating pedagogy. In this sense, the understanding of theater as the posing of 
the correct answer in front of social conflict for a learning audience is clearly oppressive. In 
turn,  following  Freire's  invitation  to  value  all  the  forms  of  knowledge  owned  by  all 
participants in the common process of learning and transformation, and thus to transform the 
one-way teaching into a double-way exchange, Boal developed his Theater of the Oppressed 
as a tool for asking questions, which, in turn, demands answers, and thus action, from all the 
participants,  most  especially  from  the  audience  conceived  of  as  a  community  of  active 
spectators. 
147 The Portuguese manuscript ‘Pedagogia do Oprimido’ ('Pedagogy of the Oppressed')  was written in 1968. 
However, it would be first published in English in 1970, and later in Brazil in 1974.
148 In this sense, Boal wrote: “For me to exist, Paulo Freire must exist” (Boal 1998, 129).
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At the base of these proposals is the idea that every person is “perfectly literate in the 
languages of life, of work, of suffering, of struggle, [...]” (Boal, 1998, 128), and thus is an 
expert of his own life, disregarding the certificates that he can show or his level of literacy. 
Consequently,  the aim sought through the method of Freire and also of Boal,  is firstly to 
achieve an awareness of the ownership of that knowledge as well as an awareness of the own 
relational  position  in  the  social  environment.  This  awareness  can  lead,  in  turn,  to  the 
activation of that subject in the sense of the activation of the wish not only to interpret reality 
but  also,  if  desired,  to  change  it.  What  in  Freire's  terminology  is  the  “theory  of  the 
transformative action”, results in Boal's approach in transformative theater. 
Understanding thus “art as a form of knowledge” (Boal 2010, 261) and as a form of 
empowerment to change reality, Boal started to develop a critical theater that more than being 
a  mere  aesthetic  pastime  of  a  passive  public,  searched  to  awake  the  spectators  to  a 
participative, reflexive and experimental event. As I have written above, the experiments that 
started with ‘Arena Conta Zumbi’  used already techniques of  Teatro Jornal or Newspaper 
Theater. This system of techniques represents, according to Boal, “the first attempt that was 
made to create the Theatre of the Oppressed, by giving the audience the means of production 
rather than the finished artistic product” (Boal 2004).149 The Marxist perspective on which this 
wish is based, is obvious. The aim of this technique, Boal continues, is “to help anyone to 
make a theatrical scene using a piece of news from a newspaper, or from any other written 
material, like reports of a political meeting, texts from the Bible, from the Constitution of a 
country, the Declaration of Human Rights, etc.” (Idem). 
From a pragmatic perspective, this type of theater allowed Boal to avoid censorship, 
since  the  plays  were based  on texts  that  had  already been published (Staffler  2009,  71). 
Secondly and most importantly, Boal aimed through this technique to “demystify the alleged 
impartiality of the media” (Boal 2010, 18). The aim of demystification is itself a motif that 
reappears throughout the different approaches that I have presented as postmodern. Equally, 
the questions regarding ‘who is speaking’ and ‘who has the power to speak’ resonate in Boal's 
statement. In other words, the accusation of partiality of a player that should be impartial and 
the concern for the power of language and speech that was put to the front in critical currents 
of legal thought found expression as well in dramatic research. While in law that player might 
be the judge, for Boal, he can be the actor, author, journalist or art critic. 
149 For an explanation of the twelve basic techniques, see Boal 1989, 30 ff.
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In any case, from the beginning with Newspaper Theater, Boal's work aimed to liberate 
those oppressed by the myth of impartiality, who are therefore unable to see their own reality 
and, consequently, to change it. This impulse for “social transformation in the sense of the 
liberation of the oppressed” (Boal 2010, 19) remained key in all the forms of his theater, even 
if his perspective suffered diverse changes that led him from a traditional Marxist structuralist 
view  to  a  rather  poststructuralist  one  (Dietrich  2011,  272).  Dramatic  art  as  a  form  of 
knowledge and as a transformative process are the tools that he put at the service of liberation 
through his Theater of the Oppressed..
Beyond the question regarding who is the oppressed to be liberated, which I will treat 
shortly, what is worth mentioning here is that Boal, taking the emancipatory call not only to 
the content but to the form of the theatrical expression, rejects the division between spectator 
and actor. In turn, he argues that the passive spectator has to turn actor, moving from being 
object to being a protagonist subject of the story, assuming it as his own. According to Boal, 
to be actor and spectator is the essence of the human being, who while acting sees himself  
acting (Boal 2007, xx), reflects and adjusts his action again to the reality in which he is the 
protagonist. Therefore, the theatrical exercise permits the humanization of the participants. 
Following this idea, Boal created the spect-actor, inviting the old spectator to enter the scene 
and act his alternatives to the conflict presented (Boal 2010, 19). This is an invitation to the 
creativity and improvisation of all participants, including the ex-spectator, as well as the ex-
actor and the ex-director, who is now a joker in the interactive game of creativities. 
As Boal explains, the emergence of the figure of the spect-actor was preceded by the 
recognition that he had to stop making theater pieces “to give advice” or transmit specific 
messages, unless he was taking the same risks as his spectators (Boal 2004, 15). In other 
words,  Boal  abandoned  a  prescriptive  perspective  in  front  of  social  conflict.  With  this 
abandonment, the figure of the joker as omniscient interpret and educator changed drastically. 
Equally, the exchangeability of participants on stage was not anymore reduced to the cast of 
actors. Neither was the protagonist excluded from the possibility of being replaced, but, on the 
contrary, it was he who was thought to be replaced more naturally, since he represented the 
(main) oppressed in search for an alternative behavior. Equally, the conception of art as well 
as  the  idea  of  the  artist  and  the  author  suffered  a  transformation.  As  Boal  states:  “I 
experienced the pleasure of asking. Before, I thought that the Artist was master of the truth. I 
discovered that I was merely an artist, that's all! [...] My theatre would be, from then on, the 
theatre of questions. [...] The people who would have to give answers would be the  spect-
actors!” (Boal 2001, 310).
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Naturally, this implied not only changes in the actors and spectators, but also demanded 
big  changes  in  the  form of  the  theater  play itself.  In  the  proposal  of  the  Theater  of  the 
Oppressed,  Boal  abandoned  thus  the  traditional  form of  beginning,  crisis  and  resolution. 
Instead of the catharsis and subsequent rest that this form aimed for, ending in a reestablished 
equilibrium, Boal, building at the beginning on Bertolt Brecht's work, claimed that theater 
must open the doors to a disequilibrium that leads to action (Boal 2004b, 95). Thus, in the 
most well known form of Theater of the Oppressed, namely Forum Theater, the play, which 
contains a real current problem to be solved, develops only until the moment of crisis, and 
there it ends. After that, the play is presented once more, but the spect-actors in the audience 
can stop the presentation at any moment when they have a proposal of how the action of one 
character can be changed in order to change his situation of oppression. 
Hence, in Forum Theater, the proponents themselves have the possibility of acting their 
ideas  on  the  stage,  what  allows  them  to  experiment  the  possible  consequences  of  their 
proposals. Most importantly, the process of acting differently on stage permits the spect-actors 
to imagine themselves differently in front of their conflicts. The importance of this process 
relies therein that “when it is the spect-actor himself who gets on stage to show HIS reality 
and  transform it  as  he  pleases,  he  returns  to  his  seat  changed”  (Idem,  emphasis  in  the 
original). In this sense, Boal asserts, “the act of transforming is transformative” (Boal 2004b, 
19), turning the spectacle into “the beginning of a social transformation” (Idem 2010, 19). 
Theater changes thus from being an end on its own to be a “rehearsal for the action in real 
life” (Idem). This is a rehearsal in which all participants learn together (Idem 2004b, 15) 
through the authentic search for appropriate answers to the situation as it is experienced by 
those who participate in the theatrical creation.
Despite the explicit  aim of a common learning,  a division remained clear in  Boal's  work 
beyond all changes that he continuously made to his original proposal. The division at the 
core  of  all  of  his  work  is  the  one  between  oppressed  and  oppressor.  Interestingly,  Boal 
blurred, on the one hand, some of the most central dichotomies in theater-work, but, on the 
other hand, he built up a social difference and made it to the main concern and the basic 
assumption of his theater. But what does Boal mean with ‘the oppressed'?
Regarding the name of his participative theater, he stated that although he had doubts 
for some time about naming it ‘Theater of the Oppressed’, he finally warmed up to it. In a  
jokingly manner, Boal presents his position in front of the name ‘Theater of the Oppressed': 
“Still today, for some, it sounds like ‘Depressed’, even if it is about uprising, about what you 
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consider  worth  struggling  for,  about  being  happy.  Imagine  if  I  had  called  it  Theatre  of  
Happiness, Theatre of Revolution, Theatre of the Invented Future! – pretentious” (Boal 2001, 
311). 
In  fact,  Boal's  choice  for  ‘Theater  of  the  Oppressed’ and  not,  for  example,  for  a 
‘Liberation Theater’,  in  the  line  of  other  innovative  and related currents  of  the time like 
Liberation Theology and Liberation Philosophy, has an epistemological relevance, as Staffler 
points out. Importantly, Boal underlines, through this qualification, an ownership and with 
that also the space of emergence of this type of theater, instead of making emphasis on the 
aim, on the ‘where-to’ (Staffler 2009, 17). The awareness of the own position is the starting 
point for any action, and it is in this learning that theater fulfills its primary function as a form 
of knowledge. As David Diamond has highlighted, the importance of awareness and analysis 
for a further action and reflection (in theater as well as in social life) is directly linked to the  
work of other revolutionary thinkers like Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) (Diamond 2007, 176 
f.).
From  a  socio-historical  perspective,  the  oppression  Boal  referred  to  had  its  most 
immediate background clearly in the context of dictatorship that he experienced in Brazil, but 
went  equally beyond that  particular  historical  moment.  Oppression is,  in  fact,  a  recurrent 
element  in  the  narrations  of  Brazilian  history,  creating  several  superposing  layers  of 
oppression across  the decades.  From a perspective of political  oppression,  at  the level  of 
political rule, already the ‘New State’ ('Estado Novo') had exercised oppression from the end 
of the 1930's, shortly after Boal's birth, onwards. But this oppression was not separated from 
other ones, especially the one resulting from economic dependency of the United States of 
America, which was present since the United States of Brazil was created in 1891. In fact, the 
national  political  development  of  Brazil  was  directly  linked  to  the  vertical  economic 
relationship between the two countries throughout the 20th century. Thus, while the military 
dictatorship increased its repression from the end of the 1960's onwards, Brazil, as many other 
Latin American authoritarian regimes of the time, experienced an economic boom, which was 
dependent on the interests of foreign investors. This complex of socio-political circumstances, 
amongst several others (like the historical trade with slaves that has left deep marks in the 
Brazilian  society  up  to  present  times),  formed  the  accumulating  oppressions  that  Boal 
searches  to  overcome  through  theater  in  the  same  way  as  many  of  his  contemporaries 
expressed their search in political, philosophical and pedagogical calls for liberation.
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It is from this historical, political, economical and cultural perspective that the idea of 
‘oppression’ becomes meaningful for Boal and his theater. Thus, while proposing a pluralizing 
perspective that allows for the recognition of the equal validity of a variety of positions, while 
putting  the  polysemy  of  the  images  at  the  base  of  his  project,  while  emphasizing  the 
importance of the subjective experience and wisdom, once Boal finds ‘the oppressed’, the 
strive for their emancipation necessarily draws a line that reduces plurality to two opposing 
categories: oppressors and oppressed. Again, as we have often found in other politically active 
currents of the time, the stance taken is one that defines itself by ‘being in opposition to’. In 
Boal's theater this clear division means, concretely, that only the oppressed character(s) can be 
replaced.  Everything  else,  Boal  assumed,  was  magical  thinking.  According  to  him,  the 
oppressor would never try to change the situation which was always in his favor.
What is interesting about this position is that Boal's approach is embedded in a logic of 
finding  oneself  in  the  Other,  of  an  existent  relation  between  the  different  participants. 
According  to  Boal's  rules,  however,  that  other,  in  which  the  spect-actor  might  find 
him/herself,  is  never  the oppressor.  Understanding works  and is  sought  in  relation to  the 
oppressed and his/her situation, but never in relation with the character presented as oppressor 
and his/her situation or his/her view. While a flexible relation between elements of a network 
is assumed, the figures of oppressor and oppressed seem rigid and, apparently, an oppressor 
could never be embedded as oppressed in a web of oppressions, or, the other way around, an 
oppressed could never be oppressive himself. In presenting a character as oppressed from the 
outset,  who  is  right  and  who  needs  understanding  is  clear  from  the  start,  and  the 
understanding of the antagonist of the oppressor is precluded. 
But this clear division between oppressed and oppressor does not derive from blunt 
blindness in front of social complexity. Boal does refer to the problematic of dividing between 
oppressors and oppressed. He clearly recognized that “oppressed and oppressors cannot be 
candidly confused with angels and demons. They almost do not exist in pure state, not the 
ones and not the others” (Idem 2010, 23). His determination to divide between oppressors and 
oppressed results actually from the consequences he fears might come out of the blurring of 
these categories. What Boal rejects, in the end, is to absolve oppressors with the argument that 
they are the “product of a society”, taking away from them the responsibility for their actions 
(Idem, 24). Consequently,  he dismisses the arguments of those who want to “'see the two 
sides of matter’ or ‘see the matter from all sides’, those who try to justify the reasons of the 
oppressors” as immobilizing (Idem, 25). 
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Understanding society as the interaction of conflictive structures, Boal recognizes that it 
is  impossible  to  take a  position  outside  of those conflicts.  What  he follows from that  is, 
however, not that every element in the system maintains or changes the whole it is embedded 
in,  but  that  any  possible  position  to  be  taken  is  either  as  “allies  of  the  oppressed...  or 
accomplices  of  the oppressors” (Idem).  In this  sense,  “to do Theater  of the Oppressed is 
already the result of an ethical choice, it already means to take the party of the oppressed” 
(Idem). To position oneself “by the side of of the humiliated and offended” is conceived by 
Boal as a civic duty (Idem, 29). Thus, while he does not oppose to work with “people who 
exert functions or professions that offer the possibility and the power to oppress”, he equally 
reminds the reader: “But we have to be very careful... and know to chose our side” (Idem, 31). 
In using this language, Boal draws a line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – ‘us, the oppressed’, 
where he is always included, and ‘they, the oppressors’, where he never takes part. In other 
words, the reader gets the message: you choose, either with us or against us! This dichotomic 
choice presented to the reader is, however, as tricky as the dichotomic choice Boal criticizes 
throughout his work. If Boal has insisted on one thing through his theater, it is that there is 
more than one or two possible answers, there is more than either/or, more possibilities for ‘the 
oppressed’ than ‘either you subordinate or you starve’. His Legislative Theater seeks, in fact, 
to develop ways by which citizenship can go from voting for yes or no, to creating norms, 
from being caught amongst options that others created, to creating new alternatives for the 
own lives. Nevertheless, he ends up stating the same limiting question he rejected in the first 
place: are you with us, the oppressed, or against us?
Hence, despite the fact that Boal goes beyond a mere understanding of class, and thus 
recognizes  the  individual  and  his/her  own  struggles,  as  well  as  the  unclear  boundaries 
between oppressor and oppressed, and even the need to transcend dichotomic divisions like 
actor-spectator,  his  theater,  deriving  from a  Marxist  perspective,  is  a  prolongation  of  the 
struggle of classes. Later on, during his stay in France, the division between oppressor and 
oppressed  will  become even  more  nuanced,  allowing  him later  to  take  the  position  of  a 
legislator, which, in former times, represented for Boal a main place where oppression was 
rooted  (Boal  1989,  117).  In  any case  he  would  never  give  up  his  ‘either-or’,  ‘us-them’, 
‘oppressed vs. oppressor’ perspective fully, in favor of a more encompassing view that would 
take fully into account the complexity of relations he recognized. This is a field that remains 
for the newer generation of practitioners of Theater of the Oppressed to develop.
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Due to his theatrical-political engagement, Boal eventually was kidnapped, imprisoned and 
tortured by the Brazilian dictatorship, and, as a consequence, he escaped into exile in 1971. 
He moved first  to  Buenos Aires (Argentina)  and in  1976 to Lisbon (Portugal),  where he 
stayed for two years and moved then to Paris until 1986.150 It was during this stay in France 
that  he founded the  Center  for  Theater  of  the  Oppressed (CTO) in  1978,  with  which  he 
organized  diverse  courses,  seminars,  interventions,  shows  and  festivals  with  community 
groups. Most importantly,  during this period, Boal went beyond his struggle with exterior 
oppressions, like the police repression he knew, and discovered for himself the ‘policemen in 
the head’, i.e. the internal forces of psychological oppression, that, in terms of oppression, 
worked as effectively as exterior repression. As a consequence, he developed introspective 
techniques of theater like ‘Cops in the Head’ and ‘Rainbow of Desire'151 that have been used 
mainly in the field of psychotherapeutic work. 
For our concern here, the important aspect of this creative phase relies therein, that, in 
this context, Boal started to transform his perspective on oppression and began to emphasize a 
less schematic and more fluid interaction between agents of desire and agents of fear as parts  
of the same complex system. Envisaging a ‘rainbow of desires and fears’ in the inside of 
human psyche, it is not as easy to divide schematically between those oppressed desires that 
struggle to appear and those oppressing fears. Boal's aim, thus, makes a subtle change from 
concentrating on the struggle of desire in front of fear, in other words, on the struggle of 
oppressed against oppressor, to focusing on the harmonization of the colors of this rainbow so 
that they are more in tune with the happiness of the holder of those dreams and fears (Idem 
2004, 29). In search for a wider harmony and understanding, the relation between oppressed 
and oppressor as complementary aspects of the same whole, is, lastly, what will allow Boal to 
move from taking position solely with ‘the people on the street’ as oppressed to taking part in 
the legislative chamber of Rio de Janeiro after his return to Brazil.
From the beginning, Boal's return to Brazil was related to new political developments in 
his home country.  It was upon the invitation of  Darci  Ribeiro  (1922-1997)152, then Vice Go-
150 Boal was granted amnesty in 1979 (Superior Tribunal de Justiça 2002).
151 For more detail specifically on these techniques, see Boal 2004.
152 It is worth remembering that Ribeiro is a highly renowned anthropologist, writer and politician of Brazil 
who was influential in the creation of (amongst other institutions) the Universidade de Brasília and its first  
rector. Furthermore, as Minister of Education he carried out important reforms in Brazil and was in turn 
invited to participate in the university reforms in other countries like Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico and  
Uruguay. In 1992, Darcy Ribeiro was elected to the Brazilian Academy of Literature (Academia Brasileira 
de Letras).
Interestingly for our topic, in his fields of academic specialization, namely anthropology and sociology,  
Ribeiro argued for a global evolutionist perspective and a ‘civilizatory process’ along diverse revolutions, 
e.g. in ‘O processo civilizatório – etapas da evolução sócio-cultural’ ('The Civilizatory Process  – Stages of 
Socio-Cultural Evolution’, 1968). While technical progress was a key for Ribeiro's conception of evolution, 
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vernor  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  to  work  in  Integrated  Centers  for  Popular  Education  (CIEPS, 
Centros Integrados de Ensino Público) that he returned to Brazil to work with a group of 
cultural animators on topics like “unemployment, health, housing, sexual violence, incest, the 
oppression of women, of young people, mental health, drugs, etc.” (Boal 1998, 8). Though 
this project ended with the next election period half a year later, it gave start to a plurality of 
Theater of the Oppressed groups around the city, and in 1989 the CTO (Centro do Teatro do 
Oprimido) Rio was created, constituted then as “an informal body, working from time to time, 
with  internal  meetings  to  study  the  ‘arsenal’  (the  collection  of  techniques,  games  and 
exercises) and external work when a contract could be obtained” (Idem, 11). After some years 
of work, the CTO could not continue, and, in 1992, the theater group was ready to close the  
project. However, this goodbye would not be in vain, and, in turn, it kick-started the project of 
Legislative Theater. 
As Boal recounts, “we wanted to lay to rest the dream of the CTO by helping either a 
party  or  a  coalition  to  realise  a  larger  dream:  to  change  the  country”  (Idem,  12).  As  a  
consequence, the CTO proposed theatralizing the campaign of the Workers Party (PT, Partido 
dos Trabalhadores). In the end, the CTO went from burying their artistic dream to developing 
the campaign of Augusto Boal for vereador (legislator in the city council), who, at first, did 
not have any intention to be a candidate or to be elected for that position153 (Idem, 12 f.). 
However,  the  theatrical  campaign  under  the  slogan  ‘With  Courage  to  be  Happy’ ('com 
coragem de ser feliz') got unexpected resonance, and the participants became aware that this 
was a must in order to make the longstanding dream of transcending the mere field of political 
reflection through theater come true. The campaign succeeded and in 1993 Boal took one of 
the six seats that the PT had won. Different than other artists that dedicated later to politics, 
Boal did not want to change his profession, and continued proposing the democratization of 
politics through theater (Heritage 1994, 27). Following his premise that “theatre is political 
and politics is theatre” (Boal cit.  in Heritage 1994, 25), he proposed to unite theater with 
the stages he conceived of were not organized in an obligatory sequence and, most importantly, Ribeiro did  
not proclaim a vectoral tendency to progress or a teleology like many other perspectives of evolution or 
development.  In  this  sense,  the  contingency  of  the  historical  process  was  central  to  his  thought. 
Furthermore,  in  his  ‘As  Americas  e  a  Civilização’ (The  Americas  and  Civilization,  1970),  he  studied 
“theories  of  backwardness  and  progress”  (Ribeiro  1970,  13),  and  proposed  a  classification  scheme 
according to the degree of ‘transplantation’ and ‘mixture’ of their population. In this sense, he identified 
‘New Peoples’, where ethnic-cultural mixture predominated, like Colombia; ‘Testimony Peoples’, where 
the language and culture of pre-Colombian groups existed along with European languages and cultures, like 
in Mexico; and ‘Transplanted Peoples’, where aborigine population was essentially replaced by European 
settlers. It is from this perspective of development, identity, authenticity, cultural mixture and transfer, that  
Ribeiro created the CIEPS, building the context in which Boal went back to Brazil and applied his Theater 
of the Oppressed.
153 To start with, Boal had basically no chance to win, since, as he relates, there were 1200 candidates from 22 
parties for only 42 seats (1998, 12). As we will see though, improbable things happen all time.
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politics in the praxis. In doing this, not only the CTO and its participants were saved, but, at 
the same time, the project of Legislative Theater was born.
In  the  words  of  Boal,  “Legislative  Theater  is  a  new  system”  within  the  Theater  of  the 
Oppressed, “a more complex form, since it includes all the previous forms of Theatre of the 
Oppressed plus others which have a specifically parliamentary application” (Boal 1998, 5). At 
the core of Legislative Theater is  the creation of plays  of Forum Theater that focus on a 
current  social  concern.  The  different  proposals  acted  by  the  participants  are  discussed 
amongst the audience, and, as far as possible, with legal and political advisers present at the 
event. After the discussion, the participants elaborate proposals of laws that are submitted to 
vote.  The  different  solutions  and  concerns  presented  are  recorded  and  analyzed  by  a 
‘metabolizing cell’ of assessors, that decides which actions should be taken, most importantly, 
those proposals approved in the communal assemblies can be elaborated more in detail and 
taken to the corresponding legislative organs in form of drafts for laws. Through the creation 
of Legislative Theater, Boal applied the principles he had already developed for his Theater of 
the Oppressed and proposed a democratic theater where not only the spectator transforms 
himself  into  the  protagonist,  but  most  importantly,  the  elector  becomes  a  legislator  and 
proposes the law. This is, in the words of Boal, a system through which the “street theatre 
becomes the Chamber and the Chamber is in the street” (Boal cit. in Heritage 1994, 26). In 
this  sense,  Boal  makes  clear  the  important  change  he  saw from the  practice  of  political 
theater, which he had been doing for years before, to the practice of theater as politics: “In the 
‘60's,” he argued, “theatre politicized itself; today in the ‘90's, the moment has arrived to 
theatricalize politics” (Idem).
In more concrete terms, Boal and his team had to develop a structure that permitted to 
bring the Chamber to the street. The three major institutions at work were the mandate as 
vereador of  the Workers Party,  the CTO Rio and the Commission of Human Rights.  The 
mandate itself acted as the central directorate coordinating the actions of an internal cabinet, 
composed, as any other usual cabinet, of legal and parliamentary business, press and office 
support; and, in addition, of an external cabinet, formed by the jokers154 and other responsible 
collaborators for the areas of dramaturgy, images, sound and laboratory. Beyond these small 
groups of assistants, forms of interaction at larger levels were created, this is, naturally, a 
permanent  company  rehearsing  and  performing  plays  of  Theater  of  the  Oppressed,  the 
154 These were five full-time and ten part-time jokers according to Heritage 1994, 26.
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specific shows of the mandate, an interactive mailing list155, and the method of a ‘Chamber in 
the Square'156. While all these forms of interaction are dependent and mainly related to the 
mandate and its activities, at the same time, nuclei157 and links were built in diverse parts of 
the community as partners of the mandate. The nuclei collaborated with the mandate in a 
frequent  and  systematic  way,  offering  workshops  and  shows  for  their  community,  and 
participated in inter-community dialogues, theater festivals, and other festive events. The base 
for a nucleus is the community, be it a geographical community or a thematic one, formed 
along a common interest or objective (for example CENUN, a group of black students), or a 
combination of a geographical and a thematic community. The links, in turn, being groups of 
people from the same community, “communicated periodically with the mandate, setting out 
its opinions, desires, and needs” in a less systematic manner, through the mailing list or any 
other means (Boal 1998, 40). The diverse activities of these different working groups were 
recorded in summaries that were brought to a ‘metabolizing cell’, from which projects of law, 
legal actions and direct interventions were initiated. With this method, in the four years of 
Boal's  mandate,  33 law projects  were  presented  as  a  result  of  the  work with  Legislative 
Theater, from which 13 municipal laws were enacted, which are still in force (Santos 2001, 
9). At the same time, several other public actions were started, which determined legislative 
discussion in the Chamber.
Despite the fact that Boal lost his mandate (as unexpectedly as he got it) in 1996,158 the 
CTO Rio restarted working with Legislative Theater in 1998, now formed as a non-profit 
organization159 and with the support of the Ford Foundation (Bendelak 2001, 14). Naturally, 
155 It is important to underline, that this interactive mailing list, as banal as it may sound for a contemporary 
reader who is regularly overwhelmed by all sorts of electronic ‘mailing lists’, was pursued through the  
postal service, and was, as such very original and interactive.
156 Olivar Bendelak, who has been accompanying the adventure of Legislative Theater from the beginning and 
is currently in charge of this project in the CTO Rio, refers to this ‘Chamber on the Street’ ('Câmara na 
Praça'), as a presentation of Forum Theater on the street in front of the building of the Legislative Chamber 
(Câmara dos Vereadores). According to him, the city councilors were invited to participate, “because the 
idea was to reproduce what happened (or should happen) in the plenum”, even if, in fact, only “four or five  
of them (around 10%) at the most” appeared (Bendelak 2009).  Bendelak underlines, in this context, the 
importance  of  Legislative  Theater  in  “activating  the  FULL EXERCISE  OF  CITIZENSHIP”  through 
inviting the citizens to enter the Chamber in days when the Plenum was gathered to vote, when the large 
majority had never entered the building. In the end, this process encouraged the citizens to return and to  
engage with Forum Theater and Legislative Theater (Idem, emphasis in the original). 
157 During Boal's  mandate,  60 nuclei were formed, from which 33 remained stable according to Bendelak 
2009; by 1998, two years after the end of Boal's mandate, 16 remained active according to Boal (1998, 82).  
For a list and a short description of the nuclei working with Boal's mandate, those that disappeared and  
those contacts which did not reach the stage of becoming nuclei  by 1996, this is by the end of Boal's  
mandate, see Idem, 106 ff.
158 Amongst other reasons, it is interesting Boal's account of a defamatory campaign against him (Boal 1998, 
100).
159 This non-profit organization was built by the team of the CTO Rio, which was composed then, as Bendelak 
remembers, by Boal as Artistic Director together with the jokers Bárbara Santos, Claudete Felix, Geo Britto, 
Helen Sarapeck and Olivar Bendelak himself (Bendelak 2009).
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the influence of this project diminished compared to the force it had in the beginning, when 
Boal functioned as a direct correspondent in the city council. Now, the CTO is obliged to find 
allies as other interest groups or NGOs have to do.160 The network of (theater) groups created 
since 1993 still exists in part, and is still actively working with legal and political advisers.  
This is the case with the group ‘Marias do Brasil’, which includes domestic employees and 
has achieved some progress in the law projects regarding rights for this working sector (Doc. 
Nr.  29/2009  of  the  Commission  of  Participative  Legislation,  Félix  2010,  95).  Most 
importantly, the theater group ‘Corpo em Cena’ ('Body in Scene') achieved the promulgation 
of the first state law, law 2068/2001, regarding rights for students, including the recognition of 
hours of internship and courses free of cost in some cases (Bendelak 2001, 14 f.). A second 
state law was approved in 2004, which originated from the presentations of the group ‘Panela 
de Opressão’ ('Opression Cooker')  regarding the obligation to provide female condoms in 
motels, hotels, etc.161 (Bendelak 2009). Furthermore, in collaboration with the  Comissão de 
Legislação Participativa (Commission for Participative Legislation, CLP), the CTO Rio has 
proposed in its character as NGO three law drafts at federal level and one has been addressed 
as an indication to the Executive.
Furthermore, the CTO Rio produces equally Solemn Symbolic Sessions of Legislative 
Theater, where plenary sessions of the Legislative Chamber are reproduced and acted by the 
citizens, who argue their points taking the role of city councilors after a presentation of a 
Forum Theater  play.  According  to  the  ideas  presented,  the  proposals  are  directed  to  the 
Legislative Chamber or they are translated into a ‘Continued Concrete Social Action’ (Ação 
Social Concreta Continuada), when not a law but a social mobilization is required162. In order 
to  exchange the diverse experiences  of the groups participating in projects  of Legislative 
Theater, the CTO coordinates also Festivals of Legislative Theater (FESTEL).163
In coordination with other projects of Theater of the Oppressed, Legislative Theater has 
expanded  thus  beyond  Rio  de  Janeiro,  organizing  especially  Symbolic  Sessions  in  the 
presentations at  state  or  regional  level.  Furthermore,  new perspectives  beyond Legislative 
160 The connection between the CTO and the Legislative Chamber has worked since then with the support of  
specific assessors of the Chamber and through specific meetings arranged with the councilors and their staff 
as well as with the members of diverse popular groups, besides the usual request for the councilors to attend 
and participate in the presentations of Legislative Theater (Bendelak 2009).
161 This presentation equally kickstarted the project  of a municipal law that  did not achieve the necessary 
majority in the Plenum of the Municipal Chamber (Bendelak 2009).
162 Bendelak  mentions  exemplarily  the  claim  for  new equipment  in  healthcare  institutions,  when  what  is  
needed more than a law, is to exert pressure on the Municipal Secretary of Health. A Forum Theater play  
can be presented in front of the Secretary in order for him to receive the representatives of the community 
and achieve a promise of action (Bendelak 2009).
163 Until 2009 five festivals of Legislative Theater took place (Bendelak 2009).
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Theater  emerged  like  the  work  with  techniques  of  Forum Theater  in  the  context  of  the 
Executive  Power  of  the  city  of  Santo  André164,  nearby  São  Paulo,  where  a  project  of 
‘participatory  budget’  has  been  carried  out  for  years  including  assembly  discussions 
stimulated by Forum Theater sessions, in which the public presented their opinions regarding 
the distribution of the municipal budget.165 At an international level, the work with Forum 
Theater as a tool for legislation is being implemented in several European countries. Some 
examples of these groups are in France166,  Italy167 and Germany168.  Most interestingly,  the 
Legislative  Assembly  of  Portugal  is  currently  developing  a  project  to  insert  Legislative 
Theater in the National Chamber.169
While all these developments in the last fifteen years serve as testimonies for the broad impact 
of Boal's proposal, and allow an outlook in its further development, it is especially important 
for us to inquire more on the perspective that this aesthetic proposal takes in front of law, 
legal  development,  and,  more  specifically  on  the  role  of  plurality  and  diversity  in  this 
aesthetic-political context. In order to do this, in the next paragraphs I will inquire which were 
the  concrete  achievements  of  this  practice  in  terms  of  development  of  positive  law and 
political  participation  in  Brazil,  to  continue  later  with  questions  on  the  perspective  on 
development and plurality that Boal's practice brings about.
Although the importance of the original experience with legislative theater in Brazil is 
not  limited to the promulgated laws, it is still essential to emphasize, especially in the context 
of a legal research, the concrete result that in the period of four years, thirteen laws were 
promulgated, which were proposed through the method of legislative theater.170 This does not 
only demonstrate that Legislative Theater is much more than a naive proposal of participatory 
164 In 1998, Santo André had a population of 625 000 inhabitants (Macedo Soares 1998). At a political level, 
this  city is  renowned for  its  political  presence,  being  the  birthplace  of  the  CUT (Central  Única  dos  
Trabalhadores, Unified Workers’ Central).
165 Interestingly, in this project, the civil servants participated from the beginning in the development of the 
theater play, different from other projects where the first impulse came from communities beyond the state  
institutions (Duran 1997). For an account a year after the project started, see Pontual/da Silva 1998, and for 
an academic detailed discussion of this project see Cleber Cecheti 2004.
166 For the example of a 2005 project on floods in Grasse, see Cie. Les Echomédiens 2008.
167 On the project on the reform of Parco XXII Aprile in Modena, see N.N. 2011.
168 To one of the most recent productions in Germany, see Clausen/Hahn 2011. As an historical reference, it is  
worth remembering an important moment for the development of Legislative Theater in Germany, namely 
Boal's visit in Munich in 1997 in the context of a workshop organized by the Paulo Freire Association, 
when Boal presented a Forum Theater session in the City Hall with the presence of the Deputy Mayor and 
the Secretary of the Green Party for Bavaria. Although this session had only a symbolic value, and only part  
of the process of Legislative Theater could actually be carried out in the short time, law proposals were 
presented, and, most importantly, a theatrical-political dialogue took place amongst the civil society and its  
political representatives. For a personal account of Boal on this experience, see Boal 1998, 118 ff.
169 For more information on this project, see Estudantes por Emprestimo 2010.
170 For a complete list, see Boal 1998, 102 ff.
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legislation made by romantic theater players, but even more, it brings results also in the sense 
of modern legal-political measure methods. While some of them may touch topics that do not 
seem, for an external observer, central to the social problems of Rio de Janeiro, like the law to 
name a Rio state school ‘Free Timor’ (Law 2449/96), other legislative decisions exemplify the 
gravity  of  the  problems  Legislative  Theater  can  deal  with,  like  the  amendment  to  the 
Constitution of the City 43/95 to allow the promulgation of Law 1245/95, which supplied 
means for the protection of witnesses of crimes. Equally, Law 2384/95 and 2384b/95, which 
took compulsory measures for municipal hospitals to have doctors and infrastructure specially 
for geriatric attendance, reflect the important legislative results achieved through the work of 
Boal's  mandate.  Furthermore,  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  City  of  Rio  de 
Janeiro 33, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 42/95 deserve special mention, because of the importance of the 
prohibition of all treatments for mental illness which produce irreversible consequences that 
they stipulated. In addition, other laws resulting from Boal's mandate deal with questions of 
gender  equality  (Law  1119/95),  school  facilities  (Law  1485/96),  and  measures  for  the 
cleanliness of the city (Law 1308/95) and its organization in accordance with the needs of 
blind persons (Law 35/95 and 848/96). Whatever their content, what is clear about all these 
laws, is that they responded to specific needs expressed by the communities that had to live 
under them, and thus were endowed with a particular form of broad popular legitimation, 
since the citizens were not only imagined as participating through the power delegated to their 
representatives,  but  moreover,  were  participating  in  the  elaboration  of  the  proposals 
themselves from the start.
Beyond the concrete laws brought about with this method, naturally, the work of Boal 
with Legislative Theater had other consequences.171 Relevant at a socio-legal level is that, in 
many cases,  the  discussion  of  social  concerns  in  conjunction  with  the  presence  of  legal 
assessors led to the explanation of the actual legal situation to the population and how they 
could  demand  their  already  positively  established  rights.  In  this  sense,  the  work  with 
Legislative Theater took an educative role. Politically and legally more important is probably 
the work with legislative theater in the context of discussions regarding the vote for or against 
legislative projects discussed in the Chamber which were not proposed as a consequence of 
projects of Legislative Theater. In this context, the institution of the ‘Chamber in the Square’ 
played a major role.172 
171 For a cartographic presentation of the mandate's intervention in the city of Rio de Janeiro, see Boal 1998, 
82 f.
172 From Boal's account, it seems that he used this type of consultation also for the building of his opinion as 
President of the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights, e.g. in the case of the discussion about the 
sterilization of women in municipal hospitals (Boal 1998, 92 f.).
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This Chamber is a form of popular consultation, which took place in different forms. At 
a basic level, the ‘Chamber in the Square’ aims to know the opinion, including hopes, fears 
and concrete experiences, of the participants on a specific topic (like the proposal of arming 
the Municipal Guards, Boal 1998, 72 f.). More specifically, this meeting allows to discuss the 
specific  text  of  the  law and the  position  to  be  taken by the  counselor  in  the  Legislative 
Chamber. In order to do this, the ‘Chamber in the Square’ requires in advance the certainty 
about the question to ask in the specific community, the presence of legislative assessors who 
can clarify the legal aspects of the topic in discussion and put the propositions into legal  
terminology,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  the  timely  availability  of  written  material  on  the 
particular subject. While the specific form of the ‘Chamber in the Square’ depends on the 
particular topic and the concrete situation when the meeting takes place, Boal emphasized the 
importance  of  the  theatricalization  of  the  discussion.  He  argued  especially  that  “the 
theatricality of the scene stimulates creativity, reflection and comprehension”, producing that 
the participants are more careful in formulating and explaining their thoughts and suggestions 
with precision (Boal 1998, 93). Importantly, after the ‘Chamber in the Square’ session took 
place,  the  community  participating  received  a  feedback  about  the  final  outcome  of  the 
consulted matter,  this  is,  the  actions  taken following concrete  suggestions  or  the  position 
presented by the counselor in the formal legislative session.  While the counselor was not 
obliged to accept the proposals, and has to state his own opinion in the Council, the sessions 
allowed him/her to interact with the community directly, see different aspects of the problem, 
understand the different opinions, check the information he has available, and, later on, make 
clear his decision in response to the concerns voiced in the community. Equally, the feedback 
allowed the participants to know that their opinions have been taken into account, and which 
were the reasons of the vereador for taking a particular position. 
Another important formal aspect of these sessions includes the writing and collection of 
summaries (not protocols) which allow to have an account of the themes discussed, the terms 
of the discussion and the particular suggestions expressed. The aim of these summaries is not 
only to have a written reference of the particular sessions, but moreover, to deliver important 
information to the cabinet, where legal projects or other actions will be decided on. In other 
words, the summaries build a membrane between the internal area of the legislative mandate 
and the external nuclei and links. Interestingly, Boal underlines that these summaries, which 
the joker who leads the session has to present, should be more than mere accounts and should  
“attempt to understand what happened, to theorise” (Boal 1998, 93). 
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Naturally, in this context, it is important to be aware of the power that the joker comes 
to represent, through his summary, the perspectives, the memory, and the proposals of the 
community. Like any other procedure of transference of information from disperse units to a 
gathering center, the problems of transmission, selection, translation and interpretation appear 
with every extra step of transference. One possibility for minimizing the consequences of 
these problems, could be the creation of a more specific procedure, reading of the summary at 
the  end  of  the  session,  and  further,  opening  it  to  public  access.  However,  the  risk  of 
purposeful  or  accidental  misunderstandings,  misinterpretations  and  dismissals  of  specific 
perspectives is naturally given. Insofar, the ‘Chamber in the Square’ is just a semi-formalized 
procedure, which intends to adapt itself to the different needs and particular circumstances in 
which  it  takes  place.  Nevertheless,  from a  legal  perspective,  it  is  easy to  argue  that  the 
‘Chamber in the Square’ is a minimalistic or primitive lay version of formal consultation 
processes that could get as formal, complex and finally inaccessible to the vast majority of 
population as any other step of a ‘normal’ legislative process.
One could argue, for example, that the ‘Chamber in the Square’ just does not get that 
complex and complicated as formal law (yet)  because it  is  in an initial  phase,  and, most 
importantly, because, as a political process, it has not been reflected sufficiently regarding 
questions of transparency and legitimate representation. The formal law would consequently 
be a more advanced state in organization (for more complex situations) as the Chamber in the 
Square or, for that matter,  as comparable procedures in indigenous law. According to this 
argument, a more thoroughly thought popular ‘Chamber’ would have to include, for example, 
a specific form of writing and making public the outcomes of the session, a right to protest in 
case the summary is argued to be incomplete or false, a secret form to vote in order to avoid 
the exercise of power on the will of the participants, etc. In the end, the machinery of ever 
more detailed formalization of procedures cannot be avoided. Thus, formal (and ever more 
formalized) law would be the last standard in a chain of increasing complexity.
In  fact,  these  forms  of  theater  as  politics  stand in  opposition  to  some political  and 
strategic principles from the moment they invite each participant to appear on the stage, and 
most specifically, particularly when vote sessions are included, they overrun the principle of 
secrecy  of  the  vote.  This  is  a  major  problem  in  the  prevalent  discussion  on  political 
participation  and  voting  rights.  In  this  sense,  one  could  argue  that  instead  of  being  an 
instrument  of  liberation  from oppression,  the  request  for  the  open  presentation  of  one's 
opinion through the techniques of the Theater of the Oppressed are tools for the reinforcement 
of that oppression. Which person, under serious threat of violence in case of voicing her/his 
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opinion, would actually go to the stage and speak up? On the contrary, she/he would likely act 
in order to be seen as obedient and loyal to her/his oppressor, creating an example for the 
whole audience and community. 
Indeed, the risk of misrepresentation and restatement of oppression exists. However, 
there are at least three points to take into account, which build the core of Legislative Theater 
and its main innovative collaboration to legal development, and which relativize the judgment 
of these theatrical techniques as naive and/or as tools of oppression from a formalistic point of 
view. Certainly, the value of Legislative Theater is to be seen in the way it puts back the legal 
into social interaction. 
Firstly,  the  aim  of  Theater  of  the  Oppressed  and  its  combination  with  formalized 
procedures  of  legislation  through  Legislative  Theater,  is  not  primordially  to  be  a  voting 
station. The principal aim is to create dialogue — the openness of which might be constrained 
by several forms of power, and which, nevertheless, can, if practiced continuously, become 
more flexible and open. To create that openness is part of the work that the techniques of 
theater might develop. 
Secondly, we have to remember that the work of Legislative Theater depends on the 
works of specific nuclei and links that gather geographic or thematic communities with a 
common  interest.  These  nuclei  and  links  need  at  first,  to  develop,  and  later  and  most 
importantly to hold, a space of safety for themselves. That is why the ‘oppressed’, in Boal's 
terminology, gather first among themselves: there is a nucleus of black students, a nucleus of 
housemaids,  a  nucleus  of  disabled  persons,  etc.  Most  of  them are  considered  to  be  and 
consider  themselves  in  a  space  of  vulnerability,  and,  therefore,  they  have  gathered  in 
associations and use theater to their advantage. The strength of the individual to claim what 
she/he considers to be lacking, is reinforced through her/his community of resistance. 
Finally, a similar aspect of the public experience of a session in Legislative Theater or 
any other form of Theater of the Oppressed must be highlighted. Being the main aim of these 
techniques to open up a discussion, and thus become political, one of the main tasks of a joker 
and the theater staff is to create a climate for discussion,  including principally a sense of 
safety and an urgency to participate. At first, it is difficult to imagine how this space could 
look like, when ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’ are part of the same audience. Nevertheless, the 
fact that it is a public event, and specifically in the context of Legislative Theater also an 
official event, creates by itself a certain sense of protection because the perpetrator of any 
oppression can become as exposed as her/his victim, the moment the latter enters the stage. 
Moreover,  after  the  first  person  has  presented  her/his  story,  the  moment  of  solitude  that 
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characterizes  the  psychological  and  material  weakness  of  any  victim  loses  strength  and 
alliances are created between persons that do not know each other but recognize themselves in 
the same character, i.e. they recognize each other. 
Last but not least, these considerations can create a space where expression is possible, 
and, due to the particularity of this situation, the consciousness about the uniqueness of the 
possibility to express oneself arises. If it is not here, where? If it is not now, when? In many 
cases, the presentation of Theater of the Oppressed is one of the rare opportunities that appear 
for people in vulnerable situations to be heard, because someone (in fact, a whole audience!) 
is ready to listen. Thus, a space is created, where communication is more possible.
Hence, what remains important for the ‘Chamber in the Square’ as well as for the whole  
project of Legislative Theater, is that it intends to create a flexible and open membrane that 
allows for communication, at least for more and more diversified communication than the 
mere existence of a city counselor allows. During the process of the development of a play 
and its presentation, equally, the self-reliance of the citizens is strengthened, so that the will 
and the capacity to communicate are enhanced. Thus, even if the joker would not transmit the 
diverse  opinions  voiced  as  all  participants  of  the  meeting  would  have  wished  to,  the 
possibility to relate to the mandate directly is not only given, as it is formally anyways, but, it  
is also existent as an accessible reality in the minds of each of the persons that form the  
community.  The idea  that  it  is  possible,  that  it  is  worthwhile,  and  that  it  is  desired  and 
expected,  that  the  community participates,  changes  the  way the  community relates  to  its 
political and legal representatives. The possibility of being heard turns lastly into a demand of 
civil  rights.  In  this  sense,  Legislative  Theater  cannot  be  seen  merely  as  a  semi-formal 
consultation process, since its intention is to go beyond and reach deeper.
What Boal, together with a variety of assistants and jokers who put Theater of the Oppressed 
in practice renewing it constantly, elaborated through these theater techniques, especially with 
the Legislative Theater, is an aesthetic-political approach. Thus, the notions of dialogue and 
debate, of reflexivity and transitivity, and of the personal and the communal are neither to be 
understood in a merely aesthetic manner, nor separately as a political and legal reflection. Not 
only aesthetics  is  politics,  but  politics  is  aesthetics,  and,  being law the result  of  political 
forces, law is a matter of aesthetics too. From this aesthetic-political perspective, which are 
then the possibilities envisaged by Boal for plurality to relate to law, and how does he think of 
law as a  system of formal social order?  In this context, how  does Boal envisage ‘social 
deve-
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lopment’ and what role does his aesthetic-political perspective and the resulting law take into 
that vision?
To start with, development, in the world of Boal, takes the form of political action. As I 
have mentioned above, Boal's theater is political, first of all, because it takes a stance in front 
of the reality he, and through the theatrical practice the other participants too, experiences. It 
is  because  of  his  discontent  with  political  oppression,  economic  insufficiency and  social 
inequality,  that  Boal  started  to  develop  Newspaper  Theater  and  ended  up putting  theater 
techniques at the service of legislation. It is a “desire for change” that he wants to develop in 
the audiences (Boal 1998, 20). That is why with his theater, he aims to “produce not catharsis, 
but dynamisation” (Idem) in the not anymore passive spectators. Taking the wish for change 
to an extreme, Boal points out, Legislative Theater seeks to “transform that desire into law” 
(Idem). 
This transformation emanates actually from another transformation, the transformation 
of the spectator into an artist, and of the citizen into the legislator. In this sense, Boal says that 
“the theatre  creates  a  space in  which  potentialities  can be ‘act-ualized’ or  developed:  the 
potential  becomes  actual”  (Idem,  68;  emphasis  added).  That  this  development  is  not 
necessarily dependent on an outer marker in a linear perspective, becomes even more clear 
with  Boal's  clarification:  “The person can  re-dimension  himself,  investigate  himself,  find 
himself, recognize himself” (Idem). The development of which Boal speaks, seems to be a 
development that goes to the inside, this is,  to find something that was all  the time there 
(restating the ancient oracle ‘know thyself'), to see oneself with new eyes. 
Seeing oneself is, in fact, the corner stone of the whole of Boal's theory of theater as a 
main characteristic of being human, as “the human language  par excellence” (Idem, 7). To 
see oneself in action (Idem), to see one reflected in the action of an other person on stage, and, 
in turn, to reflect on that and try again, to try other forms to be, to see and to be seen — this is  
the core of the whole Theater of the Oppressed and the development it proposes. It is no 
wonder thus,  that Boal insists with the value of images,  being Image Theater one central 
technique in his ‘arsenal’. The images that Boal searches for, act as symbols because their aim 
is not to be the “exact image of reality”, but, moreover, “the important thing is the reality of  
the image” (Idem, 54). In other words, the purpose of recurring to these images is to “show 
things not the way they are, but the way” the image-maker feels them (Idem, 77), in order to 
achieve a deeper understanding and enter in genuine dialogue. Somehow, Boal's aim is to find 
a  path  between  the  concrete  and  the  abstract,  through  which  meaning  becomes  more 
accessible,  so  that  seeing,  we  can  understand.  Development  derives  thus  from  a  more 
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encompassing understanding of oneself and the role one plays in a scene and in the theater of 
life.
His  whole  search  can  thus  be  understood  as  a  search  for  images,  “Subjunctive  or 
Conditional images” — as he names them — “that is, images which allow us to think, to 
imagine,  to  invent,  images  which  instil  doubt  or  allow fancy”  (Idem,  81).  And thus  the 
concept of an artist that he has, and with which he identifies, is of the artist as “a person who 
helps us to see what we tend only to look at, and to listen to what we tend only to hear” (Idem, 
81).  Understanding  seeing  as  “an  act  of  conscience”  (Idem,  79),  to  create  images  about 
oneself, about our environment, about our desires are moments of developing consciousness. 
This  process  of  self-understanding and self-consciousness  seems to  be  at  the  core  of  the 
development  that  Boal  envisages  to  support  with  theater  work.  However,  the  desired 
development does not end there. Being theater a rehearsal for ‘real life’, Boal continuously 
emphasizes  the  need  for  a  further  action  as  part  of  this  development.  From seeing  and 
reflecting, new ways to act can and need to be born, that, from Boal's perspective overcome 
real oppression.
Taking a closer look to Boal's treatment of this sphere of action, of the social sphere, however, 
the  dimension  of  self-understanding  gets  soon  lost  and  a  more  prescriptive  form  of 
development gains ground. From the beginning, Boal presents his arguments on the ground of 
a division between oppressor and oppressed, and consequently,  sets this separation in line 
with a division of the world that points at the conception of development that accompanies his 
work. An example of this divided perspective can be seen in the statement that his book on 
legislative  theater  “talks  about  a  very  specific  reality,  in  the  southern  hemisphere. 
Geographically, politically and economically the southern hemisphere!” (Idem, xii; emphasis 
in the original). What he means by the ‘southern hemisphere’ becomes clearer in examples he 
uses later to present Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, for example recalling rankings that present his 
home-country as “a divided society, with a distribution of wealth that is among the world's 
most  unjust,  ranking alongside  Botswana,  Central  Africa  and Zaire”  (Idem,  24),  partially 
quoting the International Bank for Development (Idem, 29), and presenting ‘historical photos’ 
of  the Vietnam war,  Tiananmen Square,  the civil  war  of  Rwanda,  Baghdad or  Bosnia  as 
evocations of life in Rio de Janeiro (Idem, 33). Similarly, at an international level, he refers to 
the injustice provoked by an immense external debt (depicted implicitly as illegitimate to its 
most part,  since it  was increased sixfold during the years of dictatorship)  that affects  the 
sectors  of  education and health  badly,  and an  outraging privatization  as  the result  of  the 
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extreme dependency of European and US-American politics (Idem, 36). As a consequence, in 
earlier  texts of Boal173,  Brazil is included in the group of “underdeveloped and dependent 
countries” (Idem, 225). Although he seldom speaks about ‘social development’ as such, these 
internal injustice and external dependency are clearly main oppressions that his work aims to 
overcome, and present insofar the development he aims for. On this ground, it is arguable that 
while Boal seldom refers explicitly to ‘development’, in fact, his whole work is based on the 
hope and the desire for ‘development’ from oppression to liberation, turning unnecessary to 
mention  ‘development’  as  a  separate  thought.  A  linear  ‘development’  is  the  unnamed 
assumption  from  which  he  starts,  and  the  whole  Theater  of  the  Oppressed,  including 
Legislative Theater, is a complex of techniques at its service.
In this context, law plays a key role. It is not by chance that it is in the field of law that 
he presents a clear  line of historical  development,  when he asserts  that  “as  far  as  law is  
concerned,  the  drugs  trade functions  as  if  we [in  Brazil]  were living  before the  Code of 
Hammurabi”, prior to which, according to him, “justice was administered at the whim of the 
king, and in accordance with his power, which was measured by the weight of the club that he 
carried” (Idem, 29). Similarly, it is in a speech where Boal presented the ‘Law of Protection of 
Witnesses of Crimes’ (Law 1245/95) and where he comes to speak about Human Rights, that 
Boal speaks of the progress of Humanity “by means of the struggle between barbarism and 
civilisation” (Idem, 161).174 “Civilisation,” he argues, “is only made possible by the invention 
of Ethics”, in contrast to “the law of the jungle, [where] brute force wins” (Idem, 159). 
After the perspectives I have presented in chapter A relating modernity to law, it is not 
surprising that  this  “advent  of humanity comes about  by the invention of Ethics”,  and is 
directly linked to  notions  of  justice  and law.  Thus,  Boal  sees  as  an  essential  progress,  a 
foundational  step  of  Humanity,  that  “the  individual  [is]  judged by the  norms of  society” 
173 Although included in his book ‘Legislative Theater’ of 1998, Boal makes a point of underlining that the  
texts corresponding to pages 211-246 were “written in 1971, when everything in Brazil was black or white;  
this explains the simplicity of the analysis” (Boal 1998, 211). It is interesting for our research, that, while  
‘underdevelopment’ does not appear explicitly many times in the rest of his work, and more specifically in 
the rest of his presentation of ‘Legislative Theater’ (see, however, Boal 1998, 254 quoting Noam Chomsky),  
it does appear in this text of the beginning of the 1970's. This detail is a minute example of a time when the 
concept of ‘development’ was, as we have seen, at the highpoint of its career (especially in combination 
with the political monologue of the dictatorial regimes in Latin America in tune with development agencies) 
before getting into a deep crisis during the 1980's. 
174 Boal's  engagement with Human Rights is  not  only the result  of  his presidency of  the Commission for 
Human Rights. As the end of this speech shows exemplarily, particularly his own experience during the 
dictatorial regime is crucial for his engagement. Thus, he comes to speak about the need to find the truth for 
crimes of the past and political crimes, about the law of amnesty, about torture and the need for memory 
(Boal 1998, 163). Equally, in another speech against the demolition of the Tijuca police headquarters, where 
many Brazilians were tortured, he makes explicit reference to his personal experience, his support for the 
law and his belief “in the rule of law” (Boal 1998, 150).
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instead of being, like “in far-off times, the subjective will of the king, who was the strongest 
and the most powerful [..., the one which] was the reality of the law” (Idem, 160). Thus, it is 
“as civilized people” that “we know that a man in uniform who carries a weapon is the arm of 
justice,  but  not  the  judge”  (Idem,  161).  Categories  of  knowledge  about  the  established 
authority, this is here policemen and judges, but also more generally about the division of 
powers, and at an even more abstract level about ‘the truth’ and ‘what is just’ are mingled thus 
with the idea of being civilized, in contrast to a remote barbaric past that we have overcome in 
pursuing the next step in the line of development. It is in this perspective of the advancement 
of the complex of truth-justice-civilization, that Boal reviews the story of civilizing law from 
Hammurabi's  Code, where “Shamah, the Just,  The God of Reason” makes its  appearance 
proving that “civilisation's preoccupation with a notion of Right already existed in that epoch” 
(Idem, 160), through the US-American Constitution of 1789, and the “Universal Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen” of 1791, up to the humanitarian intervention and the 
‘Duty to Intervene’ during the Gulf War. This is the road Humanity has been walking, from 
the barbarian to the civilized. 
As a consequence, Boal concludes (in his speech presenting the Law of Protection of 
Witnesses  of  Crimes),  “anyone  who  turns  against  Human  Rights,  is  turning  against 
civilisation and revealing their  primitive side” (Idem, 161).  Those against  Human Rights, 
those who “declare that such Rights must protect only such and such a category of person”, 
wish, according to Boal, “to divide us into castes, relegating the majority to the condition of 
untouchables and keeping for themselves the privileges of the Brahmin” (Idem, 162). The 
question remains open, however, of which ‘us’ is Boal speaking now about. Is this the ‘us’ of 
the  witnesses  he  was  trying  to  protect  with  the  new law?,  of  the  victims  of  the  crimes 
witnessed?, of the civilized?, of the morally advanced? In any case, he is putting himself on 
the side of the relegated majority, like in all the references in his books where he presents 
himself as being always on the side of the ‘oppressed’. However, at the same time, he is  
putting himself on the side of the civilized. Thus, through the participation in a rhetoric of a 
value scale of civilization, at the same time that he argues against oppression, he reinforces a 
division of humanity between better and worse on which the oppression he opposes is based.
In the concrete case of the debate over the protection of witnesses, this means that the 
decision for yes or no is the result of a decision over the developmental stage one wants to 
posit oneself, and thus, the answer is always pre-given, because the measure for the ‘more 
civilized’ and the better is already established, and even has an own reference in the realm of 
international  law,  namely  ‘Human  Rights’.  While  at  first  sight,  the  advantages  of  the 
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protection of witnesses might be obvious, it is important to understand the debate in which 
Boal participates with these arguments. If, on the one hand, we can imagine a totally innocent 
witness and thus the need to protect her/him turns obvious, on the other hand, we can also 
imagine, in a more realistic way, that many witnesses are embedded in the same field they 
become  witnesses  of.  From  a  dichotomic  perspective  that  draws  a  clear  line  between 
innocence and culpability, between good citizens and criminals, the defense of the witness 
presents thus a paradox, where defending her/him as ‘innocent’ means to defend, at the same 
time, a (potential and more often than not known) ‘criminal’. Only from this background is 
understandable  that  Boal  needs  to  defend his  position  stating:  “None of  us  is  asking for 
clemency for criminals, kidnappers, drug-traffickers” (Idem, 161). 
This exchange of reasons is  important to us insofar as it  highlights the structure in 
which Boal takes position. In his struggle to achieve support for what he thinks is just, namely 
the protection of witnesses, he accuses his opponents of “placing themselves on the same 
moral plane as those who they wish to accuse, they commit the same crime they are trying to 
punish” (Idem, 162). In other words, blurring the limits, Boal argues that while the opponents 
of the law for protection of witnesses apparently posit themselves against criminality, they 
actually come to take part of it. Most importantly, in doing so, they place themselves in a 
moral plane which Boal implicitly characterizes as lower, because it is the moral plane of the 
criminals. Interestingly, this might be the moral plane where also the witnesses he is trying to 
defend,  might  be  situated.  According to  this  structure  of  thought,  in  a  seemingly natural 
manner, the planes of morality succeed each other like steps of a staircase, and taking the 
position of a lower moral level is not acceptable for civilized humans. The legislator should 
be civilized and thus he could never be comparable with a criminal.
But how far is a certain position not acceptable for Boal and all other civilized citizens? 
Apparently,  as far as law is not involved. Thus, Boal criticizes the moral standards of his 
opponents presenting them as “those who plead the case for the assassination of assassins, the  
kidnapping of kidnappers, without the mediation of the judiciary power” (Idem, 162). And if  
there was a judiciary power mediating the assassination and kidnapping? That that would be 
probably the wrong type of law becomes clear, when he claims that he was defending the law, 
an  usurped  law,  when  he  was  opposing  the  dictatorial  regime  decades  ago  (Idem,  150). 
Consequently, law plays the role of the hinge between barbarity and civilization, even if what 
Boal sees reflected in law are his own ethics and morals. That law is a placeholder for a 
specific conception of civilized morals is what allows Boal, in the end, to praise the ‘Duty to 
Intervene’ as a natural and desired consequence of the supremacy of Human Rights. In any 
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case,  be it  a national  or an international matter,  Boal's  invocation of good or true law is  
explicitly aimed at offering “a little bit of terra firma in the midst of all the moral turbulence 
of the new international order” (Idem, 163).
Going back to the particular case of the Witness Protection Law, this search for  terra 
firma does not allow Boal to go beyond the problem of a lost security on who is the innocent 
witness,  and who the  guilty  criminal,  or,  in  other  words,  who  is  innocent  enough  to  be 
protected  and  who  is  criminal  enough  to  be  punished.  In  fact,  he  restores  simplicity, 
articulating his pledge in terms of imperative needs: “In the triad of crime    criminal, victim, 
witness    for the first of these to be punished, the last must be protected” (Idem, 162). If the  
witness is also criminal or not turns secondary, because truth arises as the lighting star that 
“must shine before Justice can be done” (Idem). Presenting the witness as the “restorer of the 
truth”, it is clear what a civilized person should think, because “by protecting the witness, we 
are defending Human Rights, civilisation against savagery” (Idem). With the same logic, it is 
this  common fight  against  primitivism,  what  can  transcend  the  separation  by ideological 
differences and party loyalties: “together, for civilisation and against barbarism” (Idem, 163). 
Finally, because of this dimension beyond ideology, Boal adjudicates this task to the State, 
seeing in it the legitimate protector of civilization. 
Summing up, Boal believes in “the humanisation of man” concretized in the Human 
Rights (Idem, 162), and thus in a progress towards more humanity. How shall it be brought 
about? Through ethics and social norms, that found form in law. And who shall be responsible 
for that? The State as a protector of civilization (against barbarity) and humanity, and lastly as 
the author of the law. His theater and his search to open dialogue is a result of this belief: “To 
enable people to speak is to enable them to become part of the struggle of this century, to 
become involved in the highest human objectives of this historic moment: the humanisation of 
mankind” (Idem, 224). 
That he is skeptical of this progress at the same time that he advocates for it, becomes clear in  
the ‘extra-information’ that Boal supplies to the reader, for example the sentences in brackets 
and the words between quotation marks. Thus, regarding the ‘Duty to Intervene’, Boal adds: 
“(This duty has only been applied when dealing with one oil-rich country trying to annex 
another even richer country, and was never contemplated during the bloody regimes which 
strangled so many countries in Latin America. Or in Free Timor, today, in the stranglehold of 
Indonesia, under the nose of a greedy Australia.)” (Idem, 161). With this clarification, Boal 
relativizes (and thus devalues) the absolute validity of what he stated one sentence before 
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regarding the equality amongst human beings that the Human Rights and the politics of the 
United Nations have brought about. While Boal searches for a civilizatory progress towards 
more humanization, the question that Boal states and leaves unanswered is how far does that 
advanced civilization he speaks about reach for him and his Brazil as much as he is trying to  
reach it. Thus, can the higher level of humanization he strives for ever actually include Brazil? 
At the same time that he claims the validity of the ‘Duty to Intervene’ in terms of the defense 
of Human Rights, he equally asserts the contingency and the limits of this ‘protection’ by 
international law of economic interests and political power.
The same ambivalent relationship can be seen already in Boal's references to progress 
and (under)development, when he criticizes the “subliminal ideological propaganda” of the 
cinema  and  theater  of  the  beginning  of  the  1970's  for  their  vast  “examples  of  ‘natives’ 
depicted  with  great  ‘charm’,  with  great  gusto,  especially  in  respect  of  any  of  their 
characteristics which relate to their ‘underdevelopment'” (Idem, 231). The linear development 
of  civilization  he  draws  in  other  context,  becomes  suddenly  surrounded  by  relativizing 
quotation marks. He rejects that ‘natives’ are depicted as ‘underdeveloped’ but at the same 
time has no problem in referring to opponents of what he considers as civilized, as primitive, 
using equally a personal scale of ‘moral development’. As another example, criticizing samba 
performances  which,  subsidized  by  the  state  tell  “the  history  of  Brazil  from  the 
descobrimento (discovery) up to the establishment of the Bolsa de Valores do Rio de Janeiro 
(Rio Stock Exchange)” (Idem, 220 f.), he writes that “those who sing of this ‘progress’ are the 
same exploited and starving people who made it possible, thanks to the inhuman exploitation 
of labour of which they are victims and which made the stock markets more lucrative” (Idem, 
221).  So,  Boal  believes  in  progress,  but  not  in  this  progress.  Of  what  progress  and 
development, does Boal dream of, then? Of a liberating one, in which every individual can 
pursue his own desire. But is this not the same dream at the root of the liberal individualist 
world Boal criticizes? 
Similarly,  while  he  praises  the  advancement  of  humanity  and  civilization  through 
putting  in  practice  Human  Rights  for  all human  beings  equally,  he  criticizes  the  legal 
homogenization in the European Community (Idem, 169) and the unification of the world 
through globalization (Idem, 250 f.). This case of unification in an “immense global village” 
implies for him, “to atomise, to isolate individuals”, and thus, to turn “into a formless mass, 
without character” (Idem). His argument in these cases is against the “imposition of a single 
culture on all other cultures, under the auspices of the God Market” (Idem, 169). Thus, he 
remembers,  that  “all  hegemonic  powers  have  always  been  globalising”,  and  that 
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“imperialisms have always sought to monopolise the world”, and brings the examples of the 
Pax Romana, Incas, Aztecs, British and American empires, as well as Hitler's Thousand-Year 
Reich  (Idem,  36).  This  process  is  obviously not  part  of  Boal's  idea  of  progress.  On  the 
contrary, as he asserts in the context of his globalization critique: “there is nothing modern 
about the modern world; there are still troglodytes!” (Idem), and, in this sense, “a large part of 
the world still lives in pre-history” (Idem, 169).
Progress has to be, thus, a progress in the right way. It is not just natural, we cannot just 
wait. On the contrary, it has to be fought for. Oppressed have to fight for their liberation. And 
law is a powerful tool for that aim. But also in respect to this tool Boal takes an ambivalent 
stance. Because if, on the one hand, Boal claims that he has “always been a believer in the 
rule of law” (Idem, 150), he also points out that “equally, sometimes the oppression is actually 
rooted within the law” (Idem, 9). Often, to deal with law becomes a void endeavor, as he 
expresses after  making a  detailed account  of  the successful  laws proposed by Legislative 
Theater: “I should make it clear that, in Brazil at least, laws do not apply in themselves; even 
if  they are  promulgated,  they  are  not  necessarily  enforced”  (Idem,  104).  He claims  thus 
several times, the absurdity of the vereador's duty (Idem, 98). Actually, his skepticism in front 
of law and lawyers (Idem, 27) and his ambivalence in front of them, reflect the position of law 
in the social environment Boal refers to, where law has been discredited (Idem, 27 f.), or, in 
the words of Boal, “where immorality is legalised and law is made immoral” (Idem, 158). 
Boal's  concept  of  law,  as  we  could  observe  already  in  his  arguments  around  the 
protection of witnesses, has clearly a moral background, and thus, he states: “If neither God 
nor law exists, everything is possible, even random killing” (Idem, 31). From this perspective, 
while law has replaced God, it continues working in the same moral (and hierarchical) way. 
Naturally, Boal's need for this moral law finds expression also in his concept of justice, which 
functions as the link between the realm of morals and the realm of (positive) laws. Hence, in a 
similar way than the absence of God/law makes everything possible, Boal states that “where 
justice is weak, disobedience is possible” (Idem, 171), and this, in turn, is a source of disorder 
and hate, since “with no justice, everyone thinks they are just; and everybody hates each other 
– since the absence of justice allows many possible objects for hatred” (Idem).175 
The way to state clarity about what is just, about the strength of that justice and about 
who is to make justice and how, is marked, in the plays of Forum Theater, by the choices of  
possible action presented in front of the conflict. Since the impulse for a just change, a change 
175 Interestingly,  this  sentence  appears  in  the  context  of  an  analysis  of  ‘Romeo  and  Julia’ of  William 
Shakespeare,  when Boal  refers to  the mild justice of Prince Escalus,  clearly a  paradigmatic figure for 
hierarchical and monolithic power.
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that overcomes the one-way oppression Boal envisages, can only come from the ‘oppressed’, 
identified as such through the structure of the play,  it  is only the ‘oppressed’ who can be 
replaced by spect-actors, the ‘oppressors’ cannot. The aim of this (spect-)actor's exchange is 
to find ways to achieve justice, which can only be on the side of the ‘oppressed’. 
Equally, in Legislative Theater, this need for a clear just law of the oppressed finds also 
its expression. Following Boal's account, it  becomes apparent that his participation in law 
derives to a certain degree from experiencing law as a form of oppression, and thus, the trick 
Boal develops is to put the ‘oppressed’ as authors of the law. But, while this move changes 
some aspects of law, it does not change its hierarchical character which derives directly from 
the prescriptive structure it presupposes and which it feeds. The liberation Boal strives for, 
works, thus, within a structure of oppression that he (only) aims to put at the service of the 
oppressed identified in advance. Consequently, the transformation of “desire into law” (Idem, 
20) that Legislative Theater seeks to produce is meant for the just desires, i.e. for those of the 
oppressed. All the rest is necessary haggling. 
From this perspective on law as morals and as a lever in the social machinery, which is the 
role  of  plurality  that  Boal  envisages?  Importantly,  acknowledging  that  law  is  always 
someone's desire, a similar position to the one we could observe in Critical Legal Studies, 
Boal's call is to “make our desire become law too!” (Idem). This statement is an expression of 
Boal's emphatic call in favor of plurality, in favor of a social polyphony. In order to make our 
various  desires come true,  we have to express these desires,  and for that,  as Boal argues 
further, we have to come to recognize our “individual desires” instead of having “prosthesis 
of desire” (Idem, 37), implanted or manipulated from the outside. In fact, Boal's book on 
Legislative Theater is itself, through its own form, equally, a call for the manifestation of the 
desires of the reader. Thus, already in the first pages of his book, Boal underlines: “don't let 
these suggestions act as limitations to your own desires – create your own style at your own 
risk!” (Idem, xi). 
Through this call to find and fulfill the true individual desires, Boal not only speaks of a 
plurality of ways to be, but he also invokes the individual, that should not give up to the 
manipulation  from the  outside,  for  example  through  a  global  market.  In  doing  so,  Boal 
responds to a postmodern concern regarding power, particularly the cultural power of creating 
identities, with the perspective of an underlying true individual, an individual that is what 
he/she  desires  (Idem,  149).  This  is  the same model  he uses  to  create  the figures  of  ‘the  
oppressed’ and ‘the oppressor’, which depend on a clear sense of identity. Thus, when this 
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sense of identity is endangered, he claims in front of his opponents: “For you to continue 
being who you are it is necessary that we be who we are. For you to be you, I need to be me” 
(Idem, 152). This stance seems to be in clear opposition to the dissolution of the individual 
that Foucault, for example, argued. In other words, what is a true desire, a non-cultural or 
culturally manipulated desire?
But it is true that Boal, at the same time that he calls for this reassurance of specific 
forms of identity, linked to categories of confrontation (like you/me, oppressed/oppressor), he 
also invites us to re-imagine our ways to be. In other words, Boal's political aesthetics invite 
to imagine and to create a plurality of identities for ourselves, to pluralize ourselves. The 
central function of the work with images derives from this interest for plurality, because the 
image, unexplained, permits plural meanings to arise. This plurality of meaning allows the 
participant  not  only  to  understand  and  to  a  certain  extent  to  identify  with  the  struggle 
presented, but, in the dialogue, it allows him/her to understand that the meaning he/she gave 
to the image is just  one possible interpretation amongst many.  Consequently,  a change of 
perspective and thus a different answer is possible, which may take the participant closer to 
the results he/she desires. It is because of the plural meanings that we can give to the image, 
that it enhances the imagination of plural developments, and thus, the ‘oppressed’ can find 
new ways of action. Only the expression of different views allows for a dialogue, and only 
this dialogue allows Theater of the Oppressed to find new answers to old problems.
The topic of dialogue as a result of the interaction of a plurality of expressions and as a 
producer of a plurality of possibilities is, in fact, at the core of Boal's theatrical and political 
practice. Thus, Boal asks: “In reality, does dialogue exist, ever? Or is the contrary the case – 
that  what  we  think  is  dialogue  never  actually  goes  beyond  parallel  or  overlapping 
monologues?” (Idem, 4). In other words, Boal's question is: Is communication possible? By 
now, this is a question we are used to find in postmodern approaches which aim to emphasize 
the existence of difference. How is it possible, to transcend the “interpersonal monologues” 
and “attain the supreme status of genuine dialogue” (Idem)?
Interestingly,  Boal,  echoing  contemporary  authors  concerned  with  alterity  and 
subalternity like Spivak as well as psychologists and communication theorists like Carl R. 
Rogers  (1902-1987)  and  Marshall  Rosenberg  (*1934),  emphasizes  in  this  context  the 
relevance of listening, when he states: “Could it be that we merely speak and cease speaking, 
intermittently, rather than speaking and listening? We know the word we speak, but we do not 
know what will be heard. What we say is never what is heard” (Idem). 
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Boal's  own  attempt  to  resolve  the  problem  of  transitivity,  the  conundrum  of 
communication,  this  is  the  accessibility  of  the  Other,  manifested  in  forms  of  theatrical 
language. In this sense, the playwright claims that “the Theatre of the Oppressed, in all its 
various modalities, is a constant search for dialogical forms, forms of theatre through which it 
is possible to converse, both about and as part of social activity, pedagogy, psychotherapy, 
politics” (Idem, 4). In fact, Boal's attempt to enhance a more careful listening (as well as a 
way to speak with more chances to be understood) was directed to broaden the spectrum of 
stimuli consciously involved in the communication, including, beyond rational argumentation, 
the body, the voice, the rhythm, etc. It is because of this concern with communication, that he 
challenged conventional theater as a practice “governed by an intransitive relationship, in that 
everything travels  from stage  to  auditorium,  everything is  transported,  transferred  in  that 
direction – emotions, ideas, morality! – and nothing goes the other way” (Idem, 19). Hence, 
his life-work aims as a whole to transform this intransitivity in manifold communication, to 
‘democratise the stage space’ (Idem, 67) both in the theater and in the Chamber.
His  theater   not  only  aimed  to  open  new  channels  of  communication  through  the 
corporal expression, but, at the same time, Boal searched for an empathic connection that, 
through  the  work  with  symbols  and  structures  of  the  unconscious,  goes  beyond  rational 
communication or an intellectual exchange of arguments. Hence, similar as in the case of 
Rogers’ and  Rosenberg's  theories,  the  realm  of  emotions  gained,  in  Boal's  approach  to 
communication, and thus in his perspective on plurality and politics, a protagonistic role.
In order to achieve this empathic connection that goes beyond rational interaction, the 
performances of Theater of the Oppressed start usually with some gamexercises, a neologism 
created by Boal to refer to exercises that prepare for the theatrical interaction while intending 
to enhance playfulness. Boal emphasizes that the “exercises with actors and audience [serve] 
not only as a ‘warm-up’ but also to establish a degree of theatrical communion” (Idem, 8).  
This idea of communion, a form of sharing with sacred connotations, appears again in the 
tasks of the joker, who “must show, by means of examples – preferably solicited from other 
participants – that no problem is UNIQUE and EXCLUSIVE to one person alone”, because 
“at the very least there will be a resonance, always” (Idem, 46). A plurality of experiences  
becomes linked through communion with a bigger whole. It is no surprise then, that in the 
dramatic action, “particularity must be inscribed on the universal” (Idem, 59), and thus the 
goals of the characters need to “be at the same time objective and subjective” (Idem, 57), as 
Boal  argues  quoting  John  Howard  Lawson  (1894-1977).  This  connection  between  the 
particular  and  the  universal,  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  takes  the  shape  of  a 
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communication triangle amongst the two characters in dialogue on the stage and the audience 
as a third point (Idem, 66).
In order to build and strengthen these communication links, Boal uses especially the 
symbolic language of images. It is through the capacity of reflecting oneself in the image of 
another that a link is created between actor and spect-actor, between the subjective experience 
and a broader struggle. It is through giving shape to an image, that the creator of the image 
sees himself reflected and realizes his position. Moreover, Boal argues in this sense, that it is 
the capacity to see our reflection, to see ourselves in action, to see ourselves seeing, what 
makes humans theatrical beings  per se. In other words, “all of us ‘are’ theatre” (Idem, 7), 
because all of humans are actors and spectators of their own drama. Moreover, this capacity 
of  seeing  ourselves  from the  outside  (i.e.  to  see  our  reflection)  and  to  reflect  on  it,  has 
consequences for our further doing: “This possibility of our being simultaneously Protagonist 
and principal spectator of our actions, affords us the further possibility of thinking virtualities, 
of imagining possibilities, of combining memory and imagination […] to reinvent the past 
and to invent the future. Therein resides the immense power with which theatre is endowed” 
(Idem). As a consequence, when we can imagine us differently, we can also act differently. 
Thus, referring to Shakespeare's ‘Hamlet’, Boal recalls the idea that “theatre is a mirror in 
which may be seen the true image of nature, of reality. I wanted to penetrate this mirror, to 
transform the image I saw in it and to bring that transformed image back to reality: to realise 
the image of my desire” (Idem, 9 f.). Theater becomes thus a tool for social transformation 
(Idem,  9),  a  social  transformation  that  is  directly  linked  to  the  debate  amongst  diverse 
perceptions, and, so far, lives out of the relations created in a space of pluralities.
Boal's idea of this connection with a larger community through the work on stage is at 
the  base  of  his  social  practice  with  theater.  Not  only  the  particular  is  embedded  in  the 
universal in each show, but also Boal's theater relies from the beginning on this connection. 
As  he  relates  regarding  his  experience  with  the  CIEPS,  the  plays  created  through  the 
workshop dealt with “issues of most concern to the cultural animators (and their families and 
neighbours in all the areas we were working in)” (Idem, 8). From the outset, thus, the idea is  
that the issues that appear in a certain group are expression of questions at a bigger scale. The 
cultural animators speak and act not only for themselves, but for a much larger community.  
The individual concerns are embedded in a net of relations that make their particular issues 
relevant for the whole.
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The concept of a network returns equally, when Boal argues that Legislative Theater 
works  through  a  “network  of  partners”  (Idem,  40)  built  by  the  nuclei  and  links.  He 
emphasizes,  furthermore,  the  need  for  dialogue  and  connection  amongst  the  different 
communities. It is in this sense, that he encourages the travel of the different shows “from the 
originating community to other communities, so that everyone may share their knowledge” 
(Idem, 88). Thus, at a practical level, it is possible to build a ‘network of solidarity’ through 
inter-nuclei dialogues and festivals (Idem, 52, 87 f.).
Hence,  the Theater of the Oppressed aims to make explicit  the existing connections 
between individuals and the communities they inhabit, as well as it searches to strengthen 
these  links  through theatrical  activity,  and to  build  furthermore  a  network  between these 
communities.  At  an  intrapersonal  level,  equally,  through  the  work  with  techniques  like 
‘Rainbow of Desire’, what becomes visible is a net of fears and desires within a person, that,  
in turn, have consequences at other scales. At every level, the intention is thus, to coordinate 
the interaction of plural entities into networks of relation, engaging diverse needs, desires, 
interests, questions, and, importantly, diverse fields and amounts of power with each other.
In this sense, plurality, embedded in an network of interactions, enhances growth for the 
community as such and for the individual. A network of different entities as envisaged by 
Boal allows for a development that furthers more plurality in a way that their differences are 
not  intractable,  but  remain  in  relation.  So  far,  social  conflict  could  be  understood  as  an 
element of dynamic balance. In other words, the conflict amongst pluralities turns central for 
peace, because it is only through the conflict amongst their different approaches, that new 
perspectives can arise. Legislative Theater is thus the result of plural actions and reflections in 
interaction that strive for social transformation. With this approach, Boal gives the modern 
concept  of  law and its  authoritative  universalizing  modus  a  twist,  incorporating,  through 
theatrical interaction, the plural voices engaged in one society.
Problematic is, however, the frame in which Boal envisages these ‘networks of solidarity’, 
these fields of empathy, these dialogues in difference, and, with them, the peace, justice, law, 
development and plurality they strive for. Because, despite all his efforts for dialogue and the 
understanding of otherness, Boal's ‘understandable others’ (others who are accessible to and 
worth understanding) are always predefined as oppressed. Insofar, they are not ‘others’, but 
are  always  the  same,  Boal's  team,  Boal's  constantly  invoked  ‘we’.  They  are  Boal's  
‘oppressed’.
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His network is thus a network of solidarity only with those accredited as oppressed, the 
dialogue he  envisages  is  a  dialogue for  the  sake of  the  oppressed  and their  desires.  The 
empathy he pursues is empathic with the oppressed's problems. Lastly, the development he 
strives for is one that goes from oppression to liberation, but what does that liberation look 
like?  Does  this  liberation  look  like  the  oppression  of  the  oppressor?  How far  does  this 
liberation allows the interacting characters to see the variety of relational networks they are 
embedded in and transcend a relationship marked by a fight for oppression/liberation? How is 
liberation conceivable beyond oppression? Although Boal envisages development also as a 
more encompassing understanding of oneself and the own role in a network of relations, and 
as the capacity to reinvent oneself, his claim for fighting against oppression as something 
external,  epitomized in  the unmovable figure of the oppressor,  attaches  development  to  a 
fixed outer standard, through which oppression, liberation, development, and lastly humanity 
is standardized. 
Problematically,  Boal  can  see  an  oppressor,  because  he  does  not  acknowledge  the 
arguments of this ‘other’ as valid — the same attitude he criticizes in the oppressor himself. 
Boal's call for plurality is thus embedded in a dichotomic perspective, and his development is 
embedded in a moral  setting,  excluding the others beyond his own moral  limitations and 
setting  again  a  very monolithic  limit  to  his  call  for  plurality.  From this  perspective,  the 
dialogue he envisages is monological, and the community he aims for is divided. As a result, 
the peace he envisages is partial; it is the result of a ‘just war’. In Boal's world, the oppressed 
will fight against the oppressors ever after, because the change he envisages is framed by a 
structuralist perspective and not a systemic one.
In  this  sense,  while  it  is  possible  to  say  that  Boal's  approach  participates  in  a 
postmodern critique through his questions on particularism and pluralization, his post-colonial 
stance, his emphasis on reinterpretation and appropriation, his play with myth and reality, his 
attitude  of  resistance  and  rejection  of  modern  paradigms  of  order,  and  his  interest  for 
underlining  discontinuities,  and  while  the  role  that  interaction,  relation,  power, 
communication  and  the  plurality  of  meaning  acquire  in  his  work  is  determinant,  Boal's 
response to the instability created by these challenges,  is marked by a moral and modern 
approach. 
Legislative  Theater  is  embedded  in  this  problematic,  and  thus  includes  its  own 
limitation from the beginning: being dependent on the strict  legislative process, it  has the 
same downsides as the process itself. The biggest difficulty in this sense is the need of the will 
of  the  legislators  to  actually  pay attention  to  the  proposals  made  in  a  session  of  Forum 
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Theater. In other words, while Forum Theater may reveal the complexity of a social problem, 
point at the need for specific strategic steps and even propose creative solutions, it is still a 
part of an authoritatively and hierarchically organized system of social order that follows the 
inherited modern model of law. Furthermore, it is also questionable that the creation of a new 
law, even supported by a previous session of Legislative Theater, does not imply always a 
(desired) change in the social reality, even if it can further it greatly. 
Nevertheless, the critical point relies in the process more than in the result of Boal's artistic-
political proposal. Through the public, open and direct discussion, in the process of putting in 
action proposals, several goals are achieved that further not only social cohesion, but even 
more, they give law and social order a totally different base for its legitimacy. The legitimacy 
supporting a law that results from this process is the consequence of the inclusion of diverse 
voices in a dialogue, or better, in a  polylogue176. Thus, this proposal goes further than the 
direct democracy system, in which it is possible to vote directly for every legislative matter. 
The participants are not put in front of a pre-established alternative, to which they have to 
answer  by  ‘yes’ or  ‘no’.  In  Legislative  Theater,  the  participants  are  involved  from  the 
elaboration of the question on ‘what is the problem?’ onwards, most importantly creating their 
own proposals  of  resolution.  It  is  this  process  of  discussion  of  opposing  positions,  their 
negotiation, but more than nothing their encounter, that permits to pose diverse needs, inviting 
to a common search of solutions. If there is no understanding of the social need of change, 
there is little that the law can do by itself. But if there is an understanding of the complex web 
of relations and of the possibility to act differently, the law might not be the most decisive 
element.
While, in the end, a law might not be enacted following the proposal of the Legislative 
Theater group, still, in the process, the participants have appropriated the power of voicing 
their position, of interacting with other citizens, of presenting their ideas to people related to 
the government that they would normally neither meet nor discuss with. They have regained 
the conscience that they are active part of a society and that they can create spaces to listen to 
each other and react in front of it. This is the strength that Legislative Theater pulls out of its  
grounding on Theater of the Oppressed. As an example of the importance of this encounter, 
Paul Heritage states regarding a piece of Forum Theater presented at  the 7th International 
Festival of the Theater of the Oppressed in Rio de Janeiro in July/August 1993: “a simple 
176 Regarding the concept of ‘polylogue’ in the context of intercultural philosophy, see Wimmer 2004, as well 
as the journal ‘Polylog’ (Polylog 2012).
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piece of Forum Theatre provided one of the few actual dialogs between the children of the 
streets and the citizens of Brazil who daily pity,  ignore, mourn, and fear them” (Heritage 
1994,  31).177 Of  course,  a  law  resulting  from  an  approach  marked  by  pity,  ignorance, 
mourning and fear, results into an authoritative response aimed to the eradication of the cause 
of all of these unpleasant experiences, as many social campaigns pursue the eradication of 
poverty, for example. It is doubtful, however, that eradication might be the best response in 
front of social conflict, since it is led by the fear and pity of the eradicator, disregarding the 
actual  needs  of  the  eradicated  other.  Stated  bluntly,  the  massacre  itself  was  a  form  of 
eradication of poverty street children. In contrast, this specific presentation of street children 
through Theater of the Oppressed achieved to include them in a face-to-face discussion, to 
open a door in the society that, in their fear and pity, excluded them even when it allegedly 
intended to address their needs.
In Legislative Theater, this pursuit of dialogue is broadened and acquires new and more 
specific goals, combining techniques of Theater of the Oppressed with specific tools offered 
by the  political  and legal  system.  However,  the  core  of  the  work  and the  motor  for  the  
concrete  legal  and  political  actions  rely  on  the  work  with  theater  itself,  on  the  social 
interaction it enhances, on the changes it produces in the performers, both actors and spect-
actors.178 Furthermore, the investigation of which are the needed and desired changes through 
theater allows to put concrete conflicts into a broader context while connecting it to a myriad 
of particular  stories.  For example,  the work of  the group ‘Marias do Brasil’ links,  in  the 
diverse presentations, the fight of domestic servants for standard labor rights with problems 
like  lack  of  formal  education  and gender  discrimination  (Félix  2010,  95).  The group has 
participated  in  the  project  of  Legislative  Theater  achieving,  with  the  support  of  the 
Commission of Participative Legislation, to introduce the federal law project no. 6030/09, 
regarding the rights of housemaids, as a priority in the discussion of the Legislative Chamber 
177 The piece was presented on the occasion of the massacre of eight children shot by members of the Military  
Police on the 23rd July 1993 at the Church of the Candelaria in the very center of Rio. As Heritage relates 
“The blood-stained pavement was only a few meters from the doors of the Festival and the impact 
on all the participants was profound, finding expression in various theatrical  responses on the 
streets over the next few days […]. However, within the Festival, a Forum presentation by a group 
of the street children themselves had the greatest impact of the various responses. Working with 
CTO the children produced a play about the way in which one boy is forced to leave his family  
and live on the street. Using an eclectic style that mixed rap and capoeira with naturalistic dialog, 
they dispensed  with  many of  the  myths  surrounding  the  street  children  while  simultaneously 
presenting the individual trajectory of a particular protagonist“ (Heritage 1994, 31).
178 For examples of these processes, see the Journal of CTO Rio, called ‘Metaxis’. Especially in its no. 6,  
dedicated to the memory of Augusto Boal, who died shortly before this edition, it  is possible to read a 
variety of experiences with Theater of the Oppressed. Take for example the account of Claudete Félix on 
the group ‘Marias do Brasil’, which in 2010 completed 11 years of trajectory (Félix 2010, 93 ff). 
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(Câmara 2011). But beyond this concrete political achievement, which is the result of eleven 
years of continuous work with Theater of the Oppressed, the participants underline how the 
work with theater serves as a way to search for new approaches. Thus, Maria José, answering 
why she does Theater of the Oppressed, asserts: “In order to find a solution for our problems. 
After doing this theater, we always look for another form of solving things and do not give up. 
I didn't know that life had so much solution...” (Félix 2010, 94). Maria Vilma, another of the 
participants, who represented the employer, states: “it is difficult to be the employer, but I like 
very much to know that I can change my role” (Idem). In these statements it turns clear that,  
although the legal change is naturally a central desire of the ‘Marias’, the change they pursue 
and the reason of their engagement relies on the theatrical interaction itself.
The strength of Legislative Theater relies thus, basically, in two key elements. Firstly, it 
allows for the configuration of platforms of strong legitimacy for social norms. Secondly, and 
more fundamental, it opens the door for a dialogue usually disregarded when it comes to deal 
with social  conflict.  This dialogue is by itself  empowering and transformative beyond the 
concrete legal achievements. Certainly, this type of interaction is not to be underestimated in 
terms of social order. The fact that no written law comes out of a transformative process does 
not  diminish  its  transformative  character.  Moreover,  it  allows us  to  remember  that  social 
interaction,  social  order,  the  finding  of  possibilities  for  a  common  life,  the  solution  of 
conflicts, and thus social and normative development depend only to a very limited extent on 
law. Rather, it is our own belief in law that gives its force, this is symbolic power, to the legal 
system we live in.
The work of Boal opened a door for envisaging new approaches to social order and, 
more specifically, to law. In the context of general socio-political crisis and incredulity in 
front of the law, embedded in a process of re-democratization, what Boal achieved was to go 
beyond mere criticism. In turn, he, together with his team of colleagues, elaborated forms to 
establish contact and develop a dialogue in the civil society and between parts of the civil 
society and the  state  institutions.  In  other  words,  he  developed  a  practice  for  alternative 
approaches  to  law  and  social  order,  that  aimed  at  including  a  plurality  and  diversity  of 
expressions.  
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II.  Making Place for the Other in the Court: Searching for Alternatives to the Culture of Law   
through Political Activism in Indigenous Justices in Mexico and Colombia
Concomitantly with the breakdown of a modern concept of law that aimed to be universally 
valid, also the practice of law experienced a crisis in the diverse fields of engagement with 
law. As an example, in the last section, I have presented one of the most innovative attempts 
to incorporate plural perspectives in legislative practices. Naturally, the proposals were not 
limited to this aspect of legal practice. Another legal environment where the presence of ‘the 
Other’ was  claimed  emphatically  was  the  judiciary.  In  this  section,  I  will  address  the 
discussion on the inclusion of ‘the Other’ in judiciary practices, focusing on the example of 
the place given to ‘indigenous law’. There are at least four main reasons to address this topic 
as a field in the pursuit of our research interest regarding the connections between plurality, 
law, and legal development. Firstly, the role of indigenous law has been gaining importance in 
the  international  debate  increasingly,  resulting  in  documents  of  international  as  well  as 
national law, which allow an approach to the problematic from the perspective of positive law 
central  to  contemporary discussion  and current  understanding  of  law in  a  modern  sense. 
Secondly,  the  formulation  of  these  documents  brought  with  itself  a  heated  discussion  in 
various  spheres  of  society,  including  already  existing  formalized  political  structures  and 
emergent civil organizations, which underlines the importance of this topic not only for law as 
a  distinct  discipline,  but  moreover  for  law  as  a  field  of  socio-political  debate.  Thirdly, 
development agencies, both national and international, have participated actively in the socio-
legal process of introducing ‘the indigenous’ as a particular category within state law and its 
institutions. Last but not least,  these discussions allow us to see the link of legal-political 
changes with the more theoretical discussion on legal pluralism presented above. 
While  a  variety  of  changes  have  appeared  in  this  field  worldwide,  I  will  take  the 
examples  of  the  constitutional  recognition  of  indigenous  law  in  some  Latin  American 
countries, particularly Mexico and Colombia, where this discussion had particular impact. I 
will  present  here  some  of  the  manifold  connections  between  plurality  and  the  place  of 
indigenous peoples and their  laws in the state judicial  system, the context in which these 
reforms took place, which were some of the main socio-legal consequences and which are 
some of the central questions that these proposals for including the Other in a legal frame 
posed in terms of legal development. 
257
1.  Complex Claims in a Complex Global Context  
In the previous chapters, we have been following a transformation in the discussion about law, 
what it is and what it should be, in a variety of centers of production of knowledge and power.  
It is true that the modern approach to law is not the only one existent, and it is exactly the  
point of post-modern reflection and of this research to investigate the question of how far this 
conception is a universally valid one or even a hegemonic one. Nevertheless, it is also clear 
that the crumbling down of a concept of law that pervaded an important part of the practice 
and politics  of  law had important  concrete  consequences  at  a  global  level.  In  this  sense, 
Willem Assies, scholar of legal pluralism and indigenous law in Mexico, underlined that, 
“if we speak of the recognition of indigenous rights and of a quality legislation, a 
first thing to do is to leave back the decimononic imaginary on the state; this is 
the image presented by Hans Kelsen according to which the state and law are the 
same  thing,  the  Weberian  vision  of  hierarchical  bureaucracy within  a  certain 
territory  as  well  as  the  Westphalian  notion  of  a  system  of  sovereign  states” 
(Assies 2003, 3). 
Within broad processes like globalization, that put in question the notion of sovereignty 
and legal monism, as well as the increasing decentralization and the appearance of new forms 
of  public  management,  which  destabilized  the  Weberian  model  of  social  institutional 
organization, the claims of indigenous peoples, as one group of players amongst many, have 
challenged the standing columns of legal-political thought. 
The indigenous claims are thus as much a result from vernacular historical, political and 
economic circumstances as they are embedded within global processes. In this sense, Donna 
Lee  van  Cott  enumerates  three  crises  as  key  to  the  constitutional  changes,  including 
indigenous reforms, that took place in Bolivia and Colombia in the 1990's, namely 
“a  representation  crisis,  generated  by  nonrepresentative  political  parties  that 
monopolized access to the state; a participation crisis, owing to the absence of 
means  for  most  citizens  to  participate  in  decision-making;  and a  legitimation 
crisis, arising from discriminatory access to the protection of the law and equal 
membership in the nation, and to the absence of effective bases of legitimation to 
unite and guide the political community” (Cott 2000, 1). 
All of these, but particularly the crisis of representation and the crisis of legitimation, are 
aspects of the wide change I have been delineating so far, and build the context of claims of 
representation and redistribution (of economical goods but also of political power) voiced, 
exemplarily, by indigenous communities. 
The indigenous claims are, hence, one aspect more of a broad transformation of basic 
concepts regarding social organization and, even more, they are one aspect of a more general 
upheaval in which old certainties are deeply questioned. Thus, it is no surprise that even the 
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rhetorics  of indigenous representatives resonate with academic questions I  have presented 
above. For example, Jesús Enrique Piñacué, representative of the Nasa people in Colombia 
and former senator, argued that 
“the written law bases its existence in a negation, in the ignorance of the language 
of  the other,  which,  because of  reasons of  the principle  of  equality,  has  been 
abolished in favor of the obligatory language of the law. [...] The law enforces its 
grammar. The written law rests on a basic wrong assumption: the utilization of a 
common language. The written law works through a hidden mechanism: the  a 
priori of the typification of cultural practices as a necessary condition of legal 
equality. [...] [T]he legal discourse works thus on the basis of the wounded culture 
of the other” (Piñacué cit. in Kuppe 2010, 9).
It is interesting to observe the recurrence of the topic of the language and its grammar,  
as  well  as  the  idea  of  their  wrongly alleged unifying  character.  Equally,  the  intention  of 
uncovering hidden mechanisms of a  machine of legal discourse that works at  the cost of 
wounding cultural difference, reappears in this short example. The negation is, finally, at the 
center of Piñacué's argument: the negation of the Other and his language. All these are figures 
that  we  are  familiar  with  from previous  discussions  and  that  allow  to  see  not  only  the 
contextual socio-political closeness of the indigenous claims and other postmodern concerns, 
but underline also their discursive connection. 
Importantly, the different elements of the three crises identified by Cott and linked to 
Piñacué's critique, configure a profound transformation, where diverse claims of social justice 
play a crucial role, pulling sometimes in the same and sometimes in contradictory directions. 
Within these crises, it is possible to recognize, following Nancy Fraser (*1947), two main 
types  of claims:  ones oriented to  redistribution and others  oriented to  recognition (Fraser 
1997, 83). To state boldly the tension in which these two approaches are caught, the first ones 
are guided mainly by a principle of similarity and equality, while the second ones base on a 
recognition of difference. The challenge of the contemporary transition consists, as Assies 
develops, in coordinating these two types of claims. 
In the case of indigenous peoples, the two types of claims are particularly visible if we 
take a look at contemporary indigenous politics in Latin America. On the one hand, the claim 
for recognition of the existence of various cultures in the state territory aims at fostering an 
environment of awareness and respect and at securing a space for the free exertion of cultural 
practices.  On the  other  hand,  these  claims  are  embedded also in  an  international  web of 
economic-political struggles, where questions of redistribution are central. The link between 
socio-cultural recognition and economic-political redistribution is given particularly because 
indigenous  peoples  are  often  in  weak positions  from a  perspective  of  the  current  market 
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economy  because  of  a  long-standing  socio-cultural  discrimination.  For  example,  since 
indigenous peoples live often away from urban centers and are often employed in the field of 
agriculture, their struggles for cultural respect in a specific territory are frequently linked to 
conflicts  regarding  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources  by  international  corporations, 
particularly in the field of the forest and mining industries, which are part of a wider process 
in the global economy.179 The settings in which the indigenous claims take place are thus 
determined by a wide variety of tensions at  local,  regional and global levels, all  of them 
intertwined  in  a  long  history,  which  is  worth  reviewing  shortly  in  order  to  understand 
contemporary discussion. 
In this sense, while questions regarding cultural and legal plurality in Latin America do 
not  start  with  the  European  invasion  of  the  region,  this  process,  and  the  subsequent 
institutionalization of colonial power had a drastic impact and is a central reference in the 
contemporary discussion. As René Kuppe underlines, even the name currently used for the 
middle  and  southern  part  of  the  American  continent,  ‘Latin  America’,  is  associated  to  a 
negation of the plurality within this geographic sphere, putting the emphasis on a definition 
by the linguistic tradition of the conqueror,  which was used later to create a cultural  and 
linguistic  identity for the emerging nation states of the 19th century in contrast  to  Anglo-
America (Kuppe 2010, 2).180 Under this homogenizing denomination, however, are hidden 43 
million people that belong to 657 ethnolinguistic indigenous groups, building around 10% of 
the whole population in Latin America (Noguera Fernández 2007, 1 cit.  Barié).181 Beyond 
these  groups  considered  as  original  inhabitants  of  the  region,  or  at  least  as  prior  to  the 
European invasion in the 15th and 16th century, the diversity of migrant groups that settled in 
179 For a very recent example of these struggles see the case of the protests in Panamá (CLOC 2012 and 
Meléndez 2012). For one amongst many Mexican examples see Ferrer 2011, and for factual information of 
2011 in Colombia, see Mingorance 2011. For an international cooperation of more than 40 organizations  
dealing with this topic and for an international declaration in this regard see the ‘Declaración del Foro de  
los Pueblos Indígenas: Minería, Cambio Climático y Buen Vivir’ ('Declaration of the Forum of Indigenous 
Peoples: Mining, Climate Change and Good Life') of 2011 (OCMAL 2012).
180 As far  as  historical  accounts  can tell,  the term  América Latina  was used  firstly in  Paris  in  1856 in a 
conference of the Chilean philosopher Francisco Bilbao (Moniz Bandeira 2005) and, in the same year, in 
the poem of the Colombian writer José María Torres Caicedo ‘Las dos Américas’ (The Two Americas) 
(Torres Caicedo 1857). It is important to remark the political weight of the term ‘América Latina’ (or Latin 
America), the promotion of which was supported by the French Empire of Napoleon III during the French 
intervention in Mexico (1862-1866) as a strategy to include France in the countries with influence in the  
continent  excluding,  at  the  same  time,  the  Anglo-Saxon  and,  separating  linguistically  the  middle  and 
southern  part  of  the  continent,  also  named ‘Hispanoamérica’ ('Hispanic  America')  from Spain  (Moníz 
Bandeira  2005).  Naturally,  from  then  on  the  story  continued  adding  further  meanings  to  the  diverse 
concepts referring not only to the geographic configuration but also to the political, social, cultural and  
economic field related to it.
181 These  statistics  are  from  a  study  published  in 2003.  While  the  definition  of  ‘indigenous’ is  highly 
problematic, this piece of information serves here as a general reference used often in the international  
debate on questions around the indigenous population in Latin America.
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the area during colonial times and in various waves after that period also has to be considered. 
Plurality, cultural plurality and with it legal plurality, were thus present before, during and 
after the colonial time. 
Importantly, during the 16th century, the modern concepts of state and law as I have 
presented  them  above  were  not  yet  stable  and  all-encompassing.  On  the  contrary,  the 
coexistence of diverse legitimate legal orders that applied according to the different estates, 
the different regions or the different matters in discussion, was the usual state of affairs. This 
logic  was continued,  in  general,  in  the context  of the Spanish colonies,  when indigenous 
institutions and authorities kept working (to different extents according to the particularities 
of  the  regions)  under  a  certain  control  of  the  Spanish  Kings  and  their  developing 
administrative bureaucracy, which nevertheless was too far away to keep track of the situation 
on-site or of the real implementation of their decisions. In any case, under the encompassing 
rule of the Spanish Kings, the idea of a plurality of legal systems working at the same time in  
the same region was not something strange to the political imaginary of that time (Ceballos 
Bedoya 2011).
Central to the process of the creation of a discourse based on the unity and only validity 
of  one  encompassing  state-law,  and the  corresponding lack  of  recognition  for  indigenous 
normative orders,  was the  process  of  nation building  started  in  the  beginning of  the  19 th 
century. It is this process of ‘nation building’, that “could secure, that the institutions of liberal 
law which are empty on their own become alive and are recognized and followed by the 
people  of  the  state”  (Kuppe  2010,  9).  From a  perspective  of  a  general  Latin  American 
constitutional history, Raquel Z. Yrigoyen Fajardo emphasizes that “the monocultural Nation-
State, the legal monism and a model of census suffrage (for learned white male landowners) 
were the vertebral column of the horizon of the liberal constitutionalism of the 19th century in 
Latin  America”  (Yrigoyen  Fajardo  2011,  140).  Following  this  author,  it  is  possible  to 
distinguish three main techniques in the Latin American constitutional texts of the time to 
create the unity of the nation state: “a) to assimilate or transform the  natives  into  citizens  
without individual rights, through the dissolution of ‘Indian villages’ ['pueblos de indios'182] – 
which were endowed with their own collective lands, their own authorities and indigenous 
jurisdiction  ['fuero']  – in  order  to  avoid  indigenous  upheavals,  b)  to  reduce,  civilize  and 
Christianize the natives not yet colonized […] in order to expand the agricultural border; and 
182 The ‘pueblos de indios’ were the basic administrative unit of the so called ‘República de Indios’ which were 
supported  by  the  Spanish  authorities  in  order  to  be  more  efficient  in  the  collection  of  tributes  and  
concentration of workforce, amongst other reasons.
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c) to make offensive and defensive war against indigenous nations […] in order to annex their 
territories to the state” (Idem, emphasis in the original).183
As a result of the homogenizing discourse of the nation and the practices it involved, the 
indigenous other in all its forms was condemned to disappear.184 At the same time that the 
administrative nonexistence and political irrelevance of indigenous cultures was established, a 
criminalization  of  activities  which  were  typically  connected  to  indigenous  social 
circumstances or cultural practices took place. Importantly, the free access to lands which 
were originally in indigenous hands was denied through a limited recognition of ownership 
titles,  making  their  utilization  an  object  of  criminal  prosecution.  This  criminalization  of 
indigenous activities was further justified by an academic discourse on race, which, in the 
end, brought with it a special treatment of indigenous peoples.185 While this special treatment 
implied a certain recognition of the existence of indigenous groups and of the existence of 
difference, at the same time, it meant the official positioning of these groups in a hierarchical 
scale.  In  formal  law,  this  found  expression  in  the  assumption  of  the  lack  of  criminal  
responsibility  similar  to  cases  of  mental  insanity.  But  the  result  was  not  necessarily  the 
exculpation of indigenous defendants. As Rene Paul Amry explains for the case of Peru in the 
beginning of  the 20th century,  “the judge could order  as an alternative to punishment  the 
confinement to a penal colony, which in the case of the ‘savage’ ended in his assimilation” 
(Amry 2004, 14). 
The  process  continued  with  the  increase  of  politics  of  integration  for  the  natives 
oriented  towards  the  development  and  modernization  of  the  New  World.  In  this  sense, 
Yrigoyen Fajardo speaks of a ‘social integrationist constitutionalism’, which had the objective 
to “integrate the natives to the state and to the market without breaking neither the Nation-
State identity nor the legal monism”, and which did not put in question “the authority of the 
state to define the model of indigenous development within a tutelary frame” (Yrigoyen 2011, 
140). Interestingly, as Kuppe remarks, these indigenist policies were central for a process of 
awareness,  recognition  and  self-identification  that  nourished  the  later  indigenous 
mobilizations.  Thus,  while  “the  indigenism  purposed  the  integration  and  the  final 
disappearance of indigenous peoples as socio-culturally perceivable groups within the nation-
183 The difference between the cases meant under b) and c) is subtle, but even more so, central to understanding 
the hierarchically differentiated variety of ‘otherness’. While the first group of natives not yet colonized was 
referred to as ‘savages’, the second category received the name of ‘barbarians’.
184 This perspective has consequences until present. For an example of the 1970's see the case of Guatemala 
explained in Garcia Fong 2005, 73.
185 This scientific justification was importantly inspired by Joseph Arthur de Gobineau's (1816-1882) ‘Essai  
sur l'inégalité des races humaines’ ('Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races’, 1853-1855).
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state[, i]t has, however, participated in the creation of the conditions for the opposite of these 
goals” (Kuppe 2010, 6).
The ‘indigenous question’ was thus from the beginning linked to questions of social 
modernization and economic development and thus it is not surprising that one of the first 
internationally relevant documents on the topic was related to the native as worker, in other 
words as participant in the globalizing economy. The documents to which I am referring  are 
the conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO)186  no. 29, namely the ‘Force 
Labor  Convention’ of  1930,  and no.  50,  namely the  ‘(Shelved)  Recruiting  of  Indigenous 
Workers Convention’ of 1936 (ILO 1936).187 
Revising  the  history  of  the  involvement  between  international  organizations  and 
indigenous  peoples,  it  is  important  to  remark  that  while  indigenous  peoples  and  their 
conditions of life were a concern of international organizations, especially the ILO, almost 
from  their  establishment  onwards,  the  discussion  on  these  topics  gained  importance, 
particularly  regarding  independent  countries  (in  contrast  to  rules  regarding  only  colonial 
territories), only after the Second World War. In 1946, a commission of experts in the field 
was  created  and  worldwide  studies  regarding  their  life  conditions  were  promoted188, 
producing one of the first legally relevant definitions of ‘indigenous’ at an international level. 
Importantly, the approach followed by these institutions and the agreements they produced 
was based on an evolutionist perspective that saw the indigenous populations as part of a 
problem  of  social  and  cultural  backwardness,  and  resulted  in  the  conviction  that  “the 
protection of the natives had to lie necessarily in their  integration into national societies” 
(Aragón Andrade n.d., 44). 
Consequently, the most important convention produced then, which maintained its legal 
force until 1989, was the ILO ‘Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations’ (no. 107) 
titled ‘Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal 
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries’. This convention was founded on the 
assumption that indigenous populations “were temporary societies destined to disappear with 
‘Modernisation'”  and  “encouraged  integration”  in  the  National  State  as  part  of  the 
modernization model (ILO 2012). In this sense, the convention was meant to apply to the 
186 The ILO was created, as an agency of the League of Nations, in 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles. It started  
from 1921 onwards to make studies on indigenous workers and formed in 1926 a committee of experts that 
produced several conventions and recommendations in this field.
187 The convention came into force the 8th of September of 1939.
188 The  first  published  study  of  that  kind  was ‘Indigenous  Peoples:  Living  and  Working  Conditions  of 
Aboriginal Populations in Independent Countries’ of 1953. For a short review on the work of the ILO on 
this matters, see González Galván 2000.
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“members  of  tribal  or  semi-tribal  populations  in  independent  countries  whose  social  and 
economic conditions are at a less advanced stage than the stage reached by the other sections  
of the national community,  and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own 
customs or traditions or by special  laws or regulations [...]” (ILO 1957; emphasis added) 
amongst others. 
In this context, the concept of development was a key aspect of the convention. Thus, 
regarding the lands where indigenous populations were settled, the convention stated in art. 12 
that “[t]he populations concerned shall not be removed without their free consent from their 
habitual  territories  except  in  accordance  with  national  laws  and  regulations  for  reasons 
relating to national security, or in the interest of  national economic development  or of the 
health of the said populations” (Idem, par. 1). Equally,  for the case of an imperative (and 
exceptional)  removal,  again,  one  of  the  main  concerns  to  take  into  consideration  was  of 
developmental  character.  Thus,  paragraph 2 of  the  same article  stated  that  “they shall  be 
provided with lands of quality at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them, 
suitable to provide for their present needs and future development” (Idem; emphasis added). 
Furthermore,  art.  7  stated  that:  “These  populations  shall  be  allowed  to  retain  their  own 
customs and institutions where these are not incompatible with the national legal system or 
the objectives of integration programmes”, underlining the primacy of the integration into one 
modern Nation-State (Idem). Importantly, while underlining the importance of customary law, 
this convention did not recognize any legal claim of indigenous populations to exert their own 
law.
Keeping the  integrationist  context  towards  a  unified  Nation-State  in  mind,  it  is  not 
surprising that these legal instruments regarding indigenous groups were driven first by the 
states participating in international institutions, and only later an increased activism of the 
indigenous organizations took place affirming their claims on these documents. Furthermore, 
this move strengthened the position of the Nation-State as the unifying entity of reference and 
as the active role player in international discussion as well as in social action, be it to repress 
or to protect, taking ownership over these issues from the outset.
At the same time that the Convention no. 107 was developed within the ILO, the United 
Nations, founded after the Second World War, started to participate equally in the debate over 
indigenous rights through the discussion on Human Rights, which put the protection of all 
people  not  anymore  under  the  custody of  the  Nation-State  but  also  as  addressees  of  the 
protection  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  international  community  it  represents  (Aragón 
Andrade n.d., 48). In this context, the discussion over indigenous groups took place under the 
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rubric of the protection of minorities and the protection of collective rights. In the context of 
the  Cold  War,  this  discussion  involved  a  struggle  between  socialist  advocates  and  their 
counterparts, who succeeded in putting an individualistic perspective on Human Rights to the 
front  and relegating  the  idea  of  collective  rights  (Idem,  49).  A first  group of  experts  on 
minority issues within the structure of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR)  was  the  Sub-Commission  on  Prevention  of  Discrimination  and  Protection  of 
Minorities created in 1947.189 
Importantly  for  the  indigenous  groups,  understood  then  as  minorities,  in  1966,  the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights  (ICCPR) and the International  Covenant  on Economic,  Social  and Cultural  Rights 
(ICESCR)190,  as  concrete  specifications  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human Rights  of 
1948 that could foster its implementation. Art. 27 of the first covenant explicitly referred to 
the  right  of  persons  pertaining  to  a  minority “to enjoy their  own culture,  to  profess  and 
practise  their  own  religion,  or  to  use  their  own  language”  (United  Nations  1966).  This 
recognition, while in the context of minority rights, enhanced the further debate on indigenous 
claims that would unfold with greater force during the following decades.
The  last  third  of  the  20th century  brought,  on  the  ground  of  these  international 
recognitions,  and  in  the  context  of  an  increasingly  globally  intertwined  economy and  a 
destabilization of the Nation-State, a variety of political struggles and new legal instruments 
around the recognition and engagement with indigenous peoples. Taking into account this 
situation,  Kuppe convincingly puts the further discussion of indigenous rights in terms of 
ensuring  legitimacy  of  the  exertion  of  public  violence  in  a  culturally  pluralistic  society 
(Kuppe 2010, 7). Under the circumstances of an increasingly visible and politically active 
diversified society, the mere implementation of representative democracy and the anchoring 
of individual general basic rights were insufficient, and thus the claim arose that the specific 
interests  of the diverse groups and their  particular institutions should find entrance in the 
configuration and organization of public life. The recognition of the entitlement of indigenous 
peoples to an independent legal status as well as social, cultural and economic rights became 
the center of the discussion, creating a movement that struggled for the ‘right to the own 
rights’. 
189 In 1982 a Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) was created amongst the six working groups  
of this institution.
190 Both documents have been in force since 1976.
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Recognizing  that  the  discrimination  against  indigenous  groups  was  not  sufficiently 
addressed in  terms of  the general  frame of the discrimination of minorities191,  from 1969 
onwards, an increasing amount of conferences and reports was organized and commissioned 
regarding  concrete  interests  of  indigenous  groups,  most  importantly  the  ‘Study  on  the 
Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’ written by José R. Martínez Cobo, 
the  Special  Rapporteur  of  the  Sub-Commission  on  Prevention  of  Discrimination  and 
Protection  of  Minorities192.  Equally,  in  1977,  as  a  result  of  the  first  International  NGO 
Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas, the  demand 
for  the “right  of  self-determination”  was emphasized,  as  well  as  the  revision  of  the ILO 
Convention  no.  107 “with  the  purpose  of  changing its  integrationist  approach by one  of 
respect and protection of the indigenous cultures” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 53). Interestingly, in 
this  simple  formulation  we  can  observe  a  request  to  fulfill  a  twist  from  a  unitarianist 
perspective, where diversity is subsumed to a bigger whole, namely the Nation-State, to a 
pluralist approach, where respect amongst cultures (in plural) is demanded. 
The question was thus posed in terms of the relation of the state with the indigenous 
peoples.  At  a  political  level,  six  basic  forms  of  relationship  between  the  state  and  the 
indigenous others were recognized in the influential study of Cobo: segregation, assimilation, 
integration, fusion, pluralism and autonomy (Idem). Importantly, Cobo stated that while the 
model  of  integration  impulses  the  recognition  of  legal  equality  amongst  indigenous  and 
non-indigenous members of the national society, it requires the modification of “those cultural 
elements which hamper the progress of these groups and of the State as a whole” (Idem, 54 f.; 
emphasis added).  The discussion of the question of whether  this  was the desired relation 
between the state and indigenous peoples within the frame of the UN would have to wait, 
however, until the 1980's, when the report was concluded and the work on the ‘Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Populations’ could be started.
In the decade of the 1980's, not only the indigenous claims gained force in the international 
debate, but a plurality of social movements claiming for recognition and acceptance of diverse 
areas,  from gender  to  ecology,  took  force  synchronically  and  interacted  with  each  other 
creating political alliances to support their goals while the development paradigm, as we have 
seen193, went into a deep crisis. While all these social movements involved claims regarding 
191 For the tense relations between the concepts of ‘minority’ and ‘indigenous people’ and their consequences  
for the international political development, see Kymlicka 2009.
192 The study was launched in 1972 and completed in 1986.
193 See chapter B, section IV.
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legal matters, this aspect is especially clear in the field of indigenous movements, particularly 
regarding the right to self-determination (as formulated in the UN Human Rights Covenants 
mentioned above in their art. 1). 
Importantly, the right to self-determination serves as a basis for claims of indigenous 
groups not as particular privileges towards ‘special cases’, but as the consequent enactment of 
a principle valid for all peoples (Kuppe 2010, 2). In legal questions, this autonomy means, as 
Kuppe underlines, not only the social control over the issues in the community, but also the 
control over the “adaptation of a society to social change and to new external challenges” 
(Kuppe  2010,  9).  In  this  sense,  the  claim  is  oriented  to  change  from  a  recognition  by 
exoticization or particularization to a recognition by ‘normalization’ or ‘universalization’, i.e. 
by subsumption under a common principle.  Nevertheless, the question regarding who can 
count himself as addressee of this universal principle remains. This is particularly the case in 
regards to the question of cultural minorities that are not recognized as indigenous peoples 
(Kymlicka  2009).  In  other  words,  also  this  universal  principle  of  ‘self-determination’ has 
exclusionary aspects.  Furthermore,  it  is  important  to  notice that  this  allegedly universally 
valid  principle  equally  requires  a  legitimization,  and  the  legitimizing  source  is  lastly  an 
instrument  of  positive  international  law  derived  from  a  particular  understanding  of  the 
authorities involved and their relations.
At the same time, while the right to self-determination addresses a collective interest 
key to the indigenous claims, the recognition of indigenous law responds equally to a “newer 
principle of Human Rights”, namely that legal norms can only create a legitimate obligation 
against the subject, when these norms are based on a adequate respect in front of the cultural 
background of that individual (Goransky ref. in Kuppe 2010, 9). It serves thus the ‘subjective 
right’ to be free of legal arbitrariness and discrimination, which is equally understood as a 
universally  valid  principle.  Thus,  Kuppe  concludes  that:  “In  general,  the  recognition  of 
indigenous  law  presents  itself  as  part  of  a  broader  social  project,  which  is  about  less 
discrimination and repression and more participation and democracy” (Idem). This is also the 
perspective that allowed the indigenous organizations to find allies in other social movements.
From a human rights  perspective,  besides  these  basic  rights  which are explicitly in 
connection  with  a  cultural  approach,  also  the  other  aspects  of  a  social  situation  of 
discrimination and economical marginalization in which indigenous people often live become 
relevant for their  claims of recognition of the own normative understandings.  In fact,  the 
socio-economic situation translates in a particular condition in  the judicial  context,  where 
certain obstacles might appear more likely or have heavier consequences. Take for example 
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the  lacking personal  and financial  endowment  of  the  courts  in  the  countryside,  linguistic 
barriers, spatial distance from the institutions, and the consequent inefficiency of the judicial 
apparatus (Kuppe 2010, 10). All these circumstances in which indigenous peoples are often 
embedded  because  of  their  cultural  practices  on  the  one  hand  and  because  of  historical 
marginalization on the other, derive into situations with certain proclivity for misinformation 
and abuse.  In the end,  the access to the official  state  justice system can turn particularly 
difficult. In this context, instead of being a tool against repression and arbitrariness, the state 
legal system ends up incarnating their most clear expression. Thus, the claim for a recognition 
of the validity of indigenous law is addressed as a key element for dealing with this kind of  
social imbalance.
Importantly,  from  a  perspective  of  identity  politics,  this  social  imbalance  finds 
expression also in the fact that the public order of the state supports the need and the identities 
(only) of specific ethnic and national groups. In this sense, Kuppe, referring to Kymlicka, 
argues that “[t]he liberal state is thus [...] not neutral in front of all cultures, but brings forward 
some  and  discriminates  others.  Moreover,  the  culturally  oblique  foundation,  on  which 
statehood is based, produces unavoidably, that some cultural identities are furthered and, as a 
consequence, others are necessarily disadvantaged” (Kuppe 2010, 9). Legal researchers have 
argued that the recognition of the special status of members of cultural minorities, and thus 
the recognition of their legal autonomy, allow to balancing this cultural tilt of the state. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  while  the  recognition  of  indigenous  law  could  be  seen  as 
contradicting the principles of equality, fairness and justice because it  enables diverse forms 
of  treatment  according to  cultural  backgrounds,  it  is  also possible  to  argue that  it  is  this 
recognition that enacts these principles to their most advanced level. Thus, Kuppe underlines 
that 
“it corresponds to liberal basic principles that citizens can follow their own life 
script. These life scripts are, however, connected with concrete cultural models 
and  contents.  Exactly  from  a  liberal  perspective  is  it  possible  to  derive  a 
composition  of  social  life,  according  which  minority  cultures  are  not  only 
recognized,  but  their  life  drafts  are  encouraged  and  institutionally  anchored” 
(Kuppe 2010, 9). 
In the line of the approach proposed in this research, it can be argued that it is because 
of the ambivalent structure of modern law that both contrary claims are arguable with the 
same argumentative tools: the answer to the question regarding what is ‘equal’ and therefore 
of what should be treated equally in the name of justice is externalized but not solved. This is 
a parallel situation to the academic discussion around Kelsen's positivism, which can be used 
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as a tool against or in favor of the claims of indigenous groups.194 Similarly, for indigenous 
organizations it has been problematic “the paradox of invoking Human Rights in order to 
justify their  autonomy and, at  the same time, be criticized for violating Human Rights in 
certain cases” (Assies 2003, 9).195 Importantly, an adaptation of the two normative bodies is 
achieved through reinterpretation, so that “the result is often the adjustment of indigenous law 
to Human Rights and a reinterpretation of the indigenous law as well as the Human Rights” 
(Idem). The questions, however, remain present: Who can reinterpret what and how much 
interpretative instability can endure the system?
In the end, this ambivalent character finds expression also in the diverse streams of 
interests entangled in the struggle for legal reform in favor of the recognition of indigenous 
law. In this sense, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and others have addressed the contradictory 
character of globalization arguing the coexistence on the one hand of a ‘globalization from 
below’ and, on the other hand, of a ‘hegemonic neoliberal globalization’, which, as we will 
see, found expression in the concrete institutional developments planned to incorporate the 
indigenous ‘other’ in the judicial system (Sousa Santos 2003, 209 ff.).
The  concrete  development  of  international  law regarding  indigenous  and  minority  issues 
continued (after the report  of Cobo was finally presented in its  totality in 1983) with the 
project of a declaration on the rights of the ‘indigenous populations’. This endeavor started in 
1985 with a clear emphasis on an open politics of participation. In 1993 the draft of the ‘UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (United Nations 2008) appeared,  which 
would finally be approved in 2007. In a parallel development but with a contrasting approach 
in  terms  of  public  participation,  the  revision  of  the  ILO Convention  no.  107 took place, 
culminating  in  the  ILO  Convention  no.  169  in  1989.  In  this  case,  the  organizations  of 
employers and employees were consulted by the corresponding state administrations, while 
the consultation of indigenous representatives  and organizations  remained facultative,  and 
thus only four countries took that opportunity, namely Australia, Canada, Finland and Sweden 
(Aragón Andrade n.d., 57)
Importantly,  while  the  integrationist  spirit  of  the  ILO  Convention  no.  107  was 
unanimously rejected, the emphasis on the unity and sovereignty of the state remained present 
throughout the discussions as well as in the final version of the document. In this context, the 
194 In this latter sense see for example the argument of Correas 2003, 19 ff.
195 See for example the discussion around the decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court T-523, where the 
court justified the use of physical violence as a form of indigenous sanction.
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change of the term ‘indigenous populations’ for ‘indigenous peoples'196, associated with the 
idea of sovereignty of the people in terms of international law, and the change of ‘indigenous 
lands’ for ‘indigenous territories’ built the core of the controversies. Thus, the new model 
oriented the discussion around particular concepts and their meaning within a specific system 
of positive law, taking the role of the state as a formal entity to the foreground. The question 
over a unifying identity in the frame of the integrationist model of a Nation-State gave way to 
the discussion over a formal frame that  could include,  under its  sovereignty,  a  variety of 
self-determined (and changing) identities. Thus the preamble of the ILO Convention no. 169, 
puts the new document as the result of the recognition of “the aspirations of [the indigenous] 
peoples  to  exercise  control  over  their  own  institutions,  ways  of  life  and  economic 
development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the 
framework of the States in which they live [...]” (ILO 1989). This general intention results, 
importantly, in the more concrete recognition of “the right [of indigenous peoples] to decide 
their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions 
and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to 
the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development”   (Idem, art. 
7.1). Thus, a limited autonomy was accepted, even if the document makes no explicit mention 
of  the  right  to  self-determination  (Rodríguez-Piñero  cit.  in  Kuppe  2010,  7).  That  these 
identities are meant as self-determined identities, is a consequence of the introduction of the 
criterion of self-identification as native at the base of the applicability of the Convention. 
Thus, art. 1 par. 2 states that “[s]elf-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a 
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention 
apply” (ILO 1989).
While  these  recognitions  are  very  important  at  a  level  of  international  politics, 
ambivalence  (or  polyvalence)  is  present  throughout  the  text  as  well  as  throughout  its 
preparation. Allegedly, a movement away from the integrationist model was a central goal of 
the new convention, however, the participation of indigenous groups was not at the base of 
the procedure. At the same time that the term ‘peoples’ is included in the text, it is emphasized 
that this term does not have any implications on the rights according to international law (art. 
1 par. 3). Similarly, the concept of ‘territory’ was included, while at the same time the term 
‘lands’ was used “in order to limit the scope of the prerogatives that the indigenous peoples 
could invoke” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 61). Finally, while the convention aimed to address and 
196 The term ‘population’ was rejected insofar as it carries the meaning of “temporary (and possibly soon to  
disappear)  demographic  category [Erscheinung],  while  the  concept  of  ‘peoples’ has  also socio-cultural 
connotations, including the recognition of “long-term political rights” (Kuppe 2010, 7).
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respect the institutions and socio-cultural practices of indigenous peoples, the art. 8 par. 2 
underlines  that:  “[t]hese  peoples  shall  have  the  right  to  retain  their  own  customs  and 
institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national 
legal  system  and  with  internationally  recognised  human  rights.  [...]”  (ILO  1989),  thus 
iterating the ‘repugnancy clause’ typical for colonial regimes. This limitation is reinforced 
regarding indigenous legal systems in article 9 par. 1: “[t]o the extent compatible with the 
national legal system and internationally recognised human rights, the methods customarily 
practised by the peoples concerned for dealing with offences committed by their members 
shall be respected” (Idem). 
Various authors emphasize the need and importance of overcoming this tension through 
an  interpretation  of  these  documents  according  to  an  all-encompassing  emancipatory 
approach or, at least, according to the values they claim. So for example, Kuppe argues that 
“the  norms  must  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  general  aim of  the  convention:  legal 
self-control,  at  least  over  those  issues  which  affect  the  interests  of  these  peoples,  is  the 
consequent  outcome  of  the  meanwhile  recognized  principle  of  the  self-determined 
development of indigenous peoples” (Kuppe 2010, 8). In this sense, while he recognizes that 
the concrete limit is unset, he argues that “the states will have to let themselves be guided by 
the own understanding of the affected peoples, since general extensive obligations of the state 
to consult indigenous peoples are enshrined in the convention” (Idem). Similarly, Yrigoyen 
Fajardo  put  a  similar  point  to  the  front  for  the  case  of  the  national  constitutions  at  the 
beginning of the 21st century (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 141, 150, 154). While this possibility of 
the interpretation of positive law according recognized (and thus allegedly universally valid) 
principles is always open as long as we deal with a modern legal understanding, the tension 
(both in the text and in society) does not disappear through interpretation, it is just displaced 
to spaces of power beyond the word of the law. One interpretation is just one amongst many 
and cannot by itself claim more legitimacy without referring to a specific system of meaning; 
the argument turns in the end into a problematic statement: my interpretation is always (more) 
correct, when I use my standards of good and just.
If the resulting document was ambivalent, so too were the reactions in front of the final 
document. While indigenous organizations who assisted the revision process rejected almost 
unanimously the  process  and the  convention  itself,  other  organizations,  particularly Latin 
American ones, expressed satisfaction regarding the new document (Aragón Andrade n.d., 
62). This differentiated response, as Aragón Andrade argues, derives from the diverse national 
contexts in which these organizations were embedded, so that for some organizations from 
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Europe and North America, the recognitions of the convention meant a re-statement of rights 
already clarified in national legislation, while for others it worked as an engine for new or 
better national legislation. 
In any case, also the description of Aragón Andrade reminds us of an interesting turn in 
the discussion, because while in the context of the ILO Convention no. 107 the diversity of 
the indigenous peoples does not seem to be a central element in the discussion, in the debate 
over the latter convention, the image of one group of people with similar concerns, splits up 
into a  variety of groups with diverse backgrounds and interests.  This  diversity was more 
visible in the 1980's because of the variety of indigenous groups that presented themselves as 
formalized  organizations  and  became politically  active  at  the  surface  of  the  international 
debate. In fact, this pluralization marked already the claim in the early 1970's in favor of the 
differentiation of the indigenous groups from the term ‘minorities’. The argument was not 
only that in some cases the indigenous groups were not only not a minority but actually a 
majority of the population (like in Guatemala and Bolivia), but also that ‘indigenous peoples’ 
were an-other  type  of  others  (Kymlicka 2009,  18 ff.).  This  diversification of  ‘indigenous 
peoples’ results also from a shifting of the perspective taken: while in the case of the ILO 
Convention no. 107, the document responds to a perspective of the state as subject in front of 
‘the natives’ as the object of international ruling, in the ILO Convention no. 169, the activism 
of indigenous organizations positioned themselves as the claimers and subjects of a right of 
self-determination  on  their  own.  We  are  thus  in  front  of  a  process  of  diversification  of 
otherness,  which  goes  hand in hand with  the process  of  a  diversification  of  sameness  or 
own(ed) identities.197
It is this perception of a variety of others the one that the process of a draft of the ‘Declaration 
of  United  Nations  on  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples’  intended  to  address  through 
mechanisms of  participation,  even if  the  UN Declaration  does  not  create  new rights  and 
freedoms unforeseen in other instruments of Human Rights but it just transfers these rights to 
the special conditions of indigenous peoples (Stavenhagen cit. in Kuppe 2010, 9). However, 
while the participative character of this process gave the document allegedly more legitimacy 
than the ILO Convention no. 169 had, an analysis of the various drafts presented in 1988, 
1994, 2006 and the final text of 2007 like the one Aragón Andrade provides, shows a sloppy 
blurring of the proposals and claims that the indigenous organizations made as a response to 
197 Regarding the political connotations of the pluralization of state organization, see the discussion on legal 
pluralism above as well as the reflections of Assies at the beginning of this chapter.
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the invitation to participate (Aragón Andrade n.d., 63 ff.). As the author argues, this process of 
blurring responds especially to the declining participation of indigenous organizations along 
the process of formulation of the document, due to the hierarchical functioning of the United 
Nations  (Idem).  In  other  words,  the  participatory approach proposed was  not  sustainable 
because  it  was  embedded  in  a  particular  logic  that  filtered  gradually  the  invited  and 
participating perspectives, in the end negating, to a certain extent, the claims for recognition 
of particular forms of ‘otherness’. 
Just to take an example, we can look at the aspect of state sovereignty, which had not 
been made explicit  in the first  versions of the text, while art.  46 of the approved version 
emphasizes this point. Also in this context, the elements of the sovereignty of the state and its 
titularity to demand the proper implementation of the Declaration prevailed over the titularity 
of indigenous peoples to  demand the actualization of their  rights in front of international 
tribunals (e.g.  art.  37,  art.  19; Aragón Andrade n.d.,  65 ff.).  Regarding the recognition of 
indigenous law, however, the strict subordination of indigenous law to the state seems to have 
loosened  insofar  as  art.  34  states  that:  “[i]ndigenous  peoples  have  the  right  to  promote, 
develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, 
traditions,  procedures,  practices  and,  in  the  cases  where  they  exist,  juridical  systems  or 
customs, in accordance with international human rights standards” (United Nations 2006, 70). 
Even if there is still a supremacy clause of a legal system determined by a particular socio-
cultural background based on the Nation-State and embedded in a specific system of restricted 
authoritative interpretations, at least, in this way, the indigenous legal systems are recognized 
as legal systems198 and put, the same as the national legal systems, under the standard of the 
dispositions on Human Rights of the United Nations.
In the last pages, I have presented the historical and political international context in which 
indigenous rights and indigenous law have been discussed and regulated. Summing up, while 
the  struggle  for  more  international  recognition  of  indigenous  rights  has  achieved  some 
important  changes  in  the  regulatory  statements  of  international  law,  the  resulting  legal 
instruments  did  not  meet  the  expectations  they created.  They remained,  as  products  of  a 
system that is designed according to particular mechanisms of hierarchy and exclusion, distant 
from demands of recognition amongst equals. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to 
produce an encompassing transformation of the relationship of international law to plurality. 
198 Note the difference with the ILO Convention no. 169 where still the term “customary law” (art. 8 par. 1) is  
used, which invokes a certain cultural evolutionism (Aragón Andrade n.d., 72 cit. Yrigoyen Fajardo).
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Importantly, these documents responded to a particular understanding of ‘otherness’ that was 
equally exclusionary in  front  of  other  others,  like  minorities  which  did  not  fit  under  the 
concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ (Kymlicka 2009). Nevertheless, they offered an international 
foundation for national discussions that had concrete consequences in the further development 
of law in several Latin American countries, which I will discuss in the next pages.
2.  National Changes  
These changes at an international level had as a main consequence the reform of national laws 
in a context in which several countries in Latin America started transition processes from 
dictatorships to democracies. Importantly, these transitions were marked by big projects of 
legal transfer (towards ‘better’ law) during the 1980's. If the passage to official democracy 
and the recognition of rights for indigenous groups and other social movements present these 
reforms  as  movements  towards  more  social  equality  and  emancipation,  it  should  not  be 
forgotten,  that  this  political  project  was  accompanied  by  strategies  of  loosening  market 
regulations  and by the  privatization  of  social  services.  Remarkably,  these  measures  were 
officially promoted, if not requested, as loan-conditions and through experts assessment by 
international financial organizations like the IMF and World Bank, as tools for rebuilding the 
state and making its machinery more efficacious. As a consequence, social claims and their 
institutions  were  weakened,  neutralizing  the  new  rights.  Take  for  example  the  Peruvian 
Constitution of 1993, which, the Peruvian scholar Yrigoyen Fajardo relates:
 “on the one hand,  recognized the pluricultural character of the state and legal 
pluralism,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  eliminated  the  guarantees  of  inalienability, 
imprescriptibility  and  unseizability  which  the  indigenous  lands  had  since  the 
Constitutions  of  1920  and  1930.  In  practice,  this  enabled  a  big  number  of 
transnational  corporations  to  install  themselves  in  the indigenous territories  to 
carry  out  their  extractive  activities,  giving  way  to  new  forms  of  territorial 
dispossession similar to those of the 19th century” (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 143).
As a result, the incorporation of these recognitions “generated, somehow, an inflation of rights 
without correspondence with institutional mechanisms apt for making them effective” (Idem).
Including these broader socio-economic concerns and from a perspective of positive 
constitutional law, Yrigoyen Fajardo distinguishes three main phases of transformation of the 
state  in  relation  to  cultural  (and  thus,  also,  legal)  plurality,  “a)  the  multicultural  
constitutionalism (1982-1988), b) the pluricultural constitutionalism (1989-2005), and c) the 
plurinational constitutionalism (2006-2009)” (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 140 f.). These phases 
progressively put  in  question  the  “monoculturality,  the  legal  monism and  the  indigenous 
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tutelary model” inherited from a colonial and a nationalist past, proposing thus a “long-term 
decolonizing project” (Idem).199 In the following, I will address these three phases of legal 
development that aim towards an inclusion of the ‘indigenous other’ in a pre-established legal 
setting, or, even more, towards a transformation of the ‘legal identity’ of some Latin American 
countries.
The  first  phase  of  constitutional  reforms  with  a  certain  pluralizing  impetus,  which 
Yrigoyen Fajardo characterizes as ‘multicultural constitutionalism’ (Idem, 141 f.), started with 
the  recognition  of  ‘multicultural  heritage’ in  the  constitution  of  Canada  in  1982 and  the 
explicit  incorporation  of  ‘rights  of  aboriginal  peoples’.  As  part  of  processes  of  social 
pacification in war contexts, also Guatemala in 1985 and Nicaragua in 1987 made explicit 
recognitions of the ‘multi'-character200 of these countries in their constitutions.201 
Taking the example of the constitution of Guatemala of 1985 and the constitution of 
Brazil of 1988, it is important to remark that the reformed documents referred to the need to 
respect ‘forms of social organization’ or to ‘customs’ but not to ‘indigenous law’ as such, a 
problem which, as we have seen in the debate on legal pluralism, is central for questions on 
the  legitimacy  of  the  indigenous  normative  orders.  Importantly,  as  Yrigoyen  Fajardo 
underlines, the constitutional norms of recognition of indigenous judicial functions did not 
create a new social phenomenon, but moreover resulted from the recognition of already de 
facto existing and exerted functions (Yrigoyen Fajardo 1999, 132).
Some years later, in 1991, the influential Constitution of Colombia was enacted, which 
derived from the workings of a constitutional assembly including indigenous representatives. 
With  this  document,  the  cycle  of  ‘pluricultural  constitutionalism’,  in  the  terminology  of 
Yrigoyen Fajardo, was inaugurated. In this phase, the character of the state itself starts to be 
redefined,  and pluralism and cultural  diversity became constitutional  principles (Yrigoyen 
Fajardo 2011, 142). In this sense, the rights recognized by the Colombian text went clearly 
further than the recognized in other contemporary constitutions, including that the authorities 
199 For a comparative chart of the three cycles recognized by Yrigoyen Fajardo, see Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 
155 ff..
200 While this formulation might seem quite ambiguous, it depicts a common (and equally ambiguous) element 
of the new documents of this period. ‘Multi-’ appeared in several forms as ‘multiethnic’, ‘multicultural’,  
‘multilingual’, etc, with unclear and overlapping boundaries. The important feature for us is exactly this 
emphasis on ‘the many’. Equally, the ambiguity of terms like ‘ethnic’ and ‘cultural’ and the opacity of the 
prefix ‘multi-’, behind which an undifferentiated bunch of ‘many’ hides, is an important aspect of these 
formulations. 
201 It is important to remark, however, that also previous to these reforms, in some countries with constitutions 
that  did  not  recognize  explicitly  legal  pluralism,  “secondary  or  political  norms  existed  […]  which 
recognized indigenous law, even if reduced to the resolution of minor conflicts amongst natives and with 
competencies no broader than the ones of the ‘Justice of Peace’, like the one contemplated by the Law of 
Native Communities of 1978 in Peru” (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 142). For a detailed compilation of norms in 
this line see Clavero 2007.
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of  indigenous  groups  exert,  within  the  territory  of  their  jurisdiction,  judicial  functions 
according  to  their  own  norms  and  procedures  (art.  246).  Importantly,  the  Colombian 
constitution based this judicial function of the traditional authorities on the own norms and 
procedures of indigenous groups, and not, as it had been done previously, on state law. The 
scope of this recognition was, however, as usual also in colonial times, restricted by a sort of 
supremacy clause: “as long as these [indigenous norms and methods] do not contradict the 
constitution  and  the  laws  of  the  Republic”  (Idem).  In  any  case,  the  formulation  of  the 
Colombian norm became a model for a variety of other constitutions which were reformed or 
created afterward202, expanding the model of recognition with limiting formulas “which not 
always were implemented in an organic and systematic way” (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 143).203 
Regarding the constitutional reforms in indigenous matters in Latin America before the new 
millennium  started,  it  is  possible  to  find,  following  Kuppe  (2010,  2),  five  major 
commonalities:
1. the definition of Nation-States as an expression of pluricultural, multiethnic realities,
2. the recognition of the right of indigenous (and Afro-American) groups to development 
in the frame of their own cultural identity and according to self-given criteria,
3. the  establishment  of  institutional  conditions  in  order  to  secure  the  rights  of  these 
groups to the lands traditionally used by them, as well as certain controls over natural 
resources,
4. the establishment of political rights regarding self-government within the states, and
5. the recognition, in general, of collective rights, in order to establish and protect the 
interests of ethnic groups within the state. 
Importantly, while through these reforms very similar expressions of legal pluralism are 
incorporated “which achieved to break the identity State-law or legal monism” (Yrigoyen 
Fajardo  2011,  142),  the  political  environments  of  the  different  developments  were  quite 
diverse covering a spectrum from the mobilization and participation of indigenous groups in 
the elaboration of the new norms like in Colombia, to the draft of norms without participation 
202 Important  reforms in this line took place in Mexico and Paraguay in 1992, Peru in 1993, Bolivia and 
Argentina in 1994, Ecuador in 1996 and 1998 and Venezuela in 1999.
203 A counterexample  of  this  development  is  depicted  by  the  situation  of  Guatemala,  where  a  public 
referendum regarding similar  constitutional  reforms made these  changes  impossible.  It  is  important  to  
mention however, that the public participation in the vote was of 18,6 % (Kuppe 2010, 15). For further  
analysis on this topic, see Warren 2002.
276
of  the  civil  society  under  authoritarian  regimes  like  in  the  case  of  Peru.  Beyond  these 
differences, however, it is a common aspect of these processes that the indigenous reforms 
form part of a more general development of state reform. Importantly, within the frame of 
judicial structures, models of alternative dispute resolution played a major role. For example, 
in the Ecuadorian constitution of 1998, the clause regarding the recognition of indigenous law 
is  in  the  same  article  191  as  the  regulations  regarding  “judges  of  peace”  in  charge  of 
individual,  communal  or  neighborhood  conflicts,  as  well  as  regulations  on  “arbitration, 
mediation  and other  alternative  procedures”  (Gobierno Nacional  de  Ecuador  2009).  Even 
clearer is the connection in the case of the Bolivian Constitution of 1994, where art.  171 
explicitly  mentions  the  application  of  indigenous  law  as  a  form  of  alternative  conflict 
resolution (Honorable Congreso Nacional 2008). In both cases, as in the Mexican example 
that I will address in more detail shortly, this normative bundle responds partly to the claim 
for a relief of the overwhelmed courts of the excessive amount of cases, while also permitting, 
particularly  through  the  incorporation  of  arbitration  techniques,  to  take  transnational 
corporations out of the realm of state judiciary. Thus, while indigenous practices are included 
and intertwined with practices of alternative resolution, they are put prominently in a context 
of maximization of the effectiveness  of  state-courts  and thus at  the service of  their  good 
functioning.  It  is  questionable  if  this  primacy  of  the  principle  of  effectiveness  and  the 
functionalistic  goal-oriented  approach  at  the  base  of  these  reforms  is  in  harmony with  a 
pluralized concept of law, particularly with concepts of law oriented more towards a holistic 
social balance, as indigenous approaches are claimed to be. 
Importantly,  Kuppe recognizes  the  constitutional  developments  of  the  1990's  as  the 
“formation of a new model of state with institutional free spaces for the unfolding of cultural 
diversity” (Kuppe 2010, 14 f.). However, it is questionable, how far the space is open to the 
‘unfolding of cultural diversity’ in general. Rather a selective and restricted engagement with 
legal and judicial otherness took place through the establishment of normative as well as to 
the incorporation of cultural diversity in pre-given structures, following specific procedures. 
In  other  words,  the  practice  of  this  opening  of  free  spaces  set  at  the  same  time  clear 
boundaries that responded to limits formulated within a particular cultural scope.
The  most  obvious  because  formally  explicit  limit  for  the  exertion  of  the  judicial 
authority by indigenous authorities as recognized in the diverse constitutions, is the clause 
regarding contradictions with the respective constitution and national laws which is present in 
almost all Latin American documents. In the case of Venezuela even the contradiction with 
‘public  order’  conforms  a  limit,  and  the  Peruvian  magna  carta includes  equally  the 
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“fundamental rights of the person” as a boundary of the constitutional recognition (Idem, 14). 
Importantly, while this limitation is decisive for the practical relevance of the indigenous law 
and its role in judicial practice, it is remarkable that in none of these normative limitations, the 
monetary,  legal  or  moral  relevance  of  the  case  at  stake  seem  to  play  a  role  for  the 
determination of the proper jurisdiction: there is no limitation of the indigenous jurisdiction to 
causae menores (Idem, 15). 
Furthermore, the constitutions do not only set themselves limitations, but they open also 
the floor for further regulation through ordinary laws, specially regarding the coordination of 
indigenous judicial activity and state judicial activity. It is interesting to notice the status that 
this open regulation to the future acquires in the discussion of the recognition of indigenous 
law.  Kuppe,  for  example,  argues  that  this  kind  of  clauses  express  that  the  indigenous 
authorities  own  a  significance  that  makes  a  real  coordination  with  the  ordinary  courts 
necessary (Idem), while Yrigoyen Fajardo speaks equally of an “horizontal relation between 
the ordinary jurisdiction and the indigenous (or special) one” (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 148), 
since the indigenous legal and judicial organization is recognized as part of the public (state) 
legal system. In other words, the state seems to take indigenous law serious, at least as serious 
as its own judicial system. At the same time, taking the same clause as the starting point, it is  
possible to see this promise of future regulation as an open gate for increasing restriction in a 
way that the practice of indigenous law would be hollowed out. Furthermore, it is doubtful 
how far the recognition of indigenous authorities as part of the public (state) system supports 
the engagement and self-understanding of the indigenous groups considered. The inclusion 
within a  structure means also that  the same pre-existing constrictions  apply to  the newly 
included ‘other’, and, equally, that the new realm of indigenous law will be subordinated to 
the future changes of the general structure.
Noteworthy, there has been so far only one official legislative regulation of this type in 
Venezuela in 2005 within a general law on the rights of indigenous peoples. In the other cases 
only drafts of corresponding legislation exist.204 However, the exertion of indigenous judicial 
authority is not impeded by this gap.205 As Kuppe argues, the laws to be enacted regarding the 
limits  of  the  indigenous  jurisdiction  do  not  originally  constitute  it,  and  insofar  it  is  not 
dependent  on  any  national  law  to  come  but  it  is  already  authorized  directly  by  the 
constitutions (Kuppe 2010, 21). Importantly, these laws to be yet enacted cannot establish the 
204 See for the case of Colombia the ‘Proyecto de Ley Estatutaria No. 003 de 2000’ and the ‘Proyecto de Ley 
Estatutaria No. 140 de 2000’, and for Ecuador the draft for a ‘Ley de Administración de Justicia Indígena en 
el Ecuador’ and similar efforts in Bolivia and Peru in 1999 and 2000.
205 In this sense, see for example the ruling of the Colombian Supreme Court T-254/1994.
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content or procedure of indigenous law, but their function is merely to rule the interaction 
between that jurisdiction and the sphere of state courts.  
One important aspect of this equalization of state law institutions and indigenous law 
institutions is that, putting the indigenous legal authorities at the same level than other public 
institutions, implies that the indigenous authorities cannot be prosecuted for their decisions 
within the frame of their function. Here relies an important divergence between theory and 
practice that shows the quandary in which indigenous courts are entangled. Because, while in 
theory we are dealing with two separate legal fields,  in practice it  is  not uncommon that 
persons participating in procedures of indigenous law as authorities or their representatives 
are accused of crimes according to non-indigenous law, namely ordinary state norms. Thus, 
accusations of deprivation of personal freedom and unlawful assumption of public authority 
still happen (Kuppe 2010, 21). In other words, while on the one hand the freedom of exerting 
judicial authority according to own communal principles is granted within the (demarcated) 
indigenous  community,  erasing  apparently  the  homogenizing  oppression  of  state  law,  the 
pressure to be submitted to state law is displaced to the individuals exerting that indigenous 
judicial authority. 
It  is easy to agree with Kuppe on the point that this  type of accusations are absurd 
following the logic of the constitutional recognition (Idem). However, it is imperious to see 
also that this  absurdity is not a mere irrational or unexpectable aspect,  but it  is a natural 
consequence of the setting in which the door for indigenous law has been opened within the 
state  legal  system.  The  limit  of  state  law explicit  in  the  constitutions  has  thus  a  double 
significance, because it not only puts a limit to the legitimized content of indigenous law, but 
it also puts indirectly a limit to the form and procedure of indigenous judicial authority and 
opens the door for individual prosecution of the participants in such procedures. In such a 
case, suddenly, the whole concern with a communal perspective understood as an asset of 
indigenous  cosmological  understanding  gives  way  to  the  ‘traditional’  individualistic 
perspective  anchored  in  modern  state  law.  The  behavior  of  indigenous  authorities  is  not 
understood  with  the  lenses  of  indigenous  communal  legal  understanding,  but  it  is 
subordinated to non-indigenous state law and its procedures. While this might appear absurd 
from a specific understanding of the  telos of the constitutional general statements, it might 
appear  equally  logical  to  lean  on  the  general  restrictions  of  the  constitutional  normative 
arguing that specific decisions of indigenous authorities infringe basic constitutional rights. 
Given  the  ambivalence  of  the  constitutional  texts,  that  leave  all  doors  open  for  further 
legislation and interpretation, this ‘absurdity’ is an expectable result. 
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Interestingly,  the hope to deal with this tension is often put in the enactment of the 
implementation  laws  envisaged  in  the  constitutional  texts.  This  would,  so  the  hopeful 
perspective, “in the characteristically positivistic legal environment of Latin America” (Kuppe 
2010, 21), protect definitely the persons participating in the indigenous judicial procedures of 
legal problems.206 It seems to me curious that the answer to a problem regarding the different 
interpretations of a positive norm, namely the constitution, could be solved somehow with 
more or more detailed positive norms. Also these last ones will require interpretation, even 
more so since their detailed character would derive into a matrix of particular interpretations. 
Furthermore, as I have argued before, positive constitutional norms as well as ordinary norms 
are always necessarily in need of interpretation. Importantly, naturalistic arguments, which are 
regularly part of the basic norm or constitution, are the ones which can give more or less 
legitimacy to one or the other  interpretation.  Therefore,  while adding more law might  be 
useful in the beginning, in the end, it just adds more steps within the same closed circle of  
interpretation of positive law according to positivized naturalistic understandings of law. 
In  this  line,  it  is  important  to  remark  that,  while  the  capacity  of  indigenous  legal 
decisions  to  have  the  same immediate  relevance,  status  and consequences  than  state  law, 
invites to argue for the need of the recognition of indigenous judicial decisions regarding the 
entry in registers of property and the like (Yrigoyen Fajardo 1999, 138), this type of claims 
equally poses questions regarding the autonomy and the ‘new legally legitimated freedom’ of 
indigenous people to use their own norms. How far does that freedom go, if, in the end, the  
whole apparatus around that freedom integrates the different ‘other’ within the hegemonic 
logic? Similar questions arise regarding the discussion on the incorporation of indigenous law 
within the frame of administrative assistance. In general, the result is a legalization and a 
judicialization of portions of society which were until now beyond the field of state law. The 
protection that the state offers, in this sense, requires the subordination under its rules. As a 
result, the recognition resulting from the creation of an ‘indigenous jurisdiction’ implies also 
an  incorporation  within  a  particular  preexisting  system  and  this  restricts,  in  turn,  its 
possibilities of action according to its own terms.
One central  aspect  of this  tension is  right  at  the beginning of the whole discussion 
around  the  indigenous  jurisdiction,  namely  the  question  on  the  personal  and  territorial 
jurisdiction. With this problem we go back to the question regarding the divisory line between 
indigenous/non-indigenous, us and them. Problematic is, to start with, that the property titles 
206 In a similar line, see Yrigoyen Fajardo, who criticizes the lack of institutional mechanisms apt to make the  
new indigenous rights effective (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 143). Therefore, she agrees with Kuppe regarding 
the need of these implementation laws.
280
for particular regions have not been completely elaborated, and it remains equally unclear 
how to determine the belonging of a person to an indigenous group. Furthermore, the question 
remains  on  how  far  indigenous  normative  conceptions  would  be  applicable  for  non-
indigenous peoples within a specific geographic area and, equally, how far these conceptions 
could  be  applied  for  indigenous  peoples  beyond the  geographic  jurisdiction  specified  for 
indigenous  law.  In  the  same  line,  it  is  also  an  important  topic  in  the  discussion  if  the  
indigenous jurisdiction has an obligatory character for indigenous people (in other words, the 
question  regarding  the  so  called  ‘forum  shopping').  Summing  up,  the  incorporation  of 
indigenous law to the state system depends on the definition of who is ‘native’ and what is  
‘indigenous territory’. How far the indigenous law is valid depends, thus, on categories preset 
in state law, like territorial and personal jurisdiction, which derive, in turn, from a particular 
understanding of individual,  community and territory.  Importantly,  even the determination 
through self-identification has some limits, insofar as it has to correspond with other criteria 
that are argued to justify that self-understanding as indigenous, like personal history, lingusitic 
capacity, place of residence, etc. Strangely enough, the criterion of self-identification itself 
needs  to  be  preset  within  state  law,  determining legitimate  ways  and testimonies  of  self-
identification, and even, at an abstract level, forms of understanding and expression of ‘self’ 
and ‘identification’.
This is in part connected to the fact that, during the 1990's, the process of international 
recognition based on a treatment of indigenous peoples as minorities, determining later the 
national  documents.  This  treatment  of  indigenous  peoples  as  minorities  induced  the 
incorporation  of  new  rights  of  these  communities  as  complements,  including  political 
approaches  and  institutional  practices  that  aimed  to  add to  existing  state  institutions  and 
practices,  not  to  change  them  or  transform  them in  their  core.  This  approach  has  been 
characterized thus as a ‘complementing multiculturalism’ (Walsh 2002, 25). Problematically, 
while this shift made the variety of cultures more visible, legitimizing and, to a certain extent, 
recognizing as equally valid public institutions with different logics, values and norms, it also 
demarcated a limit for the participation of these minorities in the broader realms of the social,  
political and economic life of the unified state. The practical aspect of this situation finds 
expression in the process of constitutional reform, where indigenous groups participated only 
in  a  restricted  way,  as  well  as  in  the  subordination  of  indigenous  law under  the  judicial 
authority of courts of  final appeal that  are  conceived as monocultural  entities  (Kuppe 
2010, 26). 
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Furthermore, since the possibilities of indigenous groups to influence the bigger picture 
of  national  politics  was  clearly  restricted  to  specific  areas  and  procedures  related  to  the 
political  sphere  of  the  state,  Kuppe  concludes  that  “privatization,  deregulation,  [and]  the 
retreat of the state from several areas of life undermined in a certain way the new public status 
[of indigenous peoples] and the commitment to pluralism” (Idem).207 However, it is worth 
remembering  that  the  retreat  of  the  state  is  not  a  completely  different  or  disconnected 
movement from the recognition of indigenous law, that affects the pluralistic claims from an 
opposite  side  or  from the  outside.  Moreover,  the  pluralistic  claims  of  indigenous  groups 
request equally a retreat of the state in terms of pulling out from indigenous social and legal 
spheres,  and  this  retreat  has  been  identified  and  supported  as  such  by  the  international 
community. It is from this retreat, that the state and its judicial system hope more efficacy and 
reduction of costs as well as, possibly, a better socio-cultural balance. This ‘undermining’ is 
not the result of a new force, but is part of the same force. In this sense, the claim of a legal 
pluralism without a political, economical and social de-regulation and weakening of the state, 
seems contradictory from a perspective that fights for the coexistence of different systems 
with equal validity. 
Importantly, the legislative changes of the 1990's were connected to a particular approach on 
development aid and the role law took in it. While the democratic state (under the rule of law) 
is not  per se  equated with a unitary state, this equation has been implicitly accepted in the 
politics of international development. In this sense, Kuppe highlights three main aspects of 
international development politics that entered in tension with the indigenous claims (Kuppe 
2010, 32):
1. the creation of a unified state as a goal, taking the governments as the primary partners 
in development projects,
2. the  unitary  state  as  a  condition  for  the  realization  of  the  Human  Rights  of  the 
population (ideal of equality, formal legal security, and emancipation for discriminated 
groups)
3. the  assumption  that  the  allocation  of  resources  is  more  transparent  with  a  unitary 
democratic  state,  which  creates  the  political  and  organizational ground  for  the 
intended economic development.
207 Similarly, Yrigoyen Fajardo speaks of the “neutralization of the new conquered rights” as a consequence of  
“the simultaneous adoption of neoliberal postulates and indigenous rights in the constitutions” (Yrigoyen 
Fajardo 2011, 143).
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In the same line, Chivi Vargas describes the longstanding perspective on “the judicial 
systems [sic] of Bolivia and by extension in Latin America” as follows:
“[...]  the cooperation agencies  see only problems in:  judicial  education of  the 
operators,  institutional  corruption,  excessive  support  personnel,  inadequate 
technology,  etc.,  which would  have  a  direct  bearing in  the lack  of  ‘access  to 
justice’. [... T]he self-diagnostics lead us to point out that the biggest problem is 
the budgetary one and – in descending scale-, the judicial training, the systems of 
selection of judges, etc.,  etc.,  consequently problems in the ‘access to justice’. 
Without  doubt,  these  two  perspectives  have  been  the  ones  that  marked  the 
agendas  of  modernization  of  the  systems  of  justice  administration  in  Latin 
America, since already almost fifty years, but – and most particularly – in the 
neoliberal age” (Chivi Vargas 2010). 
From this perspective centered in a unitary state system, the movement towards non-
state  laws and conflict  resolution beyond state  control  has  been interpreted,  in  part,  as  a 
paradox  in  front  of  the  seemingly  unifying  movement  of  globalization  understood  as  a 
homogenizing movement along the lines of these developmental assumptions. In front of the 
clear goal statement of a unified state, the success of other forms of resolution has been seen 
as a failure that endangered democratic and human rights standards as well  as the socio-
economic development of the specific countries (Kuppe 2010, 32). However, the creation of a 
modern unitary national state became equally problematic, since it took with it that different 
non-modern conceptions of social organization, and with them different cultures, would be 
displaced and removed.
The main problem that development institutions feared was that the particularization of 
law and non-state decisions with judicial validity would undermine the capacity to act and the 
legitimacy of the actions taken by the state, particularly in the cases where the transition from 
authoritarianism was still in process, giving way to abuses of power and unregulated forms of 
violence and social sectarianism. In other words, the destatization of the realm of law would 
put in risk the fulfillment of Human Rights, the effective allocation of resources, the access to  
justice, and, lastly the efficiency of the state as such, which is entrusted with the duties to 
protect its citizens. At the same time that development aid in the realm of law oriented its  
efforts  towards  an  unitary  model  of  state  law  with  these  arguments,  however,  the  same 
concerns  founded  a  seemingly  contrary  approach:  it  is  as  a  response  to  this  search  for 
efficiency, that development institutions fostered the implementation of new ways of conflict 
resolution connected with state structures. 
Importantly, this is a process that goes beyond the national realities or even beyond the 
situation in the Latin American region as a whole. As Sousa Santos remarks, during the 1980's 
a sense for a crisis in the judicial systems was present in the Western European and North 
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American  countries  (the  so  called  ‘global  north'),  that  produced  two  types  of  reform 
proposals: some oriented to technocratic changes, and others aiming for the informalization of 
the judicial system (Santos 1982, 10). Also this sense of crisis and this reformative approach 
reached Latin America, producing a big wave of reform proposals. The proposed reforms use 
since  then  a  variety  of  arguments  that  go  from  the  offensive  against  corruption  to  the 
enhancement of the ‘rule of law’, from the promotion of Human Rights to organizational and 
administrative  re-adjustments  of  the  judicial  machinery.  However,  as  Aragón  Andrade 
emphasizes, they form a unified package that is presented not only “as the solution to the 
crisis of the state tribunals, but it is also claimed as a necessary condition in order to guide the 
States of the global south through the path of free market and by extension of democracy” 
(Aragón Andrade n.d., 8 ref. Przworski). 
It is in the frame of these judicial reform projects, that the ‘indigenous reforms’, this is  
the recognition of indigenous rights particularly regarding their own legal systems, took place. 
As Aragón Andrade puts it, the indigenous reforms participated in the process of production 
of “a different conception of the role of the tribunals of the State in society, and, consequently, 
a  different  conception  of  their  organization,  administration  and internal  logic”  (Idem,  7). 
Importantly,  this  process of transformation of the judiciary was embedded, in turn,  in the 
context of international political and economic reorganization.
To understand the links between the international political situation, the various judicial 
reforms,  and their  corresponding indigenous reforms in Latin America,  it  is  central  to  be 
aware  of  the  role  played  by  the  Washington  consensus  and  its  re-evaluation  during  the 
1990's.208 The ‘Washington consensus’ had been formulated in the context of a search “to look 
‘beyond the debt crisis’ in an effort to chart a path for restoring sustained prosperity in the 
region” of Latin America in the 1990's  (Kuczynski/Williamson 2003). In the famous paper, 
where  the  concept  was  coined,  John  Williamson  (*1937)  “identified  10  areas  where 
policymakers and scholars in ‘Washington’ could arguably muster a fairly wide consensus as 
to the character  of the policy reforms that debtor countries should pursue”  (Williamson 
1990, 9).209
208 The term ‘Washington Consensus’ was coined in the “background paper for a conference that the Institute 
for International Economics convened in order to examine the extent to which the old ideas of development 
economics that had governed Latin American economic policy since the 1950's were being swept aside by 
the set  of ideas that  had long been accepted as appropriate within the OECD” as Williamson, an US-
American economist  and the author of that  paper,  tells  us (Williamson 2004).  The proceedings of  this  
conference, including the text of Williamson who edited the publication, were published in 1990 with the 
title ‘The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America’ (Williamson 1990). 
209 Importantly, “'Washington’ was defined for these purposes as encompassing ‘both the political Washington 
of Congress and senior members of the administration, and the technocratic Washington of the international 
financial institutions, the economic agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the 
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However,  some years later a phase of assessment  of the economic principles in the 
region  started,  since  economic  transformation  towards  the  free  market  was  seen  as 
unsuccessful, particularly due to institutional obstacles. The new (intermediate) goal was thus 
to  transform  those  institutions,  as  the  paper  issued  by  the  World  Bank  ‘Beyond  the 
Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter’ makes clear (Burki/Perry 1998). In harmony with 
this concern for institutions, a paper of the Inter-American Development Bank stated also: 
“In recent decades, the economic science has become increasingly convinced of 
the need to incorporate institutional factors in the economic analysis. In particular, 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) postulates the important role institutions 
play in the functioning of an economy and its possibilities of growth” (Eyzaguirre 
1996, 2). 
With some more detail, Burki and Perry remark that 
“institutions matter for development because they determine the efficiency and 
existence of both markets and organizations, public or private [...] [B]oth the rate 
of capital  accumulation (physical  and human) and their  quality and efficiency 
depend on formal and informal institutions. And thus, we expect institutions to 
influence the rate of economic growth” (Burki/Perry 1998, 15).
Particularly interesting for  us  in  these  quotes  is  not  only the  specific  reference  to 
development, most importantly to development as economic growth, but also the emphasis 
put on formal  and informal institutions. This opening of the ‘institutional frame’ object to 
reform  and  development,  was  also  clear  for  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank: 
“Institutions can be formal (constitution, laws) or informal (social norms, codes of conduct)” 
(Eyzaguirre 1996, 2). Furthermore, the overwhelming presence of the principle of efficiency 
in both private and public spheres shows the centrality of this concept for a linear thinking 
oriented towards one goal:  economic growth. It  is in these terms that  one ideal of law is 
formulated:  “Good  institutions,  in  summary,  should  provide  rules  that  are  clear,  widely 
known, coherent, applicable to all, predictable, credible, and properly and evenly enforced” 
(Idem). Needless to say, this is just one side of a circle, where good law is, in turn, defined as  
one which creates, enhances and supports this kind of ‘good institutions’. 
Importantly,  while  informality and the  private  sector  play a  major  role  in  this  new 
concept,  the  state  has  a  clear  function  within  this  paradigm,  namely  to  guarantee  the 
institutional frame “in order that the market works adequately” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 10). 
Hence, Burki emphasizes: “Still, with the greater reliance on markets and the private sector, 
the state will play an important role in providing basic services, and as a facilitator and arbiter 
think tanks'” (Williamson 1990, 9). 
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of private sector development” (Burki 1995, 11). In this line, institutional reform, driven by 
the state, was seen as a process subordinated to the goal of functioning markets: 
“[s]ince  markets  need an  adequate  institutional  framework  to  perform well,  a 
program of  institutional  reforms  should  be  an  important  element  in  the  new 
development strategy that is being shaped in Latin America. [...] The failure is [...] 
on the lack of the necessary conditions for the markets to work. It is there where 
the role of the state must be important, generating such conditions” (Eyzaguirre 
1996, 3).
Following this  perspective,  where the  state  failed  to  guarantee these  conditions,  i.e. 
where the institutional infrastructure was  less developed according to the standards set  by 
international  banks,  the market  economy was dysfunctional.  In terms of the report  of the 
Inter-American Development Bank: 
“following the NIE model, we can observe that in the Less Developed Countries 
(LDC)  institutions  can  not  adequately  assign  and  protect  the  agents’ rights, 
generating high transaction costs  and restricting the functioning of the market 
economy. As a result, markets can not expand, specialization is low, monopolic or 
oligopolic markets are very frequent, individuals have fewer possibilities to reach 
more complex contractual agreements, have to resort to more costly contracting 
and to  more  costly ways  of  organizing  their  economic  activities”  (Eyzaguirre 
1996, 2). 
For “rapid and sustainable development”, one major recipe with “worldwide” validity 
was thus “the clarification and protection of property rights, the enforcement of contractual 
obligations, and the enactment and application of rigorous regulatory regimes” (Shihata 1995, 
13). In other words, having or not having rights, and most importantly, having or not having 
rigorous regulation, was reflected as a question of more or less costs, more or less investment, 
and more or less economic growth. Matters of law become relevant so far as they promote 
specific forms of financial transactions. The implicit assumption is that those transactions will 
bring prosperity, and, in turn, prosperity will enhance a socio-cultural development towards 
the better fulfillment of Human Rights.
With  this  perspective  on  law,  the  judiciary  took  a  crucial  role  within  the  policies, 
assessments  and  recommendations  of  international  agencies.  Therefore,  the  World  Bank 
supported  strongly  processes  of  judicial  reform  according  to  this  new  perspective  on 
economic growth, starting from the conviction that: 
“[j]udicial  reform benefits  all  users.  It  benefits  the  private  sector  by  making 
business  transactions  more  predictable,  and  it  benefits  the  public  sector  by 
establishing better regulation and accountability. Finally, it benefits the people by 
increasing access to legal aid programs and services. The rule of law establishes 
the basic principle essential for a sound economy. In particular, judicial reform 
directed at achieving effective implementation of the law is of central importance 
in  reforming  the  role  of  the  state  and  implementing  development  strategies” 
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(Burki 1995, 11-12). 
Importantly,  the  reform proposed  was  addressed  directly  as  a  process  of  ‘modernization’ 
against the “risk of ‘antiquate’ legal normative” (Iglesias 1993, 9). As the then president of the 
Inter-American Bank of  Development concluded determinately,  “[i]ts  modernization  is  an 
essential ingredient of development” (Iglesias 1993, 9).210 
The justification for this change in the international development agenda and for the 
wave of institutional reforms was provided by a consequent reference to worldwide studies, 
statistical  charts  and the construction of indexes,  which proved the scientific  truth of  the 
“alleged link between a good economy and the development of public institutions” (Aragón 
Andrade  n.d.,  26).  This  form of  addressing  experience  and justifying  the maintenance  or 
change  of  practices,  was  soon  taken  over  within  the  judicial  institutions  (Idem,  16  ff.). 
However, the same claim to ‘scientificity’ resulted in a protection shield against every doubt 
regarding the legitimacy of these decisions, the process through which they were taken, the 
assumptions they were based on, and the further consequences they could have in the socio-
cultural environment. 
A complex approach to the questions of ‘why’, ‘how’, ‘where from’ or ‘where to’ was 
swept aside by the mere management of clearly categorized and structured behaviors. This 
impulse  towards  the  judicial  reforms  marked  equally  their  content,  which  can  justly  be 
addressed as a transition from the paradigm of justice to the paradigm of management. In this  
sense,  Aragón  Andrade  underlines  that  the  current  ways  to  approach  the  demands  of 
effectiveness,  including  predictability,  speed  and  accessibility  which  these  reforms  try  to 
respond to, changed the conception of the judiciary itself.  Referring to Lavados y Vargas, 
Aragón Andrade,  argues  that  there is  a  transition from “a justice incarnated in  goals  and 
transcendental  values,  to  one  at  the  service  of  the  ‘people’  that  turn  to  them  for  an 
‘efficacious’ solution of their conflicts”, thus conceiving of ‘people’ as agents of the market 
(Aragón Andrade n.d., 17 cit. Lavados y Vargas). 
Amongst others, this step implied understanding ‘justice as a service’ (USAID 2010, 
29), that needs to be offered to the clients in the service market as part of an exchange of 
values, organizing the professional structure, like a business branch, according to the principle 
of ‘meritocracy’ (Aragón Andrade n.d., 22), and incorporating statistics as the tool to measure 
the service of the structure as well as the merit of its elements, and thus as the central method 
210 Remarkably,  Enrique  V. Iglesias  (*1930)  made  this  statement  during  the  inauguration  of  a  seminar 
sponsored by that institution, named ‘La justicia en Latinoamérica y el Caribe en la década de los 90.  
Desafios  y  oportunidades’ ('Justice  in  Latin  America and  the  Caribbean  in  the  Decade  of  the  90es. 
Challenges and Opportunities'). This is just one example of a myriad of seminars of the sort that took place 
during the decade.
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to measure state-justice (Idem, 23 f.). Statistics turned thus into nearly the only reference for 
performance of tribunals and even grew into specialized institutions within the tribunals.
There are, however, deep quandaries behind this ‘progressive’ reforms. Particularly, the 
method of developing judgments on the institutions and their functioning based on statistics, 
which  is  at  the  core  of  the  reforms,  results  in  serious  problems  regarding  the  necessary 
homogenization and standardization of parameters and registers. A statistic does not make the 
definition  of  the  object  of  measurement  unnecessary,  but  it  makes  it  less  visible  and 
questionable. Moreover, there is an important connection between the ‘scientificity’ claimed 
through statistics and the traditional discourse in the judicial field of neutrality, objectivity and 
apolicity, which has been already questioned above (Aragón Andrade n.d., 24). However, with 
this  impulse  and  as  a  result  of  the  rejection  of  public  monopolies  and  the  traditional 
‘hierarchical  model’ of  the  administration  of  public  institutions,  the  paradigm of  ‘public 
management’, based mainly in perspectives on the functioning of the private sector, became 
central . 
Importantly, this process meant also to follow the US-American example, separating 
between  administrative  and  jurisdictional  functions  within  the  judicial  institutions,  what, 
despite the fact that its universal applicability was assumed, created immense tensions not 
only in the Mexican context Aragón Andrade investigates primarily, but also, for example in 
Spain (Idem). In this line, the judicial reforms in Latin America created, with diverse nuances, 
the ‘Councils of the Judiciary’ as separate institutions in charge of the administration of the 
tribunals.   As we will see, it is no coincidence that these changes in the judicial institution 
went hand in hand with the indigenous reforms in the region, which brought in the Mexican 
case the incorporation of indigenous tribunals to the judicial structure of the state. Along these 
lines,  and  making  use  of  Aragón  Andrade's  recent  field  research,  I  will  address,  in  the 
following pages, the particular constellation of judicial and indigenous reforms in the case of 
Mexico as projects of legal development that were promoted in the name of plurality and 
cultural diversity.
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a) The Creation of Indigenous Courts in Mexico within the Global Context of Judicial Reform  
and Legal Development
In  line  with  the  international  developments  and  the  consequent  constitutional  reforms  in 
Mexico, which I will refer in some more detail soon, in the end of the 1990's some of the  
federal states of Mexico started processes of official state validation of indigenous justices. 
The first state reform in this sense took place in Quintana Roó in 1997, building the model 
that  other  states  followed  in  turn.  Importantly,  this  process  was  connected  to  a  more 
encompassing project of judicial reform, so that the same day that the law on indigenous 
justices was published, also the law creating the Center of Alternative Justice of Quintana Roó 
was  established  (14th August  1997,  Aragón  Andrade  n.d.,  102).  Importantly,  as  Aragón 
Andrade remarks, the “'indigenous courts’ were born incorporated to the own state system of 
justice and operated formally under the regulation of the ‘Law of Indigenous Justice of the 
State of Quintana Roó'” (Idem). Taking this indigenous reform as a model, also other states 
formulated  a  “recognition  within  the  structure  of  the  state  judicial  power  and  under  the 
normativity of  the tribunal” (Idem, 103).  In  the following,  I  will  use the example of  the 
reforms in Michoacán investigated in detail by Orlando Aragón Andrade, in order to put in 
question contemporary alternative approaches to legal development that, embedded in a late-
modern or even postmodern sociolect, are promoted as key elements in the incorporation of 
plurality within modern law. 
In the same line of the arguments I have presented above regarding the manifold connections 
between  the  recognition  of  ‘indigenous  law’ at  an  international  level  and the  changes  in 
perspectives of development, particularly legal development, Aragón Andrade argues that the 
Mexican indigenous reforms are equally linked to the process of globalization, understood as 
a  process  of  intensification  of  connections,  in  a  twofold  way.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
establishment of ‘communal tribunals’ developed in the context of a general judicial reform, 
which  included  also  new  mechanisms  of  management  of  the  tribunals  and  methods  of 
alternative justice. The introduction of these elements was successful under the influence of 
international development organizations and agencies oriented towards modernization, more 
efficacy, and a transformation from justice to management in the sense I described above 
(Aragón  Andrade  n.d.,  15).  While  the  ‘success’ of  the  reforms  according  to  their  own 
parameters is questionable, Aragón Andrade points out that they produced a dramatic change 
289
in the fundamental priorities and values set as goals by the system of justice. In this sense, he 
puts in question the assumption that the Mexican judicial reform, or other similar reforms in 
the region, was the “materialization of a ‘pure or neutral’ better administration of resources” 
(Idem,  19).  Put  differently,  he  rejects  a  mechanistic  and  instrumentalistic  perspective 
characteristic for a modern approach to law, development and legal development. In the terms 
of  Sousa Santos  and Aragón Andrade,  this  judicial  reform and the  changes  in  legislation 
regarding indigenous groups it included, are an expression of the aspect of globalization that 
they label  as  “hegemonic  neoliberal  globalization” (Aragón Andrade  n.d.,  4  f.  and Sousa 
Santos 2003, 209). 
On the other hand, these authors remark the parallel existence of a “globalization from 
below”,  which involves  the “transnational  organization of the resistance of Nation-States, 
regions,  classes  or  social  groups victimized by the  uneven exchanges  which  nurture”  the 
hegemonic  neoliberal  aspect  of  globalization,  “using  in  its  benefit  the  possibilities  of 
transnational interaction created by the global system in transition,  including those which 
derive  from  the  revolution  of  the  information  and  communication  technologies”  (Sousa 
Santos 2003, 209). It is in the context of this type of globalization, that Aragón Andrade puts 
the  increasing  presence  of  indigenous  organizations,  their  interconnection  and  their 
international political  activism, recognizing the actors as historically oppressed characters, 
who, acting from the margins, have made use of the limited spaces in which they could act 
(Aragón  Andrade  n.d.,  37  f.).  In  this  sense,  he  recognizes  the  role  of  an  ‘indigenous 
diplomacy’ in promoting “the production of legal instruments on rights of the indigenous 
peoples in the international system as a strategic tool to promote, in turn, the change in the 
legal bodies of the diverse national states where they live” (Idem, 38). These efforts were 
themselves  embedded  in  a  variety  of  processes  that  include,  amongst  others,  the 
recommendations issued by the committee in Human Rights of the United Nations and the 
judicial activism of indigenous organizations in cases against the state.211
Utilizing this differentiating approach on processes of globalization, Aragón Andrade 
addresses the elements of a ‘hegemonic neoliberal globalization’ included in the Mexican 
reforms through an interesting analysis of the alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution 
(usually named ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’,  ADR) and their  role in the processes of 
judicial reform, specifically regarding the creation of ‘communal tribunals’ in Michoacán. In 
211 Note for example, the presence of indigenous organizations from diverse Latin American countries in the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and their 
effect in the treatment and decisions on topics related to indigenous peoples (Aragón Andrade n.d., 39).
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this sense, he conceives of the alternative212 mechanisms of dispute resolution basically as 
methods of negotiation, mediation (or conciliation) and arbitration developed in the United 
States, the worldwide expansion of which results from processes of judicial reform promoted 
by international  development  organizations  and  agencies.213 Importantly,  Aragón  Andrade 
characterizes the approach of Alternative Dispute Resolution as ambivalent, since it integrates 
different types of tools with almost opposite goals under a common title: while mediation is  
presented as a tool for groups of people with difficult access to the official state system to 
exercise their rights, arbitration is oriented to be useful to economically powerful actors to 
avoid  state  law  (Idem,  29).  Including  these  two  groups  of  addressees,  needs,  goals  and 
relations at the two ends of the spectrum of social power, the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
swing between a popularization of justice and its privatization.
In Latin America, it has been particularly USAID the institution that has promoted the 
Alternative  Dispute  Resolution  as  a  beneficial  set  of  mechanisms  to  be  incorporated  in 
judicial  reforms, arguing for example that “ADR programs can […] manage disputes and 
conflicts that may directly impair development initiatives” (USAID/Center for Democracy 
and  Governance  1998,  7).  Importantly,  USAID  shares  with  the  World  Bank  or  the 
International Development Bank that all of them have equally fostered ‘informal’ mechanisms 
of dispute resolution. However, it is characterized by the fact that it is one of the agencies 
which, differently from other institutions, have explicitly presented their aid not only as linked 
to the economical growth of the region where their development plans are put in action, but 
particularly to economical, political and security interests of the United States. Consequently, 
it is not surprising that this promotion of the Alternative Dispute Resolution is also linked to a  
clear economic focus (Aragón Andrade n.d., 27). 
Importantly,  Aragón  Andrade  argues  in  his  thesis  that  there  is  a  link  between  “the 
implementation of ADRs as part of the judicial reform and the recognition of the indigenous 
normative systems in Mexico”, particularly in the case of the creation of the indigenous courts 
in Quintana Roó (Aragón Andrade n.d., 29).214 To start with, USAID has argued that “ADR 
212 Importantly, the concept of ‘alternative’ is itself, as Aragón Andrade recognizes, very ambivalent, since its 
meaning  depends  on  an  assumed  idea  of  ‘what  is  normal’.  This  instability  echoes  the  instability  of 
‘otherness’ and, in our context, specifically the instability of the term ‘legal pluralism’ I presented above. As 
Aragón Andrade points out, for indigenous communities it is possible to argue that the official state-law is  
the alternative system, since they usually resort to a variety of other means before recurring to the state 
tribunals in order to deal with a conflict (Aragón Andrade n.d., 31 f.). In these cases, the alternative is the  
state.
213 Importantly, Willem Assies has characterized the ‘alternative conflict resolution’ as a “concept taken from 
US-American theories of law focused on the privatization of justice” (Assies 2003, 8). In this line, it is 
possible to say that justice is an example for a larger process, through which social services provided by 
Latin American states were privatized during the 1990's.
214 Also Manuel Buenrostro Alba makes a link between the establishment of an alternative system of justice 
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programs  can  provide  a  reasonable  degree  of  justice  if  a  tradition  of  informal  dispute 
resolution  exists”  (USAID/Center  for  Democracy  and  Governance  1998,  27).  Thus,  this 
agency  acknowledges  the  “importance  of  these  traditions  as  a  background  condition  for 
success” of their reform policies(Idem). From the perspective of this development agency, not 
only  are  these  “supportive  cultural  norms”  important  for  the  “acceptance  of  informal 
processes” but also to build “appropriate standards for settlement” and, most importantly for 
the “enforcement through community customs and sanctions” (Idem).  
However,  as  Aragón  Andrade  remarks,  there  are  important  differences  between  the 
indigenous  forms  of  justice  and  the  Alternative  Dispute  Resolution  mechanisms,  most 
importantly “because the objectives pursued, the ideologies that drive them and the form in 
which they are institutionalized are different to a great extent” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 31). 
Key is, for example, the difference between the role of the ‘mediator’ in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution mechanisms and in ‘indigenous justice systems’, that Aragón Andrade identifies 
stating that: 
“while,  in  general,  the  persons  in  charge  of  doing  the  mediations  under  the 
scheme of the ADRs are persons with a technical and formal preparation to hold 
their position, the ‘mediator’ in the indigenous justices is characterized generally 
by being  the  bearer  of  another  symbolic  capital,  which,  under  the  context  of 
indigenous communities, seems to be more appreciated, like the work trajectory 
of that person in the community and his public prestige” (Idem, 32). 
Furthermore,  the  author  argues  that  the  inclusion  of  Alternative  Dispute  Resolution 
mechanisms in the same ‘package’ with indigenous law due to their alleged common aspect of 
informality, is a result of the comparison of both groups of legal understandings with state 
law, while the procedures of Alternative Dispute Resolution show to be very formalized in 
comparison with indigenous processes of justice (Idem). 
Most  importantly,  this  scholar  underlines  the  ‘pedagogic  function’  of  basing 
mechanisms of Alternative Dispute Resolution on indigenous understandings of law, linking 
this relation to the experience with ‘popular tribunals’ under socialist regimes. In this last case 
the traditions of indigenous law were utilized as a base on which “popular tribunals were 
established  that  worked  in  a  similar  way  as  the  customary  law  in  an  environment  of 
informality  and  with  mediations  as  the  mechanism  to  solve  controversies,  but  which, 
naturally, had also as their goal to disseminate and promote in the population the legislation, 
the values and the organization driven by the revolutionary regime” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 33 
ref.  Sachs/Honwana).  Hence,  this  author  argues,  that  the  inclusion of  Alternative  Dispute 
and the recognition of indigenous justices in Quintana Roó (Buenrostro Alba 2009).
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Resolution on the base of indigenous legal practices has a similar aim and impact, because 
their presentation in connection to indigenous practices is oriented lastly to the dissemination 
of the very different perspective on law they adhere to. Importantly, while the promotion of 
the own values and normative understandings is necessarily part of any legal practice, and 
insofar  the  indigenous  groups  cannot  be  addressed  as  pure  and  authentic,  what  Aragón 
Andrade underlines is the contradiction between a discourse of alliance, similarity and mutual 
support on the one hand, and a clear intention and deliberate practice contrary to the values 
and interests identified with ‘tradition’ and invoked as legitimazing factors on the other hand. 
Thus, the researcher concludes, “the mediations in the style of ADR can be informal, flexible 
and with  lay discourses  more  or  less  similar  to  the  indigenous  justices;  but  they do not 
disseminate,  reproduce  or  recreate  the  same  principles,  values,  ideologies  and  cultural 
practices which the indigenous justices promote” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 35). 
On  a  more  theoretical  tone,  he puts  these  observations  in  line  with  Sousa  Santos’ 
statement  that  the development of hybrid structures  is  manipulated and dominated by the 
interests of the agencies that foster them (Idem, 36). This is valid also for the judicial reform 
which introduced Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms at the same time than a new 
approach to indigenous law within the Mexican legal system (Idem). Consequently, Aragón 
Andrade argues that USAID developed an “expansion strategy of the new legal orthodoxy 
based on the hybridization that aims to put the local normatives at the service of the ideology 
and  the  interests  that  promote  the  judicial  reform  at  a  transnational  level”  (Idem,  36). 
Regarding  the  hybridization  of  law,  there  is  also  an  important  similarity  between  the 
implementation of Alternative Dispute Resolution allegedly in the line of traditional local 
understandings of justice on the one hand, and the “role of customary law in the invention and 
reproduction  of  a  certain  order  of  legitimacy  that  favored  the  colonial  regime  and  the 
empowerment  of  the  ‘traditional  leaders’ as  local  authorities”  on the  other  hand (Aragón 
Andrade n.d., 33 ref. Meneses and Sango). 
Importantly,  despite  these  differences  and  tensions  between  Alternative  Dispute 
Resolution  mechanisms  and  indigenous  understandings  of  law,  in  the  discourse  of 
development of agencies like USAID as well as in the new constitutional texts, the indigenous 
reform was conceived as part of a legal (and often judicial) reform that followed a particular 
conception of legal development. This approach included alternativity, informality and, to a 
certain degree, the retreat of the state, as tools for efficacy and management. In other words, 
better law is quick, effective law, and therefore, legal development must strive for relieving 
the courts, while still making justice. According to this perspective, good law, and therefore 
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developed law, is one that gets out of the way of international investment (and with it of 
economic development), and one that does not asphyxiate under an immensity of petty cases. 
Guided  by  the  goal  of  efficacy  in  the  context  of  the  ‘paradigm  of  management’,  legal 
development was promoted in form of judicial reforms. It is in this context that the indigenous 
reform in Mexico produced the creation of ‘communal courts’ or indigenous tribunals.
Concretely, the main modernizing federal judicial reform in this line took place in 1994215 
(Aragón Andrade n.d., 72 f.), when the Supreme Court structure was changed radically with 
the creation of the Federal Judicature Council as a new and supreme administrative body of 
the judicial power.216 More recently, in 2006, the Supreme Court published the ‘Libro Blanco 
de  la  Reforma  Judicial’  ('White  Book  of  the  Judicial  Reform')  establishing  a  variety  of 
modifications oriented to the modernization of the tribunals and including amongst others, the 
“judicial decentralization, the specialization of the tribunals, and the adoption and use of the 
alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution” (Idem, 74 ref. Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación).
According  to  several  socio-legal  studies217,  this  process  of  profound  reform can  be 
explained in the context of democratization of the Mexican state. Aragón Andrade insists, 
however,  that  the  mere  frame  of  a  democratizing  process  is  insufficient  to  address  this 
complex project.  Against the perspective on the reform as a step towards democratization 
speaks  the  fact  that  it  was  “concretized  in  an  express  manner,  with  almost  no  public 
discussion and taking advantage” of the position that the political party PRI still had from its 
authoritarian regime (Idem, 76). Furthermore, it resulted in the dismissal or replacement of all 
the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  (Idem).  Consequently,  Aragón  Andrade  speaks  of  “the 
realization  of  (allegedly)  democratizing  reforms  in  an  authoritarian  way”  (Idem,  75)  and 
envisages this process as a result of the contradictions present in the ‘neoliberal democratic 
discourse’. 
215 There was however an important antecedent of this reform in 1987.
216 Mexico is, again, just one example for the more general situation in Latin America. Another example of this 
process  is  the  Colombian  constitutional  reform,  which  created  a Consejo  Supremo de  la  Judicatura 
(Supreme  Council  of  the  Judiciary).  This  institution  would  later,  in  cooperation  with  the  Indigenous 
National Organization of Colombia and other institutions, develop projects for implementation laws of the 
constitutional recognition of indigenous rights (Kuppe 2010, 24).
217 Take for an example the article of the renown director of the Institute for Legal Research (Instituto de  
Investigaciones Jurídicas) at the UNAM, Héctor Fix-Fierro ‘Judicial Reform in Mexico: What Next?’ (Fix-
Fierro 2003a, or, for the Spanish version cited here later, 2003b).
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Importantly, the lack of critique is a direct result of the context in which the reform took 
place, since the conception of this reform was linked intimately with recommendations by 
international organizations like the World Bank, the IMF and the International Development 
Bank as a sort of medicine against authoritarianism and underdevelopment (Aragón Andrade 
n.d., 116). Problematically, this conception of the reforms inhibits critiques on its ends and 
means (Idem, 76), depolitizicing the decisions to be taken under an invisible shield of alleged 
universally valid scientificity, and ending up in arguments that assume a “natural progress of 
law” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 77). As a result, while the amount of inquiries on the reasons of 
the judicial reform is small, those which actually study them often argue, like Fix-Fierro, that 
one important reason for the reform was the demands and expectations of the Mexican society 
towards a better judicial system (Fix-Fierro 2003b, 265). Aragón Andrade, however, criticizes 
these studies which “do not question the own content of the reform and share the perception 
that  it  is  an instrument  for democratization as the global  imperatives suggest it”  (Aragón 
Andrade n.d., 80). On the contrary, he underlines that the judicial reform of 1994 “shares with 
all the big constitutional reforms of that decade a very strong external drive” (Idem, 81). In 
this sense, 
“the majority of these measurements encouraged by the international agencies 
mentioned above,  are  not,  as  their  advocates  continuously assure,  neutral  and 
depolitizised  adjustments  with  the  only  end  of  the  betterment  of  judicial 
institutions; but they also represent the expansion towards the judicial field of a 
particular  form  of  knowledge  and  the  displacement  of  others,  basing  not 
necessarily in their ‘scientific’ merits, but in the relationships of power. In other 
words,  we  are  in  front  of  a  manifestation  of  Knowledge/Power  in  the  terms 
described by Michel Foucault” (Idem, 25) 
Importantly, these reforms took place at the time when NAFTA (North American Free 
Trade Agreement) came into effect (1st of January 1994), and, simultaneously, the Zapatista 
Army for National Liberation (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) started its 
first uprising and issued the first ‘Declaración de la Selva Lacandona’ ('Declaration of the 
Selva  Lacandona').  Thus,  it  is  not  surprising  that,  in  the  frame  of  this  judicial  reform, 
important institutional changes regarding the status of indigenous law took place, reverting 
some aspects of the historical relations of the indigenous groups to state law and reaffirming 
others. In accordance with the general perspective I  have been presenting before,  Aragón 
Andrade argues that during the 19th century, “the natives where seen as groups that ought to 
be exterminated in honor of the progress and civilization of the Mexican nation” (Aragón 
Andrade n.d.,  97), while in the first  decades of the 20th century,  as a consequence of the 
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‘Mexican Revolution’ (started in 1910 and lasting for several years218) the strategy changed to 
“integrate the natives in a ‘Mexican nation’. Thus the politics of direct extermination gave 
way to a politics of cultural integration, which in the end aimed at the same final goal, the  
disappearance of native in order to achieve the consolidation of the ‘Mexican nation’, this 
time in its ‘mestizo’ version” (Idem, 98).
This  situation  changed gradually with  the  increasing pressure  of  diverse indigenous 
mobilizations from the 1970s219 onwards. These visible claims and the new economic model 
of development gave form, finally, to the new art. 4 of the Constitution in 1992. Relevant to 
this reform process is equally the increased sensitivity of Mexico, like other ‘Third World’ 
countries immersed in a profound debt crisis, to economic ‘recommendations’ of organisms 
like the IMF, the World Bank, the IDB, as well as the influence of instruments of international 
law issued by organizations like the UN or the ILO (Aragón Andrade n.d., 100). Amongst 
other consequences, the constitutional change required giving up social politics, including the 
indigenist ones (Idem, 99). Thus, through this reform, the ILO Convention no. 169 was given 
constitutionality, breaking with a legal tradition regarding the indigenous groups in Mexico 
(Aragón  Andrade  n.d.,  100).220 In  this  sense,  the  art.  4  of  the  Constitution  declared  the 
“pluricultural  composition  of  the  Mexican  nation”  (Hernández  Martínez  1993,  102). 
Importantly,  it  also  established  the  obligation  of  the  Mexican  state  to  promote  the 
development of indigenous cultures (Idem, emphasis added).221 As we can see, the perspective 
on  development  continued  to  be  central  while  seemingly  changing  its  character  from  a 
unifying ‘one development’ to a ‘development of the cultural features of the Other’. However, 
it remains unclear what is meant by ‘development’ in this sense, or what does the “protection 
and promotion” of this development by the law implies. The next reform would make the 
actual content of this (still singular) development of plural cultures more explicit.  
Only two years after the reform, the EZLN raised up in arms, what derived lastly in a 
document known as the ‘Acuerdos de San Andrés’ ('San Andrés Accords'), which should be 
the  base for  a  constitutional  reform in favor  of  indigenous claims beyond the guarantees 
218 The question regarding when this revolution ended is part of an important historiographical dispute. One of  
the important dates taken into account is the declaration of the Constitution of 1917. 
219 Importantly,  the  relevance  of  these  movements  increased  in  this  period  due  to  the  agricultural  crisis, 
becoming thus more visible at a national and international level.
220 For an overview of subsequent drafts for the reform of the Mexican Constitution and the final text of the  
reform of 2001 as well as reforms in the Mexican federal states before 2003, see Assies 2003, 10 ff.
221 The complete text of the art. 4 in 1992 was : “The Mexican Nation has a pluricultural composition sustained  
originally on its indigenous peoples. The law will protect and promote the development of their languages,  
cultures, customs, resources and specific forms of social organization and will guarantee their members the 
effective access to the state jurisdiction. In the agrarian trials and procedures in which they participate, their  
legal practices and customs will be taken into account according to the law” (Hernández Martínez 1993, 
102).
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established in the 1992 constitution. After this Peace Process failed, the project of a peace 
agreement and a constitutional reform had to wait until 2001. However, the content of the new 
art. 2 of the Constitution did not correspond to the San Andrés Accords. The constitutional 
reform was  carried  out222,  but  it  was  not  accepted  by  the  EZLN or  the  big  majority  of 
indigenous organizations. 
Importantly, the new article 2 begins with the statement of the unicity and indivisibility 
of the Mexican Nation, to state in a second paragraph its pluricultural composition (Honorable 
Congreso de la Nación 2012). In this first and more general part of the article also the criteria 
to establish who is native and what is an indigenous community are established according to 
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ elements.  Equally,  it  puts  the  right  to  self-determination  in  a 
constitutional frame of autonomy, emphasizing the need to secure national unity, and orders 
the  further  recognition  of  the  indigenous  peoples  in  the  federal  states.  This  autonomy is 
detailed in section A, the second part of the article, stating that indigenous peoples have a 
right to “apply their own regulations and solve their own conflicts according to their own 
rules”, while setting at the same time the clear limit of the general constitutional principles 
and the fundamental rights. Despite this recognition, the supremacy of the state law and its 
judiciary is underlined by the Constitution, when it states that “the law shall establish the 
ways  in  which  judges  and  courts  will  validate  the  aforementioned  regulations”  (Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos 2005). This scheme is repeated regarding the election of authorities, which 
has to take place “within a framework respectful of both this Constitution and the States’ 
sovereignty”  (Idem).  In  this  sense,  Aragón  Andrade  argues  that  there  exists  a  “line  of 
continuity with the colonial dispositions in the area” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 102). 
In its last section (section B), art.  2 of the Constitution establishes the duties of the 
Mexican State, which, through agencies and policies “shall enforce the indigenous’ rights as 
well as an integral  development for indigenous peoples and indigenous communities alike” 
(Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2005; emphasis added). This support for development includes 
diverse aspects:  increasing (bilingual and intercultural)  education,  fostering local economy 
and improving standards of living, and advancing health and nutrition programs, as well as 
living conditions and communication infrastructure, mentioning particularly the promotion of 
“indigenous women's incorporation in development” (Idem). Last but not least, the agencies 
and  policies  at  stake  have  to  “take  into  account  indigenous  peoples’  opinions  and 
recommendations in order to include those adequate ones in the National, state and municipal 
222 Unfortunately, the article is too long to be reproduced here. In the text I will address those parts that are  
most important for this inquiry. For the whole text, see the Constitution of the Mexican States (Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos 2005 for an English version, or Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2011 for the original one). 
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development plans” (Idem)223. Even in this short review, it turns obvious that while making 
explicit statements regarding the recognition and appreciation of indigenous ways of life, the 
constitutional  article  not  only sets  explicit  limits,  but  also creates  structures  in  which the 
exercise of these ‘new’ rights have to fit in order to be actualized. The how of ‘diversity’ is 
clearly determined, from who is native to how to develop. What development ‘has to be’, 
even development in ‘an indigenous way’, is already pre-determined. This element at the core 
of the constitutional reform had important consequences for the development of state reforms 
as  well  as  for  the  concrete  implementation  of  the  rights  recognized  to  the  indigenous 
communities in the diverse legal documents. In the following paragraphs I will address this 
tension in the context of the reforms in the state of Michoacán.
The first constitutional reform in indigenous matters in Michoacán in 1997 (art. 3) responded 
to  the  reform of  the  national  constitution  in  1992,  and  was  equally limited.  Importantly, 
“practically  no  indigenous  organization  or  community  participated  in  its  elaboration, 
discussion and approbation” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 104), what at a legal level, violated even 
the rights recognized to the indigenous peoples and communities of Michoacan established in 
the (by then ratified) ILO Convention no. 169 (Idem). Other small reforms in the Criminal 
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure followed, but none of all these changes met by far  
the indigenous claims. In the subsequent years, diverse proposals for a new reform of the 
Constitution of Michoacán were presented, however, the project of a new reform was finally 
rejected in 2005.224 More important are, however, the new institutions that were created on the 
line of these political and legal changes, after 2000, like the Interinstitutional Coordination for 
the Attention of the Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Michoacán de Ocampo (CIACPI 
–  Coordinación Interinstitucional para la Atención de los Pueblos y Cidades Indígenas de  
Michoacán de Ocampo), the Advisory Council of Indigenous Authorities (CCAI –  Consejo 
223 While the translation of Pérez Vázquez reads “take into account” (Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2005), the  
original in Spanish states “consultar”, which can be better translated, in my opinion, with ‘consult’, what 
implies a more active attitude in addressing the indigenous communities instead of just receiving comments  
that the state agencies would ‘take into account’. An argument in favor of my proposal is also the official  
translation  of  art.  6  ILO  Convention  no.  169,  which  equates  the  English  ‘consult’ with  the  Spanish 
‘consultar’,  and  is  arguably  the  international  reference  for  this  particular  right  of  indigenous  peoples 
recognized in the Mexican constitution (ILO 1989 and OIT 1989).
224 For a detailed account of the whole drafting procedure and the various irregularities it presented causing the  
repudiation of indigenous organizations, see Ventura Patiño 2010. Three of these drafts proposed different 
approaches to the officialization of indigenous justice systems: one proposed the creation of ‘traditional  
judges’, another one planned the creation of a “court of original peoples”, which would have a special  
jurisdiction for all sorts of conflicts in the indigenous communities, and the final version voted and rejected 
in congress envisaged ‘courts of peace and indigenous conciliation’ which would depend fundamentally on 
the Superior Court (Aragón Andrade n.d., 109 f.)
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Consultivo  de  Autoridades  Indígenas)225,  and  the  Intercultural  Indigenous  University 
(Universidad Intercultural  Indígena).  Through this  process,  several  leaders  of  indigenous 
organizations  were  incorporated  to  the  governmental  structures,  and  thus  an  ‘indigenous 
bureacracy’ was created (Aragón Andrade n.d., 107 ref. Jasso and Ventura Patiño). 
The long expected reform would finally be issued in the frame of a judicial reform in 
2007, which was object of intense institutional struggles, particularly between the members of 
parliament and the magistrates at the Supreme Court of Justice of the State. One of the main 
reasons  for  this  struggle  was  the  creation  of  a  Judiciary  Council  in  the  line  with  the 
‘management paradigm’ described above (Aragón Andrade n.d., 112f.). Another problematic 
point was the creation of communal tribunals for indigenous peoples. Importantly, “the idea of 
including  the  creation  of  ‘communal  courts  in  the  package  of  the  judicial  reform  in 
Michoacán and with them the officialization of the indigenous justices, did not emerge from 
the  proposal  or  demand of  an  indigenous  organization,  movement  or  community”  (Idem, 
117). Neither were previous initiatives of constitutional reform taken up again. The key factor 
for this incorporation was the proposal of a member of the state congress, which “was the 
principal  operator  of  the  judicial  reform  in  the  State's  [Michoacán]  congress,  and  who 
furthermore did not have in his political career any major antecedent of work with indigenous 
communities”  (Idem).  The  inspiration  for  his  proposal  derived,  as  he  explained  in  an 
interview with Aragón Andrade, from “one occasion [when] the Supreme Court invited him to 
one of the seminars on alternative mechanisms of justice sponsored by the European Union 
together with other transnational entities and it was from there that the idea emerged that the 
‘usos and customs’ of the indigenous communities could be considered as a part of those 
auxiliary resources  of  state  justice”  (Idem,  117).  Importantly,  this  reform did not  include 
either any consultation with indigenous communities (Idem, 117 f.).
Following the intense dispute between the congress members and the high magistrates 
regarding the  judicial  reform, the Supreme Court  was included in  the  formulation  of  the 
secondary  norms  within  the  new constitutional  frame as  a  way to  relax  the  institutional 
tension  (Idem,  118).  Thus,  it  was  the  Supreme  Court  the  one  that  established  the  new 
implementation  laws  regarding  the  communal  tribunals  within  its  Judicature  Act  ('Ley 
Orgánica).226 This  regulation  assigned  the  competencies,  established  the  nature  and  the 
225 Despite its name, this institution practically did not participate in the creation of public policies regarding 
indigenous issues or presented legislative initiatives (Aragón Andrade n.d., 107 cit. Ventura Patiño).
226 A further law was developed by the Congress, namely the ‘Ley de Justicia Comunal’ ('Law on Communal 
Justice'), which aimed to regulate the function of the communal judges in detail. At the same time, however, 
vast aspects of communal justice remained without legislation and under the discretionality of the Supreme 
Court (Aragón Andrade n.d., 121). 
299
limitations of the communal courts, including the requirements to become a communal judge 
and, above all, stated the dependency of these courts on the Supreme Court. Importantly, the 
foundation for this legislation was, naturally, the understanding of a (indigenous) system of 
justice within the state system. As a simple example, taking the classification of conflicts of 
current state law, the Judicature Act of the Supreme Court allowed the communal courts to  
judge in  questions  related  to  criminal,  civil,  familial  and  commercial  law.  However,  this 
delimitation of legal spheres is not the one used in the communities, neither is the communal 
practice homogenous or stable (Idem, 121).
Equally, the communal judges were selected and appointed by the Supreme Court, and 
they were  not  elected  in  the  way that  the  indigenous  communities  usually  do  with  their  
communal authorities (Idem). The process started with a call for applications for communal 
judges to participate in a course which served as a means of selection.  The topics of the 
course had been designed also by the Supreme Court according to the division established by 
the  Judicature  Act  along  the  lines  of  the  scheme  of  state  law,  namely  criminal,  civil, 
commercial and familial law, plus a course on Alternative Dispute Resolution. These modules 
were imparted by judges of the Supreme Court (Idem, 122). While the CIACPI was involved 
to a certain extent in the development of the course, introducing modules on indigenous law 
and  legal  pluralism,  it  equally  excluded  indigenous  authorities  despite  their  practical 
experience in the field (Idem, 122 f.). 
Unsurprisingly, the call for applications to occupy the position of communal judge was 
made public as any other call for applications, namely via the official newspaper of the state, 
the internet and a newspaper of ‘state circulation’, forgetting those sectors of the population 
which do not buy the newspaper, use internet, can read or live in places where newspapers or 
internet  are  accessible,  as  it  is  the  case  in  several  indigenous  communities  (Idem,  124). 
Equally, the selective courses lasted almost two months and were held in Morelia, located far 
away  from the  communities,  without  envisaging  any  support  for  aspirants  coming  from 
outside  of  this  city.  The  requirement  to  prove  the  spoken and written  proficiency in  the 
corresponding indigenous language through an exam, was also a determinant filter which, 
from an indigenous perspective, was very problematic; not only the Purépechas communities 
do not have a unified grammar, but the Nahuas communities almost do not speak the language 
(Idem, 125). 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court decided where the new communal courts should be 
opened and for which communities, selecting only the Purépechas and Nahuas of the four 
indigenous  peoples  recognized  officially  as  ‘original’ from Michoacán  (that  include  also 
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Otomís  and  Mazahuas)  (Idem,  123).  It  disregarded  equally  the  big  amount  of  migrant 
indigenous peoples that inhabit Michoacán (Idem), thus establishing a clear differentiation 
according to a certain principle of ‘originary otherness’ and leaving aside the ‘others of the 
Others’. Unsurprisingly, the placement of the courts was decided also by the Supreme Court 
according to the convenience for its own structure. Hence, the communal courts were placed 
where the state judiciary had already infrastructure, disregarding the fact that they were far 
away from indigenous communities. 
Clearly for the formal state-law thinking, these courts were invested with a territorially 
limited jurisdiction. Regarding its internal organization, the courts were composed like any 
other  court:  with  a  judge,  a  secretary,  etc.,  this  is  they  were  formed  according  a  preset 
organizational  structure  that  is  unitary  for  all  courts  and  that  does  not  resemble  the 
organization of indigenous communities. In contrast with the provision regarding communal 
judges that did not need to have a legal background, but needed to be native, the other co-
workers of the court did not need to be native but “rather mestizo lawyers with a career within 
the Supreme Court” (Idem, 125). While this decision was justified with a ‘judicial logic’,  
arguing that the indigenous ‘judges’ needed to be oriented and helped in their duties within 
the state judicial system by someone that was familiar with that structure, the whole context 
of the indigenous reform suggests, as Aragón Andrade elaborates, that these decisions aim at 
the  internal  surveillance,  “standardize  the  working  procedures,  and  establish  within  the 
communal courts the routine practices that internalize and reproduce the existent hierarchies 
in this bureaucratic body” (Idem).
Summing up, while at a political level and at a general legal level the cultural and legal 
plurality was recognized, in the concrete regulations, the communal courts, and with them the 
recognition of indigenous law, were subjected to a narrowly understood state-law system and 
its judiciary. As a result, legal diversity was constructed only within the frame of the state 
(Aragón  Andrade  n.d.,  116).  Equally,  if  legal  development  meant  for  the  advocates  of 
indigenous law to open the realm of the legal and the officially legitimate to a plurality of  
understandings,  for  the  producers  of  the  judicial  reform  within  which  the  project  of 
indigenous  law  took  place,  legal  development  meant  many  other  things,  including  more 
efficacy, better management, and a better  functioning state. The connection between these 
diverse  and  often  contradicting  approaches  to  legal  development  reproduced  lastly  the 
hierarchical structure that called it into being, putting the claims for plural understandings of 
law in a corset of one state legal system oriented towards ever more efficacy and ever better  
management.
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This is the result of a reform that, on the one hand, addressed the indigenous claims as a 
reaction to the political tensions that required a certain response, but which also, on the other 
hand, responded to an international model of legal and judicial development that had different 
purposes,  and  touched  the  indigenous  communities  as  the  secondary  result  of  a  judicial 
reform, where alternativity and informality were envisaged as a form of modernization. The 
struggle for the regulation of indigenous courts mirrors the tensions between a certain trend 
for de-statization and the established institutions of the modern state, as well as between the 
demands for respect of otherness and its  normative understandings on one side, and their 
subjection to own standards of state-law and the mechanisms of international organizations on 
the other. 
The results are inadequate responses to the demands for recognition of otherness. The 
inadequacy  of  these  approaches  derive  from  their  basic  modern  character  oriented  still 
towards a unitary idea of state, including its legal and judicial system. The other option would 
lead  to  an  increasing  de-statization,  which  might  give  more  freedom for  the  indigenous 
peoples  to  make use of  their  own understandings  and practices  of  law responding to  the 
demands of what Sousa Santos has called a ‘globalization from below’. However, this de-
statization implies also the free participation of other role-players, with interests that might 
contradict the interests of indigenous peoples, and which are more in line with a so called 
‘hegemonic neoliberal globalization’. Without any authority to settle the tensions between the 
different role-players, the resulting power struggle leads easily to an escalation of violence 
and oppression,  as  the ongoing conflicts  over  territory and resources  between indigenous 
peoples and transnational firms as well as amongst different indigenous peoples show. This is 
the conundrum in which post-modern approaches that emphasize the value of plurality are 
caught into.
In this sense, Aragón Andrade's research is a good example. His work, which I have 
presented summarily in the last pages, is not only important for us because of its very recent 
completion  or  due  to  its  detailed  account,  its  concrete  research,  and  the  complexity  of 
entangled  processes  it  presents.  Moreover,  the  arguments  he  develops  are  themselves  an 
expression of the tension produced by the paradox of a postmodern sociolect, in which it is 
embedded.227 Thus,  his  own  approach  criticizes,  on  the  one  hand,  the  submission  of 
indigenous law under state institutions, while at the same time, it rejects the de-statization 
process encouraged by international (development) organizations and agencies. This tension, 
227 Aragón Andrade refers himself to the “paradoxic convergence” of different types of globalization in his 
case study (Aragón Andrade n.d., 5).
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however,  is  embedded in  the  plural  and contradictory character  of  postmodern  sociolects 
themselves. Interestingly, while the alternative methods of dispute resolution derive from an 
impulse to  go beyond a monolithic  perspective on state  law,  arguing in  line with critical 
(postmodern)  approaches  to  law,  in  the  analysis  of  Aragón  Andrade  they  undermine  a 
postmodern approach to law that addresses pluralism from the perspective of the situation of 
indigenous peoples in Latin America.
In the same line, it  is noteworthy, that there is a connection between the legislators’ 
argument  for  equality  using  a  dichotomic  ‘weak/strong’ discourse  during  the  indigenous 
reforms  and  Aragón  Andrade's  rhetoric  in  his  critical  approach  to  these  reforms.  Victor 
Manuel  Tinoco,  governor  of  Michoacán  at  the  time  of  the  implementation  of  the  ILO 
Convention  no.  169  in  that  state,  declared  that  the  constitutional  reform of  the  state  of 
Michoacán  “should  not  break  the  principle  of  equality  between  the  parties  but,  on  the 
contrary, serve in order to auxiliate the weak in front of the strong one” (Aragón Andrade n.d., 
104 cit. Tinoco). Thus, the constitutional recognition of indigenous rights was seen as a “help 
for the weak party, when it really is such” (Idem). Importantly, Tinoco remarked, this reform 
should not lead to “the extremes of strengthening the weak and weakening the alleged strong, 
generating thus a new inequality” (Idem). In his  academic research Aragón Andrade uses 
equally a rhetoric of ‘weak vs. strong’ in the shape of ‘oppressed vs. oppressor’, and applies it 
consequently  in  the  conception  of  globalization  as  ‘emancipatory  anti-hegemonic’  or 
‘hegemonic  anti-emancipatory’.  As  a  result,  while  the  modern  state  and  its  exclusionary 
institutions  can  be  criticized  for  their  self-validation  with  reference  to  ‘one  truth’,  ‘one 
justice’, and ‘one nation’. Aragón Andrade, runs the same risk in the moments when he claims 
for the emancipation of the oppressed through the recognition of indigenous systems that 
reflect  their  authentic  character.  While  he  criticizes  the  limitation  of  state  recognition  to 
particular pre-set others, he also understands under ‘indigenous law’ particular understandings 
of communal authority, rejecting, implicitly, others.
Beyond  the  questions  we  may  pose  Aragón  Andrade  regarding  his  position  in  the 
determination of the Other, what remains clear, is that the attempts to include the ‘indigenous 
other’ in the Mexican judicial system through the creation of indigenous courts produced, 
lastly, the subordination of indigenous authorities and understandings of law under the state 
legal and judicial system, as well as their subsumption within a universalized concept of legal 
development.  It  is  possible  to  state  that  this  particular  judicial  reform  (including  the 
indigenous pluralizing reform it  included)  has been done in  a ‘wrong’,  ‘undemocratic’ or 
‘unfair’ way. But the more problematic question is if any reform in this line is capable to  
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respond to the needs at stake. As we have seen, there are basic structures in conflict which, 
going beyond their relevance as social facts, are connected to systems of understandings of 
identity and otherness. In the next pages, we will see the struggle of these understandings also 
in another famous intent to incorporate the ‘indigenous other’ in the state judicial system, 
namely the Colombian process.
b) Radical Otherness in the Rulings of the Colombian Constitutional Court
As  we  have  seen,  the  pluralistic  approach  has  brought  practical  consequences  to  the 
development of law. Since the recognition by the ILO Convention no. 169, several states of 
the world have issued documents stating their self-image as multicultural states. Regarding 
the judicial system, while some states have launched concrete reforms of their judicial system 
creating new institutions, like Mexico, others have elaborated this reform particularly through 
new judicial interpretations of the written law. A key example of the importance of the latter  
type of processes took place in Colombia with the innovative rulings of its Constitutional 
Court  since the end of the 1980's.  In the following pages,  I  will  address some important 
aspects  of  this  process,  paying  particular  attention  to  the  ways  in  which  otherness  and 
plurality were incorporated within the frame of modern law.
The Colombian Constitution of 1991 marked a central change in the national and regional 
legal development not only because it recognized cultural diversity (art. 7), as some other 
countries in the region would do later. Most importantly, this constitution forms part of the 
deeper  transformation  “of  an  unconsolidated  democratic  regime into  a  distinctly  different 
model of democracy via a radical constitutional reform guided by normative criteria” (Cott 
2000, 3).228 In the context of the crisis of the nation-state in the late 20th century that I have 
mentioned above,  this  transformation  has  been seen  as  an example  of  a  “construction  of 
national  identity  and  unity  around  diversity  [that]  opens  a  new  era  of  ‘post-nationalist’ 
constitutionalism” (Idem, 10),  participating in  the so called ‘fourth wave’ of constitution-
making (Lane 1996, 74).229 This constitutional reform was highly legitimated in the official 
228 For a review of the history of this constitutional process, see, for example, Cott 2000, 39 ff.
229 The previous ‘waves’, meaning periods of intensive constitution-making processes are, according to Lane, 
1789-1799,  1914-1926 and 1945-1965 (Idem).  The fourth wave refers,  in turn to  a  certain increase in 
constitution-making in the 1980's, which Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004) named ‘new contractarianism’ (Cott 
2000, 13).
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presentation and in academic circles, that underlined its participative character, praising that 
“seventy-four diverse delegates […] considered 131 reform projects emanating 
from  the  delegates  and  the  government,  and  around  200.000  proposals  from 
municipalities and civil society groups that were generated during the working 
tables at the end of 1990 or were presented during the ANC [Asamblea Nacional  
Constituyente]. As President Gaviria observed, there are few countries that could 
argue as convincingly that their constitutions resulted from a collective creative 
act or represented a consensus of opinion among such a diverse and representative 
constituent body” (Cott 2000, 89).
While being based on a participatory principle from the outset, as the preamble of the 
document emphasizes, its first article already stated the conception of a republic which, being 
unitary,  adheres  to  the  principles  of  decentralization  and,  most  importantly,  to  pluralism. 
Article  7  explicitly  stated  that  “the  state  recognizes  and  protects  the  ethnic  and  cultural 
diversity of the Colombian Nation”230.231 Furthermore, art. 246 stated the right of indigenous 
peoples to exert jurisdictional functions according to their own norms and procedures, with 
the usual limitation by the Constitution itself and, importantly, the “laws of the Republic”, 
promising as well a future law regarding the coordination of this special jurisdiction and the 
national  judicial  system.232 Furthermore,  art.  329  allowed  for  the  creation  of  indigenous 
territorial entities and recognized indigenous territories as collective and inalienable property, 
and art. 330 established not only the attributions of the indigenous governments over those 
territories,  but  also  the  limits  for  the  exploitation  of  their  natural  resources  as  well  as 
consultation rights of the indigenous peoples. Importantly, also a national two-seat senatorial 
district for indigenous communities was created by art. 171.233
On the base of this constitution, the Colombian Constitutional Court had to decide in 
several cases, specifying the new recognitions, since there was no implementing legislation 
for  these  indigenous  rights.  Naturally,  these  resolutions  had  an  immense  impact  on  the 
230 In  the  Spanish  original:  “El  Estado reconoce  y  protege  la  diversidad  étnica  y  cultural  de  la  Nación  
colombiana” (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente 1991).
231 Importantly, this recognition amongst other more specific ones, had been previously included in the Decree 
no. 1926, “which codified the understanding among the major parties prior to the ANC with respect to the 
content of the reforms” (Cott 2000, 85).
232 “Artículo 246. Las autoridades de los pueblos indígenas podrán ejercer funciones jurisdiccionales dentro  
de su ámbito territorial, de conformidad con sus propias normas y procedimientos, siempre que no sean  
contrarios a la Constitución y leyes de la República. La ley establecerá las formas de coordinación de esta  
jurisdicción especial con el sistema judicial nacional” (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente 1991).
233 It is important to remark that in the case of Colombia, also the communities “from African origin” play an  
important role regarding the cultural diversity of the country. Also these communities were endowed with 
certain specific  rights in the Constitution of  1991, even if they were not as  many as the ones dealing 
explicitly  with  indigenous  peoples.  Interestingly,  according  to  Cott,  this  difference  was  due  to  the 
perception in the majority of Colombian society, that Afro-Colombians “are more integrated into society 
than  indigenous  peoples  and  that  black  Colombians  do  not  suffer  discrimination”  (Cott  2000,  86  cit.  
Cepeda).  Despite  the  interesting  constellation  that  results  from  this  situation,  and  in  line  with  the 
perspective of this chapter, I will rather concentrate the further reflections on the developments regarding 
indigenous communities and the consequences of the constitutional recognitions made to them.
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situation  of  indigenous  law  within  Colombia  as  well  as  in  the  whole  continent.  For  an 
example, we can take the renowned decision T-254/1994, where the Court interpreted the 
limitation of art. 246 so that only specific ‘laws of the Republic’, namely those that protect 
fundamental constitutional rights limit the usage of indigenous law according to indigenous 
understandings.  This  ruling  that  strengthened  the  status  of  indigenous  law,  was  however 
complemented  by  later  rulings  that  constricted  the  indigenous  rights.  Thus,  the  same 
Constitutional  Court  stated  in  its  decision  T-349/1996  that,  in  accordance  with  the 
constitutional right to ‘due process’, the indigenous authorities “should follow – more or less, 
since every culture is dynamic and subject to changes–, the usual procedures and that the 
sanction should be predictable for the offender” (Assies 2003, 7). However, the problem relies 
therein  that,  following  this  understanding,  the  Constitutional  Court  decides,  to  a  certain 
extent, which are the customs to be followed and when changing a custom is constitutionally 
possible.  
The same problem arises  with the division that  the court  established in  T-254/1994 
amongst  different  indigenous  groups,  stating  that  “there  exist  indigenous  groups  with 
functioning own institutions, which have to be respected (according to the constitution), while 
there exist other groups which – through extreme external influences – have suffered a more 
or less important destruction of their institutions and thus their issues have to be ruled by the 
general laws” (Kuppe 2010, 17).  The resulting problem of this  approach is  that  a certain 
‘cultural purity’ is assumed, limiting thus the scope of the rights recognized to indigenous 
groups. In the same line, and equally problematic, is the effort of the government “to prepare 
Colombian courts for the challenge of applying the new standard [by commissioning] a study 
of twenty indigenous ethnic groups” (Cott 2000, 113 f.), provoking strong critique on the side 
of  anthropologists  “for  imposing  Western  positivist  categories  and  concepts  onto  more 
flexible,  oral  traditions  that  defy  such  categorization,  and  for  separating  the  practice  of 
customary law from the fabric of indigenous society” (Idem, 114).
Summing up, while the reform as well as the rulings of the Supreme Court with an 
innovative  opening  character  created  great  expectations,  the  later  development  brought 
increasing  doubts  and  a  heated  discussion  regarding  the  real  consequences  of  the 
constitutional clause protecting indigenous law and its institutions. An important element in 
this  debate  has  been,  for  example,  the  venue  to  appeal  decisions  taken  by  indigenous 
authorities at state law courts. Equally problematic is the fact that the final decision over any 
case lies in the hands of a court with no indigenous representation restating a clear hierarchy 
between indigenous law and state law. Thus, Yrigoyen Fajardo concludes that 
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“many of the limitations end up resembling the pattern of colonial subordinated 
legal pluralism, concealed under the discourse that the indigenous jurisdiction can 
only  be  explained  because  of  cultural  diversity:  a  justice  amongst  natives, 
circumscribed to the communal territory, for minor cases, and without touching 
the  white,  even  when  the  white  infringe  indigenous  legal  goods”  (Yrigoyen 
Fajardo 2011, 148). 
However, the critiques that interest me most for this research do not refer directly to Yrigoyen 
Fajardo's concern with the concrete limitation of indigenous law, but, moreover to the social 
and cultural changes that these reforms and their constitutional interpretation produced. In 
other words, how the ‘speaker’ and the ‘other’, the ‘own’ and the ‘alien’, the ‘original’ and the 
‘modern’,  and  thus  how  ‘plurality’ and  ‘law’ are  (re-)defined  in  this  process  of  legal 
development towards ‘recognition of (legal) plurality’. As Juan Pablo Vera Lugo argues, the 
change in the Constitution and the further development of law through the constitutional court 
had consequences for the present concepts of Colombian cultural diversity in and beyond the 
legal  sphere.  The  constitutional  court  has,  for  example,  created  categories  around  the 
protection of cultural diversity that express the specific historical and cultural perspective in 
which the whole reform process as well as the practice of the court itself is involved. In this 
sense, the ‘recognition’ of cultural diversity is embedded in a discourse that develops in a 
context of tensions between diversity and unity. 
This struggle can be followed in the legal categories created or used by the court, such 
as  ‘collective  subject’,  ‘territorial  field’ and  ‘collective  property’,  which  express  implicit 
understandings about culture, property, territory, subjects etc. Importantly, when subsuming 
under these categories the idea of indigenous community (or communitarian cultures) and 
communal ownership of land, the social reality that the legal concepts aim to refer to is put in 
a formalized and normed manner (Vera Lugo 2006, 207), that responds to the language of 
state-law and follows what I have presented as a modern legal approach. Furthermore, Vera 
Lugo argues that these categories express an essentialist perspective linked to an idea of the 
‘primitive man’, fundamentally related with nature as his habitual space of realization. The 
special and protective treatment that state law provides, pretends, thus, to conserve the Other's 
specific exoticism, negating thus his contemporaneity (Idem, 211). In this sense, the Other's 
characteristic is that it is a-modern, outside of modernity and modern law.
Similar  to  Ruskola's  arguments  on  legal  orientalism234,  Vera  Lugo  links  the  legal 
development of the Colombian constitutional law to the construction of the Other, particular-
234 See chapter A, section III.
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ly, the ‘indigenous Other’. The question that he poses is of extreme relevance, insofar as it 
refers to a legal development that is supposed to take into account the legal-cultural diversity 
according  to  a  pluralistic  perspective  on  law.  Through  the  new  rhetorics  about  ‘cultural 
diversity’ elaborated by the Court, this concept has been translated to a specific rationality of 
law, “introducing conceptions that refer to a static and self-contained perspective on culture” 
(Idem, 207). Furthermore, this process has contributed to fix a static notion of indigenous 
culture (Idem, 210). On the one hand, cultural diversity is conceived basically in terms of 
indigenous groups, disregarding other cultural groups and social movements. On the other 
hand, the constitutional interpretation of difference produced “an ‘official’ way to think about 
diversity [as well as] legal procedures that were developed to regulate those cultural contexts 
that are seen as diverse (Idem, 208). As a result, “traditional values or stereotypes of ‘the’ 
indigenous,  like  its  communal  character  and  its  special  connection  with  the  earth”,  are 
incorporated in the legal discourse and, at the same time, reinforced and formalized through it 
(Idem, 210). Thus, Vera Lugo concludes that the concept of cultural diversity that has been 
materialized  through  the  jurisprudence  of  the  Colombian constitutional  court  is  linked  to 
perspectives rooted in an overcome classical period of anthropology, when biological and 
evolutionist  perspectives  on culture  and society abounded (Idem,  208).  Consequently,  the 
legal concept of cultural diversity refers to an essentialist and hierarchical way to think ‘the 
Other’. 
Moreover,  cultural  diversity  is  linked  to  exoticism  and  radical  difference.  What  is 
assumed as diverse is, consequent with a modernist need for identity based in dichotomies, 
always far from the defining center. Therefore, diversity is always far away, be it in a time or 
in a space scale. Diverse are those people who are “supposed to live ‘away’ from the center of 
the majority or ‘hegemonic’ society (urban and civilized) [and/or] those people who are at a 
previous ‘moment’ of development of that society (Idem, 209). In other words, the concept of 
cultural diversity used and reinforced by the constitutional rulings, that aims to revise and 
reform a modern approach to law, is based on a modern perspective of development.
Importantly, Vera Lugo explains that the construction of cultural diversity, and therefore of the 
Other, in the case of Colombian constitutional law, has been linked, following a long tradition, 
with the question for territory – a problematic that is key for the socio-economic claims of 
indigenous groups.  While  so far  we have referred mostly to  the economic,  historical  and 
political role of territory, according to him, the alleged cultural and spiritual connection with 
the earth has been taken as a key element to state ‘radical otherness’, and thus to recognize 
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diversity and grant rights. Importantly, the strength of this link between the ‘indigenous way 
to be’ with the earth is also a result  of the place given to it  in the ILO conventions and 
doctrinal sources (Idem, 214).235 The Colombian Court based its rulings partially on these 
internationally accepted sources, what is not surprising considering the international role in 
determining the form and content of the national legislation.236
Regarding the Colombian constitution of 1991 itself, ‘territory’ is a central concept for 
the specific  interests  of  legal  pluralism,  because,  according to  art.  246,  the  authorities  of 
indigenous peoples can exercise their jurisdictional functions within their “territorial field” 
('ámbito  territorial').237 What  is  actually  meant  by  ‘territorial’  has  been  concretized  by 
decision T-634/99, where the Court positions a ‘territorial field’ between the mere ‘earth’, 
which “within Western jurisdiction [cannot] be a subject of law”, and the (administratively 
delimited)  territorial  entity  (Idem,  220).  Importantly,  the  Court  emphasizes  the  cultural 
character of such a ‘territorial field’, and only insofar as the culture is an object of special 
protection, the indigenous territory is considered an entity to be protected by the Constitution 
(Idem). It  is this cultural  connotation the one that transforms indigenous territory into the 
legal category of ‘territorial field’. 
More explicitly, the Constitutional Court of Colombia asserts in its ruling T-188/93 that 
“the right  of  collective property exercised over  the indigenous territories  has  an essential 
relevance for  the  spiritual  values  and cultures  internationally approved by the  Congress”, 
underlining the “special  relationship that indigenous communities have with the territories 
they occupy” (Idem, 213). Remarkably, the relevance of territory is justified in various rulings 
of the court not only by the fact that it is the main means of subsistence of indigenous peoples, 
but  because  it  “constitutes  an  integral  element  of  the  cosmovision  and religiosity  of  the 
aboriginal peoples” (Idem). This idea of collective property of indigenous groups through the 
link created between culture and territory has been progressively substantiated throughout the 
jurisprudence of  the Court,  like the decisions C-058/94,  that  “states  how the principle  of 
ethnic and cultural diversity should be understood and applied, stressing the importance of 
235 Equally,  the argument  of  the  natives’ special  connection with earth  and  ecology is  present  in  the  Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992 (principle 22). Vera Lugo criticizes with Peter Wade 
the assumption of a generalized ‘environmental ethic’ of indigenous people understood as a homogeneous 
unity. Arguing against this stereotype, Vera Lugo states: “[t]he ‘myth’ of ecological wisdom of indigenous 
groups is based on the assumption that these groups are geographically isolated and that they are part of  
nature [...] similarly to animals” (Vera Lugo 2006, 214).
236 Take, for example, the decision T-257/1993, where the arguments of the Court regarding collective property 
are based on the ILO Convention no. 169, especially to articles 13 to 19 (Vera Lugo 2006, 216).
237 The  term  ‘ámbito  territorial’,  which  is  already  quite  ambiguous  in  Spanish,  has  been  translated  as 
‘territorial jurisdiction’ (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente 1991). However, the constitutional text refers to 
a  much  less  legal  and  much  more  ambiguous  understanding  of  ‘ámbito’, which,  in  its  most  simple 
translation, means ‘field’ or ‘area’. 
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territory  for  the  cultural  identity”,  and  the  decision  T-634/99,  that  “establishes  the 
characteristics  of  the  territorial  entities  as  well  as  the  applicable  principle  to  indigenous 
territories” (Idem, 217). 
In the first case, the Court requires from natives that they have to live in their territory 
and  conserve  their  cultural,  social  and  economic  integrity  in  order  to  be  exempt  of  the 
obligation to do military service. The Court argued that in the corresponding national law, 
“the native is not protected as individual but as native in his specific territorial context and 
with  his  specific  identity.  Following  this  argument,  it  is  conclusive  that  the  protection 
introduced by the law is oriented towards the ethnic community. The final message of the 
norm is a stimulus for the natives to continue perpetuating his species and culture” (Idem, 
218). The result is, as the Court correctly concludes that those “natives that live with the rest 
of the Colombian nation or with the same customs as the latter,  are not exempted of the 
service” (Idem). In this sense, the ‘non-natives’ or ‘non-sufficiently-natives’ are submitted to 
the general laws, considered ‘normal citizens’ with a role in the social project, and therefore 
bearers of social duties like the military service.238
The category of native is imagined, thus, as linked with a communal type of life and 
with its specific link to the earth. ‘The natives’ and ‘their’ culture are therefore defined in their 
essence as static categories, that are supposed to remain identical to themselves through time. 
Living with or with the habits  of ‘the non-indigenous rest  of the Colombian population’, 
automatically makes ‘the natives’ essence’ disappear. The imaginary of the Court, and thus of 
the  law  as  concreted  by  judicial  decisions,  works  again  in  a  dichotomous  scheme  of 
indigenous/earth-connected/community/them/far/rural vs. non-indigenous/earth-disconnected/ 
individual/we/here/urban. Problematically (and similar to the difficulty we found regarding 
‘communal  courts’ in Mexico),  these entities are conceived as self-contained, because the 
interaction  between  these  two  imagined  opposites  is  not  taken  into  account.  It  is  as  if 
Colombian  society  would  be  divided  between  the  ‘real’ indigenous  and  the  ‘real’ non-
indigenous, and, most importantly, as if it should stay so. Cultural exchange or a dynamic 
concept of culture are not part of this anthropological conceptions of society and law.
Now, if ‘their culture’, meaning ‘the culture’ of ‘the natives’, is considered basically in 
terms  of  an  ‘ethnic-cultural  integrity’  consistent  with  indigenous  customs,  including  a 
connection with a specific community and a specific territory, where is ‘the culture’ of the 
speaker of the law (and all the Others assumed as ‘non-indigenous') considered to be located? 
238 For an profound analysis of the consequences in terms of social peace of this differentiation in the context  
of constitutional objections to military service in Colombia, see Vallejo Piedrahíta 2011.
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Either it is equally conscripted to a different space and a different set of ‘cultural, social and 
economic  integrity’  or,  what  is  more  plausible  given  the  exceptional  character  of  the 
normative for indigenous groups,  it  is beyond locality and specificity – it  is what can be 
assumed as general, universal and normal.
Another central concept, through which the ‘communal connection’ as  an ‘essential’ part of 
‘the indigenous’ way to be, has been judicially laid down, is  the term ‘collective subject’, 
which has been elaborated in the decision T-380/93. The creation of the ‘collective subject’ is 
a  consequence  of  the  impossibility  of  the  legal  system to  put  the  indigenous  community 
within one of the pre-existing categories of right-holders, namely natural or legal persons. The 
Court, following the dictum that ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’, understands the 
‘indigenous communities’ as more than “simple aggregates of its members, who […] realize 
themselves through the group and assimilate as theirs the unity of meaning that emerges from 
the several communal experiences” (Vera Lugo, 224 ref. T-380/93?). Remarkably, Vera Lugo 
describes this incorporation of the traditional or communal society into the legal sphere as a 
paradigmatic change within the cultural context of Western law, and the constitution of the 
collective subject as the “most clear appropriation of the non-modern cultural contexts” (Vera 
Lugo, 224). Doubtless, the concept of ‘collective subject’ is a tool that allows many requests 
of indigenous groups to materialize. Nevertheless, in doing this, “the hegemonic law imposes 
itself  upon this form of relativity as it  transforms the other in object of the legal sphere” 
(Idem).  
The question at stake is clearly not if it is ‘good’ or not that indigenous groups acquire 
access to the judicial system with collective concerns, but what are the implications of the 
underlying constructs and assumptions that are connected to outdated anthropological views. 
But  even  more  preoccupying than  the  backwardness  present  in  the  static  anthropological 
perspectives used in this legal understanding, are the social (and legal) consequences of such 
an approach. From the moment that this perspective is legally fixed, it sets a scheme that 
requires much more argumentative (and political) effort to be changed in the future as ‘mere’ 
beliefs  or  even as  scientific  assumptions.  Creating  a  category of  technical  character,  and 
turning it into a legal principle, the universalizing criteria to determine cultural difference are 
progressively neutralized and fixed (Idem, 226). The creation of legal precedents, more so if 
they are developing constitutional doctrine, produces a formal and an informal pressure not 
only on other courts and future decisions, but also they anticipate the chances of future legal  
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cases and so open or close the door for the idea itself regarding  if  a social conflict has a 
chance to enter the legal debate. 
But even beyond the realm of legal debate, the creation of the legal categories does not 
only determine the answer to a legal question, but even more, it determines the possibility to 
think and pose particular questions. Equally, this process has consequences for the way in 
which diverse groups, represent themselves, because “the vision of the concept of ‘culture’ 
and  ‘cultural  diversity’  developed  by  the  jurisprudence,  is  restrictive  for  cultural 
manifestations  that  are  not  founded  on  the  values  and  believes  that  are  implicit  in  the 
conceptualization  carried  through  by  the  Court”  (Idem,  226).  The  idea  of  diversity  is 
conceptualized  with  a  universalistic  perspective,  holding  down  claims  for  a  diversy  of 
diversities. In other words, while cultural diversity is presented as a supreme value to protect, 
a universal ethical consensus is assumed and created, that overruns that primacy (Idem, 230). 
The  creation  of  the  ‘collective  subject’ and  the  other  conceptual  elaborations  presented 
“resignify the meanings of difference, keeping them subjected to the terms in which the law 
exercises its own praxis, this is the telos of its rational manifestation and the universalism it 
produces” (Idem). 
As Vera Lugo argues, through the development of concepts like the ‘collective subject’, 
the Court assumes a posture in front of ‘Otherness’, that puts the Other in a space of radical  
difference. Similarly, in its definition of ‘community’, the constitutional Court of Colombia 
bases its argument on a strict division between community and society as developed by the 
evolutionist currents of the 19th century anthropology. Interestingly, in the case T-254/94, the 
Court  had  to  decide  on  the  legality  of  the  expulsion  of  a  member  from his  indigenous 
community by its authorities, dealing with the tension between the right to due process and 
the  judicial  autonomy  of  the  indigenous  community.  In  its  argument,  the  Court  first 
differentiated  between  civil  associations  with  an  ‘animus  societatis’  and  indigenous 
communities, that are a dynamic and historical reality (Idem, 226). In other words, belonging 
to  an  ‘indigenous  community’ is,  at  least  according  to  the  Court,  not  the  result  of  a 
spontaneous act of will, like when a civil association is created. It is central to remark that, in 
this  context,  the Court refers explicitly to Ferdinand Tönnies239 (1855-1936),  an “eminent 
sociologist”,  and states  with  him that  “the  community is  a  form anterior  to  society,  that 
develops  from  the  family  and,  generally,  in  small  populations,  where  the  acquisition  of 
economical benefits does not prevail, but the blood bounds and the costums” (Idem, 227). 
“Urbanism”,  the  Court  continues  its  argument  along  Tönnies’  division,  “makes  the 
239 Tönnies’ most renowned work is ‘Community and Society’ (1887).
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communities evolve into societies. This mutation is produced under the sign of abstraction 
[...]” (Idem). With this references to Tönnies, the Court appropriates for legal reasoning the 
basic dichotomy that this author made between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’. As I have 
stated  above,  the  evolutionist  vision  presented here,  assumes  a  teleological  conception of 
cultural development and an ethnological perspective on culture, both typical for a thinking 
that has been criticized harshly during the whole 20th and 21st century. Of course, also the 
constitutional court changed with time and so did its rulings. Take for example the decision 
T-1022/01, which introduced the idea of a ‘dynamic identity’ of the indigenous community. 
However, the general tone and the basic concepts presented here remain present within the 
constitutional imaginary.
Concluding,  Vera  states  that  the  perspective  of  linear  evolution  of  the  19th century 
present at the core of the culture politics and the authoritative documents of the epoch, is not 
transformed radically through the creation of the principle of ethnic and cultural diversity, 
because,  “although the categories  and the forms to name the other  change,  the values  or 
contents  of  the  cultural  difference  remain”  (Idem,  233).  This  is  clear  also  regarding  the 
concept  of  the  ‘native’,  which  “pertaining  to  the  European  referents  of  otherness,  is 
homogenized and homogenizing”,  “including all  native men originary from the American 
continent”, and thus hiding “the diversity within that category” (Idem, 235). 
Arguing in the line of ‘radical otherness’, the attitude of the Colombian constitutional 
court  does  not  go  beyond  the  critiques  posed  by  pluralistic  approaches  to  a  modern 
understanding of ‘law’. It is still a de-localized, true, unified ‘law’ the one that is referred to as 
a  base of  normality,  against  which the Other  and the Others’ law is  made visible.  While 
indigenous law is recognized, it is incorporated within a specific language and hierarchy of 
law, as well as within the already existent legal doctrine. In the same line, the concept of  
property as conceived here is, despite all adaptations, the concept of property stated in the 
Civil Code, even if a spiritual connection is put in the forefront. 
We find here, thus, the same difficulty as with the inclusion of indigenous courts in the 
Mexican judicial system. While concrete recognitions of rights and authority are stated, these 
recognitions refer, lastly, to an understanding of ‘the indigenous’ that is determined by the 
state  law and its  authorities.  As a result,  these reforms produce an adaptation but  not  an 
encompassing systemic transformation. They include the Other within an existing system, but 
do  not  engage  with  otherness  in  an  open  and  transformative  dialogue.  In  the  end,  this 
adaptation reinforces not only the monolithically understood categories of ‘self’ and ‘other’, 
but also their oblique power relation. Under these circumstances, there is little chance for 
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transcending a pre-set hierarchical relation, which is maintained and reinforced by modern 
law, towards a deeper understanding of the Other and the Self which could lead to a more 
peaceful and respectful coexistence in diversity.
3.  The Persistence of the Problem of ‘Who is the Real Other'  
There are,  as we have seen in the last  pages,  several difficulties in making space for the 
‘indigenous  other’ in  the  judicial  system.  From my point  of  view,  these  difficulties  are, 
certainly, a reflection of particular political situations, but, at a deeper level, they are also an 
expression of a profound identity struggle, through which the more the Other is ‘included’, 
the more the Other is fixed to a specific way to be, namely the way that the including subject 
determines. Furthermore,  once ‘radical otherness’ is recognized, or better,  created,  how to 
include this ‘radical other’ within an established system for which he is outside? 
As Kuppe points out, “the fact that the normative orders of indigenous peoples differ in 
general so clearly from state law, means [...] that they cannot adequately be comprehended 
with the approaches of descriptive positivism of legal science” (Kuppe 2010, 13). According 
to him, it is problematic even to address these normative orders as ‘systems’, evoking so “not 
only a relatively clear-cut boundary between the things it includes and its outside, but also, in 
the case of  legal  systems,  logic  coherence and, at  least  in  terms of  its  claim,  an internal 
closeness of its norms” (Idem). While it could be argued that this concept of system is not the 
only one valid, it is important to realize that in the legal field these connotations are often  
implicit in the current use of the word. 
Equally,  the  content  of  indigenous  normative  orders  is  difficult  to  comprehend 
following positive legal categories.  Take for example the problematic case of criminal law. 
The discussion involves not only the quality of behavior liable to prosecution, but also the 
question on how is to be dealt with conflicts and which are the aims of criminal prosecution 
and, if necessary, of punishment. In this sense, Piñacué argues that the sanctions established 
serve,  in  the  context  of  an  indigenous  cosmological  understanding,  to  restate  the  social 
balance  and  to  uphold  harmony  within  society  as  well  as  the  legitimacy  of  the  current 
authorities (Piñacué ref. by Kuppe 2010, 12). This differs from a reference to abstract rules 
regarding competencies, crimes and punishments. In other words, what Piñacué argues is that 
“in the context of an indigenous cosmological understanding” relies a different understanding 
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of law, authority, crime, punishment, etc. Thus, the first problem we confront in the ‘inclusion 
of plurality’ is that the prevalent ‘language’ of law is insufficient for this aim.
Problematic is, at the same time, that once the idea of a certain ‘type of Other’, for 
example an Other guided by a principle of harmony, has been settled as characteristic for 
indigenous law, the Other's diversity is blurred or even erased.  All  encounters have to be 
divided in the categories of encountering the ‘normal’ and encountering ‘the particular other’, 
with the result that any third option seems to disappear. The recognition of something beyond 
the bipolarity of ‘normal (I)’ and ‘particular other’ as an aspect of a different type of otherness 
is  disregarded and its  legitimacy to being  protected  is  not  imperative.  ‘Otherness’ has  to 
respond to how the speaker envisages it.  As a consequence, the possibility of change, the 
possibility of exchange and mutual adaption and learning, and the possibility of dynamic 
development make the protection of the resulting ‘new other’ more unlikely. The Colombian 
court  put  it  bluntly,  when  it  set  as  an  interpretation  rule  that  “the  more  conservation  of 
customs, the more autonomy” (Vera Lugo 2006, 228).
In this sense, it is important to remember also a point made by Assies, namely that “the 
acknowledgment of indigenous law often implies a transformation of this law” (Assies 2003, 
9), not only because certain contents and procedures are fixed, but also because the way in 
which  this  process  takes  place  changes  the  dynamic  of  the  indigenous  norms  at  stake. 
Indigenous law is thus reconfigured in the process of the struggles for its acknowledgment, 
consequently  establishing  new relations  with  state  law.  Thus,  Assies  states  that  “we  can 
observe that, in the frame of that dynamic, the indigenous peoples often elaborate statutes and 
compilations  of  regulations  which  describe  their  political  organization  and  their 
administration of justice and even codify some contraventions, prohibitions and sanctions, as 
well as procedures” in order to “delimit the state influence and construct an own jurisdictional 
space in  front  of  the state”  (Assies  2003,  10).  Importantly (and similarly to  the cases  of 
international legal transfer), this formalization which is mainly motivated by a dynamic in 
relation to state law, has equally consequences within the indigenous communities, changing 
their  social,  political  and  cultural  dynamics,  particularly  their  approach  to  conflict,  and 
producing  an  increasing  ‘bureaucratization’.  In  this  sense,  the  new  formalized  legal 
documents of reference, “are not directed only to the ‘exterior’ (this is, to the broader society 
and  the  state),  but  have  at  the  same  time  effects  towards  the  ‘interior’  on  the  local 
communities  and  their  components  which  incorporate  this  new  logic  to  their  political 
dynamics and ways of conflict resolution” (Idem). 
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This  increasing  assimilation  of  indigenous  law to  mechanisms of  state  law and the 
explicit  dependency  of  its  implementation  and  interpretation  on  state  institutions  and 
processes,  result  in  the  re-statement  of  an  uneven  relationship  between  ‘state'/'non-state’, 
‘non-indigenous'/'indigenous’, ‘normal'/'other’. Thus, it is not surprising that the bill regarding 
indigenous courts for the state of Quintana Roó has been presented as “a real nationalization 
of the Indigenous Law as well as the establishment of a kind of indirect rule through the 
designation  and  control  over  the  indigenous  authorities”  (Idem,  15).  This  results  in  a 
problematic situation which Assies labeled as “internal legal colonialism” (Idem).
As a result,  the difference of the new legal frame with previous attitudes in cultural 
politics  that  did  not  acknowledge  ‘cultural  diversity’  as  the  reformed  Latin  American 
constitutions of the 1990's do, resides mainly therein that, previously, the Other was supposed, 
if possible, to evolve towards (through being included within) ‘real law’. In contrast, now, the 
Other is either acknowledged with his culturally diverse normative conceptions and conserved 
in his particular form of a-legality, on the outside of the ‘real law’ – conserved as ‘Other’, or 
he  is  subjugated  to  ‘normal’  state-law,  its  infrastructures  and  procedures.  As  a  result, 
acknowledgment,  understood  this  way,  is  at  the  exact  distance  between  an  oppressive 
inclusion and an oppressive exclusion, allowing the powerful speaking ‘I’ to judge without 
getting truly engaged with the ‘Other’ he defines. Through  this process, the speaking ‘I’ is 
absolved from the  criticism of  domination  because,  through the  magnanimous  gesture  of 
recognition, he exercises his power in a subtle manner, underlining with this generosity its 
alleged superior character and position. Moreover, acknowledgment is insofar more violent 
than the mere oppression as it makes appear the oppressive inclusion (You as I) or exclusion 
(You as Not-I) as a free choice, when, actually, the possible options were predetermined. 
What  remains  unspoken,  however,  is  who  states  the  conditions  for  this 
acknowledgment, what is the exchange good requested in turn for that noble recognition. In 
other words, through the constitutional reforms I presented, the legal acknowledgment of the 
Other, in this case the ‘indigenous other’, is conceded but not in an unconditional way. If the 
Other is not ‘Other’ the way that the ‘I’ states, he cannot legitimately exist as ‘Other’ at all, 
and his normative perspective loses legitimacy to exist. As a result, the diverse approaches to 
conflict and their resolution are homogenized through “a pan-indigenous discourse about the 
characteristics attributed to the indigenous law in front of the Western and state law” (Assies 
2003, 9; emphasis added). The center of reference is thus the alleged normal case, in front of 
which otherness is homogenized. The result is a cultural critique of this “Western and state 
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law” (Idem), and not a truthful exercise of listening to what the Other says in his own way to  
speak.
Because of these and other reasons, this approach to law and its perspective on plurality has 
been criticized strongly in the last years. In response, the advocates for legal pluralism in the 
context of a ‘New Latin American Constitutionalism'240, underline that the main problem of 
the judicial system resides in their colonial heritage and in a way to think that is “trapped in 
an Anglo-Euro-centric  tutelage  mentality”  (Chivi  Vargas  2010).  Comparing  this  statement 
with the critiques of post-developmental thinkers presented above, it is possible to see this 
approach as the legal version of Escobar's reasoning on economic aid. Following this line, the 
questioning of  the legal  and judicial  system cannot  be oriented  merely towards  a  reform 
process but requires a more radical approach. As a result, the problem statement is oriented 
towards a revolution that consists in the overcoming of a colonial perspective, turning the case 
of indigenous law, and the claims for their autonomy, to parts of a bigger movement towards 
the redistribution of social, economic and political power. As an example, Chivi Vargas argues 
against  the term and the  conception of  ‘communitary justice’,  since  it  “represent[s...]  the 
neoliberal coloniality of the academic and later normative treatment of a model of justice that 
has its own history, its own cultural sensibility of good and bad, its own internal development 
and its own dynamic of modifications in its practical exertion” (Idem).
These critiques result, partially, of the dissatisfaction with the previous reforms, where 
‘legal pluralism’ was acknowledged, but in a way that was not organic or systematic enough, 
so that it did not pervade all the sections of the constitutional document  (Yrigoyen Fajardo 
2011, 146), and it  did not find expression in all the ordinary laws under the constitution,  
making the implementation of the new rights very difficult. Most importantly, “the principle 
of  equal  dignity  of  cultures  remained  without  institutional  translation,  since  only  the 
hegemonic legal institutionality retained the capacity to decide in conflicts between systems” 
(Idem, 148). As Yrigoyen Fajardo continues, “the pluralist constitutionalism laid principles 
the  effective  implementation  of  which  is  beyond  the  sovereign  monocultural  traditional 
institutions, that do not represent in their institutional structure, composition and functioning 
the diversity of peoples and cultures [...]” (Idem, 148 f.).  Thus, with the millenium, new 
perspectives  on  the  role  of  plurality  in  society  became  increasingly  relevant  in  the 
international political and legal debate.
240 For a resume on this political development, see Kuppe 2010, 27.
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In general,  the emerging variety of social  movements  with a  critical  perspective on 
socio-political development included under the ‘New Latin American Constitutionalism’ is 
characterized,  amongst  other  elements by a more direct  participation of the population in 
political decisions and by the incorporation of indigenous peoples in political life beyond a 
‘complementary’ multiculturalism. Moreover, cultural diversity became a main column, an 
organizational  principle,  of  a  new  conceptualization  of  the  state,  moving  from  a 
‘multicultural’ to a ‘plurinational’ model (Kuppe 2010, 26, 30), and breaking thus with the 
fiction of the cultural unity of the Nation-State. Importantly, within this approach, that aims to 
decolonialize Latin American states envisaging the state beyond national unicity, indigenous 
peoples play a particularly important role. On the one hand, the term of ‘decolonialization’ 
refers  itself  to  the  historical  colonialization,  during  which  the  social  organization  of 
indigenous communities living in the ‘New World’ was violently destroyed and oppressed; 
de-colonialization refers thus implicitly to a process of giving those communities the spaces 
back, that were taken from them or that they lost during the colonialization. Furthermore, 
indigenous groups  become particularly relevant,  because  some of  the  social  and political 
practices associated with them are interpreted as expressions of the goals and ideals of the 
new model of state and society,  for example a community-oriented participative model of 
social organization.  
Examples  of  these  new developments  are  the  constitutions  of  Bolivia  and Ecuador. 
Yrigoyen Fajardo remarks that, in contrast with the Colombian model, these documents are 
“founded not solely on the cultural diversity, […] but above all in the acknowledgment of the 
right of indigenous or originary peoples to self-determination (Ecuador) or free determination 
of the peoples (Bolivia)” (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 150). But, even beyond that, these new 
constitutions base on the idea to “produce a decolonialization of the national legal order” 
(Kuppe 2010, 3) and thus aim for a “new foundation of the state” (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 
149). While in previous constitutions a recognition of the right to cultural self-determination 
of particular indigenous groups was outspoken, the new documents aim to make indigenous 
law a central pillar of the order of these states that are conceived as plurinational. In these 
texts there are several specific articles regarding indigenous law and the topic pervades the 
whole of the constitutional texts.241 Especially in Bolivia, the question on indigenous groups 
goes  clearly  beyond  questions  over  national  minorities  and  “legal  pluralism  becomes  a 
foundation of the country” (art. 1), putting indigenous legal decisions and decisions of the 
state judiciary as equally valid. Interestingly, as Kuppe remarks, these changes have important 
241 For a short synopsis of the content of these constitutions see Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011, 151 ff.
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consequences in the context of international cooperation, demanding to include the aspect of 
cultural diversity in development projects. (Kuppe 2010, 3)
While these political developments are very innovative in their approach and in the tools they 
incorporate, particularly in the form and scope of indigenous participation, it is important to 
reflect how far they are capable of transcending a modern understanding of law, but most 
importantly  a  modern  approach  to  otherness  and  plurality.  In  this  sense,  it  is  worth 
remembering the warning Assies’ expressed in the beginning of the century: since the claims 
of indigenous groups form part of a wider and contended transformation of the state in an 
international context, it is crucial to keep in mind that this global struggle “can lead to the hate 
amongst  ethnic  groups if  it  is  not  appeased by politics  of  redistribution and participative 
equity in the frame of a reconstructed and, so to say, ‘post-national’ state” (Assies 2003, 3). 
While the vision of a ‘post-national state’ is starting to take shape, the connected vision of 
social peace in diversity (Chivi Vargas 2010) is increasingly endangered. Unfortunately, also 
in the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, the more the vision of overcoming colonial structures is 
linked to ethnic and cultural identities, the higher is the risk of a cultural and social division in 
hate. 
This  is  the  conclusion  of  Andrés  Solíz  Rada,  the  first  Minister  for  Energy  of  the 
government of Evo Morales (*1959) in Bolivia242, which, in turn, was a key leader of the 
constitutional transformation. Thus, Solíz Rada states that the “assignation to one of the 55 
indigenous  peoples  (or  ‘nations')  and  the  intention  of  impeding  the  Bolivians  to  declare 
themselves ‘mestizos’, as it was the case of the census of 2001, have sharpen the polemics 
with ethnic content, in front of the new inquiry programmed for this year” (Solíz Rada 2012). 
To be ‘indigenous’ has been used as a category set as opposite to ‘mestizo’, deriving into 
expressions of official representatives like the one of the vice-president Álvaro García Linera 
(*1962) “the ‘kharas’ (or mestizos) can return to the power if the indigenous brothers fail [... 
If that happens] it will be for us, again, 500 years of silence and obscurity” (cit. in Idem). 
Importantly, not only representatives of a “radical indigenism” discuss about politics putting 
clear identity claims to the front, but also their counterparts, the advocates of “eurocentric 
mettisage” in terms of Solíz  Rada,  produce arguments like,  for example,  that  “we are all 
mestizos, thank God” (Idem cit. José Gramunt de Moragas). From the outset, this statement is 
242 Importantly,  he  participated  already in  the  nationalization  of  petroleum in  1969  as  the  adviser  of  the  
socialist  minister  Marcelo  Quiroga  Cruz.  Solíz  Rada  resigned  his  position  in  the  government  of  Evo 
Morales in 2006. For an interview after his resignation, see Dilger 2007, 36.
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doomed to create a division starting by the ‘we’ it imposes on the reader, telling her who she 
is. 
In this sense, if many constitutions and international documents were criticized because 
of their discrimination of indigenous peoples, the new Bolivian constitution has equally been 
presented as  “ethnicist,  since it  privileges  the  natives,  then the  intercultural  communities, 
while the rest is considered like third class” (Idem 2010a, cit. Víctor Hugo Cárdenas). Even 
considering the various political interests embedded in these criticisms, and leaving aside the 
question regarding who is right or wrong, who is conservative or not, which way would be 
just or not, beyond all these questions, what is important to see is that the debate is dividing 
by the mere dichotomies it presents. Therefore, the question is still how to reestablish the 
coexistence in this divided society, as Solíz Rada pointed out already in 2010.
From a perspective of the post-modern understanding of state and nation, it is easy to 
criticize Solíz Rada regarding his vision of Bolivia, which comes over and over back to the 
concept of the nation, even if he addresses this perspective as part of a ‘defensive nationalism’ 
(Idem 2011), emphasizing as well the intercultural aspects of the nation he envisages (Idem 
2010b). However, dismissing his critique simply because he formulates social ‘cohesion in 
diversity’ in terms of ‘the Bolivian nation’, will not help us to understand the current social 
tension he makes explicit, neither will it allow us to envisage something new. 
More  important  is  his  argument  that  the  conjunction  of  the  claims  of  a  ‘radical 
indigenism’ and  an  equally  radical  emphasis  on  the  ‘mestizo’ quality  of  Bolivia  have  a 
common result because they are propelled to a great extent by the same financial interests and 
the  same  ideological  standpoints.  Thus,  he  presents  the  recent  agreement  between 
transnational oil companies and indigenous communities (Idem 2012 and 2011c) as well as 
the financial support of USAID, the World Bank and European NGOs to the project of the  
current plurinational state (Idem 2010c) as examples of a coincidence of interests  and an 
overlap of alleged opposites: “the eurocentrism sponsors the NGOs, that, through indigenism, 
contribute  to  subjugate  the  oppressed  people,  while  also  trying  to  obstruct  the  emergent 
nations” (Idem 2012). It is obvious that his concern is marked by a political position and by 
concerns of international economics (and politics). From a more abstract level, it is worth to 
ask who is the real indigenous other under this conditions? Who speaks for whom and who is 
the addressee and the beneficiary of political measures? And, most importantly, considering 
this  type  of  social  polarization,  are  this  socio-political  (post-modern)  transformations, 
particularly the changes regarding the position of law, capable of transcending the modern 
hierarchical thinking they criticize?
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To conclude this short review of an example of a critical position both in front of the 
supporters of the Bolivian attempt to open the realm of law and social order to a diversity of 
cultures, as well as in front of its detractors, I would like to highlight an aspect that seems 
particularly interesting to me in Solíz Rada's approach. When he criticizes this polarization, 
what is it  that he envisages as an alternative or as a valid goal?  Interestingly,  he tries to 
formulate a common goal for (the non-radical understandings of) the “national thinking and 
the endogenous indigenism”, namely to “conquer [the] self-esteem as country, as people and 
as human beings” (Idem 2011b). Importantly, this self-esteem is not necessarily linked to a 
limited concept of identity, but, on the contrary, Solíz Rada underlines that the “coexistence of 
several mestizajes within the same person” is possible, since he can, easily feel, at the same 
time indigenous and belonging to many other groups at the same time (Idem 2012). Taking 
this position he puts to the front the value of interculturality beyond plurinationality. The fight 
over which of these two latter concepts is more appropriate is not our main concern, but what  
remains at the core of this approach is, in any case, the search for a coexistence of diversity 
beyond a model that understands identity only as an exclusionary asset.
Coming  back  to  our  point,  are  the  constitutional  and  political  innovations  in  Bolivia  an 
example of a better inclusion of ‘the Other’ in political life? Certainly they are the expression 
of new and enriching approaches to plurality and the state. However, they confront, in my 
opinion, the same problems that the other phases of these policies of pluralization have gone 
through: they refer lastly to a dichotomic division between us and them, where one type of 
‘us’ has always the prerogative to state what is true, what is right, what is just, and, most  
importantly,  who  is  ‘not-us’.  While  it  opens  the  floor  for  ‘the  indigenous’ (meaning  the 
recognized ones), it also puts limits to ‘recognized otherness’. As a result, the perspective on 
diversity is based on a social dichotomy between indigenous/non-indigenous. One of the most 
clear  examples  for  this  point  is  the  establishment  of  “parity  of  representatives  of  the 
indigenous jurisdiction and the ordinary jurisdiction in the formation of the judiciary and the 
constitutional  tribunal”  in  the  Bolivian  constitution (Yrigoyen  Fajardo  2011,  150).  While 
these mixed tribunals, on the one hand, open the space of legal praxis in a way that just some 
years ago was unthinkable, on the other hand, they still  function clearly on the base of a 
dichotomic divide.
Similar  reflections  can  be  made  regarding  the  academic  conceptualization  of  the 
subsequent transformations towards the ‘pluralistic principle’ in Latin America. For example, 
in  Yrigoyen  Fajardo's  proposal  of  historical  cycles  from  the  perspective  of  a  pluralist 
321
constitutionalism since the end of the 20th century, it is noteworthy that while she addresses a 
variety  of  changes  in  the  quality  of  constitutional  approaches,  speaking  for  example  of 
‘multicultural  constitutionalism’ in  the  1980's  and then  of  ‘pluricultural  constitutionalism’ 
until  2005,  the  element  of  ‘constitutionalism’  remains  untouched  even  in  the  last 
emancipatory  phase  of  ‘plurinational  constitutionalism’.  It  is  worth  asking  thus,  what  a 
constitution in this context means, and how far it can still be addressed as a certain guarantee 
for multi- or  pluri-, -cultural or -national dialogue. Is it still useful for these perspectives, and 
can it respond to the persistent search for coexistence in diversity? Is it coherent with the rest  
of the contemporary discourse in favor of socio-cultural diversity to understand a constitution 
in the traditional positivistic form of a  Grundnorm at the edge of a hierarchically organized 
set of norms? 
Furthermore,  it  is  also  interesting  to  notice  that  Yrigoyen  Fajardo ends  her  critical 
appraisal of the constitutional development in the region with an important call for a “pluralist 
interpretation to save the limitations [of the constitutional texts] and resolve the tensions in a 
favorable way for the fulfillment of the objectives and principles of the pluralist constitutional 
project”, underlining that “that exercise of interpretation is an exertion of power” (Yrigoyen 
Fajardo 2011, 141; 150).  However,  the question remains: who is  legitimized to exert  that 
power and how does that legitimation comes into being? 
In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  the  reference  to  the  right  to 
‘self-determination of the peoples’ (according to Chapter 1, Article 1 UN Charter and Article 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – ICCPR – and International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – ICESCR) as a base for these new constitutional 
and legal developments does not respond by itself the question about who are the ‘peoples’ it 
refers to and how are they to be determined. Therefore, definitory questions gain particular 
strength,  for  example  regarding  the  division  between  national  minorities  and  indigenous 
peoples  (Kymlicka  2009,  23  ff.).  It  is  no  surprise  that  “this  asymmetry  is  generating 
instabilities” (Idem, 23), because 
“once we start applying the category of indigenous peoples beyond the central 
case of the colonial states of the New World, there is no clear point to stop. […] 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  attempts  to  establish  a  categorical  distinction 
between  national  minorities  and  indigenous  peoples  will  seem  arbitrary. 
Moreover, any category, would be politically untenable” (Idem, 26).
In  other  words,  the  problem of  socio-cultural  (and  with  it  also  legal)  plurality,  its 
exclusion and subordination, has not been solved. It has just been displaced; and the violence 
behind  that  exclusion  and  subordination  has  been  just  seemingly  neutralized  behind 
322
international documents, legal categories and more or less preset decision mechanisms. In any 
case, an interpretation of the concepts used in these attempts to ‘include plurality’ will mean a 
conceptualization of the Other that puts limits to his/her way to be, and, at the same time, it 
excludes authoritatively forms of plurality with the same arguments of supremacy that are 
now  allegedly  repudiated  because  they  served  in  the  past  against  the  now  recognized 
‘peoples’. In this sense it is legitimate to ask: Are we not anyways trapped into the scheme of 
a legal system that understands itself as a structure of hierarchical power, of positive law and 
authoritative interpretation? And does this correspond to the claims of a plurinational state to 
achieve social peace in diversity?
Also in these political and academic processes the question of Spivak remains valid: 
how far do these new approaches present themselves as transparent for the Other's presence 
and how far do the mechanisms utilized are successful in this sense. How far do they allow to 
see the complexity of forces involved in this process? And, most importantly: where is the 
possibility to listen, to dialogue amongst peoples with different understandings. In this sense, 
Yrigoyen Fajardo herself underlines the importance of “improving the capacity of all actors to 
participate  in  authentic  processes  of  intercultural  dialogue  which  allow to  build  effective 
plurinational  spaces”  (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2011,  154).  But  how is  an intercultural  dialogue 
possible when I preset the Other I am supposed to be not only talking to and speaking with, 
but, most importantly, listening to? This is the aporia where those approaches are stuck which, 
coming from a post-modern impulse towards the blurring of identities and hierarchies, search 
for an answer in the securities of a modern concept of identity and otherness. Consequently, 
the way to deal with social conflicts and norms resulting from these impulses is embedded 
within this reductionist frame and doomed to be social and culturally violent.
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III.  Closing Remarks  
In this chapter I have addressed some examples of projects that put in practice pluralistic 
approaches in the realm of law, elaborating new forms of legal development. Boal's work 
proposed a conception of legal development that was based on the participation of a plurality 
of perspectives through theatrical exercise, creating for the resulting legal proposals a strong 
legitimacy.  With a  similar  invocation of the importance of  plurality,  and embedded in an 
international context of political struggles and economic models and interests, the projects in 
the judiciaries of Mexico and Colombia aimed to open state-law to the consideration and 
incorporation  of  indigenous  perspectives  on  law.  The  first  one  permitted  the  creation  of 
courts,  the declared aim of which is to recognize the authority of indigenous law at least 
within a certain frame. The second one invoked the value of difference and plurality within 
the  Colombian state  resulting  in  a  variety of  rulings  directed  to  protect  and enhance  the 
plurality  of  cultures.  Through  these  reforms  and  changes  in  judicial  interpretation,  legal 
development is envisaged, at least at first, in a new way that is connected to opening law to a 
variety  of  approaches  instead  of  setting  one  form  of  law  as  the  only  possible  goal  of 
development
In this short overview over these projects, we could see that they recall some elements 
that  were of  importance in  philosophical  and theoretical  discussions  on plurality,  like  for 
example the claim for the recognition of legal pluralism which took form in the Mexican and 
Colombian  developments.  Equally  similar  questions  arose,  like  the  problematic  of  the 
pluralization  of  the  subject,  which  was  an  important  part  of  Boal's  anthropological 
conceptions, and the questioning of an authority that can set which is the right interpretation. 
Most  importantly,  in  these  examples  we  found  similar  difficulties  as  in  the  theoretical 
discussions on the pluralization of ‘law’ and ‘development’. While they, in principle, aim to 
incorporate plurality, to open up for diversity, to emphasize the value of the particular, the 
results are more often than not the return to modern models of law and development. 
Boal,  for  example,  although blurring bipolar  concepts,  proposes  lastly a  dichotomic 
divide  between  oppressor  and oppressed,  and his  legal-political  endeavor  ends  up  in  the 
statements of ‘new truths’, returning to a unitarian form of justice that becomes the new goal 
for ‘true’ development. Equally problematic results the fact that the recognition of indigenous 
law  and  indigenous  rights  is  embedded  lastly  in  a  frame  that  determines  what  kind  of 
indigenousity, what kind of otherness the Other must have to actually access a space within 
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the legal frame. Remarkably, in the case of indigenous courts, the institutional structure and 
the  determination  of  profiles  of  the  authorities  involved,  is  a  decision  taken  from  an 
authoritative position that is still clearly occupied by state law representatives. In other words, 
the place, time and form of proper plurality is determined by the logic of the just and true one 
law  towards  one  common  development.  Most  importantly,  the  newest  constitutional 
developments in the region, which search to engage with the deep past of colonial  socio-
cultural division and oppression, and which aim to be more radical in their affirmation of 
plurality in the cultural, social, political and legal organization of the state, have shown to be 
equally trapped in essentialistic and dichotomic perspectives on identity. The result in the case 
of  Bolivia  has  been  the  collision  of  perspectives  that  argue  in  the  same  terms  as  the 
approaches  they started rejecting,  namely with a  hierarchization of the ‘us’ as the proper 
authority to state the just and true. Outbursts of violence and social division have been the 
consequence of emphasizing plurality while determining identities in a schematic way.
Summing up, we can say that the alternatives posed to modern perspectives on law and 
development within a postmodern sociolect, result insufficient in their own terms of opening 
up to plurality and diversity. The endeavors in this line result consistently in a return to the 
modern schemes they rejected in the first place. But, even more problematic is that this return 
has resulted in an increase of social division and violence, that reminds us of Zima's critique 
of postmodern approaches. How is it possible to imagine an engagement with the Other, when 
he is conceived as radically different?
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D. Pluralizing Legal Development and Legal Transplants
In the last  chapter  I  have presented some examples  of how postmodern approaches  have 
changed theoretical and practical forms to engage with law. In other words, modern law has 
been  developed in a variety of directions through these new perspectives. Along with these 
philosophical and political changes, also the concept of ‘legal development’ and the projects 
with this particular orientation have been reflected anew. Complaints have been raised that the 
modern approach to international  development aid in the area of law has  disregarded the 
actual existence and action of structures beyond the state and beyond state control, which had 
their own procedures of legitimation and organization (Benda Beckmann et al. 2005, 198). In 
doing so, the legal development project supported the ideological dominance of the Nation-
State  that  made these other  practices,  in  turn,  less  visible.  As a  consequence  of  the new 
political movements and the new pluralistic approach to society, law, and development,  the 
former perspective oriented to a strong nation-building process is confronted today with new 
conditions (Kuppe 2010, 33). As Kuppe (Idem) points out in detail, for development projects 
this means that 
1. the  cooperation  partners  have  to  be  broadened and diversified  in  order  to  contact 
decentralized state institutions, NGOs, social movements and indigenous peoples,
2. new  cultural  identities  have  to  be  addressed,  and  are  addressed  as  part  of  new 
approaches to Human Rights, that require a pluralistic approach,
3. concrete  guidelines  for  international  cooperation  emphasize  the  cooperation  with 
indigenous peoples and their organizations, and
4. the criteria of transparency is addressed as a broader concept that includes the need for 
taking  into  account  aspects  like  the  protection  of  investors,  private  interests  of 
economic and financial actors and the protection of natural resources.
Thus,  echoing  the  problematic  posed  by  Escobar  regarding  a  vectoral  economic 
development but this time in relation with the instrumentalization of law for this purpose, 
Kuppe stresses that “law should not be only ‘lubricating grease’ for the competitive attraction 
of businesses and economic growth” (Idem, 34). In this sense, if the idea of a ‘democratic 
Rechtstaat’ remains, meaning a democratic state under the rule of law as the abstract goal of 
the international cooperation (Idem), it can do so only as an aspect of a redistributive and 
participatory endeavor. In other words, while for a long time development was seen in the 
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rhetoric of international organizations as something different from indigenous claims for legal 
pluralism  and  the  utilization  of  creative  techniques  in  law-making,  the  changes  that 
accompanied  these  socio-political  processes  in  law,  meant  equally important  shifts  in  the 
conceptualization of development and its implementation strategies. In particular, this change 
occurred in the connection between development and law.
In this chapter, I will address these shifting perspectives in development and the role of law in 
this process. In turn, I will refer to the particular aspect of legal transfer, which was a central 
tool in projects of legal development. Importantly, this topic has received increased attention 
by politicians and academics in the context of social transformation in regions as varied as the 
European  Union,  East  Asia  and  South  America.  Going  back  to  the  beginning  of  this 
investigation,  where I referred to Alan Watson's approach to legal transplants as a central 
element of legal modernization, I will engage with other approaches to legal transfer which 
emphasize cultural and social diversity in line with post-modern critical reflection. While we 
have  already  seen  examples  of  some  new  approaches  to  law,  development,  and  legal 
development in the previous chapters, here we will observe the process and consequences of 
particularization in the realm of international development referring particularly to law and 
legal transfer. Again, the leading question in this chapter is how do these approaches to law 
and development engage with plurality. 
I.  Plurality within New Perspectives on Law and Development  
As I  have shown above, law played an important role in development discourse after the 
Second World War,  with particular  strength from the early 1960's  (the ‘first  development 
decade') to the mid 1970's. Influenced by the theoretical current of legal realism, law came to 
be seen as a tool for social engineering in ‘developing countries’ by the advocates of the so 
called  ‘Law  and  Development  Movement’.  To  be  clear,  the  ‘Law  and  Development 
Movement’ was not an independent social movement, but rather a project launched in the 
United States  with the  financial  support  of  institutions  like  the United States  Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Ford Foundation, that focused primarily on legal 
education and training in ‘developing countries’. In this sense, the context of its appearance is 
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determinative, since this endeavor was embedded in the political frame of the Cold War and it  
is also marked in an economic and academic perspective by modernization theory. 
As we know, this current of international political strategy was harshly criticized as a 
failure during the 1970's, thus marking, at least temporarily, the end of the hopeful project to 
bring development through law. The development programs themselves not only they in their 
main aims, but also they showed that changes in the realm of law might be counterproductive 
for the desired social reforms. Thus, by 1974, David Trubek and Marc Galanter argued that 
“legal  changes  ostensibly  designed  to  reform  major  areas  of  social  life  and 
achieve developmental goals may in fact be a form of symbolic politics, the effect 
of which is not to cause change but to defeat it by containing demands for protest, 
thereby strengthening, rather than weakening groups committed to the status quo. 
And  increased  instrumental  rationality  in  legal  processes  together  with 
governmental regulation of economic life may contribute to the economic well-
being  of  only  a  small  elite,  leaving  the  mass  no  better,  or  even  worse,  off” 
(Trubek/Galanter 1974, 1084). 
The  disappointment  in  the  potential  of  law  to  engineer  society  in  the  expected  ways, 
reinforced by critical currents in other areas of philosophy and politics, produced waves of 
self-criticism243 provoking studies  like ‘Legal  Imperialism’,  which  I  cited  above (Gardner 
1980). Importantly, this moment of internal decline of the Law and Development movement 
went along with processes of international politics, through which ‘Third World’ countries 
gained more autonomy in front of the two powers of the Cold War, which in turn began a 
phase of some relaxation.244 
At  the  same  time,  these  international  developments  and  this  perception  of  failure 
paralleled a change in the emphasis of the organizations supporting the Law and Development 
movement within the United States. In this sense, Bryan G. Garth underlines that “[a]s the 
Ford Foundation moved further into legal strategies consistent with the civil rights movement 
in  the United States,  the emphasis  shifted to  public  interest  law. Those favoring the new 
public interest law in the United States found themselves in opposition to programs investing 
in corporate law in the service of Latin American states” (Garth 2002, 394). In other words, 
there was a struggle within the ‘donor’ side of the ‘development machine’ on the role of law 
243 This disenchantment would later foster the development of critical legal scholarship in the United States  
(Rodríguez 2001, 23).
244 Take for example the increasing influence of the Non Aligned Movement which grew from 54 member 
countries in 1970 to 96 in 1979. Importantly, in this last year of the decade, under the presidency of Fidel 
Castro (which lasted until 1983), the 6th Summit of the organization was held in Havana, Cuba. In this 
decade,  the  Movement  expanded and  produced declarations that  show its  presence in  the international 
agenda. See, for example, already in 1970, the Lusaka ‘Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, 
Cooperation and Democratisation of International Relations’ (Institute of Foreign Affairs of Nepal 2011, 29) 
and the ‘Declaration on  Non-Alignment and Economic Progress’  (NAC/CONF. 3/RES. 14; Idem, 42), 
which were emphasized in 1973, 1976 and 1979, as well as in later decades (Idem). 
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in state politics, economics and their reform. Consequently, “[w]hen the approach changed in 
the United States, it also changed in Latin America” (Idem).
As a result of this combination of elements, the movement of Law and Development 
was declared to be ‘almost dead’ in 1982 (Snyder 1982, 373). However, as César Rodríguez 
remarks “from the perspective of Latin American lawyers and scholars” he sees himself in, 
“the concrete, vital tasks related to the improvement of legal institutions and the creation of 
legal  mechanisms  empowering  marginalized  sectors  of  the  population  did  not  disappear” 
(Rodríguez 2001, 16). So, while the ‘Law and Development Movement’ ceased to boom from 
the perspective of the ‘donor’ USA, the endeavor towards more development continued to be 
central for the activities on the ‘recipient’ side of these development aid projects.
In fact, the (legal) development project never disappeared totally, but it was, on the one hand 
reformed, and on the other hand, paused to be continued later in a similar way. For example, 
at an institutional level, the International Legal Center which was an agency that promoted the 
aims of the Legal Development Movement in Latin America with the support of the Ford 
Foundation  (Idem,  23),  was  replaced  in  1974  by  the  International  Center  for  Law  in 
Development  (ICLD).  As  the  founder  and  director  of  this  new  institution  underlines, 
comparing the new with the previous structure: “[t]here were two major changes. From an 
administrative point of view, Third World lawyers and scholars took over the Center, and we 
decided to seek funding in Europe, rather than in the US. From an ideological point of view, 
we decided to substitute a bottom-up approach to development for the top-down perspective 
that dominated the projects previously undertaken” (Dias cit. in Rodríguez 2001, 23).245 This 
change is the institutional result of the emergence of an “alternative law and development 
movement” in the spirit of dependency theory and along the lines of the proposal of ‘another 
development’ supported by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (Idem). 
A central argument of this alternative approach was that the type of law emphasized by 
the Law and Development movement has a proclivity “to centralize power in the hands of the 
state,  thus  encouraging  bureaucratization  and  specialization”,  and  consequently,  “when 
transplanted to Third World countries, it tends to reduce the potential for self-reliance that 
exists in the informal practices of local communities and constitutes an order that is alien to 
most  people”  (Idem,  24).  As  a  result,  the  emphasis  of  this  legal  strain  of  the  ‘another 
development’ movement, relied on “informal, communal varieties of regulation and dispute 
245 Remarkably, the new institute was established with the funds remaining from the old International Legal  
Center, and, despite the change of perspective, it had its seat in New York (Dias cit. in Rodríguez 2001, 23).
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settlement” as means “conducive to self-reliant economic activities and to the cultural and 
social strengthening of local communities” (Idem). Importantly, this perspective is different 
from other approaches I have presented above which emphasize vernacular practices, as it still 
works  within  formal  state  law,  understanding  law  as  a  tool  for  social  and  economic 
development  of the ‘Third World’.  The concrete  result  was the execution of a  variety of 
projects “providing legal assistance to marginalized communities, as well as [...] lobbying for 
changes in legislation and promoting social change through adjudication” (Dias 1981, 187) 
focusing, geographically, in Southeast Asia.246
Importantly,  this  approach  of  an  ‘another  development’  as  something  ‘radically 
different’ from the first approach of the Law and Development movement, has not dominated 
most  of  the political  efforts  and financial  investments  on legal  aid in  the last  decades.247 
Rather, the bulk of this endeavor was dedicated to projects that, as we will see, resemble to a 
great extent the discourse of the Law and Development movement of the 1960's and 1970's, 
embedded in modernization theory. Interestingly, however, the alternativist approach appeared 
in  conjunction  with these perspectives  within contemporary projects  of  legal  and judicial 
reform.
If the 1980's, development's lost decade, gave space for alternative approaches to law, they 
also gave opportunity to reorganize the modernization approach according to the new political 
and economic circumstances. Regarding the United States, Garth underlines the importance of 
the human rights movement during the 1980's “as a tool directed against President Ronald 
Reagan and Jeanne Kirkpatrick and their policy favoring authoritarian states in a renewed 
Cold War” (Garth 2002, 394). This boom of Human Rights led to the new wave of Law and 
Development under a new sign. In the same line, Garth remarks on the relevance that the 
investment in law and legal institutions during the 1990's  had as a form of legitimizing the 
policies  and  the  position  of  economists  in  the  state  administration.  As  a  result,  “[t]he 
economics profession shifted the center of gravity from anti-state policies to investment in 
246 It is an interesting observation that the change from the International Legal Center to the ICLD, as a result 
of the failure of the Law and Development movement and the emergence of an ‘alternative development’ 
approach, produced a double geographical reorientation, this is a shift from ‘donors’ in the United States to 
‘donors’ in Europe and from ‘beneficiaries’ in Latin America to ‘beneficiaries’ in Southeast and East Asia. 
These institutional changes remind us of the international and globalized political context in which legal  
development and legal development aid take place.
247 Nevertheless, from a point of view of ‘dependency theory’, the elements of law and development became  
intertwined also through the discussions on a ‘right to development’, which was first recognized in 1981 in 
Article 22 of  the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,  and subsequently proclaimed by the 
United Nations in 1986 in the ‘Declaration on the Right to Development’ (A/RES/41/128; United Nations 
1986).
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institutions to support markets and the neo-liberal policies of the 1980s” (Idem, 395). It is 
important to recognize here the important impact that the tensions and struggles within the 
United States had on the development activities supported in Latin America and elsewhere: 
The engagement in the political processes abroad was an important tool used to gain power in 
national discussions.
To  these  elements  which  have  favored  the  redesign  and  relaunching  of  law  and 
development programs, Garth adds two key blocks of pressure actors towards the new wave 
of law and development reforms. One of them is linked to an emancipatory call related to 
‘alternative development’ as I mentioned above, and which I will address with some more 
detail  later.  The other  one draws on economic  or  business  approaches  resulting  from the 
increasing global interconnection and participation of business firms and the corresponding 
worldwide  expansion  of  advisory  expertise  (Idem,  386).  This  constellation  creates  a 
“remarkable pressure for legal convergence” (Idem).
At the same time, in Latin America, the ‘fourth wave of constitution making’ was taking 
place in a general environment of re-democratization and played a key role. Importantly, this 
social  and political  movement went  hand in hand with economic reforms.  As Rodríguez-
Garavito  puts  it,  “[t]he  turn  of  national  elites  toward  the  democratic  variant  of  the  thin 
conception [of the rule of law] resulted from the twin processes of democratization of the 
polity  and  the  second  wave  of  neoliberal  reforms  in  the  1980's  and  1990s”  (Rodríguez-
Garavito 2011, 163). By the middle of the 1990's, the neo-liberal reforms found a new shape 
in institutionalist thinking. In 1994, when the NAFTA came into force synchronically with the 
Zapatista uprising in a context of economic crisis, it became obvious that the model of the 
Washington Consensus required change, and thus the re-evaluations of this approach started, 
as I mentioned above citing the works of Burki and others.
In summary, during the 1990's, in a setting beyond the Cold War, in a time when liberal 
capitalism expanded increasingly and the Washington Consensus gained political strength and 
stability, in a general context of global reorganization, the Law and Development Movement 
found good conditions  for  a  conceptual  and political  re-launch based on the  harmonious 
couplet between good economic results within a globalized free market and good law. As a 
result, the setting for the contemporary reforms in the frame of a New Law and Development 
movement, is quite different from the context of the first Law and Development endeavor, 
since 
“the consensus [in development circles] is far stronger in favor of reform and the 
legal approaches identified with the United States, including the core idea of a 
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strong  and  independent  judiciary.  […]  Economists  have  come  to  see  the 
importance of legal institutions to the markets that they now promote. Political 
scientists see the rule of law and independent judiciaries as key components of 
‘transitions  to  democracy’ and  even  to  the  production  of  ‘norms’ central  to 
international relations” (Garth 2002, 385 f.). 
In fact, the ‘rule of law’ is emphasized as an antidote against ‘crony capitalism’ by different 
portions of the group of experts on economic development (Idem, 386). As a result, while data 
regarding the concrete amounts differ, what is certain is that the investment in legal reforms in 
Latin America has reached record amounts (Rodríguez-Garavito 2011, 164).
 Despite contrary political stances and opposing social projects, Garth correctly puts to 
the forefront, “a field that all tend to support, with debates about how the major institutions 
should best approach legitimate reform efforts that include a commitment to build strong and 
independent judiciaries” (Garth 2002, 388). However, the broad support has not resulted in a 
perception  of  more  success  in  comparison  to  the  first  wave  of  law  and  development. 
Disappointment and doubt have appeared in theory and praxis oriented research (Garth 2002, 
Ginsburg 2000, 830). Nevertheless, “[t]he lack of success has neither shaken the field nor 
diminished the enthusiasm for further efforts” (Garth 2002, 388).
The main international actors in this context were already mentioned in the context of the 
Latin American constitutional and judicial reforms I presented above, namely the World Bank, 
the  Inter-American  Development  Bank  and  USAID.  We  can  add  furthermore  the  United 
Nations  Development  Program  (UNDP),  the  United  Nations  International  Drug  Control 
Program (UNDCP) and the governments of Spain, Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy 
(Rodríguez 2001, 26), including the collaboration with NGOs and academic institutions. Main 
actors from the importer's side were often Latin American economists and lawyers who were 
educated and trained in the United States, and who occupied elite positions within the state 
and supported the reforms from within the national systems. 
As a consequence of the increase and scattering of development agencies dealing with 
law reform, the new development activities are of a far larger scale than ever before, and are 
directed  by  “a  wide  range  of  multilateral,  governmental  and  private  actors  that  advance 
multiple reforms, oftentimes in an uncoordinated way” (Rodríguez 2001, 27). Furthermore, 
the  new generation  emphasizes  as  part  of  their  self-image  “a  holistic  approach  which  is 
developed  by  the  local  legal  communities”  (Dakolias  1996,  69),  recovering  critiques 
expressed by advocates of ‘another development’. Rodríguez summarizes the similarities of 
the first and second wave of modernizing law and development projects, stating that: 
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“Both generations share the pillar of modernization theory, i.e., the conviction that 
underdevelopment  can  be  overcome  if  countries  in  the  South  adopt  the 
institutions  typical  of  Western  capitalism and democracy.  They also  share  the 
basic features of the proposed model, that is, liberal legalism [...], and economic 
development through private initiative in a free market. And they view law as an 
important instrument  for the construction of institutional  settings conducive to 
development” (Rodríguez 2001, 27).
The  new  wave  of  political  and  financial  investment  in  legal  development  was 
accompanied and supported by a new wave of academic reflection in the field, which was 
nourished  by the  new  post-Cold  War  global  environment.  Interestingly,  as  Ginsburg  has 
remarked, the resurgence of the interest on ‘law and development’ (in ‘donor’ countries and 
their  academic  institutions)  is  connected,  beyond  the  national  and  international  aspects 
underlined above, with questions around the rapid economic growth in East and Southeast 
Asia  (Ginsburg  2000,  830).  Importantly,  these  cases  did  not  offer  a  vindication  of  the 
instrumental perspective on ‘good law’ that results in a ‘good economy’, but – rather – they 
seemed  to  falsify  it.  Naturally,  this  observation  increased  doubts  on  the  role  of  law  in 
development,  since this region did not present an ‘advanced law’ although its economical 
growth was patent, at least according to the prevailing discourses on development. In other 
words,  it  seemed to be  proven that  ‘law does  not  matter  for  development’.  After  having 
discussed post-developmental approaches and legal pluralism, it is worth asking the meaning 
of  law and  development  which  this  statement  aims  to  debunk  and which  challenges  the 
premise of the Law and Development movement. 
To be more precise, the doubts regarding the importance of law for development do not 
concern in general the role of law as normative social tool, but rather the role of a particular 
type  of  law,  meaning  a  ‘human-rights-rule-of-law-constitutionalist’  approach  to  law  in 
contrast to authoritarianism (Davis 1998). The conglomeration of these varied aspects of law 
into this ambiguous expression is not just a play on words. Moreover, it reflects the fact that 
analysts conflate very different aspects into one model and bound them with one allegedly 
clear  concept:  ‘law’ – whether  arguing for or against  its  role  within an equally universal 
concept of development. Take for example Davis’ analysis on ‘Constitutionalism and East 
Asian  Economic  Development’ (Davis  1998).  The  title  of  his  paper  uses  relatively  clear 
concepts, however, things start to get mixed up, when he starts presenting the context and aim 
of his research asserting that: 
“Central to the assertion that authoritarianism is an essential component of East 
Asia's ‘economic miracle’ are the claims first, that  human rights and the rule of  
law are dispensable in pursuit of economic development [...]. [T]his authoritarian 
developmental challenge to democratic and human rights reform can be expected 
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to  persist. This article will challenge  this  authoritarian  developmental claim and 
will affirmatively offer constitutionalism as an avenue for East Asia's continuing 
economic development” (Idem, 304; emphasis added).  
Davis is clear about some differences between the concepts he uses of constitutionalism, 
human rights,  democratic reform and rule  of law, however,  he quickly dismisses them as 
practically irrelevant (Idem).248 Interestingly, his gloss quoting Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-
1859) (which sets the frame for his work) as well as the main reference for the argument he 
contests, namely an article by Bilahari Kausikan249, refer only to ‘democracy’.
More important for us than Davis’ argument itself, is what happens on the basis of such 
conceptual  packages.  Exemplarily,  Ginsburg,  referring  to  Davis’ paper,  summarizes  that 
“having drawn on evidence from Asia, some have claimed that the rule of law is dispensable 
in the pursuit of economic growth” (Ginsburg 2000, 830; emphasis added). However, the title 
of his own paper is ‘Does Law Matter for Economic Development?’ (Idem; emphasis added). 
So, what is this discussion actually about? Constitutionalism, democracy, the rule of law, or 
just  law?  Or  maybe  human  rights?  And,  more  importantly,  what  particular  type  of 
constitutionalism, democracy, rule of law, or law are they referring to? Or maybe the idea at  
stake is a particular combination of all of these,  which is a recipe for economic growth as a 
particular form of development? 
If we are just talking about law in terms of positive law, from the beginning of Davis’ 
(and Ginsburg's) arguments, the answer to the question of whether  law matters for economic 
development, is clearly ‘yes!’. Law matters because what is characterized as authoritarian law 
has  allegedly brought  de facto the  economic development  they have in  mind,  while  “the 
alleged price of human rights is the destruction of the Asian social fabric and the resultant 
political and economic chaos” (Davis  1998, 304). In other words, for Davis’ and Ginsburg's 
question to make sense, we have to read it differently. The problem they analyze is not if 
positive law as such matters, but if a conglomerate of ideas that they put together and name 
law  (excluding  implicitly  other  forms  of  normativity  from  this  loaded  concept)  affects 
economic development. 
248 Davis explains his concept  of  constitutionalism as  follows: “The fundamentals  of constitutionalism are 
taken to include three core institutional  components:  democratic elections with free and fair multiparty 
contestation; human rights and freedom of expression; and the rule of law, including adherence to principles 
of legality. In addition to these core components, this article argues that constitutionalism must take on 
indigenous  institutional  extensions that  attach it  to  local  social  conditions and  concerns.  This  dualistic 
structure  supports  the  notion of  universal  human rights  and,  at  the  same time,  allows  for  a  degree  of 
diversity in constitutional practices” (Davis 1998, 307. 
249 Kausikan was then Singapore's permanent representative to the United Nations.
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What I am trying to show here is that ‘law’ in terms of the debate on development (and 
its  practical  consequences)  conflates a variety of aspects  producing in the end an understan-
ding of law with a very particular character that becomes generalized.250 If the New Law and 
Development movement is seen to an important extent as an expression of the revival of 
modernization  theory,  the  new  detractors  of  law-and-development  based  their  arguments 
equally  on  modern  approaches  to  law  and  development.  They  used  similar  strategies  of 
conflating different terms in ambiguous concepts that were declared as generally applicable. 
Similarly, regarding the concept of development, it is important to keep in mind that 
both in academic reflection as well as in policy design, the point of reference continues to be 
economic growth. Understanding the ‘human-rights-constitutionalism-rule-of-law’ approach 
as a means subordinated to this end, Davis’ can argue that 
“[a]t an early stage, proper economic policy sometimes may be more important 
than whether a regime is authoritarian or democratic. [… U]ltimately, the success 
of  a  regime  depends  on  its  ability  to  generate  the  conditions  favorable  to 
economic  development  […].  As  economic  development  succeeds,  however,  a 
degree of social complexity and stratification arises such that authoritarian state 
institutions [...] may become overtaxed and no longer able to afford the degree of 
order, reliability, and participation sufficient for continued economic success in a 
free market system. It is at this stage that many regimes may be called upon to 
initiate democratic reform” (Idem, 306)
At the  same time,  a  specific  form of  economic  development  tied  with  the  proper  law is 
supposed to serve social order. Thus, the warning for East Asian governments/economies is 
that  “[u]nder  the  circumstances  of  rapid  development,  if  formal  channels  for  interest 
representation are not available and fully functional, cronyism, corruption, and social disorder 
are likely to occur” (Idem). 
The  positioning  on a  clear  path  towards  economic  growth  is  not  just  an  aspect  of 
scientific  reflection  on  the  role  of  the  rule  of  law  or  constitutionalism  in  international 
development, but it is also a central aspect of the policies and strategies of the international 
organizations financing legal aid and promoting legal reforms towards more development. 
While the first generation of law and development has been characterized as having a “more 
encompassing  notion  of  development  […]  which  entailed  greater  social  equality  and 
participation” (Rodríguez 2001, 27), this new generation of developers framed development 
clearly in terms of economic growth.  Thus,  one of the most important aspects that differ 
between  the  two  generations  of  law  developers  is  that  now  the  main  field  of  law  and 
development is not anymore legal education, but institutional reform. Adding to the examples 
250 For a more detailed discussion of the same problem regarding the ambiguous use of the concept of ‘rule of  
law’ in the context of development and an attempt to create some minimum consensus, see Ringer 2007.
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referred to in the last chapter in the context of the Mexican legal reform, the emphasis on an 
economic perspective and its connection with an institutional perspective can be found also in 
the argument that Maria Dakolias251 put forward for prioritizing the modernization of legal 
institutions: “such institutions contribute to economic efficiency and lead to growth which in 
turn alleviates poverty” (Dakolias 1996, 71). Following this perspective on development, law 
is understood more like a “facilitator of development, rather than its source” (Rodríguez 2001, 
28).
In  sum,  while  the  new wave  of  law and  development  has  sought  to  overcome the 
criticisms posed against their predecessors of the 1960's  and 1970's, both groups of reforms 
are  very  similar.  The  new  model  might  emphasize  institutional  reform  and  intend  to 
incorporate  the  participation  of  local  actors,  be  more  scattered  and have  a  more  concise 
approach to development as economic growth. However, as Rodríguez criticizes, the core is 
the same: “the new programs focus narrowly on promoting foreign investment and capital 
accumulation as conditions for economic development.  [... They] have clearly adopted a top-
down perspective” (Idem, 37 f.). To these two elements, we can add that the equalization of 
development  with  economic  development  did  not  change  (but  became stronger),  and  the 
emphasis on the need to develop towards a certain goal remained central to this endeavor.
Looking  a  bit  deeper  into  the  philosophical  and  theoretical  underpinnings  of  these 
proposals, it is no surprise that the similarities with the first wave supersede the differences. 
Both  approaches,  one  emphasizing  legal  education  and  the  other  institutional  reform, 
correlate, in fact, to two strains of Weber's understanding of the relation between legal reason 
and economic development.  In this  sense,  Tom Ginsburg argues that while the first wave 
emphasized rather  the aspect of legal rationality as a cultural  aspect  that  could allow the 
transition from traditional ways of life to modern ones, the second one, revitalized by the new 
institutionalist  approach of the economic historian Douglass North,  emphasized law as an 
effective  institutional  constraint  (Ginsburg  2000,  831  ff.).  Law,  in  this  sense,  is  part  of 
“technical  institutional  arrangements  (which  provide  an  environment  for  individual 
entrepreneurs)” (Idem, 833). Due to this technical neutrality, “[t]oday's development policy 
assumes  that  a  country  must  adopt  the  proper  institutions  to  facilitate  growth  and  that 
institutions can be transferred across borders” (Idem). 
251 Maria Dakolias was the World Bank official in charge of the Latin American programs from 1992 until she 
joined the legal vice presidency of the bank in 1996.
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The role of plurality in this context, is,  consequently,  a very constrained one. While 
there is, on the one hand, an increasing awareness of the need to incorporate the ‘recipient's’ 
perspective to the planning and implementation of such programs, and, on the other hand, a 
scientific  claim  to  pay  more  attention  to  “the  different  roles  of  law  in  later-developing 
countries” and the “widespread use of informal alternatives to law” (Ginsburg 2000, 833 f.), 
the idea of what a developed law should provide to society and what development should 
mean remain rather stable. Importantly, the relation between law and economic development, 
is primordially one in which law is subordinated and at the service of economic growth. In the 
end, however, this alliance of law and economic development is supposed to support social 
order and ‘full functionality’ of the society. What social order means, how or when a society is 
functional, or for what it should function are questions that receive, from this perspective on 
law and development  that  encompasses  the biggest  international  investments,  one answer 
which is  allegedly valid  for  all,  and which  is  lastly subordinated  to  the  requisites  of  the 
globalized free market. 
Importantly, this type of development proposals has been criticized as part of the revival of an 
imperialistic project. Thus, Aragón Andrade has stated regarding the Mexican reforms of the 
two last decades, that “this process of legal reform does not pretend, as its promoters have 
asserted, to make a series of measures to correct ‘the flaws’ of the judicial system, but actually 
it is about putting in motion a project and a different conception of the role that the tribunals 
of  the  State  in  society  and  thus  of  their  organization, administration  and  internal  logic” 
(Aragón  Andrade  n.d.,  7).  In  other  words,  he  conceives  of  these  reforms  as  part  of  the 
‘hegemonic model of globalization’ mentioned above. 
These criticisms do not oppose every kind of legal development, they do not aim to 
maintain the legal and political  status quo. Neither is this an expression of antiquate state 
nationalism in front of the all-powerful globalization, nor is this type of claim reduced to 
Latin American thought. On the contrary, this type of critique is well in line with international  
philosophical and political concerns and calls lastly for a different type of reform. In this line, 
based on Slavoj Žižek (*1949), Aragón Andrade asserts that 
“the idea of the ‘good justice’, that overcomes the flaws of the current justice 
apparatus of the State, has been filled by the specific content of an idea promoted 
[...] by several international agencies as if these were the only possible options to 
achieve this objective […. T]he solutions proposed from the agenda of the judicial 
reform driven by the prevailing economic order  are  part  of  this  bet”  (Aragón 
Andrade n.d., 7). 
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From this  perspective,  the  challenge  is  to  open the  notion  of  ‘good  justice’ beyond  that 
‘specific  idea’ promoted  by  international  agencies,  and  to  boost  reforms  in  a  different 
direction.
As we can appreciate in this critique and in the discussion of the examples regarding the 
recognition of indigenous law and indigenous justice, the approach to development identified 
with the enhancement of globalized free market and the rhetorics of economic growth, is not 
the only one pushing for legal development through judicial and legal reform. Sousa Santos 
and Rodríguez-Garavito have addressed this critical stream of political and legal activism as 
‘subaltern  cosmopolitan  legality’.  According  to  them,  this  perspective  is  based  on  a 
participatory approach, “seeks to expand the legal canon beyond individual rights and focuses 
on  the  importance  of  political  mobilization  for  the  success  of  rights-centered  strategies” 
(Sousa Santos/Rodríguez-Garavito 2005, 15). 
Most  recently,  Rodríguez-Garavito  has  referred  to  this  current  in  the  context  of  an 
approach to  the rule  of law from a perspective of ‘global  constitutionalism’.  To be more 
precise,  the  author  envisages  this  perspective  as  a  transnational  ideological  and  political 
project with roots in the human rights movement which, interestingly, is related, at the same 
time,  to  a  project  of  ‘global  neoliberalism’.  The  concrete  expressions  of  this  ‘global 
constitutionalism’ can  be  seen  in  extensive  constitutional  bills  of  rights,  an  emphasis  on 
judicial review (particularly through the express means of a tutela claim) and the spreading of 
judicial activism (Rodríguez-Garavito 2011, 164 ref. Tate). While there have been different 
approaches to these reforms, including more or less the element of judicial review, the model 
of market  economy and democracy,  what  is  remarkable is  that this  is  a project that  goes 
beyond  Latin  American  reforms,  including  the  incorporation  of  judicial  review into  new 
constitutions, like in the cases of Spain (1978), Portugal (1976), and South Africa (1993), the 
more encompassing transition of former socialist countries like Hungary (1989-90), Poland 
(1986) and Russia (1991), as well as softer reforms as it was the case in Canada (1982) and 
New Zealand (1990) (Hirschl 2004, 7 f.).
Due  to  its  institutional  focus,  and more  clearly to  its  emphasis  on  rights  and their 
enforcement through judicial review, the main object and means of (legal and social) reform 
of this current was the activist constitutional court, or the supreme court. Rodríguez-Garavito 
divides between two main tasks of these courts, namely the strengthening of citizens’ liberties 
in front of the state (or ‘negative rights'), and the protection and enhancement of social rights 
(or ‘positive rights') (Rodríguez-Garavito 2011, 165). Both of these aspects challenge a thin 
version  of  the  rule  of  law  that  Rodríguez-Garavito  identifies  with  the  global  neoliberal 
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project: The first one is insofar challenging as it goes beyond a mere understanding of law as  
a tool for financial and legal security and political stability, while the second one takes hold 
on the state and its duties to protect and provide certain goods.
Importantly, these movements, according to Rodríguez-Garavito, are not separated from 
foreign interests and investments from abroad. On the contrary, they base on international 
human rights networks and work with key financial  support from private foundations and 
governments  located  in  the  financial  and  political  centers  of  the  globe.  Equally,  the 
transnational formal and informal networks of lawyers and constitutional court judges have 
played a major role in this context. Particularly the latter connections lay at the foundation of 
“cross-citation among constitutional courts, the growth of comparative constitutional law, and 
the migration of ideas on constitutional interpretation and enforcement mechanisms across 
borders” (Rodríguez-Garavito 2011, 166). A  concrete example of the role of these networks 
can be seen in the professional development course for magistrates organized by the Judicial 
College of Paraná (Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil) in 2010, titled ‘Jurisdictional Dialogue between the 
European and Latin American Integration Courts’. In this seminar, which was funded to an 
important  extent  by  the  German  foundation  Konrad  Adenauer  Stiftung  (KAS)  and  the 
Austrian University of Innsbruck, judges from different parts of Brazil gathered with some 
Austrian and German academics, representatives of the KAS and the German judge Günther 
Hirsch (*1943, former president of the Federal Court of Justice and judge at the European 
Court  of  Justice)  to  discuss  the  interaction  and  cross-citation  between  the  European 
jurisdiction  and  the  Mercosur  (Konrad  Adenauer  Stiftung  2010).  The  emphasis  was  put, 
naturally,  in the development of better  justice in the Latin American region following the 
European model.252
Naturally, this constitutional project is connected with traditions I have presented above. 
Regarding  the  conceptual  foundation  of  this  constitutional  project,  Rodríguez-Garavito 
underlines the movements within and beyond Latin America of ‘alternative use of law’ and 
the  constitutional  traditions  and  judicial  activisms  in  Europe  and  the  United  States 
(Rodríguez-Garavito 2011, 166 f.). We have already seen the results of this approach in the 
case of the role given to indigenous law and indigenous justice in Mexico and Colombia. The 
results in these cases, as well as the result in the current of Alternative Law in Brazil, have 
shown that this project suffers the same structural flaws as the neo-liberal model they aim to 
contest, at the same time that they are intimately connected. Even if a part of their supporters 
252 The author participated in this course as a speaker, and could thus appreciate through direct experience the  
functioning of this transnational network of judges of diverse levels and law scholars.
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had the intention to make basic rights effective and transform society through active courts, at 
the same time, they have provoked new hierarchical divisions within society that reflect the 
new hierarchies  established  by their  conceptual  frame.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  they present 
themselves as contrary to the neo-liberal approach, on the other hand they support the same 
scheme of thought. This is due, to an important extent, given the connections between the two 
models, that, as we will see shortly,  did not escape scholarly attention.
Summing up, according to Rodríguez, who develops his research in the same line as 
Sousa Santos and Aragón Andrade,  there can be identified two basic lines  of law reform 
projects. On the one hand there is a ‘neo-liberalist’ stream, connected to a thin vision of the 
rule of law and arguments of technical neutrality of judicial reform, and leaded by institutions 
like the World Bank. This stream is related with what Sousa Santos, and with him Aragón 
Andrade, name the hegemonic globalization project. All of these authors recognize, at the 
same  time,  the  existence  of  another  stream  pursuant  of  legal  reform  towards  more 
development.  From  this  other  perspective,  the  conceptualization  of  development,  and 
sometimes of law is partially different from the one presented by the first stream. Importantly,  
in  line  with  this  last  approach,  Sousa  Santos,  Aragón  Andrade  and  Rodríguez-Garavito 
support  all  a  certain variety of legal  pluralism.  In terms of  the rule  of law as a  form of 
development they endorse furthermore a participative and distributive perspective in contrast 
to an approach only or mainly oriented towards economic growth. Rodríguez-Garavito, for 
example,  identifies  with  an  alternative  approach  to  law,  relating  it  to  a  conception  of 
development based on dependency theory.  All  of these researchers, as well  as other legal 
scholars working on the field of legal pluralism and in the frame of the current of New Latin 
American Constitutionalism invoke Human Rights through a perspective of cultural diversity. 
Regarding the practical consequences of this approach, it is possible to say that the Colombian 
court reform and other changes in the Latin American region respond also to and derive from 
these  calls  of  alternativity.  Going  beyond  mere  alternativity,  also  the  Bolivian  legal  and 
political  development  addresses  a  call  for  emancipation  to  leave  behind  centennial 
dependency and subordination. 
Importantly, both currents are, as the advocates of this ‘alternative’ approach accentuate, 
interlinked through institutions, biographies and concepts participating in this move towards 
better law and better law-enforcement through legal and judicial reform (Rodriguez Garavito 
2011,  159  ff.;  Garth  2002,  387;  de  Sousa  Santos  and  Rodríguez-Garavito  2005,  19  ff.). 
Concretely,  this  connection  meant  the  launching  of  projects  that  include  a  mixture  of 
approaches  and  resulted  in  ‘combined’  results.  Take,  for  example,  the  reform  of  the 
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Colombian  criminal  justice  system in  the  frame  of  the  already  mentioned  constitutional 
reform, which Rodríguez-Garavito investigated in his detailed account (Rodríguez-Garavito 
2011, 167 ff.).  The context  of this  reform was marked by the presence of both reformist 
approaches:  on the one hand, the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 included a  neo-liberal 
strain visible in the government's proposal to the assembly incorporating the central elements 
of the Washington Consensus, on the other hand, it incorporated as well a neo-constitutional 
strain through the “unprecedented representation of leftist parties [...] and the influence of 
constitutional  lawyers  within  the  government  elite”  (Idem,  168).  Importantly,  Rodríguez-
Garavito underlines that both groups participating in the constitutional drafting were trained 
or educated in the United States. While the first ones were occupied with the provisions that  
would  permit  the  implementation  of  neo-liberal  economy,  trade  liberalization  and 
privatization of state firms, the latters elaborated the bill of rights of the constitution and key 
institutional arrangements. Importantly, this bill of rights and the institutional arrangements 
were  developed  through  an  intense  exercise  of  comparative  law,  inquiring  into  the 
corresponding sections of the constitutions of Germany, Italy, the United States and Spain 
(Idem, 170), and permitting the incorporation of ideas found in these documents. 
The moderation of the discussion that emerged in this tension was led by some key 
political figures participating in this project who acted as ‘brokers’ between the two groups. 
Besides the role of these particular agents, Rodríguez-Garavito emphasizes also two basic 
mechanisms for the management of potential clashes: Firstly,  the agreement between both 
groups regarding the need to make effective a thin version of the rule of law, and, secondly, 
the fact that the two groups had a common educational and personal background that provided 
the possibility of understanding, identification, respect and dialogue to a certain extent. At the 
same time, both groups were in a similar situation regarding their  own professional field, 
trying to establish themselves with perspectives beyond the mainstreams of Keynesianism and 
French legal tradition leading in Colombia. This urge for positioning themselves in their own 
areas resulted in a common struggle against other groups, what, in turn, allowed for a certain 
understanding and connection between the two positions. 
In sum, “[a]lthough differences between the two camps were evident, agreement over 
the  core  civil  and  political  rights  included  in  the  thin  version  of  the  ROL [rule  of  law] 
combined  with  social  and  professional  affinities  to  avert  an  open  confrontation  over  the 
constitutional  text”  (Idem,  171).  Naturally,  the  result  of  this  combined  assembly  was  a 
‘combined’ Constitution: “the Assembly ended up adopting  both  norms enabling neoliberal 
reform (e.g. enhanced protection of property and prosecution of crimes) and  norms enabling 
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contestation of the former (e.g., enforceable social rights and strong procedural protections for 
criminal defendants)” (Idem). Importantly, this combined approach expresses a theme that I 
have been advancing throughout this research, namely the ambivalence characteristic for the 
late modern endeavors. 
This Constitutional Assembly intended to respond to the crumbling down of traditional 
social, economic and political order in the midst of a context of globalized economic crisis, 
continuous  struggles  with  guerrilla  groups  and  marginalized  parts  of  society,  and  an 
international tension around the production and smuggling of drugs. The response however, 
did  not  transcend  the  models  that  were  at  the  base  of  these  conflicts.  It  ‘combined’ the 
different forces and interests in an ambivalent solution that tried to keep everybody happy by 
delaying the outburst of the tension. Thus, it is not surprising that Rodríguez-Garavito reports 
that  “once  the  exceptional  political  circumstances  surrounding the  enactment  of  the 1991 
Constitution shifted, the consensus [between the two groups of reformists] was also shaken” 
(Idem, 171). 
If we take the example of the transformation of the criminal justice system, the clash 
between the two approaches found expression in the opposition between security-oriented 
reformers, that aimed to improve crime investigation through the inclusion of an independent 
prosecutor belonging to the executive branch, and rights-oriented reformers, who feared a 
limitation of judicial independence and advanced the protection of citizens’ rights. The result 
was the introduction of a hybrid prosecutor with judicial functions. As the author remarks, 
“[r]ather than a satisfactory compromise for both camps, the hybrid embodied a 
‘catastrophic tie’, in that the result was an all-powerful Attorney General whose 
judicial functions [...] would come to worry both neoliberal reformers (who would 
later  see  them  as  an  obstacle  to  the  district  attorneys’  focus  on  efficient 
investigations) and neoconstitutional lawyers (who would come to view them as a 
source of arbitrary power)” (Idem, 172). 
While in the beginning, this ambivalence seemed to be the solution closest to consensus, 
both projects, soon clashed, starting with the decisions on the course of the reform programs. 
On the one hand, the funding institution of the reform project, USAID, advocated for the 
improvement of efficient crime investigation, and, on the other hand, the local administrator 
FES (Fundación para la Educación y el Desarrollo Social,  Foundation for Education and 
Social Development) criticized this approach, emphasizing the need to allocate resources on 
other branches of the judiciary and in citizen access to justice (Idem, 174). In the end, the 
cooperation between both institutions was abandoned in dispute. 
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The clashes regarding judicial reform escalated in national academic and professional 
circles, as well as in the implementation of other reform programs funded by USAID, leading 
finally to the abortion of several of them, e.g. the reform of the Attorney General's Office. In a 
later phase of the reform process, neoliberal and neoconstitutional interests gathered again to 
reform the criminal justice system established in 1991. Importantly, this reform implied the 
completion of “the institutional transplant that had been promoted by USAID for more than 
ten years”, including an Attorney General's Office with minimal judicial functions, focusing 
on criminal investigation and working through oral procedures (Idem, 175). Furthermore, this 
project, accompanied by other endeavors strengthening access to justice programs and the 
legal aid system for ‘the poor and marginalized’, combined a ‘chastened neoliberalism’ with a 
‘chastened  neoconstitutionalism’,  entailing  “a  mutual  accomodation  of  the  neoliberal 
emphasis on property and public order and the neoconstitutionalist focus on redistribution and 
guarantees of individual freedoms” (Idem, 176). This is the consensus at the foundation of the 
contemporary support of the rule of law – unsurprisingly, a consensus dominated by tense 
ambivalence. In the words of the Colombian expert,  “the result of this ongoing inter-elite 
struggle  is  a  provisory  reformist  hybrid  that  tones  down  both  the  neoliberal  and 
neoconstitutional  projects  and  integrates  them  into  an  unstable  amalgam  of 
neoliberlism-cum-rights”  (Idem,  177)  Importantly,  he  remarks  that  this  convergence  has 
“effectively  reproduced  elite  privilege”  (Idem,  178),  showing  again  a  way by which  the 
alleged integration of diverse approaches in one combined rule, re-enacts the displacement of 
diversity.
It  could  be  surprising  that  such,  at  times  clearly  opposed  perspectives  on  law  and  on 
development like the ones Rodríguez-Garavito depicts as neo-liberal and neo-constitutional, 
are able to share projects, concepts, carriers and political moves, such as it is surprising at first 
sight that indigenous groups sign agreements with transnational firms of the mining industry 
as  a  support  for  the  claims  of  vernacular  communities  (Solíz  Rada  2011c).  However, 
remembering  the  approach  proposed  by  Zima  regarding  the  ambivalence  at  the  core  of 
concepts in a late modern approach, this unstable combination seems a quite logical result. 
The  mere  concepts  used,  amongst  them  the  ‘rule  of  law’,  are  maintained  in  a  certain 
ambivalence because otherwise the whole project would collapse. Also alternative approaches 
need to invoke the rule of law if they aim to receive the support of their own guilds as well as 
the  backing  of  international  financial  institutions.  Both  groups  aim  to  change  the  state, 
developing it according to their own ideals and perspectives, and hence it is not surprising that 
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they are both interested in the same reform techniques, use similar language etc. In other 
words,  the  two  approaches  to  legal  reform  can  connect  with  each  other  because  their 
argumentative tools are ambivalent. Terms like ‘rights’ or ‘law’ have the capacity to make 
everyone agree even when they dissent on what are the specific features invoked.253 
Furthermore,  these new approaches recreate  a  complicit  tension that  we know from 
before.  While  the  neo-liberal  approach  elaborates  on  the  promise  of  legal  positivism 
promising that a certain structure, and most importantly certain institutions, produce better 
law, the neo-constitutional approach, echoing old naturalistic perspectives on law, promises 
that laws that follow certain principles – humanitarian principles and principles of the respect 
of different cultures, amongst others –, that these moral guidelines will create better law and 
thus the right or a better development. Naturally, these confronted arguments differ from the 
older discussion in important points. Besides the particular context of increased worldwide 
interconnectedness and the specific economic context, both are embedded also in a discourse 
of law as politics typical for currents that find support in legal realism. Being the judge at the 
center  of  this  approach,  it  is  natural  that  both  currents  put  strong  emphasis  in  judicial 
performance.  It  is  not  surprising,  thus,  that  both  approaches  agree  on  an  institutional 
approach,  since  both  depend  on  a  concept  of  better  institutions  that  respond  to  specific 
structures.  These  are  important  differences  that  contrast  with  the  discussion  between 
postivism and naturalism in its original form. In their basic approach as well as in the form of  
their  interaction,  however,  they do not  differ  dramatically  from the  naturalism-positivism 
debate. Nor is their relation (and their success) less ambivalent.
Summing up, the approach to contemporary legal development that Rodríguez refers to as 
neo-liberal, or as a re-enactment of the modernization theory, deals with plurality in a form 
that  a  hierarchy  is  conserved  and,  lastly  dismisses  the  pluralistic  critique.  The  neo-
constitutional  approach,  in  turn,  starts  from  a  pluralistic  critique:  a  holistic  approach  is 
needed, an alternative development is possible. But, lastly, it ends up emphasizing one form 
of alternativity, is equally oriented towards the idea of a particular development and a better 
law. The criteria for  better law and  more justice are set basing on specific clear standards. 
Even in cases when these standards might be opposite to the ones of a neo-liberal approach, 
they function in the same way, require a similar authority and establish stable hierarchies in 
the same form. To take an image, one approach is the negative mirror of the other. We can 
253 In this sense, see also the discussion of Fitzpatrick presenting modern law as a myth, meaning a complex  
that due to its ambiguity acquires and recreates its validity (see chapter A). 
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thus jump between one mirror to the other, but we are not creating a different world beyond 
that. 
In  this  sense,  and  remembering  what  has  been  said  regarding  the  New  Law  and 
Development movement in the beginning of this section, it can be said, that none of the new 
options transcend a modern model. Although the new approaches orient their efforts towards 
incorporating  a  plurality  of  perspectives,  operating  within  a  postmodern  sociolect,  they 
engage with plurality in ways that reduce it. This reduction can take many forms: sometimes a 
hierarchy is  determined from the beginning,  sometimes it  is  the result  of an unsatisfying 
compromise. Consequently, legal development is subordinated to a modern model of the one 
good law, or it vanishes into a web of compromises that leaves the door open to all sorts of 
abuses of power. 
II.  Pluralizing Legal Transplants  
The critiques of what Rodríguez-Garavito and others have framed as ‘neo-liberal’ approaches, 
have found also expression in the discussions on legal transplants, which, as we have seen, 
were crucial tools for legal development and development through law. In this context, for 
example,  Ugo  Mattei  (*1961)  has  advanced  the  thesis  of  an  ‘imperial  law’,  which 
“subordinates local legal arrangements world-wide” through the “penetration of U.S. legal 
consciousness”, and which “despite its absolute lack of democratic legitimacy, [...] imposes as 
a natural necessity, by means of discursive practices branded ‘democracy and the rule of law,’ 
a reactive legal philosophy that outlaws redistribution of wealth based on social solidarity” 
(Mattei 2003, 383 f.). Importantly, according to Mattei, these legal changes serve particular 
economic interests that manifest also in international development models, since “[p]redatory 
economic globalization is the vehicle, the all-mighty ally, and the beneficiary of imperial law” 
(Idem, 383, 394). 
His  emphasis  on  redistribution  allows  us  to  relate  his  strong  position  with  the 
‘neo-constitutional’ approaches Rodríguez-Garavito presented. As a consequence, his critique 
on legal transplants is  embedded in the context of ‘alternative approaches to  law’ and of 
political claims of redistribution. Furthermore, Mattei's work is an important example of the 
connection between the political stances at work in projects of law and development on the 
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one hand, and academic theoretical discussion on the form and character of ‘legal transplants’ 
on the other hand.
From a theoretical perspective, it is remarkable that Mattei rejects a linear perspective 
on ‘legal transplants’ and on the role of law in social development. First of all, he underlines 
the  insufficiency  of  a  cause-and-effect  paradigm  to  understand  the  relationships  of  law, 
politics and economy (Idem, 384), thus putting in question a Marxist understanding of law as 
a  superstructure  as  well  as  a  simplistic  version  of  development  through  law.  While 
understanding  law  and  legal  change  as  an  endeavor  embedded  in  social,  political  and 
economic tensions, he equally takes distance from a strict division between law and society, 
fitting perfectly well with other post-modern reflections I have addressed above. Related to 
this rejection of a model that understands influence as a one-way force, on a second line, he 
rejects a dichotomic division between two patterns of transplanting law often assumed, this is, 
either as imposed transplants or as consensual receptions. Moreover, he stresses that “[l]aw is 
a detailed and complex machinery of social control that cannot function with any degree of 
effectiveness  without  some  cooperation  from  a  variety  of  individuals  staffing  legal 
institutions” (Idem, 385). 
The language chosen by Mattei allows, however, to see that, beyond his criticism, he 
remains  bond to  modern  perspectives  in  important  forms.  On the  one  hand,  he  rejects  a 
mechanistic view regarding the process of transplant as well as regarding the relation between 
law and society as typical for a modern sociolect. On the other hand, however, he holds on to 
a mechanistic metaphor of law, which allows him to work with ideas of functionality and 
effectiveness.  Naturally,  general  concepts  of  functionality  and  effectiveness  depend  on 
particular, even if discursively generalized, goals and a specific understanding of what should 
be.  Furthermore,  at  the same time that  he underlines  the importance of the staff  of  legal 
institutions, understanding law as a machine depersonalizes, dehumanizes and deculturalizes 
it  and the  struggles  it  entails.  Culture,  and thus  human symbolism,  enters  the  stage  as  a 
construct that supports a specific form of the law machine and shapes the introduction of new 
elements in it. Thus, he speaks of fundamental cultural constructs that are utilized by “the 
imperial  model  of  governance”  (Idem,  384).  In  the  same line,  while  he  argues  against  a 
“spectacular  de-legalization  of  alternative  contexts  of  legality”  and  non-western  legal 
traditions (Idem, 446), in this critique, he refers consequently to formal state law and only 
marginally to legal pluralistic concerns.
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Similarly, he criticizes a binary and static perspective that envisages legal transplants as 
“the result of the choice of one mind that freely or coactively receives the produced model” 
(Idem,  389).  However,t  he  remains  in  a  dichotomic  model  also  when  he  argues  for  the 
correction of this view saying that “[b]oth in the phase of production and in the phase of 
reception,  legal  transplants  are  a  lively  dialectic  between  consent  and  dissent,  between 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces, between mainstream and critical approaches. In 
other words, dominant and dominated positions have to be considered in the picture [...]” 
(Idem). The “high complexity of the picture” (Idem) he wants to underline ends up being 
weakened by a division of the players in antagonistic pairs, which are not understood just as 
ideal types for the orientation of the debate, but as concrete ways to be. At the same time, 
while he argues in favor of the appreciation of diversity, an essentialized view of ‘the Other’, 
leads him to statements emphasizing an alleged incommensurability of social and political 
languages. To take an example, Mattei asserts that “not much needs to be said of Iraq to show 
the fundamental incompatibility of its social structure with Western notions of legality and 
Western institutions (Idem, 398). In other words, Mattei remains ambivalent in his approach 
to a dichotomic model of legal transplant and diversity.
This ambivalence in Mattei's arguments is not surprising but particularly interesting, 
since  his  own  argument  makes  special  emphasis  on  the  blurring  of  differences  and  the 
ambiguity created in politics and law, particularly since the 1990's (which forms part of what 
he calls the ‘imperial law'). He underlines, for example, that from a “domestic perspective of 
U.S. Law [which is at the core of the Imperial Law], both the legal process and the economic 
analysis of law share an ambiguous relationship with formalism and realism” (Idem, 410 f.; 
emphasis added). This ‘characteristic’ has important consequences for legal development in 
form of legal transfer, since 
“[l]aw and economics,  once  transplanted  outside  of  its  context  of  production, 
displays  the  high  level  of  ambiguity that  allows  it  to  flourish.  Conservative 
scholars admire its intellectual elegance; more progressive and liberal scholars see 
its potential in subverting the highly formalistic and black letter flavor of local 
law, and claim that the conservative political bias is something that can be left on 
the other  side of the ocean.  Many European scholars are  attracted to law and 
economics, and even when attempting to use it critically, are paving the way to 
scholarly  Americanization  and  becoming  part  of  the  very  same  world  
phenomenon of hegemonic imposition that they would like to criticize” (Idem, 411 
f.; emphasis added)
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Importantly, Mattei despises this ambiguity, which ends, according to him, being instrumental 
to the expansion and strengthening of hegemonic interests.  Importantly,  he criticizes this 
transition as an aspect of postmodernism which he presents,  in turn,  as “the logic of late 
capitalism” (Idem, 428). 
His points of critique, and with them some central aspects of contemporary scholarly 
despair,  are  patent  when he states that  “postmodernist  legal  discourse gives up claims of 
universality, objectivity, and monism. The nation-state blurs, sovereignty is decentralized, and 
legal propositions cannot be legitimized in terms of right or wrong. Justice becomes relative, 
and efficiency becomes expediency, pragmatism, and strategy” (Idem). As a result, “[i]f legal 
reasoning is a technique of argumentation, a battle of hired weapons, there is no space for the 
myth of political representation” (Idem), and therefore, the likely scenario Mattei sees in the 
long run is “lawlessness and a free battleground for exploitive business interests” (Idem, 429). 
This is the horror-scenario of infinite worlds of poly-valence that Mattei tries to avoid solving 
the tension with his call for the right ‘law’.
To  take  concrete  examples,  seeing  in  this  ambiguous  character  an  expression  of  a 
market  oriented  project,  instead  of  a  project  led  by political  legitimacy,  he  criticizes  the 
undermining of the prestige of national “hard” European civil codes as a “blank check to 
corporate rapacity” (Idem, 431). In turn, he argues that “such national civil codes are the only 
source  of  principled  legitimacy of  judicial  power  in  present  day Europe”,  and thus,  “the 
Americanization  of  the codification  process  weakens European institutional  effectiveness” 
(Idem).  In  other  words,  he  favors  the  return  to  ‘hard’ and  ‘principled’ sources  of  legal 
argument, deriving legitimacy from an  already traditional combination of natural and positive 
law. 
However, as I presented above, this combination is equally ambiguous as the model he 
criticizes, and carries the same problems of a modern ‘ambiguity-solving’ approach. Lastly, he 
bases  his  argument  on  the  same goals  of  the  approach  he  criticizes  when  he  refers,  for 
example,  to  ‘effectiveness’  as  a  reason  in  favor  of  ‘European’  law.  The  cultural 
essentialization implicit in this kind of statement is also typical for a dualistic oppositional 
argument,  that  shapes  his  perspective  on  development.  In  fact,  he  argues  that  “dualism, 
discussed in the development literature devoted to the economics of the Third World, is now a 
particularly useful notion in understanding changes in the global  legal profession” (Idem, 
444).  The  only  way  he  finds  to  combat  “unlimited  exploitive  patterns”  is  “re-asserting 
effective legal (and political) control” (Idem, 448). This is the alternative Mattei presents to 
the  menacing  “tragic  outcomes”  of  postmodernist  polyvalence  (Idem).  However,  it  is 
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questionable if the return to modern schemes can promise such a messianic salvation. The 
apocalyptic  perspective  that  Mattei  presents  makes  clear  that  instead  of  transcending  the 
models he criticizes,  he remains in  a linear  conception of development  and a dichotomic 
understanding of human interaction that does not allow enough space for engaging with the 
complexity of plural, variable interactions embedded in contexts of diversified identities. 
An alternative to this recurrent imposition of hierarchies is a total opening to plurality and 
particularism.  In  this  radicality,  the  pluralizing  proposal  cannot  find  expression  within  a 
political and social project that is organized around law understood as a system that sets and 
requires a hierarchy. This possibility appears therefore in other forms. One important role that 
this absolute opening to plurality takes is (similar as in the view Mattei presents) as a source 
of fear, an image of disaster that the new proposals present as a chaotic end to which they 
intend  to  offer  a  solution.  Total  openness  to  plurality  is  thus,  particularly  in  political 
discourses,  often  embedded  in  a  narrative  of  horror,  anarchy,  disorder  and  apocalypse. 
Academic reflection, however, offers an open field for a different investigation of the fantasy 
of total plurality. Thus, absolute plurality finds a place, for example, in the arguments posing 
the impossibility of exchange, the incommensurability of systems, an ultimate estrangement 
in front of the Other 
An aspect of this academic freedom that allows further questions around plurality can 
be seen in  the formulation of hypothesis  regarding the (in-)comparability of systems at  a 
theoretical and practical level.  For example, from an academic perspective, the uncertainty 
resulting from the ‘successful development’ in the area of Southeast Asia in the 1990's despite 
its contrast with a law model advocated by the law and development movement, has found 
expression in statements like the following: “If Asia is indeed different, ‘[i]t would suggest 
that  the  prevailing  social  theories,  which  were  derived from the  experience  of  economic 
development in the West, cannot be generalized. It would also caution against the use of legal 
technical assistance programs as an instrument to stimulate and support economic growth and 
development'” (Ginsburg 2000, 838 cit. Pistor/Wellons). Formulated in terms of ‘Asia’ versus 
‘the West’, a possible answer to this question is naturally framed in culturally essentialistic 
ways and addresses  constrained understandings of  development.  However,  the aspect  that 
needs to be highlighted here is the profound doubt regarding the connections between law 
(particularly  law  as  the  ‘rule  of  law'),  foreign  assistance,  and  economic  development. 
Moreover, the idea of absolutely different approaches, of experiences that are not transferable 
or generalizable, appears as a form of absolute plurality and particularization.
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A key aspect of this absolute opening is the question of transferability of experiences and 
models between different systems. If ‘our’ world and ‘their’ world are incommensurable, then 
communication and transfer, including legal transfer, are impossible. However, legal transfer 
has been a core element in legal development projects of all kinds, old or new, as part of a 
‘neo-liberal’ or a ‘neo-constitutional’ project in terms of Rodríguez Garvito. It is natural thus, 
that the concept and praxis of ‘legal transfer’, particularly as a tool of legal development, has 
suffered important shocks with the post-modern questionings. 
As we have seen, post-modern critique of legal scholarship and praxis has emphasized 
the contextualization of law, its intrinsically cultural character, and therefore its embeddedness 
in webs of power. At the same time, development critics and ‘post-developmentalists’ have 
advanced similar culture-and-power-oriented reflections. In this context of self-reflection, also 
the theory and praxis of ‘legal transfer’ put in question the focus on ‘transplants’ of positive 
law, paying increasingly particular attention to complex institutional formations, practices, 
and principles involved in this process. Also different ways to think, express, interpret, and 
even criticize ‘imported’ law became central for  the conceptualization of ‘legal transfer’. In 
this context of post-modern critique, lastly, a radical pluralistic approach proposes even the 
impossibility of legal transplants.  
This  and  other  proposals  emphasizing  the  cultural  and  pluralizing  aspects  of  legal 
transplants as a result of post-modern reflection will be at the center of my inquiry in the 
following pages. The question now is how does this tool of ‘transplant’ has been reshaped by 
legal theory in the light of post-modern critique. If one of the main criticisms against Watson's 
model  of  ‘transplants’  regarded  his  understanding  of  a  linear  development  of  a  law 
disconnected from culture and politics, how can legal transfers be explained from a view that 
emphasizes the particular contexts of cultural diversity in the field of law?
Regarding  cultural  diversity,  one  of  the  most  renowned  scholars  who  have  stressed  its 
importance for the legal field and particularly in terms of legal transplants, is Pierre Legrand. 
In fact, he makes diversity a core value for his scholarly praxis as a law comparatist, arguing 
that 
“since the role of the comparatist […] is to bear witness to another way of life 
(specifically, another law, another experience of law, another way of life-in-the-
law),  a comparatist  must also be someone who  values  diversity.  […] In other 
words, I argue that the ethics of comparison demands of the comparatist that he be 
prepared  to  affirm  diversity  as  a  good”  (Legrand  2002,  62,  emphasis  in  the 
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It  is  important  in  this  regard  to  understand  the  place  that  difference  takes  in  his 
argument.  Unsurprisingly,  due  to  his  philosophical  parentage  in  deconstructivism,  the 
emphasis  on  difference  is  associated  with  an  emphasis  on  that  which  is  un-known,  un-
thinkable, in-accessible, in short, associated with a ‘non-’, ‘un-’ or ‘in-’ -aspect of experience: 
“difference  suggests  a  dimension  unknown  to  the  self,  beyond  the  self;  […]  difference 
perhaps partakes in what thought cannot think” (Idem, 68). Resulting from these connotations 
of negation, the “reality of alternative and contrapuntal worlds” is perceived as “painful” and 
presents a “trauma” (Idem) for the sentient being and, especially, for the researcher with a 
cognitive urge to apprehend experience. This situation can be met with different attitudes. 
Following Legrand, one of the possible attitudes echoes the “return to a pre-Enlightenment 
cast  of mind which denied parity for all  before the law and favoured exclusion based on 
status”  (Idem,  68).  In  this  line,  we  have  seen  the  problems  arising  from  universalistic 
approaches, even if it  might be difficult  to consider all  these anti-diversity efforts as pre-
Enlightened. 
Another  possible  answer,  which  is  opposed  to  the  latter  and  pursued  by  Legrand, 
envisages “difference as complementarity”, difference not as a means of separation but of 
relation  (Idem).  This  proposal  envisages  thus  the  “deft  management  of  the  cultural 
heteronomies  within  the  whole,  in  the  assumption  of  pluralism,  in  the  acceptance  of  a 
coexistence  of  non-harmonised  rationalities  on  [European]  territory,  in  the  willingness  to 
enlarge the possibility of intelligible discourse between legal traditions,  and in the steady 
practice of a politics of inclusion [...]” (Idem). He argues therefore for the incorporation of 
“'culture’ within the analytical framework”, because, as he details in another part of the same 
paper, “if one is not prepared to envisage law as a cultural phenomenon one thereby places it, 
at least to some extent, beyond the bounds of intelligibility” (Idem, 71, 74).  It is from this 
emphasis on difference that Legrand puts questions regarding legal transplants as discussed to 
begin of this inquiry using Watson's approach.
If we recall Watson's perspective on legal transplants, the main aspects I highlighted 
were  that,  in  his  view,  law  can  be  transplanted  (successfully)  relatively  independent  of 
‘cultural’ traits of the particular society, and that correct legal development is a path towards 
objectively  better,  evermore  less  ambiguous,  law.  Importantly,  already  Kahn-Freund,  in 
dealing with the same problem of transplants as Watson, underlined the context in which law 
254 The same attitude is emphasized by Legrand in other relevant earlier texts. For example, he stated, referring 
to Foucault, that “comparison must involve ‘the primary and fundamental investigation of difference’. The 
priority of alterity must act as a governing postulate for the comparatist” (Legrand 1997, 123 f.).
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is embedded, making the success of a transplant dependent on geographical, economic, social, 
and,  most  importantly,  political  factors  (Kahn-Freund  1974,  6,  8,  27).  Naturally,  these 
understandings of ‘legal transplants’ depend on a set of assumptions regarding the concepts of 
law  and  transplant  amongst  others.  Also  Legrand's  criticisms  of  Watson  derive  from  a 
particular understanding of law, namely as one which is necessarily embedded in a cultural 
setting  that  gives  meaning  to  it,  emphasizing  particularly  the  role  of  interpretation  and 
language (Legrand 2002, 74). In his words, 
“[t]he meaning of the rule is an essential component of the rule; it partakes in the 
ruleness of the rule. The meaning of a rule, however, is not entirely supplied by 
the rule itself; a rule is never completely self-explanatory. [...] The meaning of the 
rule is, accordingly,  a function of the interpreter's epistemological assumptions 
which are themselves historically and culturally conditioned” (Idem). 
In line with the theoretical developments in the second half  of the 20th century,  Legrand 
makes an emphasis on the elements “beneath consciousness” that are included in the acts of 
interpretation, as well as the elements of power and ideology (Idem, 115, 120, 122).
Legrand develops his perspective on legal transplants from this idea of an all-pervading 
cultural contingency of meaning. He argues thus against the perspective that a rule “carries 
definite meaning irrespective of interpretation or application” (Idem, 120). As a result of this 
understanding and making use of philosophical arguments advanced by Foucault and Derrida, 
Legrand takes the statement of the cultural embeddedness of law to its extreme consequence, 
concluding that  “legal  transplants  are  impossible”  (Legrand 1997,  114).  His  emphasis  on 
difference makes of each law a unique,  a particular  combination of irretrievable past  and 
present material, as well as psychological facts. 
However,  in  Legrand's  approach,  this  emphasis  on  the  uniqueness  of  legal 
understandings cannot stand without a notion of identity that supports it and makes it one and 
unique. His understanding of interpretation sees in it an “'intersubjective’ phenomenon” which 
leads him finally to a key aspect of his approach to law, legal transplants, the discipline of 
comparative  law  and  contemporary  politics:  a  community's  cultural  identity  (Idem,  115). 
Thus, despite all emphasis on the value of diversity, the argumentation of Legrand tends to 
end up in problematic essentialistic (and nation-state dependent) understandings of identity, 
culture, and lastly, of law. Take for example, following quote from Legrand's section ‘Rule as 
Culture’ in his renown paper ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997):
“In enacting a rule for the reasons they do and in the way they do, as a product of  
the way they think, with the hopes they have, in enacting a particular rule (and not 
others),  the  French,  for  example,  are  not  just  doing  that:  they are  also  doing 
something typically French and are thus alluding to a modality of legal experience 
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that  is  intrinsically  theirs.  in  this  sense,  because  it  communicates  the  French 
sensibility to law, the rule can serve as a focus of inquiry into legal Frenchness 
and into Frenchness tout court” (Legrand 1997, 115; emphasis in the original).
After the prominent place of diversity in Legrand's thought, it is worth asking here, who 
are  actually  ‘they’,  the  ‘French’,  that  exercise  all  their  ‘Frenchness’ in  understanding  a 
particular rule. What is the typical and intrinsic aspect of it? Would it be equally ‘typically 
French’ if  interpreted,  applied and understood by a  French interpret  born in  Alger?  Or a 
French raised at the German border? Is there one French sensibility to law? Who is ‘they’, 
and, most importantly, who is the implicit ‘we’ in Legrand's reflection? 
According to his argument, law is – like any other meaningful asset (Legrand 1997, 
117) – inseparable of its interpretation, understanding interpretation as “the outcome of an 
unequal distribution of social and cultural power within society as a whole and within an 
interpretive  community  in  particular  [...]  and  operates,  through  repeated  articulation,  to 
eliminate or marginalize alternatives” (Idem, 115). If we assume this, then,  it  suits to ask 
which alternative interpretations of what he has normed as ‘French’ is he marginalizing, and 
where does he take his authoritative power from? Where remains his concern for the defense 
of diversity, and its treatment in equality beyond pre-Enlightenment exclusion in this case? 
Which is the final element of legitimation that Legrand can present for us to follow not only 
his  interpretation  of  ‘French’  but  also  of  ‘culture’,  ‘identity’,  ‘law’,  ‘rule’  and  ‘legal 
transplant'? Reducing his argument to a minimum, the element of legitimation he invokes is 
‘reality’, or, in other words, his privileged capacity to see ‘the whole’, to access reality.255 
Despite  his  use  of  language  evoking  notions  of  very dynamic  systemic  approaches 
(using expressions like “the part is an expression and a synthesis of the whole: it resonates”, 
Idem, 116),  he returns to arguments that emphasize the  univocity of reality,  meaning and 
context, recalling Hans-Georg Gadamer's (1900-2002) statement that “the meaning of the part 
can be discovered only from the context – i.e., ultimately from the whole” (Idem; emphasis 
added). Importantly, it is the capacity to see the whole, what stands, according to Legrand, for 
the quality of the comparatist. And who will be the privileged one to guarantee at the end of 
the vertical ladder of hierarchy, that this one or that one was the whole whole, or the right 
whole to look at? 
255 In this sense, see for example, Legrand's statement: “Rules are just not what they are represented as being 
by Watson. And, because of  what they effectively are, rules cannot travel” (Legrand 1997,  114; emphasis 
added).  For  a  critique  of  essentialistic  understandings  of  law  in  general,  see  particularly  Tamanaha's  
argument presented above and Tamanaha 2000.
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This combination of a strong voice for diversity with an univocal perspective on identity 
has clear consequences for his concepts of law and legal transplant. While Legrand underlines 
that “law is a polysemic signifier” (Idem), he nevertheless seems to assume that there are 
specific meanings that law signifies and others not. In this line, it is just natural that, in his 
arguments on legal transplant, when he speaks about law, he refers to formal state law. In 
terms of legal transplant,  his  arguments result  in  a strange (and ambiguous) combination. 
Following his argument on this topic, particularity and difference have primacy, and thus, 
legal  transplants  are  impossible.  In  other  words,  the  world  of  law  on  the  one  side  is  
incommensurable with the world of law on the other side of the imagined transplant border. 
Meaning does not go beyond borders. The conundrum then would be, reenacting the problem 
presented  above regarding Lyotard's  argument  against  Habermas,  if  understanding of  and 
communication with any ‘Other’ is at all possible. 
However,  and this  is  the puzzling part  of Legrand's  argument,  he escapes from this 
question and its devastating consequences for human interaction, coexistence and survival, 
through the emphatic assertion of communities’ cultural identities. In other words, when he 
states  the  existence  of  an  ‘other’,  he  also  states  the  existence  of  an  apparently  quite 
homogenous  ‘we’,  within  which  communication  ‘works’.  There  is  simply  no  difference 
within ‘us’. Furthermore, identifying ‘the Other’ as a specific one, and putting boundaries to 
its otherness, he assumes that I can actually categorize the system of the Other in my language 
and understand him and his otherness within my own set of meaning.
It is from this combination of contextualized law and limited identities that Legrand 
argues  the impossibility of  legal  transplants.  The remaining ‘transplant’ as  such,  this  is  a 
transplant that disregards the meaning given to law in the different contexts and refers only to 
the use of meaning-less word combinations, is explained as a ‘rhetorical strategy’, due to the 
fact that “law reformers on occasion find it convenient, presumably in the interest of economy 
and  efficiency,  to  adopt  a  pre-existing  form  of  words  which  may  happen  to  have  been 
formulated  outside  of  the  jurisdiction  within  which  they  operate”  (Legrand  1997,  121). 
Understandably, this “turn to the past to help [individuals] construct the present” should not 
be at the center of comparatist reflections. 
However, it is problematic that the consequence he draws from this stance results in an 
invitation to focus on the “particular epistemological framework” that conditions “the fact of 
repetition” (Idem). This framework does not refer directly to the variable, concrete, specific, 
diverse  and unique  conditions  of  the  transplants,  but  to  the  ‘mentalité’ (Idem).  With  this 
concept, Legrand brings again a notion of the cultural identity of a community. The question 
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remaining  is  thus  how  are  comparatists  supposed  to  perform  that  work  of  comparing 
‘mentalités’,  if  every  interpretation  is  unique,  if  meaning  is  totally  contingent,  and  if, 
consequently, the Other is understandable only from the inside and, lastly, inaccessible.
In this sense, it is remarkable the stress that Legrand puts on a divisory border when he 
claims that “the comparatist must never abolish the distance between self and other” (Idem, 
123). From this stance, is there any room to find something different in looking at the Other 
than what the researcher is searching most desperately for, namely non-self? The comparative 
project Legrand draws, “must depend upon an initial receptivity to the otherness of the Other” 
(Idem, 124). But is it equally prepared for its sameness with the own self? Is this presumption 
of  difference  any better  or  at  least  any different  from the  presumption  of  similarity  that 
Legrand criticizes? And what if the Other is not so self-contained and homogenous? And what 
if the Other out there is just an expression of ‘the Other within'? And what about empathy and 
transformative encounterings with otherness? Am I not a bit more other every time I truly 
understand ‘otherness'? This step of transformation is prohibitive for Legrand. 
Despite  his  argument  that  foreign  law  turns  rapidly  into  own(ed)  law,  with  new 
meaning,  making legal  transplants  de  facto  impossible,  this  process  of  appropriation  and 
change is not equally true for the researcher in comparative law, who, apparently, remains 
clearly outside of her research. The observer does not alter her object of observation and her 
object of observation does not alter the observer. Thus, she can follow Legrand's imperative to 
“allow the self to make the journey and see the Other in the way he must be seen, that is, as 
other” (Idem). Who will state that there is an ‘other’, and the way how he must be seen? A 
privileged outsider only. 
The distance between self and other has consequences for disciplinary questions. It is 
crucial thus, for the comparatist endeavor Legrand proposes, to define a ‘legal culture’. But, 
of course, the ultimate legitimation for this definition according to the result of “finding what 
is significant in its difference from others” (Idem, 123 ref. Taylor) is dependent again of an 
alleged privileged perspective. In the same line, Legrand argues that “comparison must grasp 
legal  cultures  diacritically”  (Idem,  emphasis  in  the  original).  But  is  not  the  intention  to 
compare already a result of assuming a particular pre-determined concept of law and culture, 
of  sameness  and  difference?  Is  not  any  comparison  the  result  of  a  previous  diacritic 
demarcation?
Criticizing the ‘tendency to emphasize sameness in comparative legal research, Legrand 
argues  that  an  attitude  that  takes  the  ‘legal-change-as-legal-transplants’  argument  (like 
Watson)  with  its  specific  understanding  of  law  as  detached  from  their  cultural  context, 
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“betrays a  political  decision to marginalize difference and correlatively to extol sameness” 
(Idem, 122). Focusing on “the technical level of law”, he argues, this stance “reflects a faith in 
abstract  universalism”  (Idem).  This  critique  is  no  different  from  the  critique  against  a 
technocratic version of law and development. Importantly, recalling Sousa Santos, he links the 
proposition  of  ‘legal-change-as-legal-transplants’ to  “the production and the perception of 
empirical regularity [needed] to meet ‘the regulatory needs of liberal capitalism'” (Idem).256 
While  this  criticism against  an apolitical  technocratic  view of law and legal  change 
might be valid, as I argued above, the question is if Legrand's ‘diacritical’ attitude is, in the 
end, more open to diversity and more sincere regarding its political bias. If Legrand criticizes 
that Watson and others over-emphasize similarities, is it any less problematic to argue that 
“comparison must involve ‘the primary and fundamental investigation of difference'” as its 
priority (Idem, 123 f.)? This is just an inverted mirror of emphasizing similarities between 
two objects (which must be previously identified as different). 
Difference  and  similarity  are  just  two  names  for  the  results  of  the  same  cognitive 
process  that  draws  a  line,  disregarding  variety within  the  identities  drawn and  sameness 
between them. The question is, lastly, if Legrand is not doing the same imposition of one 
rationality on disparate  experiences,  avoiding equally any “critical  vocation” (Idem, 122), 
when he utilizes concepts of cultural identity and otherness, that already pre-form what the  
Other is. The same problem appears regarding his aim to determine “what law is” (Legrand 
1997, 114, emphasis added) and his search to “uncover the roots of law” (Legrand 2002, 71). 
He equally claims a certain general technical validity of his argument, while his elaborations 
are embedded in political stances that he does not make always clear. In fact, his argument 
that “the gap between an articulated uniformity and local practices can never be bridged” 
(Idem) is deeply connected with concrete debates around the creation of a Civil Code for the 
European Union, which not only is a matter of uniformization of law, but also of legal transfer 
(in  several  directions)  as  well  as  a  project  of  legal  development  that  aims  to  increase 
economic performance through better law.
Hence, following a Derridean call for the duty to respect difference, particularly in the 
context of the European experience (Idem, 62), Legrand criticizes the engagements with legal 
diversity in Europe, which, according to him “rather than promote understanding across legal 
cultures  and  legal  traditions,  purport  to  show  that  the  problem  of  understanding  across 
cultures and traditions is a false one because, in effect, there is very little difference across 
256 Further critiques of Legrand  against claims that this approach to legal change is non-ideological can be 
found in Legrand 2002, 71.
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laws” (Idem, 63). These are, what he calls ‘strategies of simplification’, that instrumentalize 
law and aim to efface the differences, overlooking cultural heteronomies. Significantly, he 
refers to these cultural heteronomies as “the specificity of Europe” (Idem, 68), a Europe he 
conceives as formed basically by ‘two legal traditions’. We find here the same problem we 
have found before regarding Frenchness. Is the no-European law, whatever that might be, 
intrinsically  non-heteronomous?  Are  the  ‘two  legal  traditions’ of  civil  and  common  law 
homo-
genous in themselves? His project is clear, when he states that what he is “actively trying to 
‘preserve’,  as  befits  a  compartist-at-law,  is  the  entitlement  of  historical  communities  to 
maintain a local connection with their law as a legitimate vector of cultural identity” (Idem, 
72). But how local and how homogeneous are the historical communities he envisages? Here 
also,  Legrand  ends  up  emphasizing  diversity  through  an  essentialistic  perspective  which 
depends  lastly  on  an  universalistic  and  objectivistic  approach  regarding  otherness  and 
difference.
This modern character of his perspective on identity, tinges also Legrand's concept of 
change, which he conceives in a linear perspective, either as regressive or progressive (Idem, 
71). Progress is, in fact, an important element in his argument in favor of difference in the 
European context. Thus, he criticizes the idea of a uniformization as a need for progress, not 
because progress can be conceived in diverse ways or because the idea of progress itself 
depends on a particular mindset, but because, as he underlines, “[t]here is no discontinuity 
between localism, on the one hand, and democracy and progress on the other” (Idem, 75). 
Modernization is also part of his political desires and so, he can “fully agree” with advocates 
of  a  legal  European  unification  “that  the  European  Community continues  to  offer  signal 
opportunities  to  local  communities  to  modernise  their  laws  against  the  wishes  of  local 
orthodoxies” (Idem, 75). 
Importantly, the concepts of progress and modernization that are being invoked here 
hand in hand with ‘democracy’ are, however, the same lying at the base of a uniformizing 
schedule. In this sense, he criticizes, for example, the idea that “a common market requires a 
common  law  of  contract”,  adding  (in  order  to  strengthen  his  argument  for  European 
particularisms) that in “other common markets such as those of the United States or Canada, 
[...] legal diversity has been regarded as perfectly compatible with the development of a sound 
economy” (Idem, 66, emphasis added). Thus, Legrand does not oppose a linear pattern of 
modernization and progress towards a particular form of society by itself, but it is just the 
‘how’ of this development that he aims to change. Despite his emphasis on the protection of 
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diversity,  he  still  holds  to  a  specific  and  linear  understanding  of  development  towards  a 
unified ideal, connected directly with economic perspectives257 and with a universalistic and 
essentialistic posture regarding identity and difference. 
In this sense, his theoretical posture resonates with the one present in contemporaneous 
projects of legal development, which, as I have shown, defending cultural diversity end up 
defining  specific  identities  and  bounding  them to  particular  traits.  Development,  in  turn, 
continues focusing on economic perspectives, including this  time also the maintenance of 
differentiated  and defined ‘cultural  identities’.  Thus,  we can  find  similar  oppositions  and 
continuities in the realm of theory as well as in the praxis of legal development. In none of 
these cases, the approaches that advocate for the value of difference, manage to go beyond the 
modern assumptions of the positions they criticize. In terms of legal transfer, the questions 
over the need and consequences of harmonization as a form of legal development are thus 
caught in a debate with unsatisfying answers. As David Nelken sums up, “[t]he advocates of 
harmonisation do not deal satisfactorily with the likelihood of their projects producing new 
differences. And those who claim that difference should be taken as a presupposition do not 
explain  why  their  concern  for  difference  is  restricted  to  only  certain  levels  of  types  of 
difference” (Nelken 2007, 26). 
Although  the  positions  of  Legrand  and  Watson  are  key as  researches  reflecting  on  legal 
transplants  trying  to  deal  with  the  tension  between  plurality  and  unity,  divergence  and 
convergence, naturally, they have not been the only studies in this line. On the contrary, the 
tension  between  the  positions  presented,  and  the  contemporary  political  developments, 
particularly in the context of the European Union, have made of ‘legal transplants’ a matter of 
intense  discussion  amongst  law comparatists.  In  an  attempt  to  transcend the  positions  of 
Watson ('legal transplants are the main form of legal development’ resulting in increasing 
convergence) and Legrand ('legal transplants are impossible’ and thus legal development does 
not happen through legal transplant and more convergence), which at first sight contradict 
each other clearly, new approaches have sought for developing differentiated arguments in 
front of ‘legal transplants’. The concept itself has been challenged and new metaphors have 
been proposed, including amongst others the concepts of “legal irritants” (Teubner 1998) and 
“diffusion of law” (Twining 2004).258 In order to give a wider picture of the contemporary 
257 Examples regarding the connections between law and trade can be found in Legrand 2002, 73 f.
258 For a discussion of the multiple metaphors advanced for the study of the influence of one legal system on 
others, see Nelken 2001.
358
discussion  on  ‘legal  transfer’,  and  to  underline  the  recurring  difficulties  with  pluralistic 
approaches to legal transplants, I will refer succinctly to two of these approaches.
An innovative approach in this field has been Esin Örücü's perspective on law as “a 
series  of  transpositions  and tunings”  (Örücü 2002,  206).259 According to  this  perspective, 
introducing law from a different environment equals changing the key in which a note or a 
whole melody is played, and “'tuning’ […] is the key to success” in this process (Idem, 207). 
More important than the details of this musical metaphor260, is Örücü's emphasis regarding 
that “all law is mixed and there are no exceptions. It is only that the mixture is different, and 
the levels of combinations and therefore the extent of the mix varies” (Idem, 221). This is not 
just a perspective regarding closed results and firm (even if mixed) entities. Moreover, the 
author  envisages  legal  systems in  a  constant  process  of  “mixing,  blending,  melting,  then 
solidifying  into  new shapes  as  they cool  down while  transposition  and  tuning  take  their 
effect”  (Idem, 223).  Hence,  Örücü's  work expands the notion of ‘mixed systems’ used in 
comparative law to all legal systems (Örücü 2008, 2).
Important for us is how she deals with this constant blending, which, in the terms we 
have been using until now, describes the conjunction of constant and extended processes of 
‘legal transplants’ or ‘legal transfers’. As she argues, “[a]n entirely fresh approach is needed 
today  [in  comparative  law],  within  which  legal  systems  can  be  classified  according  to 
parentage,  constituent  elements  and  the  resulting  blend,  and  then  be  regrouped  on  the 
principle of predominance” (Idem, 3). Based on these aspects, she borrows two schemes from 
linguistic theory in order to address different aspects of legal transposition: firstly, the use of 
‘family trees’ to  address  divergence,  and secondly,  the use of  a  ‘wave model’ to  address 
convergence of legal  systems,  thus giving importance to  both movements  participating in 
processes of legal development. Furthermore, she elaborates on four kinds of encounters of 
legal systems, according to the division between similar or different ‘legal cultures’ on the one 
hand, and ‘socio-cultures’ on the other hand (Idem, 6).  As a result,  she argues that when 
259 'Transposition’ is notably a term taken from music theory. Örücü explains the advantages of her proposal as 
follows: 
“The term ‘transposition’ is more apt in instances of massive change based on competing models,  
in that here the pitch is changed. In musical transposition, each note takes the same relative place 
in the scale of the new key as in the old, the ‘transposition’ being made to suit the particular 
instrument or the voice-range of the singer. So in law. Each legal institution or rule introduced is  
used  in  the  system of  the  recipient,  as  it  was  in  the  system of  the  model,  the  transposition  
occurring to suit the particular socio-legal culture and needs of the recipient. In fact, there may be 
a number of ‘transpositions’, since no single model is necessarily used by any one recipient. Even 
what is called ‘reciprocal influence’, a more acceptable term today among the comparatists, is 
actually a number of transpositions” (Örücü 2002, 207).
260 Interestingly, this concept goes in line with other acoustic metaphors in contemporary comparative law, like 
the discussion on the ‘harmonization’ of law shows.
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elements  from  socio-culturally  similar  and  legal-culturally  different  legal  systems  come 
together, they form mixed systems of a “'simple’ kind”, and “'complex’ mixed systems” result 
“where the elements are both socio-culturally and legal-culturally different” (Idem, 13). She 
considers,  however,  that  “[m]ore  complex  mixes  might  appear  in  places  where  the  legal 
system or the law is based on, or heavily determined by, religion or belief” as well as in the 
case of indigenous laws (Idem, 14).
While it is remarkable that Örücü does not pretend to create a new separate category of 
‘mixed systems’, but accentuates the ‘hybrid’ aspect of all legal systems, it is important to 
notice also that she speaks of ‘levels of hybridity’ that need to be determined. If “[t]he various 
degrees of hybridity arise from various degrees, levels and layers of encounters, crossing and 
intertwining” (Idem, 16), the problem appears that also ‘levels’ of purity are implied. And 
who  will  set  the  categories  of  purity  to  understand  what  has  encountered  or  what  is 
intertwining? 
In the end, Örücü resorts to the great divide between civil law and common law as 
sources from which hybrids are formed that she identifies as ‘simple mixes’. Opening up the 
perspective to ‘complex mixes’, she incorporates also other three ‘basic’ categories of law 
apparently pure (or purer?) at least as ideal types, namely socialist law, religious law and 
customary law. Importantly, “legal pluralisms” appear as a third category for more rare cases 
of “dualist systems with layers of law co-existing and applicable to different members of the 
population” (Idem, 17).  From a similar point of view, in another ‘map’ of categorization, 
mixes are divided between unstructured and structured mixes (Idem, 18).  Importantly,  the 
main elements  for that  distinction is  if  civil  law is  or is  not codified,  making the central 
reference points the idea of ‘civil law’ and the idea of a ‘code’, both elements dependent on a 
particular perspective of what law is. 
It is clear that Örücü speaks here of formalized state law, particularly from a perspective 
that divides clearly between private/public and codified/non-codified, and all her claims for 
opening up the perspective to more diversity in the field of comparative law are limited to that 
conception of law. Her argument can thus be reduced to a minimum in following words: Legal 
norms are adopted from one (formal) legal system to another, thus a key aspect is to tune 
these  changes  with  the  law and other  socio-cultural  aspects.  These  processes  create  new 
mixtures, which, when successful, result in “harmony rather than harmonisation” (Idem 2002, 
211). Importantly, she makes a claim for the coexistence of diversity when she emphasizes 
that “[t]o converge does not mean to attempt to create sameness, but to accept diversity. Only 
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when diversity is  accepted can there be ‘healthy infusion’.  Only then can the transferred 
norms become ‘internalised’ and thereby work” (Idem). 
In this short resume of Örücü's approach, we can see, once again, how the pluralistic stance 
hits  the  limits  of  positive  formal  state  law and,  clearly,  of  functionalism.  Thus,  it  is  not 
surprising that Örücü justifies the importance of ‘tuning’ and the ‘tuners’ involved, this is 
”those who move the law and help in its internalisation” […], “by the fact that countries 
which adapt transplanted law have more effective legality, that is, they further develop their 
formal sources and build effective legal systems, and have effective economic development” 
(Idem, 208). Other problematic points of her perspective that resonate with critiques presented 
above,  are  also  the  division  between ‘socio-cultures’ and ‘legal  cultures’ that  she makes, 
which is only possible from a de-socialized perspective on law and legal culture, and the 
technical aura that her proposal of ‘transposition’ of law entails. 
However, the most immediate question for me in front of this approach is how far does 
it  allow  us  to  engage  with  the  identified  ‘transpositions’.  While  her  explanation  of 
incorporation of new law intends to be merely of descriptive or analytical use, what does it 
tell us about the power relationships involved and how does it helps us to engage with the 
transpositions it outlines? The ‘healthy infusions’ are supposed to be ‘healthy’ for whom? Is it 
also possible that ‘socio-cultures’ dissonate with each other in the same country? How far is 
this tuning reinforcing the system of power that ‘tunes’ it in? Even more complex problems 
arise, when we recover the idea of co-existing legal-cultures within one Nation-State (Benda-
Beckmann/Benda-Beckmann 2007, 54f., 67 ff.).
Beyond these questions,  however,  we have to  emphasize the importance of  Örücü's 
perspective, in helping legal researchers to see transfer everywhere. For example, she states 
that “[o]ne could go further and say that every time a court distinguishes from a prior case, it  
is undertaking tuning and sometimes transposing a rule of principle from some other area of 
law to solve the problem at hand” (Idem 2002, 208; emphasis added). However, also here a 
technical, neutral perspective and a linear perspective on the betterment of law are present. In 
this line, she argues further that “[s]hared human problems require similar responses from 
legal systems, hence legislatures and courts look to other jurisdictions for inspiration at least, 
if  not  for  direct  borrowing,  in  an  effort  to  improve  these  responses”  (Idem,  221  f.) 
Problematically, with these assertions she minimizes and banalizes the moments of exertion of 
authority presenting them as mere technical  and needed ‘solutions’.  The judge transposes 
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when he solves and solves when he transposes, but does this approach give us tools to address 
the way he transposes, what he solves and in whose favor? 
The problematic I see relies therein that transposition involves an assortment of choices 
and,  on the way,  not  only the new key is  set,  but  also the instruments  and the  range of 
interpreting musicians that could play them too. On the way, even the melody might change. 
In other words, Örücü calms us down, showing that ‘legal transplant’ is nothing new, and that 
tuning is needed, possible, and constantly ongoing. If this is the case, as I also believe, even 
more so is it crucial to ask who takes the place of the tuner, who carries that responsibility and 
power, which cultures are these tuners linked to? Do all have equal access to transpose and 
tune? And, most importantly, in Örücü's language: What if I do not like the tune?
Summing  up,  Örücü's  proposal  of  ‘legal  transfer’ as  transposition  invites  us  to  see 
plurality and transfer everywhere. In this sense, it  is a pluralizing approach to law, and it  
entails an important critique of mainstream perspectives on comparative law and the prevalent 
division among ‘legal families’ or ‘legal cultures’. But, at the same time, Örücü bases her 
approach  on  delineated  cultural  unities,  that  become  hybridized.  All  these  processes  of 
pluralization,  transfer  and  hibridization  are  oriented,  furthermore,  towards  better  law,  an 
effective legal system that results in an effective economic development. Even if the idea of a 
‘better law’ is pervaded by a broad understanding of social harmony in diversity, nevertheless, 
Örücü envisages a road to development,  where law is a technical tool.  With it,  the judge 
solves conflicts,  and the developing politician fixes social  disharmony.  Importantly,  while 
diversity is at the core of Örücü's approach, all this variety is subsumed under one set of social 
functions.
Very relevant for the discussion on legal transplants has been equally the proposal of Gunther 
Teubner to view ‘legal transplants’ as ‘legal irritants’, arguing that “'transplant’ creates the 
wrong impression that after a difficult surgical operation the transferred material will remain 
identical with itself playing its old role in the new organism” (Teubner 1998, 12), so that the 
only alternatives possible are repulsion or integration. With the metaphor of irritants, Teubner 
aims to emphasize the aspect that the introduction of foreign law “triggers a whole series of 
new and unexpected events” within the system of law and in the relationship of the system of 
law with society, understanding society “as a fragmented multiplicity of discourses” (Idem, 
12, 21). The ‘legal irritants’ force these arrangements “to reconstruct internally not only their 
own rules but to reconstruct from scratch the alien element itself” (Idem, 12). As a result, 
Teubner concludes that “'[l]egal irritants’ cannot be domesticated; they are not transformed 
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from something alien into something familiar, not adapted to a new cultural context, rather 
they  will  unleash  an  evolutionary  dynamic  in  which  the  external  rule's  meaning  will  be 
reconstructed and the internal context will undergo fundamental change” (Idem).
What  is  compelling  about  Teubner's  approach,  is  the  diversity  he  envisages  within 
society,  remarking  that  “different  sectors  of  the  globalised  society  do  not  face  the  same 
problems for their laws to deal with, but highly different ones” (Idem, 13) This diversity will 
produce in the end, that even a project of uniformization or harmonization results in new 
differences (Idem, 23 f.).261 
Problematic remains, as I have mentioned above, the conceptualization of the social 
system of ‘law’ as separate from other systems, and the perspective on law from a rather 
unifying perspective when it comes to particularization rather than to globalization. Equally, a 
critical perspective regarding the what, how and who of processes of ‘legal irritation’ stays 
also off the shore in Teubner's proposal. However, as a tool for organizing analysis of the 
interaction between ‘systems of law’ within global discourse the approach of Teubner can be 
very useful. Particularly, he emphasizes the global connections of national processes which, as 
we have seen above, are central to contemporary political changes and legal reforms. In this 
sense, he argues that 
“the  transfer  of  legal  institutions  is  no longer  a  matter  of  an  inter-relation  of 
national societies where the transferred institution carries the whole burden of the 
original national culture. Rather it is a direct contact between legal orders within 
one global legal discourse. This explains the frequent and relatively easy transfer 
of legal institutions from one legal order to the other. However, at the same time 
their ties to the ‘life of nations’ have not vanished” (Idem, 16).
Furthermore, his point regarding the emergence of new differences through any process 
of ‘legal irritation’ is a key aspect to take into account in order to develop a perspective on 
‘legal transplants’ that takes plurality sufficiently in consideration. Teubner's demands become 
quite concrete in this aspect when he reflects about the incorporation of ‘good faith’ in British 
law in the context of the jurisprudence of European courts. Regarding this particular example, 
the  author  emphasizes  that  the  cleavages  amongst  diverse  interpretations  oriented  to  the 
particularities of different institutional environments “cannot and should not be papered over 
by the European zeal for harmonisation of laws” (Idem, 31). In the same line, he is clear about 
the role he bestows upon European legal authorities, which if any, “would be to strengthen the 
capacity for irritation of the good faith  clause instead of neutralising it  when they try to 
enforce its unitarian interpretation” (Idem). 
261 This argument has been taken up by Pierre Legrand in several occasions. See, for example, Legrand 2002, 
69.
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Teubner's approach thus emphasizes the pluralization of interpretations and advices the 
support of this continuous process. Importantly, it is worth asking how far does this pluralized 
and pluralizing freedom go? To start  with,  does this  freedom include the pluralization of 
interpretations by understandings of local minorities or of non-state-dependent social groups? 
Does it  include  the  pluralization  of  the  interpretations  of  norms of  interpretation?  If  this 
freedom has a limit, then that is also the end of the claim for plurality and the return to a 
hierarchy that Teubner rejects. 
Problematically,  in case this freedom goes really so far that the valid interpretations 
multiply constantly, then the question remains of how can these diverse particular approaches 
engage with  each other,  interact.  Teubner  depicts  accurately the  problem of  the  unifying 
efforts in the European Union as “a question of Euro-paradoxia, the paradox of the unitas 
multiplex which requests the integrating law against all the rhetorics of an ‘ever closer union’ 
to  pay utmost  respect  to  the  autonomy and  diversity  of  European  cultures”  (Idem,  31). 
However,  is  it  less  paradoxical  and  immobilizing  the  alternative  of  an  ever  increasing 
conflicting multitude of interpretations claiming equal legitimacy? Is it any less dangerous 
regarding the use of oppressing violence against diversity?
Summing up, we can say that, if postmodern approaches to legal transplant do not provide 
satisfying responses regarding how to deal with conflicts taking diversity into account, at least 
they have successfully destabilized a mechanical or even organicist perspective on the transfer 
of law and the transformations that result  from it.  William Twining addressed the diverse 
elements  of  puzzlement  that  contemporary  researchers  encounter  when  dealing  with 
‘diffusion  of  law’,  recovering  his  personal  academic  trajectory.  His  reflections  serve  as 
testimony and summary of the problems that modern approaches to law, transfer and change 
find in the context of a postmodern sociolect. In this context, the aim and dream of modern 
comparative law researchers (like Twining) to present a map portraying the systems of law in 
the  world  turns  into  a  nightmare,  when  they  have  to  abandon  a  “naïve  model  of  legal 
receptions”  (Twining 2004,  4).  With  courageous self-criticism,  Twining characterized  this 
model, which he himself followed in the past, denouncing:
“(a) It assumes that there [is] an identifiable exporter and importer;
(b) It assumes that the standard case of a reception is export-import between 
countries;
(c) It assumes that the typical process of reception involves a direct one-way 
transfer from country A to country B;
(d)  It  assumes  that  the  main  objects  of  reception   are  legal  rules  and 
concepts;
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(e) It assumes that the main agents of export and import and governments;
(f) It assumes that reception involves  formal  enactment or adoption  at a  
particular moment of time;
(g)  It  assumes  that  the  object  of  reception  retains  its  identity  without  
significant change after the date of receptions.
Other  common,  but  by  no  means  universal  assumptions,  include  the 
following:
(h) The standard case is export by a civil law or common law ‘parent’ legal 
system to a  less  developed  dependent  (e.g.  colonial)  or  adolescent  (e.g.  
‘transitional') legal system;
(i)  That  most  instances  of  reception  are  technical  rather  than  political, 
typically involving ‘lawyers’ law';
(j)  That  the  received  law  either  fills  a  legal  vacuum  or  replaces  prior 
(typically outdated or traditional) law” (Idem, 4 f.).
As Twining regrets, while these assumptions have been put in question from different 
approaches in social sciences, the legal studies have paid little attention to these challenges. 
Nevertheless, as Kuppe underlined, some of the criticisms and new perspectives have found 
expression in changes regarding the development aid strategies concerned with legal matters 
(Kuppe 2010, 33 f.). Thus, an emphasis has been put in addressing not only states but also 
NGOs and the civil  society in general,  and informal interaction has become an important 
element.  At  the  same  time,  ‘diffusion  of  law’ has  been  identified  as  only  one  form  of 
interaction amongst legal orders (Twining 2004, 16). 
Through these  discussions,  involved in  a  postmodern  sociolect,  the  notion  of  ‘legal 
transplant’ has been pluralized, addressed from the perspective of varied particular contexts, 
and criticized in its political instrumentalization. Time and space, identity of the subjects and 
of the objects, aim and context – all these categories conforming the idea of ‘legal transplant’ 
are blurred and destabilized.  This is  the expression,  in the theoretical discussion on legal 
transplants,  of  the  same  tensions  we  have  seen  in  the  more  general  debates  on  modern 
approaches  in  theory  and  praxis.  When  the  clear  lines  and  boundaries  of  these  modern 
perspectives on law, identity,  otherness and interaction are twisted, then ‘diffusion of law’ 
turns into a  complex and dynamic system of  a wider  variety of interacting elements  and 
relations. But once we have taken that step, going back to a modern model of law, a linear 
perspective on development, and a simplistic idea of exchange is, if not impossible, always 
unsatisfying and insufficient to deal with current social needs. The pluralistic turn, however, is 
not an answer by itself, it is a situation in which our thought and action are embedded. How to 
engage with ‘Other’ and ‘Self’, or rather with ‘others’ and ‘selves’, is the recurring question at 
the core of the present time.
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III.  Closing Remarks  
In  this  last  chapter,  I  have  addressed  how  the  culture-and-power  oriented  post-modern 
critiques found expression in the discussion on law and development and in the theorization 
of legal transplants as a central aspect of development processes.  As I have shown, ‘legal 
transplants’ have  not  only  played  a  key role  in  the  rhetorics  and  in  the  praxis  of  legal  
development strategies, but also have become a central spot in scholarly reflection regarding 
legal and social change as such and the relationship between law, society and culture. 
In this line, I have presented the transition that the ‘Law and Development’ movement 
underwent, particularly, how new conceptions of development shook its conceptual pillars, 
and fostered new ‘alternative’ approaches to legal development and development through law. 
Unsurprisingly, the reflection on ‘legal transplants’ experienced a similar process resulting in 
new approaches  to  law that  aim to  take  the  cultural  aspects,  and  with  it  the  element  of 
diversity and power, sufficiently into consideration. However, these changes have not resulted 
in  a  profound  transformation  in  the  structures  at  the  base  of  the  old  understandings. 
Particularly, the vast majority of the projects of the New Law and Development approach is 
based on the same modernization theory as the last one. Importantly,  the newer proposals 
have been shaped by the realist perspective in the realm of law and the New Institutionalism 
in  the  economy field,  producing  an  emphasis  on  institutions,  particularly  in  the  judicial 
structure. But the basic understandings are not crucially different from old approaches to law 
and development. 
Also  other  approaches  have  shown  to  be  problematic,  resorting  to  cultural 
essentializations, authoritative schemes, linear and economic conceptions of development and 
dichotomic understandings of law, thus reproducing the modern approach they criticize. The 
results in praxis and theory have been, as Mattei and Rodríguez-Garavito clearly recognized, 
ambiguous and ambivalent combinations which not necessarily strengthen the coexistence in 
diversity. However, the antidote elaborated by scholars and practitioners against these hybrids 
has been more often than not a clear ‘solution’ effacing ambiguity, and, by doing this, they 
have equally dismantled their own claim for plurality.
Another possibility found in response to the disintegration of clear understandings of 
law, development, and, connected to these elements, of legal transfer, has been the emphatic 
acceptance of particularism. Consequently, the most radical approach in this line regarding 
legal transplant,  presented by Pierre  Legrand, has depicted them as impossible.  However, 
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even this extreme proposal does not bring its emphasis on plurality and difference to an end, 
recurring again to cultural essentialisms and positivistic understandings of law. Moreover, if 
we would think Legrand's approach to its end, going beyond the limits he puts, we would 
come to a perspective of incommensurable and ever increasing particularisms. It seems that 
Örücü's and Teubner's proposals go in this direction, although they present equally important 
difficulties  in  terms of  the unities of legal  cultures and socio-cultures,  or  in  terms of  the 
system of ‘law’ and other social systems they assume. Most importantly, these approaches 
leave us equally with the question on how interaction, understanding, and thus new forms of 
social balance are possible in an ever more pluralizing and particularizing environment.
Naturally, none of these two basic approaches to plurality is satisfactory, because one 
draws us, lastly, into the statement of one linear vertical hierarchy, and the other to absolute 
incommensurability. None of them permits us to engage with other and self consistently in a 
manner that takes ongoing transformation and interaction, but also inner diversity and change, 
sufficiently  into  account.  Importantly,  an  approach  that  envisages  complex  systems  of 
influence and transfer should allow us still to engage critically with those processes. This is 
the point where the less dichotomic and more differentiated approaches often let us down. Is 
every result the same, are all processes exchangeable? As Zima highlighted in the review I 
presented at the outset of this inquiry, exchangeability is a core element of the postmodern 
sociolect, and, most importantly, it bears as much potential for social violence as the modern 
model that the advocates for the value of diversity aimed to oppose. Summing up, in terms of 
law,  development,  diversity and (legal)  transfer,  we have to  recognize that  none of  these 
approaches help us to transcend modern perspectives and problems totally. The alternative of 
infinite particularizations not only is insufficient for social engagement but it is also trapped 
in exclusionary concepts of identity and culture that it allegedly aims to avoid.
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E. Conclusion – On the Many Laws and their Developments
There is a certain trap in writing a conclusion, namely that it evokes the idea that it concludes 
or  closes  something.  Here  is  the  place  to  talk  about  results.  From  a  linear  concept  of 
development applied to academic research, the idea would be to start with a question, search 
for the truth, and end with an answer that closes the open wound of the question:yes or no,  
right or wrong, at least in part;to establish a norm, a standard, an answer, that would present a 
recipe for better future behavior, law or development. Certainly, this chapter is the formal 
limit of this thesis. But, after the pluralization of the modern subject, after the recognition of 
the embededdness of each reflection in infinite webs of meaning, after arguing for the value 
of a variety of interpretations as legitimate in their uniqueness, what kind of truth can I offer 
with  this  research?  I  have  presented  some arguments,  all  of  them possible  to  doubt  and 
critique, that is all. Other arguments might be as appealing, legitimate and meaningful for the 
readers (and even for myself!) as the ones I have presented. 
From the start, my aim with this research could not be to find a universally valid truth 
because of the critical perspective taken. The proposal of this research was to address some 
questions around law and development, reflecting particularly on the role of plurality in legal 
development. Importantly, because of my own background and the frame where this doctoral 
thesis takes place, I referred especially to certain legal traditions I am more familiar with. 
More than finding a truth, I developed a perspective. I created a system of interpretations, a 
way to see things, that naturally, has some consequences for ways of acting, asking further  
questions, and answering them. My aim was to develop an arguable set of interpretations in 
approaching law, development and legal development, as well as to seduce you (and myself) 
to revisit the certainties at the ground of our actions. This thesis is an invitation to engage with 
a variety of perspectives that have shaped my intellectual life, my social environment and my 
own actions. I believe that this personal search was not  only of individual use, but it can, 
hopefully, inspire some of my readers.
Consequently,  this  conclusion does not aim to close a question, but, if you wish, to 
transform it, to use its creative power to give birth to new engagements with life. In the next 
pages, I will revisit some of the more important aspects of the arguments and connections I 
elaborated in  this  journey as  well  as delineating some of the consequences  that  could be 
drawn from them. Most importantly, what remains open after this exercise in persuasion, after 
this invitation to dialogue, is to listen what others, like you, my reader, might say about it. 
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Insofar this conclusion more than a closure is a call to open new questions, new approaches, 
new dialogues.
The leading questions of this inquiry revolved around the problem of how it is possible to 
incorporate  plurality  within  current  perspectives  on  law  and  development,  particularly 
regarding processes of legal transfer as a tool for development. Throughout this work ‘legal 
development’  was  highlighted  from  different  perspectives,  including:  international 
development aid;development through legal transfer;legal development as an aspect of social 
evolution  and  economic  growth;  development  as  an  oppressive  concept;  development  as 
legal-political activism; legal development as the change in judicial institutions;the increase of 
differentiation  in  interpretation  practices  responding  to  indigenous  claims;  and  legal 
development as the creation of forms of social order through artistic involvement with the 
community. It is clear from this summary, that the questions regarding law, development, and 
their combination were studied in a variety of fields that encompass not only traditional legal 
research, but also international and national politics, art, philosophy, as well as linguistics and 
post-colonial studies. The list could continue. 
Most importantly, among these diverse views, I focused my attention on a particular 
aspect  of  the  debates  in  the  different  fields,  that  is  crucial  in  contemporary  academic 
discussion and political engagement: plurality. In this research, I addressed plurality as a key 
question for law understood as an intermediary between a plurality of human beings with a 
plurality of perspectives on life, and a social unity within which all their actions take place. 
How is legal development thinkable when plural norms and norm-systems interact, claiming 
equal legitimacy in overlapping social contexts? What type of law can respond to the needs of 
plural concepts of development and what type of development can respond to the needs of 
plural concepts of law?
In the beginning of this investigation, far from aiming at a complete and conclusive 
understanding of the relationships amongst plurality, law and development, I envisaged three 
main aspects, challenges or argumentative lines for this inquiry. Firstly, I proposed that ‘legal 
development’ in  its  most  classical  understanding  is  linked  to  anthropological  and  social 
perspectives that are specifically related to modernity as a socio-linguistic situation. Secondly, 
I aimed to see if and how the assumptions at the base of modern law and modern development 
were  challenged  by  a  postmodern  sociolect.  Thirdly,  I  posed  the  question  of  whether 
pluralistic  postmodern  approaches  to  law and development   envisage new forms of  legal 
development.
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With these questions I reflected on the academic work and political developments of 
several thinkers that were active mostly in the 20th century.  Remarkably, I have addressed 
their arguments based on the assumption of the existence of different sociolects in terms of 
Peter  V.  Zima.  In  this  context,  I referred  particularly  to  a  modern  sociolect,  marked  by 
ambiguity  and  the  search  to  overcome  it,  and  a  post-modern  sociolect,  marked  by  the 
emphasis on the particular, both mediated by a late-modern sociolect, where ambivalence is 
prevalent. This frame proved fruitful for developing key questions and arguable answers on 
different approaches to the connections between law, development and plurality.
Addressing the first question of this research, I presented some central aspects of prevalent 
understandings of law and development in the environment in which I was  educated (this is 
within academic traditions of law and social  sciences in Western Europe) as aspects of a 
modern sociolect. In turn, showing the connectedness between the two concepts of modern 
law and modern development, I addressed the problematic results from this perspective in 
terms of legal development, using  the example of the conceptualization of ‘legal transplants’ 
proposed by Alan Watson. 
In  both  cases  of  ‘law’ and  ‘development’,  I  emphasized  the  role  of  a  universal 
enlightening  reason  to  give  these  concepts  orientation  and  meaning.  Following  this  line, 
development finds its aim in an ever increasing enlightenment, in an increase of the rule of 
universal reason. Applying subjective idealism, ambiguity could be overcome. When the ideal 
dreams of the early-modern subject showed to be risky for the advancement of civilization, 
when individual freedom was seen as a potential for barbarism, science  – and with it all other  
aspects of social life – moved to a perspective based on the primacy of objectivity and a 
mechanistic model. Late-modernity's ambivalence makes its appearance in the (now exposed) 
tension between the universal validity of the primacy of objective machines and universal 
categories on the one hand, and plural subjective experiences or even plural mechanic results 
on the other. Importantly, both subjective idealism and objective positivism, while differing in 
their tools and legitimation strategies, draw straight arrows of development. 
In this setting, modern law is both a carrier and a result of reason that functions as the 
marker of development. Modern law is marked thus by the intention to overcome ambiguities 
through a higher reason, be it  incarnated in a universal value or in  a  pre-established and 
absolutely  valid  form.  Particularly,  I  referred  to  the  discussion  between  naturalistic  and 
positivistic approaches to law, drawing a parallel with idealistic and objectivistic perspectives 
on science and development. In this sense, ‘modern law’ is the result of combining the belief  
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in the emancipatory power of the subject, who can overcome ambiguity by applying reason, 
with  an  objectification  of  that  reason through legal  mechanics.  In  any case,  this  strained 
combination serves to overcome contradiction by finding (within the system)  the one, true, 
just, good answer. In other words, law is a tool for developing ever further towards the one 
Truth,  the  one Justice,  the  one Good.  Consequently,  plurality  and  its  plural  concepts  of 
development and of social order, can occupy only a subordinated space. 
Importantly, a key element in this process of overcoming that becomes more evident 
and central with the positivization of law is the constant reform and reinterpretation of law, a 
topic which is directly linked to the projects of self-construction envisaged by the project of 
Enlightenment.  In  this  process,  modern  law  plays  a  central  role  in  the  formation  of 
subjectivity of  individuals and communities as  well,  connecting and  differentiating them 
from their past. Importantly, while law constructs the ‘modern man’, it also participates in the 
creation  of  the  past  non-modern  ‘other’,  which  is,  from  a  perspective  of  vectoral 
development, necessarily far from the universal reason at the base of modern law. Clearly, this 
perspective on the Other  on a  vector  of time,  has consequences for  a  perspective on the 
present ‘other’. In any case, the Others’ norm, must necessarily be different from the one 
universal reason and  the one true, just and good law. The result is a hierarchy of normative 
systems which works on the one hand historically, as the resulting and proper development 
through time, and on the other hand synchronically in comparison with present ‘others’. The 
uni-vectoral view on development in terms of time and the validity claim of law for the whole 
universe, are thus two aspects of the same modern perspective.
In the pursuit of an always increasing rule of universal reason, and law being the carrier 
of this reason, legal development is a central element in order to maintain  modernity (away 
from past a-modernity) and modernize the present ‘other’, bringing him closer to universal 
reason.  In  turn,  conceiving  of  law as  carrying  a  universal  value  as  well  as  an  objective 
instrument for solving tensions, legal transplants become a key element for developing the a-
modern into the modern. With his impetus to support the technology of law to help nations to 
achieve modernity, Alan Watson's perspective on ‘legal transplants’ exemplifies this approach 
to legal development from a modern perspective. 
In this sense, I gathered several arguments that support the claim that ‘modern law’ as 
well  as  ‘modern  development’,  including  ‘legal  development’  and  particularly  legal 
development through ‘legal transplants’, are connected to a modern sociolect, marked, in its 
early variant, by ambiguity, and, in its later form, by ambivalence. Importantly, these modern 
approaches determine contemporary prevalent perspectives on law and development. The aim 
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of such an approach is to progress towards ever more absolute truth and justice and move ever 
further away from ambiguity and chance for conflict. However, this perspective of a linear 
development towards the one better  law is incompatible with an understanding, ethical or 
peaceful encountering with an Other that is envisaged as ‘radically different’. In response, 
postmodern critiques elaborated important reflections on the violence involved in this model 
of  law  and  development.  I  have  engaged  argumentatively  with  some  examples  of  these 
critiques addressing the second aspect of my research question. 
I addressed the postmodern discussions on law and development as endeavors nurtured by the 
philosophical approaches of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault,  Jean-François  Lyotard, and 
Jürgen Habermas, as well as by the social movements for civil rights and women's rights, and 
those against racism, authoritarianism and war that burst out in the 1960's around the world. 
While, at a philosophical level, the certainty of the knowing subject entered into a deep crisis, 
placing  plural  interpretations  at  the  forefront,  in  political  terms,  this  turn  resulted  in  the 
emphatic claim for the respect of difference. In terms of law, postmodern approaches put in 
question the unity and autonomy of the judging and the legislating subject; they questioned 
the legitimate capacity of justice itself, and lastly destabilized the unity and identity of law. 
I have addressed particularly two elements in this search which was guided by the idea 
of plural interpretations, namely the elements of ‘culture’ and ‘power’. As I have argued, these 
two  aspects  are  intimately  related,  because  if  a  particular  interpretation  is  a  result  of 
understanding experience through a specific system of meaning, every interpretation is the 
result of one or more choices (of one or more authors), and thus it is the result of an exertion 
of power. In terms of law, this new perspective had a dramatic impact: if law is culture and 
law is politics, it cannot be legitimized fully anymore by an absolute value of justice or by a 
form  or  method  of  universal  reason.  Moreover,  it  can  be  seen  as  ‘just  a  matter  of 
interpretation’. Certainly, it  is a matter of authoritative, and most importantly, an imposed 
interpretation. In any case, it is not the only one possibility, it is contingent. 
Seeing law as language, culture and politics has produced a variety of approaches that 
concentrated,  to  a  great  extent,  on  the  figure  of  the  judge.  He,  as  the  most  obvious 
authoritative interpreter of law, became a core object of postmodern reflection. Embedded in 
the traditions of Legal Realism and Critical  Theory,  Critical  Legal Studies engaged in an 
important discussion of legal institutions (the ‘making of law'), as well as in a debate on legal 
actors (including the ‘making of the lawyer and judge’ through legal education). Importantly, 
the  scholars  participating  in  this  endeavor  continued  and  responded  to  the  previous 
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movements of Law & Society and Law & Modernization, which accentuated the link between 
law and its social environment, with the aim to develop law within the United States and 
abroad.  While  critical  of  this  perspective,  researchers  of  Critical  Legal  Studies  were  not 
deterred by an interest to better law and its role in society, even if the emphasis relied on 
exercising and opening spaces for critique, resistance and otherness.
This search and struggle for spaces of critique and resistance, was equally present in 
European  legal-political  activism,  where  a  variety  of  associations  and  groups  of  lawyers 
worked to put law at the service of social justice. As I have argued, these efforts developed 
with an emphasis  on the rejection  of  previous  hierarchical  models,  reinforcing with their 
militant  attitude  the  model  of  one  truth  and  one  justice.  This  is  a  core  thought  in  the 
international endeavor of Alternative Use of Law, which was particularly strong in Italy, Spain 
and Brazil. At a social, historical and political level, this attitude is understandable within the 
contexts  of  transition  from authoritarian  regimes  to  democracy.  Nevertheless,  it  remains 
problematic and re-produces either modern dichotomies in tension with each other that need 
to be solved, or it  results  in ambivalent combinations.  In other words,  once the universal 
model of modern law is cracked, the question of how to engage with the Other has to be 
stated.  However, the postmodern approaches to that question reestablish allegedly unified, 
certain,  stable  categories.  The  same  problem  appears  in  legal  philosophical  attempts  to 
reintroduce the value of justice as the foundation of law. After law has been deconstructed, its 
inner contradictions  highlighted, and its meaning destabilized, Jack M. Balkin interpreting 
Jacques Derrida's approach, recovers the category of justice and with it a transcending value 
in the line of iusnaturalism. That many approaches to justice are possible is a problem that 
remains insufficiently addressed.
The return to modern dichotomies where the speaking subject regains legitimacy and his 
hierarchical  position,  is  a  figure  that  we encountered  over  and over  again in  postmodern 
approaches and proposals. Another important example  is the discussion on legal pluralism, 
particularly in the seminal presentation of ‘legal pluralism’ made by John Griffiths in the 
1980's. Understanding the idea of ‘state law as the only law’ in terms of an ideology of ‘legal 
centralism’, Griffiths proposed ('strong') legal pluralism as a descriptive endeavor, which had 
an  emancipatory  character  insofar  as  it  assumed  the  coexistence  of  diversity  without 
hierarchical recognition by any state authority. In the end, in his claim for plurality, Griffiths 
ended up taking the position of being the one recognizing the reality and having the truth.
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With roots in the intersections amongst law, anthropology, sociology and history, the 
debate on legal pluralism developed in a very interdisciplinary exchange, producing at the 
same time a variety of approaches. At the core of the discussion is the problem of the power 
of language in legitimizing a specific system of norms by naming it ‘law’ and others not. As a 
result of these new approaches to law, not only parallel normative systems appeared as laws 
co-existing and competing with state law, but also state law itself was pluralized from within. 
Its  unity and inner coherence,  as well  as its isolation from other normative systems were 
addressed as part of a myth and an ideology. Most importantly, the interconnections amongst 
different  systems  was  emphasized,  particularly  by  Boaventura  de  Sousa  Santos  who 
elaborated  on  the  term ‘interlegality’ and  Peter  Fitzpatrick  with  the  concept  of  ‘integral 
plurality’.
At the same time that different schemes of categorization of laws and legal systems 
appeared,  different  perspectives  on  what  ‘legal  pluralism’  is or  should  be,  arose.  In  this 
process,  the  imminent  risk of  making the category of  law itself  useless,  and therefore  to 
trivialize the power exerted by normative systems like state law, became patent. Furthermore, 
‘legal pluralisms’ have been criticized for making use of an essentialistic and functionalistic 
approach to law. In other words, they recover a modern understanding of law, the Other and 
the Others’ law. Importantly, I have underlined that the alternatives posed to this critique, as 
was the case with Brian Z. Tamanaha's proposal, ended up equally claiming to have access to 
the Other and understand what the Others’ ‘law’ was, and thus, in the end, setting ‘the Other’ 
in their own frame of reference. In this line Simon Robert's critique is crucial, as he points out 
that the expansion of ‘law’ is equally the expression of a concept's imposition  on others  
telling them what they are and what their orders are, namely ‘law’, thereby negating to some 
extent  the  existence  of  their  own rationalities.  In  summary,  the  whole  endeavor  of  legal 
pluralism is  put  upside  down.  If  the  discussion  on legal  pluralism started  as  a  claim for 
opening the concept of law to recognize the legitimacy of a variety of normative orders, it is 
turning now into the question of how the term ‘law’ entails an oppression of the diversity of 
normative understandings. The question at  stake is ‘how can we relate with that which is 
different without suffocating it at the same time?’. 
The same question appears in other contexts, like the discussion on development and 
development aid.  The key critique of post-developmental reflections points at the vectoral 
perspective that the concept carries, implying a movement from less to more, poor to rich, 
disorder to order etc. In this line, the concept and the projects for development have been 
addressed by Gustavo Esteva, Ivan Illich, Arturo Escobar and others as an extension of the 
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colonial endeavor. As postmodern critiques concerned directly with culture and power, these 
authors emphasized the transformation of the concept and the creation of the discourse of 
development in the context of the aftermath of the Second World War, which was marked by 
political and economic reorganization at a global level. Importantly, economics, understood as 
abstract standards marking the line of growth, and numeric statistics, are still at the core of 
measuring development; thus placing all human perspectives on the pursuit of a ‘good life’ 
under one measuring system. 
While  the practical  failure of  development  projects  produced a  continuous loop  of 
critiques  and  new  developmental  approaches,  the  need  for  ‘a’ development  was  never 
doubted, emphasizing with every new proposal that there existed a proper goal to achieve by 
walking a proper path. Contesting this situation, postdevelopment researchers argued that the 
term ‘underdevelopment’, that corresponds with the linear vision of development, defines a 
perception, thereby producing a devaluation of the  wishes, choices, and the way to be in the 
so called ‘Third World’. The consequence of such a perspective in terms of plurality is quite 
clear.  The  value  of  plurality  is  negated,  diversity  is  organized  on  a  straight  line  and,  
consequently,  violence  prevails.  In  this  line,  Illich  argued  the  incompatibility  of  modern 
development with peace understood as a peace in diversity.
The  post-developmental  endeavor,  however,  deserves  critique  in  a  similar  way  to 
postmodern  approaches  I  have  presented  before.  Amongst  the  several  critiques  against 
postdevelopmental proposals, including charges of romanticism, essentialism, unawareness of 
the ‘real’ struggles in the ‘Third World’, etc., what is more interesting for us are questions on 
the  relationship  between  the  post-development  researchers  and  the  ‘Third  World’  they 
conceptually  destabilize..  Because  while  emphasizing  the  colonial  force  present  in  the 
discourse of development,  most  of  them argue implicitly or explicitly to  be closer  to  the 
‘victims’ of  that  violence  and  to  represent  their  voices  accurately,  thereby reenacting  an 
oppression that they criticize. In the moment of encountering diversity, the Other is labeled as 
an oppressed victim (or as an oppressor) within the ‘One Development’ system, silencing at 
the same time his voice in a similar way as the modern development they criticized.
A key  reference  in  this  context  is  the  work  of  Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak,  who 
emphasized the question on the possibility of the subaltern to speak, even in contexts that 
allegedly intend to listen to him. Most importantly,  Ilan Kapoor recovers five elements of 
Spivak's thoughts that can support an ethical encounter with the subaltern ‘other’. These very 
interconnected  proposals  involve:  developing  a  critique  from the  inside  of  the  inhabited 
structures, acknowledging complicity and being vigilant of the discourses on which our views 
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are based, learning from the Others’ perspective an recognizing the value of the Other to deal 
with his needs, detaching from particular expectations of how the Other might speak or say 
and  opening  ourselves  to  imagination  and  surprise.  Importantly,  I  argued  that  Kapoor's 
interpretations of many of these points permit him to elaborate on new possibilities for his 
practical endeavor in the ‘development business’. Also, I pointed out thathis approach and 
critiques  on the lack of mechanisms for distinguishing better  from worse alliances or for 
taking decisions on development strategies, are expressions of his very intimate connection 
with a modern notion of development linked to a transition from bad to good. If Spivak's 
question addressed the capability to engage in a sincere dialogue,  develop capabilities for 
understanding, and enter into an ethical exchange, Kapoor returns to the search for a better 
development to develop the Other. In turn, I argued that Spivak's points can be read as an 
invitation  to  transform speaker  and  listener,  encouraging  continuous  revision  of  personal 
truths. In a similar line, Escobar as well as Illich, seem to have changed, , the emphasis of 
their critiques in the later parts of their works, turning their interests towards an exercise of 
imagination,  encountering,  listening  and presence.  This  perspective,  however,  remains  an 
intention  embedded  within  a  rhetoric  of  liberation  and  emancipation.  Nevertheless,  they 
contain  as  well  important  potentials  for  future  engagement  while  the  vast  majority  of 
postmodern approaches produces important twists of modernity but does not transform its 
foundations. 
In summary, addressing my second challenge on the questions of if and how modern 
law  and  modern  development  have  been  destabilized  through  postmodern  reflection,  a 
differentiated approach is needed. On the one hand, it is evident that the understanding of law 
as a legitimate tool for solving ambiguities, individual conflicts, and social tensions, has lost 
an important part of its authoritative appeal. Equally, the critiques presented against a modern 
vectoral perspective on development hit the core of old development aid approaches. On the 
other hand, however, the critics in both areas applied the same tools or arguments in their  
critiques  which  appealed  to  universal  reason,  truth  and  justice,  thereby aiming  to  ‘solve 
ambiguity’ in a modern manner. Importantly, plurality emerged as a key concern guiding the 
destabilizing critiques made within this postmodern sociolect. However, this claim could not 
be held thoroughly because it resulted either in a particularism that would put in doubt also 
the pluralistic approach, or, emphasizing the value of plurality, it resulted in the return to a 
hierarchy of arguments with alleged general validity.
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Quite naturally, this posing of questions and critiques from a pluralistic perspective has been 
accompanied by manifold attempts to develop practical political answers. Focusing on some 
of these answers, particularly in the context of Latin America, I addressed the third question in 
the frame of this inquiry regarding how far postmodern approaches to law and development 
permit  to  create  new  alternatives  in  terms  of  legal  development.  In  this  part,  I  focused 
specifically  on  proposals  that  aimed  directly  at  incorporating  the  Other,  and  thereby 
incorporating diversity, in the legal sphere, envisaging legal development as the increase of 
political  participation  of  a  plurality  of  perspectives:  in  the  legislative  realm,  I  pointed  at  
Augusto Boal's techniques of Legislative Theater, and in the judicial realm I referred to the 
incorporation of indigenous understandings within legal institutions and jurisprudence in the 
cases of Mexico and Colombia. 
Problematically, the answers delivered through philosophical, theoretical, artistic, legal 
and political  endeavors  within a  postmodern sociolect  have resulted in  different  forms of 
returning to certain unities, stable grounds from which it is possible to put one value and one 
way of being above others, to put one form of reason above the ‘less-reasonable’. In other 
words, these approaches divide again between right and wrong in a way similar to the modern 
perspective  that  they criticize,  despite  the  fact  that  they started  searching for  exactly the 
opposite of what they achieved: to put in question clear divisions and monolithic unities. In 
the same line, we could observe a tendency to essentialize otherness, framing it at the same 
time in dichotomic models of oppressed vs. oppressor.
A clear  example  of  this  is  Boal's  aesthetic-political  proposal  of  Legislative Theater, 
which, basing on other techniques of Theater of the Oppressed, blurs many other dichotomies 
like spectator/actor, but, at the same time, creates another bipolar division which is equally 
inflexible  within  his  frame  of  work:  oppressor/oppressed.  Nevertheless,  his  theater  work 
depicts  an  immense  innovation  not  only  in  the  praxis  and  theory  of  dramatic  art,  but, 
particularly in terms of political-legal dialogue. The joker system he developed allowed for 
constant interaction between actors and spectators, for action and reflection, for the exchange 
of proposals from very different and very personal perspectives, aiming at the transformation 
of the participants. In the same line, his perspective on law was a participative one that aimed 
to  make  political  actors  of  marginalized  individuals  and  groups.  He  made  thus,  a  clear 
emphasis  on  the  incorporation  of  plural  perspectives  in  his  (always  political)  theater, 
particularly in Legislative Theater. However, again we find the problem that the plurality he 
presents  as  worth  incorporating  is  always  one  that  he  determines,  within  which  he  feels 
included,  and  which  he  refers  to  as  the  ‘oppressed’.  Development,  in  turn,  becomes  the 
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transition from oppression to emancipation. The problem that this struggle might mean a new 
oppression of a  different  sort  of other  remains  unaddressed.  In  terms of  law, he ends up 
equally resorting to the authority of a positive law with content legitimized by iusnaturalistic 
arguments,  in  order  to  find  and  create  social  justice,  which  he  identifies  lastly  with  the 
progress of civilization and humanity in general. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that 
the work of Augusto Boal with his working team at the Centro do Teatro do Oprimido Rio as 
part of the city council is an impressive experience, not only because they impulsed a variety 
of legal changes. Most importantly in terms of political theory, they achieved to go beyond 
postmodern critique in a context of social and legal crisis of redemocratization, developing a 
new theatrical language for legal discussion and including different communities of Rio de 
Janeiro in a creative dialogue with the law-making authorities.  
The incorporation of marginalized communities within legal processes was equally the 
goal  of  the  political  activism fighting  for  the  recognition  of  indigenous  law and  diverse 
indigenous rights.  Importantly,  this  struggle  was  connected  to  a  variety of  other  political 
endeavors for the recognition of rights at the international level, as is the case of national 
minorities, as well as with other processes of legal change, including a process of reform of 
judicial  institutions  around  the  world.  Boaventura  de  Sousa  Santos  and  Orlando  Aragón 
Andrade  put  these  processes  in  the  context  of  globalization  as  a  complex  process  that 
encompasses  hegemonic  interests  and forces  as  well  as  struggles  for  emancipation  ‘from 
below’. In this context, I have presented the elaboration of documents at the international 
level like the ILO Conventions no. 107 and 169, as well as national reforms as a result of 
negotiations amongst a plurality of tensions that include political, social, cultural, economic, 
territorial aspects and questions of identity. In the intersection of these different fields, claims 
for recognition and redistribution (that do not always comply with each other) appear at the 
center of indigenous’ political activism. 
The national responses in Latin America varied, producing, as Yrigoyen Fajardo argues, 
diverse  constitutional  approaches  since  the  1980's, that  moved  from  a  ‘multicultural 
constitutionalism’ to a decolonizing project in the last years. Importantly, the transition to a 
‘pluricultural constitutionalism’ was marked by important steps towards the recognition of 
legal pluralism along with the validation of alternative methods of conflict resolution. It is in 
this phase that key judicial and indigenous reforms took place in Mexico. However, following 
the research of Aragón Andrade, it is possible to see that, while these reforms were brought 
about  as expressions of a recognition of  the plural  character  of  the cultures living in  the 
national territory and their rights, including rights to use and develop their own law, the result 
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was their accommodation within and their subordination under the structure of state law. Not 
only is the state law (to a certain extent) an explicit limit for the application of indigenous law, 
but  the  institutional  embedding  itself  determines  the  when,  where,  who  and  how  of 
indigenous rulings. Equally, while development is portrayed as a movement towards a society 
with a harmoniously interacting plurality of particular laws, and while the right to develop 
according to own convictions is established, the model of how these pluralities should be 
connected and how this right should be exercised is clearly dependent upon the rule of the 
state as well as upon the application of mechanistic models of efficiency and the institutional 
support of international economic strategies.
It is the same tension resulting from an emphasis on the validity of plurality through a 
reinforcement of the monolithic hierarchy of the one modern state law, that appears in the 
case of the innovative Colombian Supreme Court. While the process of constitutional reform 
has  been  seen  as  a  clear  example  for  a  participative  experience,  and  the  rulings  of  the 
Supreme Court that interpreted the new document allowed indigenous groups to have access 
to  important  goods,  the  rhetorics  of  this  transition  is  marked  by an  essentialization  and 
exoticization of the indigenous other. The problem at the core of this process relies not so 
much in the resort  to outdated anthropological  theories,  but  moreover,  the resort  to  these 
sources is a result of the need to fit the Other within the language of state law and the system 
of  argumentation  of  its  institutions.  Concepts  like  ‘territory’,  ‘property’,  ‘subject’  and 
‘community’ require, and most importantly reproduce, a radical different other in order to be 
reinterpreted in a context that understands ‘difference’ in terms of an exception to the normal. 
The division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ at the base of modern perspectives on a hierarchical law 
and a vectoral development, is not transformed by these pluralizing efforts, it is restated.
Summing up, regarding new approaches to law and development from a pluralizing 
perspective within a postmodern sociolect, we have seen different examples of movements 
oriented to the inclusion and recognition of marginalized others in political life, be it through 
their participation in law-making or in law-enforcement, putting in question at the same time 
the mere concept of law, of state, of nation, and equally of development. The result, however, 
has been the renewed delivery of clearly delimited categories of cultural identity, law and 
development, of ‘we’ and ‘the Others’. In this context, the original critique reemerges: Who 
decides on the form of redistribution of power, who shall be the participating others, who 
recognizes,  and  how and who is  recognized?  Who is  the  speaker  that  delimits  the  clear 
borders between ‘us’ and ‘others'?
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As I have pointed out from a philosophical perspective in the beginning of this inquiry, 
the redefinition of new (allegedly more inclusive) standards is not the only type of possible 
answers in front of plurality claims. There is also the possibility of emphasizing diversity ad 
infinitum, of reinforcing particularization over and over again. In fact, we have seen already a 
proposal that intends to go in this line, namely the new political attempts in Bolivia. However, 
the  problem  of  the  authoritative  definition  of  ‘who  is  the  Other’  and  its  consequent 
subordination under a scheme owned by the speaker, does not disappear with the emergence 
of plurinational constitutionalism in the new millennium. 
It is true that through this approach law and development are envisaged, notably, in a 
new  way,  namely  from  a  decolonizing  perspective.  And  the  ‘New  Latin  American 
Constitutionalism’ does allow more and more direct participation of the different sectors of 
the population, making of cultural diversity an organizational principle of the new state and 
society.  The  example  of  the  Bolivian  constitution  is,  in  this  case,  paradigmatic  for  an 
important turn in the modern political, social and legal systems. However, the result of this 
explicit constitutional foundation of the country on legal pluralism, has resulted not only in a 
validation of the (legal) culture of indigenous communities, but it has also reinforced the lines 
of dichotomic division between indigenous and non-indigenous. Importantly, the result of this 
return to identity demarcations,  has been the emergence of increasing cultural,  social  and 
political clashes. 
Beyond the question of whether this is a desirable situation in terms of social stability 
and freedom, it is worth asking if this is truly an alternative to the modern hierarchical models 
of social organization. In the end, also this model relies in ever more increasing and ever more 
detailed  demarcations  of  identity,  including  cultural,  ethnic  and  linguistic  identities. 
Remarkably, while it supports a variety of development perspectives, it rejects as well many 
others, and therefore the openness to plurality is open only to certain types of others. But, 
most  importantly,  conceiving  of  unitarian  entities  with  specific  cultures,  laws,  and 
development  perspectives,  it  bases  identity  on  an  opposition  in  front  of  otherness.  The 
engagement with the Other, empathy, the capacity of understanding, all of these become more 
and more difficult, once the identity boundaries are set definitely. While this model aims to 
enable the coexistence of self and other, the question remains on how far does it foster the 
engagement with self and other, their constant interaction and transformation.
The academic engagement with these processes is as well embedded in the problematic 
of this authoritative definition of ‘who is the Other’. For example, they emulate the gesture of  
compliance with the ‘weak other’ in order to support him to emancipate himself, as many 
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post-developmental authors have done. At the same time, the trust and emphasis that they put 
on interpretation as a tool to achieve true pluralism, does not take into account that these new 
interpretations  equally  need  legitimation,  and  that  a  pluralistic  approach  is  based  on  the 
legitimacy of plural interpretations, particularly those that are truly different to mine, those 
that  I  recognize  as  belonging  to  an  ‘other’.  If  the  goal  is  to  improve  the  capacity  for  a 
pluricultural dialogue, or rather a polylogue, how can I ever sincerely strive to achieve it when 
I am still defining which ‘other’ is worthy of having the power to speak and the right to be 
listened to?
With these examples I have addressed some contemporary legal developments that are based 
on a postmodern pluralistic approach. In turn, these changes in a socio-political sphere, but 
also in a philosophical sphere, have produced important changes in the conceptualization of 
‘legal development’ and projects of international aid with that goal. In this sense, René Kuppe 
has highlighted a variety of changes in institutional terms, in guiding lines, in transparency 
criteria, and in the diversification of partners present in these projects. In other words, the 
form of thinking of projects of legal reform at an international level has changed radically 
since the decay of the Law and Development movement. 
Importantly for us, also the changes at an international level recovered the notion of 
‘another  development’  at  the  same  time  that  other  sectors  rebuilt  international  legal 
development  on  the  base  of  a  modernizing  perspective  that  had  marked  already  the 
development wave of the 1950's and 1960's. The last approach, which has been at the center 
of projects of international organizations like the World Bank, differs partly from the first 
wave, in terms of the diversified institutions taking part, their emphasis on a holistic view and 
the incorporation of local legal communities as agents of the projects. But its advocates, as 
well as the opponents of the idea that law is indispensable for economic development, are 
equally based on a modern view on law and development at the service of a ‘good economy’ 
in the frame of a globalized free market. 
At  the  same  time,  another  approach  on  law  and  development  has  emerged  that 
underlines the importance of the recognition of, access to, and enforcement of rights often in 
the search for protecting individuals and groups in front of the overwhelming imposition of 
the particular economic model propagated by the globalized free market. Importantly, despite 
their apparent opposition, these two approaches are connected by international networks and 
personal biographies. Deriving strength from both sources, and as a result of the interaction of 
particular group interests within the specific context of the ‘donor’ countries on the one side, 
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and within the ‘beneficiary’ countries on the other, the idea of Law and Development has 
experienced a revival during the 1990's. This new combination,  that reenacts old tensions 
between iuspositivism and iusnaturalism in the context of an institutionalist  approach, has 
resulted in an increase of the consensus around the need for legal development, utilizing a 
common language based on concepts like ‘rule of law’, ‘constitutionalism’, ‘democracy’ and 
a  ‘human-rights  approach’ with  ambiguous  connotations.  In  line  with  César  Rodríguez-
Garavito's studies, it is possible to observe that the result of this combination has been the 
production of ambivalent (and insufficient) responses to the social struggles. 
In any case, the perspectives on plurality at the core of these interacting approaches to 
legal development, are as problematic as the other postmodern perspectives I have presented. 
If neo-liberal approaches to legal development deal with plurality in a form that a specific 
legal hierarchy is conserved, subordinated to a linear perspective on development, the neo-
constitutional approaches orient their efforts equally towards a better law conceived in terms 
of the increase of one particular understanding of justice. The last approach sets as well its 
particular standards, which require an authoritative subject and a stable hierarchy as much as 
the first one. In their combination, these approaches appear as seemingly exchangeable, but 
when it  comes to  understanding the meaning of the (ambiguous) concepts they use,  their 
modern base shows up again. While, due to the ambivalence these conceptions show, they 
could be understood as late-modern, it is also important to underline their emphasis on the 
value of plurality and diversity, which I have presented as a key aspect in postmodern thought. 
It is in the name of plurality, that modern models are revived. Furthermore, it is important to 
remember that the division amongst sociolects does not pretend to set strict limits, but rather 
to  show  different  configurations  that  determine  key  aspects  of  thought,  action  and  their 
connections.
In  the  context  of  postmodern  reflections  on  international  legal  development  and 
development aid, legal transplants have been equally put in question. Because, if a crucial 
result of legal transplants is lastly the convergence of legal understandings, they imply equally 
effacing different legal approaches, or at least minimizing their efficacy. The risk is thus the 
use of legal transfer at the service of an ‘Imperial Law’, as Ugo Mattei argued. With a similar 
emphasis on the cultural embededdness of law, Pierre Legrand has presented legal transplants 
as simply impossible. If each law is unique, then the incorporation of foreign law can never 
result in the same law as it was in the original setting. These approaches reject the value or  
even the existence of legal transplants in the name of plurality, diversity and particularity. 
Importantly, while the first one produces, in a similar way to other postmodern approaches, a 
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return  to  modern  dichotomies,  to  the  essentialization  of  difference  and  law,  and  to  a 
restatement  of  a  line  of  development,  Legrand's  radical  call  for  plurality  to  the  point  of 
asserting the incommensurability of differences, seems to avoid this problem. However, his 
argument showed to be dependent on a perspective of law that restricts it to the national state, 
returning over and over to an essentialistic idea of a unified cultural identity of each (national) 
community. Plurality in these terms is reduced to the coexistence of unities that Legrand, as 
an external observer with an omnispective (or ‘holospective') view, sees and categorizes. 
Other approaches to legal transfer, such as Esin Örücü's proposal of the transposition of 
law do not manage either to transcend the idea of legal and socio-cultural unities, even if she 
explicitly  addresses  the  constant  process  of  blending.  In  its  dynamic  perspective,  this 
approach is similar to the interactions that Gunther Teubner presents, which, however, also 
assumes a system of law as separated from other social systems. Nevertheless, what is more 
important  about  these  two  last  approaches  is  that  with  these  dynamic  perspectives  that 
enhance and support constant pluralization and particularization (and, at the same time, try to 
avoid an essentialistic and static perspective of cultural identities), a key problem becomes 
more apparent, namely  how can plural particular contradicting understandings engage with 
each other in a way that is still respectful of the constantly new emerging forms of difference. 
How is it possible to avoid or go beyond the risk of indifference lying underneath a plurality 
of constantly changing differences?
Summing  up,  what  new  possibilities  to  approach  law  and  legal  development, 
particularly  the  tool  of  legal  transfer,  can  be  advanced  from  a  postmodern  perspective 
emphasizing plurality?  Legal  development  has  certainly become a much more diversified 
endeavor compared to the modern Law and Development project, thus connecting a plurality 
of  proposals,  interests  and  approaches.  However,  it  is  exactly  this  combination  that  was 
pointed  out  in  important  critiques  from pluralistic  academic  perspectives.  Because,  while 
plurality is at the core of the arguments and present in the projects’ design and participating 
institutions,  the  ventures  result  either  in  the  oppression  of  plurality  or  in  ambivalent 
compromises, in the end opening the door for similar violence. In this sense, the academic 
critical conceptualization of legal development and legal transfer are equally problematic. 
Therefore, in my opinion, the postmodern approaches to legal development, including 
legal transfer, can offer only limited new possibilities. They can offer what they are, a twist, a 
twist  of  modern conceptualizations,  but,  lastly  they  get  caught  in  linear  perspectives  of 
development and essentialistic understandings of law and otherness. The interaction between 
legal  systems  and  the  incorporation  of  new  legal  understandings  always  remains  a  tool 
383
subordinated to these visions. If, however, we emphasize the aspect of pluralization of these 
postmodern endeavors, which in general are not followed through to their final consequences, 
the  result  is  quite  problematic,  because  the  emphasis  on  plurality  alone  leaves  us  with 
incommensurable  differences  and  a  myriad  of  unintelligible  others.  If  understanding  is 
impossible, then what remains beyond indifference and the never-ending confrontation in the 
name of the (own) truth? 
Then, how can we encounter difference and how can we pursue a development that considers 
it sufficiently?  Under these conditions, can legal development and interaction between legal 
systems be conceived as a multifaceted cultural and political process without resorting again 
to notions and methods that reinforce vectoral perspectives and hierarchical structures? The 
search for new answers has just started, and it is not the aim of this work to give a conclusive  
response. But what remains clear after this inquiry is that the perspectives advanced until now 
are certainly insufficient since they are trapped in schemes of thought that they themselves 
aim to contend. In other  words,  postmodern approaches to law,  development,  culture and 
transfer, as necessary as they are to put in question modern views, are not as radical in their  
proposals  as  they  purport.  They  do  not  transcend  the  violence  resulting  from a  modern 
hierarchy. And this turns extremely relevant in the context of law, justice and development, 
where our utmost intimate concerns are touched upon. 
In the course of these reflections, one recurrent aspect has been that the claim for one 
development  and the  claim for  the  recognition  of  plurality,  be  it  a  general  claim or  one 
regarding particularly the legal field, can both end in the same establishment of difference 
from a hierarchical perspective. Both can, lastly, put one model of truth and justice as their  
goal. Even more, the emphasis on the absolute value of particular interpretations can end up in 
a  vision  of  plurality  as  a  bunch  of  self-contained  and  particularized  confronted  views. 
However, because in a plural society all these particularities interact, even if their exchange is 
an encounter amongst unintelligible others, each with his own language of truth and justice, 
the result is indifference and violence. Lastly, with the absolute and constant pluralization of 
others,  which  makes  them  unreachable  and  incomprehensible,  the  ‘I’  itself  becomes 
meaningless, plural and, in the end, it disintegrates. The call for the recognition of plurality 
and the critique of a modern unitary model are key for understanding contemporary struggles 
and engaging in social interaction in new ways, but what really is at stake is the relationship 
with difference.
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In other words, at the core of the question of the value of law and the goals of legal 
development  is  a matter  or  identity,  or,  more accurately,  of  identification.  As long as  we 
conceive of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in self-contained forms of identity related by opposition, little 
will change in the relations we can imagine and practice. Little will change in the violence 
governing the supremacy of the speaking self in categorizing the mute ‘other’. Little will 
change in the ways we envisage to listen to the Other. We need to develop understandings of 
‘self’ and ‘other’ that allow for recognizing difference and the limits of understanding the 
intimate world beyond the own, at the same time that they allow for dynamics of change and 
transformation,  if  you wish,  for an ‘othering’ of the Self  and a ‘selfing’ of the Other,  for 
empathy and a sense of communion.
In the search for respecting difference, and emulating the arrow of economic growth 
characteristic for modern economic perspectives on development, the continuous pluralization 
promises a continuous expansion of particularities, always ever more diversity. But how do 
we connect again? My idea is that the internal division of the subject through his pluralization 
and the external  division of society through its  particularization,  end up underlining only 
dividing borders, when it does not incorporate elements that allow for moments of integration 
within this dynamic of constant diversification into plural others. 
Integration has meant until now the subordination of the Other within ‘my’ model of 
life. But can we imagine forms of integration of the confronting particularities that result from 
a common interaction and transformation? Can we envisage a dynamic system where these 
particularities coexist and enter in dialogue constantly? How can we create platforms that 
allow for the concrete agents in this encountering to find their own momentary and dynamic 
understanding? Can the norms that so far have served to divide proper from improper, and my 
justice  from  your  crime,  support  also  processes  of  social  transformation,  contribute  to 
building spheres to engage with plural understandings of justice, and participate in finding 
ways to coexist  in dissent? Is it possible to reshape our understanding of development into 
forms of adaptation and transformation at the service of the concrete needs of the participants, 
in each moment, in each place? I believe that if we do not manage to ask these questions and 
search for common (even if momentary and dynamic) answers, we will remain stuck in forms 
of unity that result in being violent in their universalism as well as in forms of plurality that 
result in being violent in their particularism.
In order to do this, we have to revise and reshape the concepts and tools we use, as well 
as the aims and needs we try to address with them. But, probably most important, we have to 
learn to engage with each other and with our own experience in different ways, this is in ways 
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that enable us to relate to the particularity of each circumstance and to its relevance for the  
wider system in which they are embedded. The door for attempts that complete the twist, 
transcending modern hierarchies and postmodern critiques is wide open.
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Epilogue262
So, the question that remains is how can we engage with diversity differently? And, secondly, 
what can the role of law be in this new engagement? As I  said,  I have no clear or final  
answers, and it is not the aim of this work to present one. In fact, I do not believe that there is 
one  appropriate  answer  for  this  query.  Diversity  requires  namely  diverse  forms  of 
engagement.  I  think,  we  have  to  learn  to  live  with  it:  to  live  with  the  insecurity  of  the 
unknown, to live expectant and open for the surprise. In other words, to be open to that which 
we do not know, that ‘other’, which is always conflictual. Conflict is an essential part of life; 
it is the encounter with the different what allows transformation and growth within a dynamic 
system. And it  depends on our engagement with those conflicts if  and how we achieve a 
certain balance again or not.  Consequently,  recalling Gayatri  Chakravorty Spivak's  call  to 
listen and Ivan Illich's invitation to be present, here and now, what remains for us, is, in the 
end, the duty to be aware, the duty to be mindful in engaging with that conflictual otherness. 
But what does this mean in praxis? What does this mean for conflict and development? 
There  are  at  present  a  variety  of  approaches  searching  for  new  answers,  searching  for 
techniques that allow us to use conflict in productive, transformative ways, permitting us to 
transcend  the  dichotomy  of  ‘I’ and  ‘Other’,  and  to  find  moments  of  integration  of  the 
particularities. After having gone through this research, it is for these new perspectives that I 
strive, and I believe they are a rich source of inspiration that enhances the capacities of each 
individual to engage with her own situation in her own way. In this line, I believe it is our 
responsibility as researchers to incorporate these new approaches and envisage ways to deal 
with a reality that poses new questions to our anthropological and social perspectives on law, 
conflict, development, plurality and identity. 
Therefore, in the awareness of the importance of the particular, I am convinced that the 
model of social normativity we use in contemporary legal studies in Europe and the Americas, 
the one that is at the core of strategies for international legal development and legal transfer, 
needs to be complemented. An approach to conflict that aims to solve it, that aims to cancel 
the dissent, is insufficient in societies that conceive of themselves as plural and dynamic. 
Rather, I believe that we are in need of a change of perspective that allows us to see conflict 
262 This epilogue is dedicated to the facilitators, colleagues and friends of the Master of Arts Program in Peace, 
Development, Security and International Conflict Transformation at the University of Innsbruck (UNESCO 
Chair for Peace Studies), with whom I remembered how to listen, how to engage in transformation, how to 
dance between balance and chaos.
387
(and  otherness)  as  a  possibility  to  transform relations,  like  the  one  John  Paul  Lederach 
(Lederach 2005) proposes. 
It would require another doctoral thesis to inquire in detail into a transformation of law 
in this sense, but one thing is clear: If a universalistic perspective is insufficient in terms of 
conflict and law, so too is the corresponding approach that is limited to rational engagement, 
neglecting  the  human  experience  in  its  own  (integrated  and  often  conflictual)  diversity. 
Therefore, I believe that artistic approaches, like the ones envisaged through poetry by many 
of the advocates of the current of ‘Direito Alternativo’ as well as the ones elaborated through 
theater as a holistic practice in the experiment of Augusto Boal's ‘Theater of the Oppressed’, 
are key for us to find new possibilities for engagement, new questions, new forms to listen, 
new ways to answer, and new points of view. Most importantly, I think that the strength of 
these proposals does not rely only in their capacity to produce something new and original,  
but in their capacity to elicit perspectives linked directly to the present individual experience 
in the concrete encounter with difference, to the here and now that Illich invoked. For anyone 
who has experienced it, the power of theater in this sense is obvious. It is this generation's  
moment  to  recover  these  tools  to  engage  with  social  conflict  anew,  going  beyond  the 
perspectives of the previous generations when they no longer respond to the actual needs of 
transcending dichotomies. An example of the newest attempts in this line is the ‘Theater for 
Living’ of David Diamond (Diamond 2007), which explicitly aims at envisaging social (and 
always personal!) conflicts in a systemic and dynamic view of conflicts through theater. The 
research and practice of social normativity and conflict cannot disregard anymore powerful 
tools like this if it aims to transcend the unsatisfying state where it is now.
Naturally, these are just two examples of a variety of possibilities that open constantly 
in  front  of  us  today.  In  this  moment  of  transition,  when  the  old  models  cannot  respond 
anymore  to  the  present  needs,  many  groups  and  individuals  have  advanced  their  own 
proposals to engage with the challenges they face. More than anything, it is important that we 
are  aware  of  these changes  and challenges.  In  this  sense,  Wolfgang Dietrich  speaks  of  a 
‘transrational  turn’ (Dietrich  2008,  319 ff.)  that  carries  the  potential  to  produce  profound 
changes  in  our  ways  to  engage,  at  a  global  as  well  as  at  a  personal  level,  with  politics,  
economics, law, development, philosophy, culture, peace, etc. In this process, what becomes 
key is the capacity to incorporate the various approaches existent and to be able to choose 
mindfully when it comes to respond to present needs. Therefore, this is not necessarily a time 
to dispense of modern law, neither a moment to reject the postmodern pluralism absolutely. 
Rather,  the  contemporary search  needs  to  be  oriented  to  find  dynamic  ways  to  approach 
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conflict,  in order to use those tools and find those responses that in the moment, for that 
specific situation, in its specific context is more appropriate for the needs of those involved in 
the  conflict  according  to  their  own  perspectives,  but  taking  into  consideration  their 
embededdness in a bigger whole. 
In other words, this is a time when we, researchers and practitioners of social conflicts 
and norms (who are at the same time participants in these conflicts and norms!), are invited to 
encounter new forms of being, reflecting, and acting that are often put aside and rejected in 
legal academia. It is a time when our creativity is required,  our personal expertise in our 
vernacular environments is central, and our individual way to engage with the different, the 
Other, the plurality beyond and within us are key. In this sense, it is my wish that this work is 
an invitation and an inspiration to engage with the different and encounter the unknown.
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Abstract
This  project  investigates  diverse  understandings  of  law  and  development,  particularly 
regarding the role of plurality in this  context.  On one hand, the author questions modern 
understandings of law that envisage it  as a system of general norms, which demands and 
establishes  normatively  a  certain  form  of  generally  valid  rationality  and,  therefore, 
universality and unity.  Importantly,  the  idea  of  normativity is  put  in  connection  with  the 
concept of development, that co-determines the modern perspective on legal development and 
international development cooperation. However, on the basis of the failure of these projects 
in many ways, and in the context of new political situations, as well as a general questioning 
of modern categories of law and development, a plurality of critical voices from a postmodern 
perspective have emerged.  These critiques  are  oriented against  vectoral  understandings of 
development and against hierarchical understandings of law, and advocate for an approach 
that embraces cultural and legal plurality. This research deals particularly with this critical 
turn and the practical alternatives that it inspired.
Summarizing, the author investigates mainly three questions. Firstly,  how far does a 
hierarchical and universalistic idea of law and a vectoral idea of development determine the 
modern understanding of legal development, and particularly, what role does cultural plurality 
play in this context. Secondly, if and how post-modern critiques have challenged and changed 
this perspective, and thirdly, what kind of new approaches has emerged that allows for a new 
understanding of legal development that enhances cultural plurality. As examples for these 
contemporary  developments,  the  research  will  inquire  into  some  key  political  and  legal 
changes in the context of Colombian and Mexican courts as well as the project of Legislative 
Theater in Brazil.

Zusammenfassung
Dieses  Projekt  untersucht  unterschiedliche  Verständnisse  von  Recht  und  Entwicklung, 
insbesondere  im Hinblick  auf  die  Rolle,  die  Pluralität  in  diesen  Zusammenhängen  spielt. 
Zunächst befasst sich die Autorin mit dem modernen Verständnis von Recht als einem System 
von  allgemeinen  Normsätzen,  das  eine  gewisse  allgemeingültige  Rationalität  und  somit 
Universalität  und  Einheit  für  sich  beansprucht  und  normativ  festlegt.  Diese  Idee  von 
Normativität  wird  in  Verbindung  mit  dem  Begriff  von  Entwicklung  betrachtet,  der  die 
moderne  Perspektive  auf  Rechtsentwicklung  und  internationale  Entwicklungskooperation 
mitbestimmt.  Allerdings  ist  auf  der  Grundlage  des  Versagens  dieser  Rechtsentwicklungs-
projekte  in  vielerlei  Hinsicht  und  im  Kontext  neuerer  politischer  Ereignisse  sowie  einer 
allgemeinen  Hinterfragung  von  modernen  Kategorien  von  Recht  und  Entwicklung,  eine 
Vielzahl von kritischen Einwänden aus einem post-modernen Blickwinkel entstanden. Diese 
Kritiken  richten  sich  gegen  vektorale  Verständnisse  von  Entwicklung  sowie  gegen 
hierarchische Verständnisse von Recht und plädieren für die Berücksichtigung von kultureller 
und rechtlicher Vielfalt. Diese Arbeit berücksichtigt insbesondere diese kritische Wende und 
die praktischen Alternativen, die sie angestoßen hat.
In  diesem Kontext  befasst  sich  diese  Untersuchung  hauptsächlich  mit  drei  Fragen: 
Erstens wird analysiert,  inwieweit  eine hierarchische und universalistische Idee von Recht 
sowie eine vektorale Idee von Entwicklung das moderne Verständnis von Rechtsentwicklung 
bestimmt, insbesondere welche Rolle kulturelle Pluralität in diesem Zusammenhang spielt. 
Zweitens  untersucht  die  Autorin,  ob  und  wie  post-moderne  Kritiken  diese  Perspektive 
geändert  haben,  und,  drittens,  inwieweit  daraus  Entwürfe  entstanden  sind,  die  ein  neues 
Verständnis  von  Rechtsentwicklung  ermöglichen,  das  kulturelle  Vielfalt  unterstützt.  Als 
Beispiele  für  diese  zeitgenössischen Entwicklungen werden einige  zentrale  politische  und 
juristische Änderungen in kolumbianischen und mexikanischen Gerichten sowie das Projekt 
des Legislativen Theaters in Brasilien analysiert.

CURRICULUM VITAE
1. Persönliche Daten
Name: Florencia Benitez-Schaefer
Geburtsdatum: 13. September 1982
Geburtsort: S. C. de Bariloche (Argentinien)
Staatsangehörigkeiten: argentinisch/deutsch
2. Bildungsweg
März 1994 – 
Dezember 1998
Sekundarschule Deutsche Schule Bariloche 
S. C. de Bariloche, Argentinien
Diplom: Bachiller Mercantil (Note: 9, 25)
September – 
Dezember 1999 
Studienkolleg Comenius Kolleg – Mettingen, Deutschland
Diplom: Feststellungsprüfung* (Note: 1,0)
April 2000 – 
Juli 2005
Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät – Universität Passau 
Diplom: 1. Juristisches Staatsexamen (Note: 7,66)
Akademischer Titel: Diplom-Juristin (Univ.)
April 2009 – 
September 2010
Master of Arts Program in Peace, Development, Security and 
International Conflict Transformation 
UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies – Universität Innsbruck
Seit April 2010 Graduiertenkolleg „Das Reale in der Kultur der Moderne“
Universität Konstanz
3. Forschungsaufenthalte im außereuropäischen Ausland
September 2005 – 
Mai 2006
Institut für Deutsch-Chinesisches Recht; Universität für Rechts- 
und Politikwissenschaften; Peking, Volksrepublik China
Dezember 2006 – 
April 2007
Rechtsfakultäten  der  Universidad  de  Cuyo,  Mendoza 
(Argentina), und der Universidad de Santiago de Chile
Juni 2007 – 
Juni 2008
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, IIJ, 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, UNAM
 
* Prüfung zur Feststellung der Eignung ausländischer Studienbewerber für die Aufnahme eines Studiums an 
Hochschulen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
4. Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang
Mai – Juli 
2000
Lektorin für Spanisch 
Programm „Studenten als Dozenten“ – Universität Passau
Oktober 2000 – 
Februar 2004
Studentische Hilfskraft 
Lehrstuhl  für  Bürgerliches  Recht  und  Deutsche  sowie 
Europäische Rechtsgeschichte; Prof. Müßig – Univ. Passau
August 2002 Tutorin für ausländische Studenten 
Akademisches Auslandsamt – Universität Passau 
April – Juli 
2005
Studentische Hilfskraft 
Lehrstuhl  für  Bürgerliches  Recht  und  Deutsche  sowie 
Europäische Rechtsgeschichte; Prof. Müßig – Univ. Passau
Februar – Juni
2009
Wissenschaftliche Assistentin in Ausbildung (Stellvertretung)
Institut für Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte; 
Prof. Dr. Brauneder – Universität Wien
April – August
2009
Working Student / Assistentin 
UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies – Universität Innsbruck 
August 2009 – 
März 2010
Universitätsassistentin 
Institut für Europarecht und Völkerrecht;
Prof. Dr. Schröder – Universität Innsbruck
5. Stipendien und Auszeichnungen
Vollstipendium für das Studium an der Universität Torcuato di Tella – Auszeichnung im
Rahmen des V. Modells der Vereinten Nationen (Argentinien, 1998)
DAAD – Preis für hervorragende Leistungen ausländischer Studierender (2002)
Aufnahme in die Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes (2003)
1. Preis beim Wettbewerb junger Lateinamerikaforschern im Rahmen des
IV. Europäischen Kongresses von Lateinamerikaforschern – CEISAL (Slowakei, 2004)
Promotionsstipendium der Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes (Dez. 2005 – Nov. 2008)
Förderungspreis des Theodor Körner Fonds zur Förderung von Wissenscahft und Kunst 
(Österreich, 2010)
Promotionsstipendium der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft im Rahmen des 
Graduiertenkollegs “Das Reale in der Kultur der Moderne“ (seit April 2010)
6. Veröffentlichungen
„Viaje al centro de la periferia o el pensamiento latinoamericano y los desafíos de 
América Latina en el siglo XXI“, in: Acta Scientiarum Socialium – Tomus XVIII./2004;
Horváth, Gyula (Hrsg.); Universitas Kaposváriensis; Kaposvár, Ungarn, 2004
„Hin und Her im Zentrum der erweiterten EU – Offizielle und inoffizielle Initiativen zur
Zusammenarbeit mit Lateinamerika an der Universität Passau“, in: ¡atención! – Jahrbuch
des Österreichischen Lateinamerika-Instituts – Band 7; Dietrich, Wolfgang und Stefanie
Reinberg (Hrsg.); Brands & Apsel Verlag; Frankfurt am Main, 2004.
„Reflexiones en torno a la transferencia de elementos jurídicos en China” – in: Actas del  
Congreso ALADAA, Mexiko, 2007
„Reseña: 'The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship' de Paul Kahn“ 
(Rezension), in: Presencia Jurídica – Revista de la Univ. Michoacana, Nr.1, 2008
„Introducción al pluralismo jurídico y su relevancia para los pueblos indígenas en
México“ in Zusammenarbeit mit Orlando Aragón Andrade, in: Los derechos de
los pueblos indígenas en México. Un panorama; Aragón Andrade, Orlando (Koord.);
Fondo Editorial Morevallado, Morelia, Mexiko, 2008
„Bericht zur Ostasien-Sektion des 37. Rechtshistorikertages (Passau, Sep. 2008)“ – in:
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Nr. 126
„Exporting European Law – Some Theoretical Remarks on ‘Legal Transfer’”; in: Minutes  
of the International conference for PhD-candidates and young scientists – “The 
milestones of law in the area of the Central Europe” (International section) (im Druck)
„Die europäischen Einflüsse in die chinesische Gesetzesentwicklung bis 1949“; in: 
Interpretation of Law in China – Roots and Perspectives; Tomašek, Michal and Guido 
Mühlemann (eds.), University of Chicago, 2011
„Transformation Through Transfer – Legal Developments between Monarchy and 
Republic in 20th Century China“; in: Legal Relations and Power Structures in History; 
Augusti, Eliana, Markus Prutsch and Norman Domeier (eds.), AV Akademieverlag, 
Florenz, 2011
 
Konstanz, 20. Mai 2012
